PLATO

AGAINST THE ATHEISTS;

OR, THE

TENTH BOOK OF THE DIALOGUE ON LAWS,

ACCOMPANIED WITH

CRITICAL NOTES,

AND FOLLOWED BY

EXTENDED DISSERTATIONS

ON SOME OF

THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED WITH THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

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חַי־יְהוָה וְחֵי־נַפְשֶׁךָ

As the Lord liveth, and as thy soul liveth.

Hebrew Oath.

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אָמַר נָבָל בְּלִבּוֹ אֵין אֱלֹהִים

Psalm xiv., 1.

הֲלֹא אֶת־הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲנִי מָלֵא נְאֻם יְהוָה

Jeremiah, xxiii., 24.

Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καί ἐσμεν.

Acts, xvii., 28.

Πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸν προσερχόμενον τῷ Θεῷ, ὅτι ἘΣΤΙ, *καὶ τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσιν αὐτὸν μισθαποδότης γένεται.*

Hebrews, xi., 6.

TO THE

REV. ELIPHALET NOTT, D.D.,

THE VENERABLE AND VENERATED PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE
MY REVERED ALMA MATER,

THIS WORK

Is most respectfully Inscribed,

IN REMEMBRANCE OF THOSE LESSONS, BOTH OF THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL WISDOM, WHICH HAVE AIDED IN FORMING THE MINDS AND CHARACTERS OF SO LARGE A PORTION

OF

THE EDUCATED MEN OF OUR LAND.

INTRODUCTION.

It is generally agreed among those who hold The Laws of Plato to be a genuine production, that it was a treatise written in his old age. If so, it may be regarded as containing his most matured and best-settled opinions on many of the great subjects discussed in his other dialogues. Some have thought that they discovered many contradictions between this work and the Republic. One has even gone so far as to say that they are opposed in every page. In this opinion, however, we cannot concur; although it must be admitted that they differ in respect to style, and, notwithstanding the near relationship which would seem to be indicated by their titles, are very dissimilar in design. In the one, the State is the main subject of discussion; in the other it is a secondary part, subordinate to what the writer evidently regards as a higher and more philosophical investigation into the nature of *right or righteousness*. The practice of contrasting these two works has arisen from a wrong view of the true title of the one generally styled the Republic. Its most appropriate designation is Περὶ Δικαίου, or, *An Inquiry into the Nature of Right*. The imaginary State is evidently made subservient to this, or, as he expressly tells us in the second book, intended only as a model of the human soul, so magnified that we might read therein, in large letters, what would not be distinct enough for the mental vision when examined in the smaller characters of the individual spirit. Vide lib. ii., 369, A. This comparison of the soul to a commonwealth has been a favourite, not only with Plato,

but with the most philosophical minds in all ages. We find it on a much smaller scale in the eleventh book of The Laws, where the Nightly Conference, or the most solemn legislative and judicial body in the state, is compared to the head in the human system. In the Republic it is the great idea, to which the construction of the fancied State is altogether secondary. Sometimes, however, it must be admitted, the author seems so taken up with this imaginary commonwealth, that he unconsciously, perhaps, brings it into the primary place, and thus distorts his plan. It is this occasional forgetfulness of his main design that has introduced into Plato's Republic those incongruities which, in all ages, have been so much complained of. Sometimes the consistency of the under or fictitious part is overlooked, or, in other words, the State is utterly forgotten, while we are carried away to some of the most abstruse of all metaphysical discussions, such as may be found in the sixth and seventh books. Again, his attention seems to be so occupied with the outward drapery that he loses sight of his main theme, and, pleased with the efforts of his own fancy, dwells at great length on what, in reality, is merely external to the higher and inner sense. In the third, fourth, and last three books, the harmony of primary and secondary is well preserved. In the sixth and seventh he seems to lose sight of the commonwealth almost wholly, while in some parts of the second he appears to have nothing else before him. The fifth may be regarded as a sort of hybrid production, arising from a confusion of both views. Some of its arrangements are altogether too unnatural to allow the supposition that they were ever intended for a real State; and yet it is very difficult to discover what bearing they can have upon the

higher philosophy to which the whole scheme was intended to be subservient. The least we can say is, that Plato here lost himself, and produced something which was neither allegory nor reality, neither philosophy nor legislation.

It is on the subject of the domestic relations, which are supposed to be assailed in this fifth book, that there exists the greatest contrariety between the Republic and The Laws. Plato seems, even in his own day, to have been so reproached with this apparent blot in his philosophy, that he was led to take special pains to do it away in this work of his old age; and hence the great desire he shows in The Laws to set in their highest light the sanctity of the family, or parental and filial relations. We have adverted to this at some length in the first of the dissertations appended to the text. In other respects, the discrepancies between the Republic and The Laws have been greatly exaggerated. Differing, however, as they may in some of their minor details, no one can attentively study both without discovering evidences that they are productions of the same mind, and that, in the main elements of that higher philosophy on which all legislation and morals depend, they are substantially the same.

The Treatise on Laws is undoubtedly intended for a really *practicable*, if not a really *existing* State. In discussing, however, the primary principles of legislation, the author takes a very wide range, occupying far more time in what he styles the preambles, or recommendatory reasonings about the laws, than in the laws themselves. Hence there are but few points in the Platonic philosophy and ethics, as exhibited in the other dialogues, but what have some representative here. We find the same questions started respecting

the nature and origin of virtue—whether it is *διδακτή*, or capable of being taught as a science or not; whether it is one or many—that is, whether the virtues are all so essentially connected that one cannot exist without the others. We find the same views in regard to the end and origin of law—the importance in all things of looking to the idea, the *ἓν ἐν πολλοῖς*, or one in many. There is the same reverence for antiquity and ancient myths, the same disposition to regard religion as the beginning and foundation of every system of civil polity, and the same method of representing the ideas of a God, of his goodness, his providence, of a present and future retribution, as lying at the foundation of all morals and all religion. Even in the departments of psychology and ontology we find many things in The Laws which remind us of the author of the Phædon, the Parmenides, and the Theætetus. The favourite doctrines and methods of reasoning contained in the Gorgias are exhibited everywhere; and perhaps there is no other part of Plato's works more in the style and spirit of the Timæus than this very tenth book of The Laws, which we have selected as the ground of our comments in the present work.

It was on this account chosen as forming, in our judgment, one of the best central positions from whence to make excursions over a large part of the Platonic philosophy. We may perhaps be charged with having sometimes used the text as a mere thread on which to hang our own discussions; but even should it be admitted that there is some truth in this, still might it be maintained that those discussions are all closely connected with the Platonic philosophy and theology, and that from this field we never depart, unless, perhaps, to dwell on kindred subjects suggested by the

Holy Scriptures. Our object has not been merely to make a classical text-book, but to *recommend Plato* to the student or reader by every means through which attention could be drawn to our favourite author; believing that in no other way could we render a better service to the cause of true philosophy and religion. Some may say that, in our great partiality, Plato is made to talk too much like a Christian. It may be that we have found senses higher and more Scriptural than are contained in the letter of the passages to which reference is made; yet even if this is, to some extent, the case, it only shows the *suggestive* nature of his philosophy; how it is capable of carrying the earnest reader to more spiritual views than the author himself, perhaps, ever entertained, and how he differs, in this respect, from all other profane writers of ancient or modern times. We think it will be found that the views in which we have indulged are thus naturally suggested; that they are not hunted for, or brought from afar, but are such as, if not always contained in the precise letter of our text, do most easily present themselves in connexion with it, especially to one who reads Plato by the light of the Christian Revelation. On this subject, of what may be called the Platonic *Spiritual Sense*, or capability of *accommodation* to higher views, the reader is referred to Dissertation LX., where it is treated of at some length.

In pursuance of this favourite plan of recommending Plato and the Platonic philosophy, the method followed in the present work was adopted. The text and critical notes form by much the smallest part, and even these accompanying annotations frequently exhibit as much of a philosophical and theological as of a critical character. The longer dissertations an-

nexed, and which, for the reader's convenience, we have divided into numbered sections, with general and running titles, are devoted almost entirely to the elucidation of some of the main points of the Platonic philosophy, in their connexion with other systems of antiquity, to a comparison, whenever there was occasion for it, with the sentiments of Aristotle, illustrations drawn from the Grecian poets, together with a continual reference to the Holy Scriptures, by way of resemblance, contrast, agreement, or condemnation. For these purposes, there have been introduced, from almost all the other Platonic dialogues, very frequent and extended quotations of the most striking passages; being such as, besides having a natural connexion with the subject discussed, would promote our main design, by producing in the reader a desire to have a deeper knowledge of Plato than is generally possessed by the greater part of our philosophical and theological writers. To these quotations, in almost every case, full translations have been given, sometimes literal, and sometimes paraphrastic. The exceptions to this course are, when the nature and substance of the quotation were sufficiently indicated by the manner of its introduction. The main references are to the Timæus, the Republic, the Phædon, Gorgias, Theætetus, Parmenides, Philebus, Protagoras, Symposion, Politicus, Cratylus, Sophista, and the other books of The Laws, with occasional citations from most of the minor dialogues having any claims to be regarded as genuine.

The work has been the result of a careful examination of the Platonic writings; in which we have sought to interpret Plato mainly by himself, and by the aid, on the one hand, of his jealous rival, Aristotle, and on the other, of his enthusiastic admirer,

Cicero. Of modern critical and philosophical helps, whether English or German, we make little display, because, in fact, we have made but little or no use of them. In regard to the text, we have followed that of Bekker and Ast, who hardly differ at all, either in words or punctuation. Wherever there has been a departure from them, the reasons are assigned, mainly in the shorter notes. The critical means within our power have been very limited, and we therefore, in this department, ask indulgence for any errors which may have been committed. For the philosophical opinions advanced no such plea is interposed. By their own merit, and their accordance with the true interpretation of the Platonic system, they stand or fall.

One design of the work is to serve as a text-book for senior classes in college, not so much by way of furnishing an exercise in the study of the Greek language, as for the higher object of exhibiting, in connexion with the Platonic, the other systems of Greek philosophy, and their bearing upon the Christian theology. On the same grounds, it is supposed that it may be found useful to students in our theological seminaries, and form no unprofitable addition to the libraries of clergymen, besides commending itself generally to the attention of our scholars and literary men.

We believe that in this age there is a peculiar call for a deeper knowledge of Plato. Some acquaintance with his doctrine of ideas seems needed as a corrective to the tendency, so widely prevalent, to resolve all knowledge into an experimental induction of facts, not only in physical, but also in ethical and political science. If the Good, to adopt our author's own style,* is something more than pleasure or happiness,

* See *The* Cratylus, 440, B.; also Dissertation XX., p. 163.

either present or anticipated—if the True is something higher than past, present, or future *facts*—if the Beautiful is something more than a generalization from pleasing individual sensations—if the Just and the Right involve inquiries far above those endless logomachies, and questions of casuistry, which form the main features of modern ethics—if the State is a reality transcending a present aggregation of flowing and perishing individuals—if Law is a spiritual power distinct from the muscular force of a majority of present wills—if God is something more than gravitation, or the eternal development of a physical fate, which is only another name for an eternal succession of inexplicable phenomena—if there is a real foundation for the *moral* and religious, as distinct from, and not embraced in, the *natural*, or, in other words, if penalty and retribution are terms of far more solemn import than the modern jargon about physical consequences—then surely is it high time that there should be some disturbance of this placid taking for granted of the opposing views; then surely should Plato be studied, if for no other purpose, as a matter of curiosity, to see if there may not possibly be some other philosophy than this noisy Baconianism, about which there is kept up such an everlasting din, or that still more noisy, because more empty, transcendentalism, which some would present as its only antidote. In place of all this, we want the clear, simple, *common sense* philosophy of Plato, commending itself, when rightly understood, to all the *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*, or universal ideas of the race, in distinction from that miscalled common sense which is only the manufactured public opinion of the moment—a philosophy most religious—most speculative, and yet most practical—most childlike in its primeval simpli-

city, and yet most profound. We speak with confidence on this point. The young man who is an enthusiastic student of Plato can never be a sciolist in regard to education, a quack in literature, a demagogue in politics, or an infidel in religion.

Our main object, then, is to recommend this noble philosopher to the present generation of educated young men, especially to our theologians. The present work by no means professes to set forth his system as a whole, but merely to present some of its attractive points, to allure other minds among us to a more thorough examination. The main doctrine of ideas, although alluded to in almost every dissertation, is not discussed under its own title, because we had formed the design, if permitted to accomplish it, and if the present work should be acceptable to the public, of treating it by itself in an examination of another of the most interesting of the Platonic dialogues.

We conclude with the remark that, in a moral and practical, as well as in a speculative point of view, the particular subject of the dialogue selected has some claim to attention. He who thinks most deeply, and has the most intimate acquaintance with human nature, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism. Especially will this be the case at a time when physical science, in league with a subtle pantheism, is everywhere substituting its jargon of laws, and elements, and nebular star-dust, and vital forces, and magnetic fluids, for the recognition of a personal God, and an ever wakeful, ever energizing special providence. Theism, we admit, is everywhere the avowed creed, but it wants life. It is too much of a mere philosophy. There

are times when the bare thought that *God is*, comes home to the soul with a power and a flash of light which gives a new illumination, and a more vivid interest to every other moral truth. It is on such occasions the conviction is felt that all unbelief is Atheism, or an acknowledgment of a mere natural power clothed with no moral attributes, and giving rise to no moral sanctions. We want vividness given to the great idea of God as a judge, a moral governor, a special superintendent of the world and all its movements, the head of a *moral* system, to which the machinery of *natural* laws serves but as the temporary scaffolding, to be continued, changed, replaced, or finally removed, when the great ends for which alone it was designed shall have been accomplished. Just as such an idea of God is strong and clear, so will be a conviction of sin, so will be a sense of the need of expiation, so will be a belief in a personal Redeemer, and so will follow in its train an assurance of all the solemn verities of the Christian faith, so strong and deep, that no boastful pretension of that science which makes the natural the foundation of the moral, and no stumbling-blocks in the letter of the Bible will for a moment yield it any disquietude. There is a want of such a faith, as is shown by the feverish anxiety in respect to the discoveries of science, and the results of the agitations of the social and political world. This timid unbelief, when called by its true name, is Atheism. The next great battle-ground of infidelity will not be the Scriptures. What faith there may remain will be summoned to defend the very being of a God, the great truth involving every other moral and religious truth—the primal truth, *that HE IS, and that he is the rewarder of all who diligently seek him.*

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STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT.

As a dramatic work, The Laws is far inferior to the Republic. The speakers are three: namely, Clinias, a Cretan, Megillus, a Lacedæmonian, and a stranger, who passes by no other name than the Athenian. The latter is the Socrates of the dialogue. The first two are either mere listeners, or only brought in as suggestive helps in the various transitions of the discourse. After nine books occupied with varied and extended schemes of legislation, and where laws are mingled with reasonings and introductory preambles, which need not here be specified, the author comes, in the tenth book, to treat of offences against the public worship and religion, which it is supposed, of course, the State must possess, if it would be a state indeed, and not a mere herding together of men and women in a political congregation, having no other bond of union than the temporary consent of individual wills. Previously, however, to the enactment of laws for the punishment of sacrilege and other offences against religion, the chief speaker proposes that there should be laid down, by way of foundation, a preamble or hortatory statement, containing the reasons of the laws; which preamble, although concisely expressed at first (page 3), is subsequently expanded into an argument which occupies nearly the whole book, the few last pages only being taken up with the laws and the penalties annexed.

The argument is divided into three parts; 1. Against those who denied the Divine existence; 2. Against those who, while they admitted the existence of a God, denied a providence; and, 3. Against those who, while they admitted both a God and a providence, maintained that the Deity was easily propitiated, or would not punish sin severely. The first part is introduced by a declaration of Clinias, that it must be easy to prove the existence of the Deity. He appeals at once to the most obvious phenomena of nature, the sun, the earth, and stars, &c., as conclusive evidence, especially if taken in connexion with the universal sentiments of mankind. This gives occasion to the chief speaker to suggest that the subject is involved in greater difficulties than the other, in his simplicity, had imagined; difficulties, however, not intrinsic, but arising from the perverseness of those who imposed upon themselves by the words *chance*, *nature*, *art*, &c., referring to the old Atheists of the Ionic or Materializing school (*page* 4 to *page* 15). After a short digression, in which it is

debated whether it is best at once to apply the law to such men, without argument (15 to 19), the Athenian devotes himself to the work of refutation, and commences a most subtle disquisition respecting the nature of soul as implying self-motion involved in its very essence. Hence he proves that matter cannot possess this power, and, therefore, soul being more ancient than body, the properties of soul must also be older than the properties of body. From this it is inferred that nature is the child, and not the mother of Art, as the Atheists said, and that, therefore, *law*, and *will*, and *design*, and *thought*, must have been before *hard*, and *soft*, and *heavy*, and *light*, and all the adaptations of the natural world. The Atheists had held that religion, and the belief in the existence of Gods, being the production of human law, which was a production of art, and art itself being the offspring of Nature, therefore religion and all ideas of the just and right were conventional among men, and had no other foundation. This argument is refuted by the Athenian by showing the superior antiquity of soul, and, therefore, of these ideas as essential parts of its constitution (25). In proving the self-energy of soul, he goes into a very minute examination of the different kinds of motion, summing them all up, however, under two general heads; namely, *motion by impulse*, and *that which moves something else by commencing motion in itself*. This latter he identifies with psyche, or *soul*, by a species of logical necessity, or an argument drawn from the force of terms and the innate ideas involved in them. The next step is to determine whether it is one or more souls which are engaged in the affairs of the universe; the result of which inquiry is, that there are two, the one good and the other bad; the one constant, uniform, and ever exhibiting the highest reason in all its motions, which he compares to those of a sphere, the other irregular, disorderly, without reason, and full of madness (36). After this, there are stated three methods by which soul may guide the motions of the heavenly bodies; namely, by an indwelling spirit, or by a soul with an æthereal body, or entirely destitute of body, and external to the object of its guidance (42).

This brings the Athenian to the second grand division of the subject, namely, the arguments of those who deny a Providence. After premising that men are led to this opinion by seeing the apparent impunity and prosperity of the wicked (45), he shows that it is utterly derogatory to any right views of the Divine Nature. For if we admit that God is possessed of every virtue, indolence and indifference can form no part of his character. Neither can it be that there is in him any want of power. Therefore we cannot suppose

that he will neglect anything, either great or small. Next is shown the importance of small things as *parts* of a *whole*, absolutely essential to its totality, and that, without small things, the great could not exist. Hence the doctrine of a minute special providence, unless the Deity is to be regarded as inferior in wisdom to human artists (56). The method of this special providence is shown to be by such arrangements in the sovereignty of God (but not by any inherent necessity of things), that every agent finds its fitting place; namely, virtue rises and wickedness descends, until the one reaches The Most Holy Place, and the other sinks down to the most painful retributions of Hades (61). This Eternal Justice, or fixed law of God's government, no one can escape, and, unless it is kept in view, it will be impossible to form any right opinion respecting a blessed or miserable life (64).

The third grand division of the argument respects those who view sin as a trifle, and who confide in the general mercy of God as capable of being easily moved by prayers and sacrifices. He contrasts their views of the Deity with such as are entertained of the lowest class of human guardians, as though God could be bribed by the wages of iniquity, when dogs could not be prevailed upon by similar motives to admit the wolf into the flock. Arguments against those views which would regard sin as a small matter, and God as easily appeased, are drawn from the *μάχη ἀθάνατος*, the battle of the universe, or everlasting conflict between good and evil, in which God and all good influences are contending for the victory, and where, of consequence, the least taking part with the enemy, or the least neutrality is treason against the cause of good throughout the universe (69, 74).

There are then enumerated six classes of offenders; namely, two to each of the three divisions of Atheists or semi-Atheists, differing in their degrees of guilt, and therefore requiring different gradations of punishment. The book closes with a specification of the various penalties, and a law against private chapels and private religious rites; in the course of which a very striking description is given of that class of Atheists who, while they had no religious belief themselves, made it their business to excite the superstitious fears of mankind for their own unnatural pleasure or profit.

N.B.—All references to any of the dialogues of Plato, except the text of the present work, are made according to the pages and letters of the alphabet, as given in the standard edition of Stephanus, and as they may be found in the margin of the Leipsic.

PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS.

DE LEGIBUS LIBER X.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τὰς αἰκίας, περὶ παντὸς[1] ἓν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν·[2] μηδ' αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέ-

1. Περὶ παντὸς. In reference to the whole subject discussed in the preceding book (ix.), namely, ὕβρεις, or wrongs committed wilfully and with some degree of violence, of which αἰκία, treated of at the close of the ninth book, is one species, and sacrilege another.

2. Φέρειν—ἄγειν. A collective phrase. "To take and carry away by violence." Compare Thucydides, i., 7: Ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους. Ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν is a phrase derived from the earliest times, and is always employed in reference to acts of violence. Hence, because personal courage was anciently regarded as the chief part of human virtue, some have supposed that from ἄγειν, in this sense, came ἀγαθὸς, and from φέρειν, its comparative and superlative, φέρτερος, φέρτατος, or φέριστος. Such a view encounters etymological difficulties in the termination of ἀγαθὸς. Besides, it can only be maintained on the false theory that the savage life was the original state of men, and that moral terms partake of the ideas most prevalent in such a condition. We much prefer the derivation of Plato, although, in general, he is entitled to but little deference as a philologist. According to him, τὸ ἀγαθὸν is τὸ ἀγαστὸν, "the wonderful, the admirable," from ἄγαμαι ἀγάομαι, "to wonder at," also "to admire with great delight." See the Cratylus, p. 412. The force of this will be better felt by comparing what the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Republic, of the *wondrous idea* of the ἀγαθὸν, or *The Good*, as surpassing all human comprehension. No one, on reading it, will be at a loss as to what led him to this etymology, whatever we may think of its philological correctness. It must be remarked, however, that, in reading the Cratylus, it is difficult to determine in what parts the writer is sincere, or how far he may be indulging in the severest satire against certain false systems of philosophy.

λας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ[3] τὸν κεκτημένον. ἐκ γὰρ δὴ του τοιούτου πάντα ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ γέγονε, καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. μέγιστα δὲ δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ τῶν νέων ἀκολασίαι τε καὶ ὕβρεις·[4] εἰς μέγιστα δὲ, ὅταν εἰς ἱερὰ γίγνωνται, καὶ διαφερόντως αὖ μεγάλα, ὅταν εἰς δημόσια καὶ ἅγια ἢ κατὰ μέρη κοινὰ φυλετῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων κεκοινωνηκότων· εἰς ἱερὰ δὲ ἴδια καὶ τάφους, δεύτερα καὶ δευτέρως.[5] εἰς δὲ γονέας,[6] τρίτα, χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων,[7] ὅταν ὑβρίζῃ τις. τέταρτον δὲ γένος ὕβρεως, ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις[8] τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄγῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ χρῆταί τινι[9] τῶν ἐκείνων, μὴ πείσας αὐτούς. πέμπτον δὲ, τὸ πολιτικὸν ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρισθὲν, δίκην ἐπικαλούμενον. οἷς δὴ δοτέον[10] εἰς κοινὸν νόμον ἑκάστοις. ἱεροσυλία μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ξυλλήβδην, βίαιός τε καὶ λάθρα ἐὰν γίγνηται, τί χρὴ πάσχειν. ὅσα δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὅσα ἔργῳ περὶ θεοὺς ὑβρίζει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων,[11] τὸ παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ[12] ῥητέον ἃ δεῖ πάσχειν. ἔστω δὴ τόδε· θεοὺς

3. Ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ, "unless he get the consent."

4. Ὕβρεις, "violent wrongs committed *wilfully* and with *malice prepense*, whether by act or speech." The writer now proceeds to specify five different grades into which offences of this kind might be divided: 1st, against sacred things public; 2d, against sacred things private; 3d, against parents; 4th, against magistrates; 5th, against private political rights of individual citizens.

5. Δευτέρως has respect to διαφερόντως above, referring not, like δεύτερα, to numerical rank, but to the grade of enormity.

6. Εἰς δὲ γονέας. See Note I., App.

7. Χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων, namely, those mentioned in the ninth book.

8. Ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις, "when any one who is reckless of the authority or respect due to magistrates."

9. The case of τινὶ is determined here grammatically by the last verb, χρῆται, although in sense it is the common object of them all.

10. Οἷς δὴ δοτέον, "for all which cases there must be a common law," or "a law in common containing provisions applicable to each respectively."

11. λέγων ἢ πράττων, "by speech or action."

12. See Note II., App.

ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον. ἀλλὰ ἓν[13] δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον, ὄντας, οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον, εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι, θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους.

ΚΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ δρῷμεν ἂν ἢ καὶ λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτούς;

ΑΘ. Ὦ γαθέ, ἐπακούσωμεν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἃ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ἡμῶν[14] προσπαίζοντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν μαντεύομαι.

ΚΛ. Ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. Ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν ἐρεσχελοῦντες εἴποιεν. Ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε καὶ Κνώσιε, ἀληθῆ λέγετε. ἡμῶν γὰρ οἱ μὲν τοπαράπαν θεοὺς οὐδαμῶς νομίζουσιν· οἱ δὲ, μηδὲν ἡμῶν φροντίζειν· οἱ δὲ, εὐχαῖς παράγεσθαι, οἵους ὑμεῖς λέγετε. ἀξιοῦμεν δή, καθάπερ ὑμεῖς ἠξιώκατε περὶ νόμων, πρὶν ἀπειλεῖν ἡμῖν σκληρῶς, ἡμᾶς πρότερον ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί,[15] τεκμήρια λέγοντες ἱκανά, καὶ ὅτι βελτίους ἢ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπό τινων δώρων παρατρέπεσθαι κηλούμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἀκούοντές τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστων εἶναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ μάντεων καὶ ἱερέων, καὶ

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13. ἀλλὰ ἓν. Supply as follows: "but when he has done thus, he has done it—ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων—being in one or the other of these three states."

14. τῷ καταφρονεῖν ἡμῶν, "in their contempt for us." προσπαίζοντας is best rendered adverbially, "*sportively*."

15. ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί. This example furnishes an excellent illustration of the general difference between the particles ὡς and ὅτι. Both follow nearly the same class of verbs, and are frequently regarded and rendered as though they were nearly, if not quite, synonymous. The difference, however, in this and similar cases, is obvious. Ὅτι would simply refer to *the fact*; ὡς, to the *manner* or *reason* of it. As, for example, διδάσκειν ὅτι, "to teach us *the fact, that there are Gods*;" διδάσκειν ὡς, "to teach us *how*;" that is, "*in what manner*, and for what necessary *reasons*, there are Gods." And so in the following sentence: καὶ ὅτι βελτίους ἢ, κ. τ. λ., "and also *the fact* that they are better than," &c., or "that they are too good."

ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν τὰ ἄδικα[1] τρεπόμεθα οἱ πλεῖστοι, δράσαντες δ' ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα. παρὰ δὲ δὴ νομοθετῶν φασκόντων εἶναι μὴ ἀγρίων, ἀλλὰ ἡμέρων, ἀξιοῦμεν πειθοῖ πρῶτον χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ πολλῷ βελτίω[2] τῶν ἄλλων λέγοντας περὶ θεῶν ὡς εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὖν βελτίω γε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. καὶ τάχα πειθοίμεθ' ἂν ἴσως ὑμῖν. ἀλλ' ἐπιχειρεῖτε, εἴτι μέτριον λέγομεν, εἰπεῖν ἃ προκαλούμεθα.

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας[3] λέγειν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί;

ΑΘ. Πῶς;

ΚΛ. Πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος, ἄστρα τε τὰ ξύμπαντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶ διειλημμένα· καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς.

ΑΘ. Φοβοῦμαί γε, ὦ μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηρούς, (οὐ γὰρ δή ποτε εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσγε αἰδοῦμαι) μήπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι τὴν τῆς διαφθορᾶς[4] αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατείᾳ μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ

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1. *οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν τὰ ἄδικα.* This may be freely rendered thus: "Instead of being turned away from the *commission* of sin, the most of us are wholly occupied in attempts to avert its *consequences.*" In this there is most concisely, yet most forcibly expressed, the essential difference between two things that are often mistaken the one for the other, namely, between *true religion*, consisting in right views of the Divine Nature, or that true "fear of the Lord which is *to depart from evil*" (*τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν τὰ ἄδικα*), and *superstition*, which is wholly occupied, not in the avoidance of sin, but in vain attempts to cure the evils and terrors which it brings upon the soul, (*δράσαντες δ' ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα*). This superstition, or false religion, as Plato elsewhere shows, is nearly allied to Atheism. See Note LXXX. and LXXXI., App.

2. *πολλῷ βελτίω.* The antithesis here is between *πολλῷ βελτίω* and *βελτίω γε*, "better, indeed, in respect to truth, if not far better."

3. *ἀληθεύοντας.* See Note III., App.

4. *διαφθορᾶς.* We have adopted this instead of the common reading, *διαφορᾶς.* It is supported by the authority of Cornarius and Stephanus, although Ficinus seems to have read *διαφορᾶς*, and is in

ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀσεβῆ βίον ὁρμᾶσθαι[5] τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.

ΚΛ. Τὸ δὲ τί πρὸς τούτοις αἴτιον ἄν, ὦ ξένε, εἴη;

ΑΘ. Σχεδὸν ὃ παντάπασιν ὑμεῖς ἔξω ζῶντες οὐκ ἂν εἰδείητε, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς ἂν λανθάνοι.

ΚΛ. Τί δὴ τοῦτο φράζεις τανῦν;

ΑΘ. Ἀμαθία τις[6] μάλα χαλεπή, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι, οἳ παρ' ὑμῖν οὐκ εἰσὶ δι' ἀρετὴν πολιτείας, ὡς ἐγὼ μανθάνω· οἱ μὲν, ἔν τισι μέτροις,[7] οἱ δὲ, καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς[8] γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ, τῶν τε ἄλλων· προϊόντες[9] δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν. ἃ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ

far better accordance with all the words of the context—*morum corruptio atque depravatio—rottenness of soul.* In the same way are the same class of persons characterized by the Psalmist: "*The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God;*" הִשְׁחִיתוּ הִתְעִיבוּ עֲלִילָה, *corrupt are they, and abominable in their deeds.* Psalm xiv., 1. נֶאֱלָחוּ, *corrupti, perditis moribus sunt. They are altogether become filthy.*

5. ὁρμᾶσθαι, "to rush impetuously or violently." Admirably descriptive of the headlong course of those to whom it is here applied.

6. Ἀμαθία τις. A more perfect description of this disease of Atheism (διαφθορᾶς) could not be given. It sets forth the malady with its cause, and is equally applicable to ancient and to modern times: "*an invincible ignorance, fancying itself the highest wisdom.*" Ἀμαθία here has no reference to speculative or scientific knowledge, but is used in the usual Platonic sense for "ignorance of one's self."

7. οἱ μὲν ἐν μέτροις. See Note IV., App.

8. λέγοντες . . . ὡς . See remarks on ὡς and ὅτι, page 3, 15.

9. προϊόντες δε, "Advancing, or going on from the discussion of the origin (τῆς ἀρχῆς) of the first nature (τῆς πρώτης φύσεως), which was the subject of the most ancient (or Orphic) writings (τῶν παλαιοτάτων), they treated next of the theogony, that is, the individual births and generations of the Gods, with their actions and mutual intercourse," as set forth by Homer and Hesiod.

καλῶς ἔχοι, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐπιτιμᾷν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν.[10] εἰς μέντοι γονέων τε θεραπείας καὶ τιμὰς[11] οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ ποτε ἐπαινῶν εἴποιμι, οὔτε ὡς ὠφέλιμα, οὔτε ὡς τοπαράπαν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.[12] τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πέρι μεθείσθω καὶ χαιρέτω, καὶ ὅπῃ θεοῖσι φίλον λεγέσθω ταύτῃ·[13] τὰ δὲ τῶν νέων ἡμῖν καὶ σοφῶν[14] αἰτιαθήτων ὅπῃ κακῶν αἴτια. τόδε οὖν οἱ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξεργάζονται λόγοι. ἐμοῦ γὰρ καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντες, ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, λόγοισι δὲ ταῦτα εὖ πως εἰς τὸ πιθανὸν περιπεπεμμένα.[15]

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10. *παλαιοῖς οὖσιν.* See Note V., App.

11. *γονέων θεραπείας καὶ τιμὰς.* He alludes here to the poetical fables respecting the treatment of Saturn by his son Jupiter. This, to Plato, was the most offensive part of the Grecian mythology, and he often alludes to it, as a sort of standing example, whenever he attacks the poets in other portions of his works. See the Republic, ii., 377, P: *τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέως, κ. τ. λ.* It interfered with his high views respecting those duties which grow out of the domestic relations, especially the duty of filial obedience. Hence it furnishes his constant example, whenever he would condemn the demoralizing and irreligious tendency of some of the ancient poetry.

12. *οὔτε ὡς τοπαράπαν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.* These and similar portions of the mythology he would altogether expunge, as being utterly incapable of any improved allegorical meaning, however gently he might deal with the system as a whole. See Note V., App.

13. *καὶ ὅπῃ θεοῖσι φίλον*, "May what we have said respecting these ancient and venerable matters be thus said as may be agreeable to Heaven," as it may be paraphrased. We see, from this expression, with what a gentle, pious, and cautious hand he touches the ancient mythology; how he seems to implore forgiveness for venturing to cast away anything that might have claims to reverence for its antiquity, and which, under all its deformity, might yet, perhaps, contain the corrupted and disguised remains of some primitive or anciently-revealed truth.

14. *νέων σοφῶν.* See Note VI., App.

15. *περιπεπεμμένα—περιπέττειν.* This is a term of cookery, and

ΚΛ. Χαλεπόν γε λόγον, ὦ ξένε, εἰρηκὼς τυγχάνεις, εἴ γε εἷς ἦν μόνον· νῦν δὲ ὅτε πάμπολλοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον ἂν εἴη.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν δή; τί λέγωμεν; τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἡμᾶς; πότερον ἀπολογησώμεθα οἷον κατηγορήσαντός τινος ἐν ἀσεβέσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡμῶν φεύγουσι[1] περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, λέγουσιν

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signifies *to crust over—crustare.* Compare Seneca, De Provid., 6, *non est ista sincera felicitas—crusta est.* Also Aristophanes, Plutus, 159:

> Ἀισχυνόμενοι γὰρ ἀργύριον αἰτεῖν ἴσως,
> Ὀνόματι περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν.

"*With a name they crust over their depravity.*" The metaphor here suggests the thought of vile doctrines, like pernicious and unhealthy dishes, crusted over with some specious disguise to allure the eye and tempt the appetite. Socrates was ever fond of drawing comparisons from the body to the soul, from the health of the one to the moral soundness of the other, and from the sciences and arts that pertain to the one, to that higher philosophy which is concerned with the wants and relations of the other. The use of this word here corresponds well with his ordinary similes, and especially those made use of in the Gorgias, in which false philosophy (σοφιστικὴ) holds the same relation to the soul that the unhealthy confectionary art (ὀψοποϊικὴ) bears to the body. See the Gorgias, pages 28, 29, Leip.: ὅτι ἡ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

1. φεύγουσι. This is rendered by some *aversari, non* tolerare. So Ast, *qui nos aversantur.* It also, as a term of the Athenian courts of law, signifies *to be defendant in a suit or prosecution*, as διώκων signifies *the plaintiff, pursuer, or prosecutor;* both terms being derived from the ancient custom of the *pursuit* of the homicide by the avenger of blood, and from thence transferred to other legal contests both of a civil and criminal kind. Ficinus, in accordance with this idea, renders—*in judicium pertractos.* To warrant this, however, the reading should be φεύγοντες or φεύγοντας, with a change in the construction of the Greek. The first version seems so far fetched, that we would prefer combining the two ideas by translating φεύγουσι, "*who put us on our defence.*" This agrees well with ἀπολογησώμεθα, and with the whole context. The speaker is complaining of the hardship of being compelled to assume the attitude of apologist or de-

ὡς δεινὰ ἐργαζόμεθα νομοθετοῦντες ὡς ὄντων θεῶν; ἢ χαίρειν ἐάσαντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους τρεπώμεθα πάλιν, μὴ καὶ τὸ προοίμιον[2] ἡμῖν μακρότερον γίγνηται τῶν νόμων; οὐ γὰρ βραχὺς ὁ λόγος ἐκταθεὶς ἂν γίγνοιτο, εἰ τοῖσιν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀσεβεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἀποδείξαιμεν,[3] μετρίως τοῖς λόγοις, ὧν ἔφραζον δεῖν πέρι λέγειν· τὰ δὲ, εἰς φόβον τρέψαιμεν· τὰ δὲ, δυσχεραίνειν ποιήσαντες, ὅσα πρέπει[4] μετὰ ταῦτα ἤδη νομοθετοῖμεν.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε, πολλάκις μὲν ὥσγε[5] ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἰρήκαμεν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ προτιμᾶν βραχυλογίαν μᾶλλον ἢ μῆκος. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμᾶς, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπείγων διώκει. γελοῖον δὴ καὶ φαῦλον τὸ πρὸ τῶν βελτίστων τὰ βραχύτερα αἱρουμένους φαίνεσθαι. διαφέρει δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἀμωσγέπως[6] πιθανότητά τινα τοὺς λόγους ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶν-

fendant in such a cause, and of being required to give reasons for the belief in the existence of the Deity, especially before profane and ungodly men.

2. *προοίμιον.* See Note II., App.

3. *τὰ μὲν ἀποδείξαιμεν, κ. τ. λ.,* "*Should in some things demonstrate by arguments,* &c.—*τὰ δὲ, εἰς φόβον τρέψαιμεν, should in others excite their fears—τὰ δὲ, δυσχεραίνειν, κ. τ. λ., and in others making them dislike, or appealing to their prejudices,*" &c. Or it may be paraphrased still more generally: *If we should address ourselves to their reason, their fears, or their tastes,* namely, their moral sentiments, of which they cannot wholly divest themselves, or their wholesome prejudices.

4. *ὅσα πρέπει.* In most editions there is a comma after *πρέπει.* It is clear, however, that these words are connected with *νομοθετοῖμεν* which follows, and that the comma should be after *ποιήσαντες.*

5. *ὥσγε ἐν ὀλίγῳ,* "for so short a time as we have been together."

6. *ἀμωσγέπως.* A difficult particle to analyze, so as to show the force of each part. It may be rendered "*in some one way or other, at least;*" *ἀμως, in some way,* expressing the *certainty* that there is such a way; *πως* (indefiniteness), *whatever that way may be; γε, that there is one such way at least, if no more. γε* always, whether alone or in composition, implies that the writer chooses to limit the meaning of a word, although intimating that he could say more if it pleased him.

τες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο[7] ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν εἴη. μηδὲν οὖν δυσχεράναντες μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες, ἥντινά ποτε ἔχομεν δύναμιν εἰς πειθὼ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μηδὲν ἀποθέμενοι, διεξέλθωμεν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἱκανῶς.

ΑΘ. Εὐχήν μοι δοκεῖ παρακαλεῖν[8] ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν λόγος, ἐπειδὴ προθύμως συντείνεις· μέλλειν δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγχωρεῖ λέγειν. φέρε δή, πῶς ἄν τις μὴ θυμῷ λέγοι περὶ θεῶν, ὡς εἰσίν; ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ χαλεπῶς φέρειν καὶ μισεῖν ἐκείνους οἳ τούτων ἡμῖν αἴτιοι τῶν λόγων γεγένηνται καὶ γίγνονται νῦν, οὐ πειθόμενοι[9] τοῖς μύθοις, οὓς ἐκ νέων παί-

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7. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο. See Note VII., App.

8. Εὐχὴν παρακαλεῖν, "to invite the wish," that is, to second one's wishes—to invite one to do what he already desires to do.

9. γίγνονται νῦν, οὐ πειθόμενοι. In the common text this stands thus: γίγνονται. Νῦν οὖν πειθόμενοι: the great objection to which is, that it is impossible to make any suitable sense out of it. Ficinus felt the difficulty, and therefore made a paraphrase rather than a translation. The correction was made by Stephanus, *partim* (as he says) *veteris exemplaris ope, partim conjectura mea.* In fact, the *exigentia loci* absolutely requires the reading of Stephanus, which we have given, although not altogether free from objections. It is followed by editors generally in their notes and translations, although the other reading is retained in their text. The words οὐ πειθόμενοι may therefore be regarded, not as a commencement of the following, but as the conclusion of the preceding sentence, which runs on, without coming to a close, until it terminates in οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί, some distance below. The whole passage being the language of justly-indignant feeling against those who would ruthlessly destroy all the religious reminiscences of youth, and all the hallowed associations of domestic instruction, is, on this account, rather involved and parenthetical. The thoughts and emotions outrun the expressions, leaving much to be supplied to bring out the meaning in all its fulness. This we attempt in the following free paraphrastic translation: "For we must feel indignant, and dislike those who have ever been and are now the causes of such discussions; who believe not the myths, which, when yet children, they heard of nurses and mothers in soothing strains of sportive or serious song, as they listened to the prayers and gazed upon those attending spectacles (of

δων ἔτι ἐν γάλαξι τρεφόμενοι, τροφῶν τε ἤκουον καὶ μητέρων, οἷον ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς μετά τε παιδιᾶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένους, καὶ μετὰ θυσιῶν, ἐν εὐχαῖς αὐτοὺς ἀκούοντές τε, καὶ ὄψεις ὁρῶντες ἑπομένας αὐτοῖς, ἃς ἥδιστα ὅ γε νέος ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει πραττομένας, θυόντων ἐν σπουδῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων ἐσπουδακότων, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα οὖσι θεοῖς εὐχαῖς προσδιαλεγομένων καὶ ἱκετείαις· ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις ἀκούοντές τε καὶ ὁρῶντες Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων[10] πάντων ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εὐπραγίαις, οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῆ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί. τούτων δὴ πάντων ὅσοι καταφρονήσαντες οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ λόγου, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, νῦν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς λέγειν ἃ λέγομεν, πῶς τούτους ἄν τις ἐν πρᾳέσι λόγοις δύναιτο νουθετῶν ἅμα διδάσκειν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσί; τολμητέον δέ. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γε δεῖ μανῆναι,[11] τοὺς μὲν, ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς, ἡμῶν, τοὺς δ'

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religious worship) which the young soul hears and sees so joyfully —their parents sacrificing with solemn earnestness for themselves and their families, and by their vows and supplications conversing with the Gods as the most real of existences—who too, at the risings and settings of the sun and moon, have often seen and heard the prostrations and adorations both of Greeks and Barbarians, in every diversified situation of prosperity and adversity appealing to the Gods, not as unreal fancies, but as existing in the highest sense, and without any suspicion to the contrary." It is a strain of eloquence fervid and indignant, yet not unkind or harsh, against those who, trampling under foot the most sacred associations, demand proof for that which never should have been doubted, and which seldom again finds a secure resting-place in that soul in which false reasoning, the result of licentious passions, has taken the place of wholesome religious authority.

10. Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων. See Note VIII., App.

11. Οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γε δεῖ μανῆναι, τοὺς μὲν . . . ἡμῶν, τοὺς δε, &c. Stephanus, Cornarius, Ast, and most of the commentators, would here reject ἡμῶν, although without the authority of any manuscripts. We

ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἴτω δὴ πρόῤῥησις τοιάδε τις ἄθυμος τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις· καὶ λέγωμεν πρᾴως,[12] σβέσαντες τὸν θυμόν, ὡς ἑνὶ διαλεγόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων, Ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ· προϊὼν δέ σε ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβαλόντα, ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι. περίμεινον οὖν εἰς τότε κριτὴς περὶ τῶν μεγίστων γίγνεσθαι. μέγιστον δὲ, ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ἡγῇ σύ, τὸ, περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα, ζῆν καλῶς ἢ μή. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἕν τι μέγα σοι μηνύων οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανείην ψευδής, τὸ τοιόνδε· οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε· γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ[13] πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες. τόδε τοίνυν σοι παραγεγονὸς αὐτῶν πολλοῖς φράζοιμ' ἄν, τὸ μηδένα πώποτε λαβόντα ἐκ νέου ταύτην τὴν δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐκ εἰσί, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας[14] μεί-

would, however, by all means retain it, essential to the full sense intended to be conveyed. "It must not be that some of us (ἡμῶν) become frantic through the ravenings of licentiousness, and others (of us) through indignation at such persons." The passage would lose all its tender charity in the loss of ἡμῶν. It binds together the two classes here described, by representing the fault of either extreme as arising out of that deep-seated depravity which is the common inheritance of the race. It may be thus paraphrased: "All ultraism, into which all of us are so apt to run, must be avoided; whether it be the ultraism of sensuality, or of harsh and denunciatory religious zeal." No man can be truly charitable who is not a firm believer in the common depravity of the race. Every other appearance of charity is only a spurious liberality or a hollow indifference.

12. καὶ λέγωμεν πρᾴως. Nothing can be more in accordance with the very spirit of charity than this most gentle and exquisitely tender address: "But let us say unto them, meekly quenching all angry feeling, as though we were now conversing with one of this class, 'My child, you are young, and time, as it rolls on, will produce many a change in opinions once formed," &c. Compare with it some of the tender expostulations of the Bible: "*My son, forget not my law. Hear, O ye children, the instruction of a father.*"

13. γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ. See Note IX., App.

14. διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας. The sentiment is that *speculative* athe-

ναντα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διανοήσει. τὰ δύο μέντοι πάθη περὶ θεοὺς μεῖναι, πολλοῖσι μὲν οὔ, μεῖναι δὲ οὖν τισί, τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς φροντίζουσι μέν, εὐπαραμύθητοι δέ εἰσι θύμασι καὶ εὐχαῖς. τὸ δὴ σαφὲς ἂν γενόμενόν σοι περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ δύναμιν δόγμα, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς ἀνασκοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ[15] *παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου. ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τολμήσῃς περὶ θεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεβῆσαι. πειρατέον γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νόμους σοι τιθέντι νῦν, καὶ εἰς αὖθις διδάσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς ἔχει.*

ΚΛ. *Κάλλισθ' ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν*[1] *εἴρηται.*

ΑΘ. *Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν,*[2] *ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία· λελήθαμεν δ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς θαυμαστὸν λόγον ἐμπεπτωκότες.*

ΚΛ. *Τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;*

ΑΘ. *Τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων.*

ΚΛ. *Φράζ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.*

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ism does not often continue in old age, but that, although a speculative theism may take its place, the other accompaniments, namely, unbelief in a special Providence, or an indifferent trust in the Divine placability, may continue to the latest period. We think that this remark of Plato would be abundantly confirmed by an actual observation of life. It is seldom that we find an old man a speculative Atheist, whatever he may have been in his youth. It is, however, much more common to meet with those whose insensibility in respect to the reality of the Divine anger against sin is in direct proportion to the years in which they have experienced the special care and sparing mercy of Heaven.

15. *καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ* The combination of particles here is worthy of notice. *Καὶ δὴ* generally denotes an application of a previous assertion, and is commonly used *à fortiori*, "learning from others, and, therefore, if from others (*à fortiori*), from the lawgiver also, and in the highest degree." The second *καὶ* is to be taken with *μάλιστα*, and the third with *νομοθέτου*. See Note X., App.

1. *μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν*, "so far at least."

2. *παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.* See Note XI., App.

ΑΘ. Λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα, καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα, τὰ μὲν, φύσει, τὰ δὲ, τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην.

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς;

ΑΘ. Εἰκός γέ τοί που[3] σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν. ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς, σκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν,[4] τί ποτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι.

ΚΛ. Πάντως.

ΑΘ. Ἔοικε, φασί, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα, τέχνην· ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα,[5] φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων,[6] καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως,

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3. Εἰκός γέ τοί που. This is the usual Socratic or Platonic irony. "It may be likely, at least, that these wise people talk correctly." Εἰκός γε, "*likely, plausible, probable, at least, if not certain.*" Γέ τοί που is a combination of particles deserving special notice. Γὲ has its usual limiting sense as given above; τοι, like δὴ, confirms and strengthens the limitation, while που seems in the usual manner to diminish the positiveness of the expression by way of appeal to the party addressed. "Surely (τοι) may we say, may we not (που), that these wise men talk plausibly at least (γε), to use no stronger term."

4. τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν. *Haud dubie* (says Ast) scribendum est, τὸ εκεῖθεν, *quod ex illo consequitur.* We have but little doubt, on the other hand, that Ast is wrong. The old and established reading, τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν, may be rendered "those from, or of that school," namely, their followers, those who expand and explain the doctrine more fully, as in the next answer.

5. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. See Note XII., App.

6. φύσει . . . τέχνῃ. See Note XIII., App.

θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρά, καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλὰ εἴδωλ' ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷ' ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ, καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι· αἱ δ' εἴτι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν· οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν σμικρόν τι μέρος εἶναί φασι κοινωνοῦν φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ, τὸ πολύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν,[7] οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ· ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς θέσεις.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις· καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τοπαράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δή τινι φύσει. ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον ὅ, τί τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος. ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν· στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, ἑλκόντων[8] πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ

7. *νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν.* See Note XIV., App.

8. *ἑλκόντων.* The article *τῶν* would seem to be required here be-

ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον.

ΚΛ. *Οἷον διελήλυθας, ὦ ξένε, λόγον, καὶ ὅσην λώβην ἀνθρώπων νέων δημοσίᾳ πόλεσί τε καὶ ἰδίοις οἴκοις.*

ΑΘ. *Ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ Κλεινία. τί οὖν οἴει χρῆναι δρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, οὕτω τούτων πάλαι παρεσκευασμένων; ἢ μόνον ἀπειλεῖν στάντα ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμπασι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς, εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν*[9] *εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ διανοηθήσονται, δοξάζοντες τοιούτους οἵους φησὶν ὁ νόμος; καὶ περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν μεγίστων, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅσα τε πρὸς ἀρετὴν τείνει καὶ κακίαν, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν, διανοουμένους ὅπηπερ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων· ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ παρέχηται ἑαυτὸν τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθῆ, τὸν μὲν δεῖν τεθνάναι, τὸν δέ τινα πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, τὸν δὲ, ἀτιμίαις, ἄλλους δὲ πενίαις κολάζεσθαι καὶ φυγαῖς· πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,*[10] *ἅμα*

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fore *ἑλκόντων*, although there is no authority of manuscripts for it. It seems to refer to *φασκόντων* above. "Hence factions or quarrels arise by reason of these things, while they violently drag (the young) to that mode of life which is right by nature (that is, in their opinion), which consists, in reality, in so living as to have power over others, and to be in subjection to none by virtue of law." In this metaphorical expression, *ἑλκόντων*, Plato seems to have had an eye to some of those violent contests which Homer so vividly describes as taking place over a dead body, in which both sides are pulling with all their might, the one to carry off, the other to rescue; as in the battle over the body of Patroclus, in the sixteenth book of the Iliad. He rises, however, infinitely above Homer in his subject. It is not the *dead body* of the slain hero which is here the object of contention, but the *living soul* of the young man that the atheistic crew are seeking to drag down to their own kingdom of darkness; or, to accommodate the language of the Grecian poet to a sense far beyond his highest conceptions, we may say, with a slight change of the verse, Iliad, xxii., 161:

Ἀλλὰ περὶ χυχῆς μάρναντ' ἀθανάτοιο.

9. See Note XV., App.

10. *πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.* Connect this with *ἢ μόνον ἀπειλεῖν*, about ten lines back; and then, by leaving out all that is explanatory

τιθέντα αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τοῖς λόγοις προσάπτοντα εἰς δύναμιν ἡμεροῦν;

ΚΛ. *Μηδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ τυγχάνει γε οὖσα καὶ σμικρὰ πειθώ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ μηδαμῆ κάμνειν τόν γε ἄξιον καὶ σμικροῦ νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν, τὸ λεγόμενον, φωνὴν ἱέντα,*[11] *τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ ἐπίκουρον γίγνεσθαι λόγῳ, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί, καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ διῆλθες σύ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νόμῳ αὐτῷ βοηθῆσαι καὶ τέχνῃ· ὡς ἐστὸν φύσει ἢ φύσεως οὐχ ἧττον, εἴπερ νοῦ γέ ἐστι γεννήματα, κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν ὃν σύ τε λέγειν μοι φαίνῃ καὶ ἐγώ σοι πιστεύω τανῦν.*

ΑΘ. *Ὦ προθυμότατε Κλεινία, τί δ'; οὐ χαλεπά τέ ἐστι ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὖ*[12] *κέκτηται διωλύγια;*

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or parenthetical, the contrast may be exhibited thus: "Or ought he to threaten them only, that unless they shall say, &c.; but not, by attaching it to his arguments, exercise persuasion towards men at the same time that he lays down the laws, so that (by such persuasive arguments) he may render them as mild, or as well-disposed towards the laws as possible." *Δὲ* here may be rendered "and," which, in a similar connexion in English, is sometimes a disjunctive particle: "Shall he threaten, &c., *and* shall he not persuade?" Or the disjunctive force of *δε* may be better brought out, and the connexion with the first part of the sentence at the same time preserved, by rendering it "instead of," thus: "Ought he only to threaten *instead* of using persuasion?" &c. In this construction, *ἔχειν*, as well as *ἀπειλεῖν*, will depend on *οἴει χρῆναι*, about twelve lines back.

11. *πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἱέντα*, "letting out all his voice," that is, omitting nothing which may tend to produce conviction. A proverbial expression, for which see Erasmus, Adag., p. 788. It seems somewhat to resemble a nautical metaphor, of which the Greek poets were very fond, and of which we have a striking example, Eurip., Medea, 280:

Ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξίασι πάντα δὴ κάλων.

"For my enemies let out all their rope," that is, "are attacking me under full sail, and straining every nerve."

12. *μήκη τε αὖ.* There is a harshness here in consequence of the sudden change from the participle to the indicative mode *κέκτηται.*

ΚΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ ξένε; περὶ μέθης[13] μὲν καὶ μουσικῆς οὕτω μακρὰ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περιεμείναμεν,[14] περὶ θεῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐχ ὑπομενοῦμεν; καὶ μὴν καὶ νομοθεσίᾳ γέ ἐστί που τῇ μετὰ φρονήσεως μεγίστη βοήθεια, διότι τὰ περὶ νόμους προστάγματα ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντα, ὡς δώσοντα εἰς πάντα χρόνον ἔλεγχον, πάντως ἠρεμεῖ·[15] ὥστε οὔτ' εἰ χαλεπὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀκούειν ἐστὶ φοβητέον, ἅ γ' ἔσται καὶ τῷ δυσμαθεῖ πολλάκις ἐπανιόντι[1] σκοπεῖν· οὔτε εἰ μακρά, ὠφέλιμα δέ, διὰ ταῦτα λόγον οὐδαμῇ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ὅσιον ἔμοιγε εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΜΕΓ. Ἄριστα, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ λέγειν Κλεινίας.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε· ποιητέον τε ὡς λέγει.

This, however, must be rendered as though it were *κεκτημένα*, if, indeed, this is not the true reading.

13. *περὶ μέθης.* This refers to discussions in the first and third books of this treatise, which had been continued at great length.

14. *περιμένω*, "to linger around a subject—to wait one's own leisure." *ὑπομένω*, "to endure, to wait with patience." After *ὑπομενοῦμεν* supply *περιμένειν*, thus: *οὐχ ὑπομενοῦμεν περιμένειν*, "shall we not endure to wait?" or, taken adverbially, "shall we not wait patiently?" There is evidently a case of paronomasia, or play upon words here.

15. *ἠρεμεῖ.* "*Are altogether silent.*" Compare this with the myth respecting the God Theuth in the Phædrus, 275, D., where oral instruction is commended, as better than that of books, and doubts are suggested, whether, after all, the art of writing has been of real service to mankind: *ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον (γραφή) ζωγραφίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἕστηκεν μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ γραφή. ἐάν τι ἔρῃ βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή· πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῷ.* In the Gorgias, 525, B., this term *ἠρεμεῖ* is applied, in a somewhat different manner from this, to the victorious party or argument that holds its gronnd *in quietness*, after the rest have been *silenced*: *ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος.*

1. *ἐπανιόντι.* Like a gerund, "*Sæpius animo agitando.*"

καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνούντων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί· νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη. νόμοις οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην;

ΚΛ. *Οὐκ ἔστιν.*

ΑΘ. *Ἀλλὰ δὴ λέγε μοι πάλιν Κλεινία, καὶ σύ. κοινωνὸν γὰρ δεῖ σε εἶναι τῶν λόγων. κινδυνεύει*[2] *γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ.*

ΚΛ. *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.*

ΑΘ. *Ἆρ' οὖν, πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων; σκόπει, πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες,*[3] *μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.*

ΚΛ. *Εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὅπῃ, πειρῶ φράζειν.*

ΑΘ. *Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἀληθεστέρων ἁπτέον*[4] *εἶναι λόγων.*

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2. *κινδυνεύει.* The primary sense of this word is "to be in danger;" the secondary and quite as frequent sense is "to seem." The connexion between them is not obvious. In its secondary meaning it is not synonymous with *δοκεῖ*, and the primary may be preserved with tolerable distinctness in many of those places in which it is rendered "to seem." As, for example, in this passage,—"ventures to regard," or "is in danger of regarding." It implies that the sentiment is a bold one, and one which, probably, he would not adopt, if he could trace all the consequences of this dogma, viz., "that fire, and water, and earth, and air, were the first of all things." In confirmation of this view, compare what follows a few lines below: *οὐ γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσέβων,* "for it would make no small difference if they should appear," &c. This sense of *κινδυνεύω* is quite a favourite with Plato.

3. *ἐξάρχοντες*—auspicantes—qui aliis auctores sunt.

4. *ἀληθεστέρων.* See Note XVI., App.

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένε. μανθάνω γὰρ ὡς νομοθεσίας ἐκτὸς οἰήσῃ βαίνειν, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτώμεθα λόγων. εἰ δέ ἐστι μηδαμῇ ἑτέρως συμφωνῆσαι[5] τοῖς νῦν κατὰ νόμον λεγομένοις θεοῖς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ ταύτῃ, λεκτέον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καὶ ταύτῃ.

ΑΘ. Λέγοιμ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον τινὰ τόνδε. ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι·[6] ὃ δὲ ὕστερον, πρότερον.[7] ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας.

ΚΛ. Οὔπω μανθάνω.

ΑΘ. Ψυχήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν[8] πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον. εἰ δὲ ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, ἆρα οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης ταύτης πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος;

ΚΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. Δόξα δὴ[9] καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος, σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἴη· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξ-

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5. *συμφωνῆσαι.* Plato was very fond of metaphorical expressions derived from the science of music. Similar terms in similar connexions are found throughout all the dialogues, such as *συνᾴδειν, συνῳδὴ, ἐπᾴδειν, ἐπῳδὴ,* &c.

6. *οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι,* "which render the soul of the impious what it is." Equivalent to this other expression, *ἀπεργασάμενοι τὴν τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἀσέβειαν.*

7. *ὃ δε ὕστερον (ἀπεφήναντο) πρότερον.* They are guilty of the fault which logicians style *hysteron proteron,* that is, putting the effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect; which they did, in making *τέχνη* posterior to *φύσις* and *τύχη.*

8, 9. *σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν.* See Note XVII., App.

εις, τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις· τὰ δὲ φύσει, καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ[10] *τοῦτο) ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ.*

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Οὐκ ὀρθῶς φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα. εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δ' ἐν πρώτοις γεγενημένη, σχεδὸν[11] ὀρθότατα λέγοιτ' ἂν εἶναι διαφερόντως, ὅτι φύσει[12] ταῦτ' ἔσθ' οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώμεθα;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Φυλάττωμεν δὴ παντάπασιν ἀπατηλὸν λόγον, μή

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10. *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, "which they incorrectly call this very thing," namely, "this first thing, which we call *ψυχὴ*, they call *φύσις*." *ὕστερα καὶ*, &c., "Nature and its works would be posterior to and ruled by art and reason, or mind."

11. *σχεδὸν*, here, does not qualify *ὀρθότατα*, but *λέγοιτο*,—"it might almost be said with the highest degree of correctness." It, in fact, renders the whole declaration stronger instead of weakening it. It seems to be often used as a sort of apology for a bold expression, and thus, instead of diminishing or impairing its force, as the common rendering (*almost*) would imply, it has directly the contrary effect.

12. *φύσει*. "It might then be said with the highest degree of correctness, that these things are thus *by nature*, if any one should show that soul is older than body, but otherwise not." Plato seems somehow to have changed the sense of the word upon the atheist. He evidently here makes *φύσις* the same with the *truth of things*, whatever that may be, and, therefore, if soul is older than body, then in the highest sense may this be said to be the *order of nature*. If any should regard it as a mere play upon words, it certainly should be deemed pardonable in a contest with those whose whole strength consists in the dexterous use of such words as *τύχη, φύσις, chance, nature*, &c.

πη πρεσβύτας ἡμᾶς ὄντας νεοπρεπὴς ὢν παραπείσῃ, καὶ διαφυγὼν καταγελάστους ποιήσῃ· καὶ δόξωμεν, μείζονα ἐπιβαλλόμενοι,[13] καὶ τῶν σμικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. σκοπεῖτε οὖν, καθάπερ εἰ[14] ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, νεώτατος δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ὑμῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ῥευμάτων, εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι[15] κατ' ἐμαυτόν, καταλιπόντα ὑμᾶς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, σκέψασθαι εἰ διαβατός ἐστι πρεσβυτέροις οὖσι καὶ ὑμῖν, ἢ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ φανέντος μὲν ταύτῃ, καλεῖν ὑμᾶς τότε καὶ συνδιαβιβάζειν ἐμπειρίᾳ, εἰ δὲ ἄβατος ἦν ὡς ὑμῖν, ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν κίνδυνον γεγονέναι· μετρίως ἂν ἐδόκουν λέγειν. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁ μέλλων ἐστὶ λόγος σφοδρότερος, καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως

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13. ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. "Lest, aiming at things too great, we should fail even of the small."

14. καθάπερ εἰ. The common reading is εἰ καθάπερ. We have ventured to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on the authority of Stephanus; "as if we three had to cross a violently-flowing river."—See Note XVIII., App.

15. πειραθῆναι. Whenever a verb is used only in the middle voice to the entire exclusion of the active, or when the middle is the predominant form—or when the active has a causal signification, thus giving rise to what in the middle is seemingly an independent sense—in all such cases, the passive aorists and passive perfect do not denote the receiving of an action, or, in other words, are not the passive of the active, even when it is in use, but are strictly middle tenses. Thus, πειράω, "to tempt another;" πειράομαι, "to tempt one's self, or to attempt, to try;" πειραθῆναι, not *to be tempted*, but "to attempt, or try;" same as the middle. So, also, πλάζω, "to cause to wander;" πλάζομαι, "to wander;" πλαγχθῆναι, not "to be made to wander," but to wander; same as the middle. Such cases are very frequent in Greek. Nothing seems to us to be gained by calling them deponent, a term which would seem to belong peculiarly to the Latin where there is no middle form, except as it is supplied by the passive. In Greek no good reason can be assigned why such verbs should be regarded as essentially different from others of the middle voice. This peculiarity does certainly exist in cases where there is an actual middle beyond all doubt, as shown in the use both of the middle and passive aorists with the same sense.

ἄβατος[1] ὡς τῇ σφῷν ῥώμῃ· μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν[2] τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ, παραφερόμενός[3] τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἀήθεις ὄντας ἀποκρίσεων, εἶτ' ἀσχημοσύνην ἀπρέπειάν τε ἐντέκῃ ἀηδῆ, δοκεῖ δή μοι χρῆναι ποιεῖν οὕτωσὶ τανῦν ἐμέ· ἀνερωτᾷν πρῶτον ἐμαυτὸν ἀκουόντων ὑμῶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι πάλιν ἐμέ· καὶ τὸν λόγον ἅπαντα οὕτω διεξελθεῖν, ἅχριπερ ἂν ψυχῆς πέρι διαπεράνηται, καὶ δείξῃ πρότερον ὂν ψυχὴν σώματος.

ΚΛ. Ἄριστ', ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖς ἡμῖν εἰρηκέναι· ποίει τε ὡς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ἄγε δή,[4] θεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον· ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν ὡς εἰσὶ τὴν αὐ-

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1. σχεδὸν ἴσως ἄβατος. See page 20, 11. Here also, σχεδὸν, instead of impairing, increases the force of the expression, and may be regarded as an apology for not using a stronger term. "We might almost say ἄβατος," &c.

2. σχοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ. These are favourite terms with Plato to express that state of intellectual dizziness with which the soul approaches the contemplation of those great truths, which may be regarded as the ἀρχαὶ or foundations of all others. Compare the language used in the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, as applied to those who are supposed suddenly to emerge from the dark cave of error and phenomena into the upper world of light and truth. Compare, also, the Gorgias, 527, A.; Theætetus, 155, D. That this language was common with Socrates himself, and that Plato in this, as well as in almost everything else, truly represents his peculiarities, not only of reasoning, but of style, may be inferred from the manner in which Aristophanes joins together these two terms in evident allusion to Socrates, whose philosophy and favourite modes of speech he omits no opportunity to ridicule, not only in the Clouds, but also in many places of his other comedies. Vide the Acharnenses, 1218.

ἰλιγγιῶ κάρα λίθῳ πεπληγμένος,
καὶ σκοτοδινιῶ.

3. παραφερόμενος. In this word the metaphor of the rushing stream is still sustained, although, in a critical point of view, it is rather awkwardly dropped in ἐρωτῶν. λόγος is to be supplied for both. See Note XVIII., App.

4. See Note XIX., App.

τῶν, σπουδῇ πάσῃ[5] παρακεκλήσθων. ἐχόμενοι δὲ[6] ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος, ἐπιβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί μοι ἐλεγχομένῳ[7] περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐρωτήσεσι τοιαῖσδε ἀσφαλέστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι[8] φαίνεται. Κᾆτα δέ, ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἆρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα,[9] κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ μένει; Τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί που,[10] φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε, καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται;[11] Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ που ἂν

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5. See Note XIX., App.

6. *ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος.* "Holding fast as by some sure cable." There is still preserved here the metaphor of the dangerous flood, and there can be no doubt, that by this *sure cable* is meant that Divine strength and guidance for which he had just prayed. See Notes XVIII. and XIX., App.

7. *ἐλεγχομένῳ.* This word is generally rendered "refuted," or "convicted of error." It here, however, means simply "engaged in an argument." It is thus frequently used in the Gorgias and elsewhere.

8. *ἀποκρίνεσθαι,* "to take the part of respondent" as well as that of interrogator. *Κᾆτα δέ.*—See Note XX., App.

9. *ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα.* See Note XX., App.

10. *που.* This particle, of so frequent use in the Platonic dialogues, in its primary sense implies doubt or hesitation, and is, therefore, generally said to take away from the positiveness of a declaration, in a manner directly the opposite of *δῆ.* It is, however, often employed, when nothing of this kind is really intended, but only an appearance of it, in those familiarities of the colloquial style, to which this particle is so admirably adapted. It is a term of courtesy, by which the speaker, to avoid being thought dogmatic or positive, appeals to the other party for his assent, without, however, intending any doubt of the proposition advanced. If connected here with *φήσω,* it should be rendered, "I will say, shall I not?" Or if with *κινεῖται,* it comes nearly to the same thing, "some things move, do they not?"

11. *ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε . . . . κινούμενα κινεῖται.* Perhaps a better example could not be found in Greek to illustrate the essential difference between the present and the perfect. From its very nature the idea of rest is finished and complete, and is therefore denoted

τοῦτο δρῷη, τὰ δὲ, ἐν πλείοσι. Τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων[12] ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά; Ναί. Μανθάνομεν δέ γε ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ περιφορᾷ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν σμικρότατον κύκλον ἅμα περιάγουσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις, ἀνὰ λόγον[13] ἑαυτὴν διανέμει σμικροῖς τε καὶ μείζοσιν, ἐλάττων τε οὖσα καὶ πλείων κατὰ λόγον. διὸ δὴ τῶν θαυμαστῶν[14] ἁπάντων πηγὴ γέγονεν, ἅμα μεγάλοις καὶ σμικροῖς κύκλοις βραδυτῆτάς τε καὶ τάχη ὁμολογούμενα[15] πορεύουσα, ἀδύνατον ὡς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε γίγνεσθαι πάθος. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. τὰ δέ γε κινούμενα ἐν πολλοῖς[1] φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν, ὅσα φορᾷ κινεῖται μεταβαίνοντα εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν, ἔστιν ὅτε βάσιν ἑνὸς κεκτημένα τινὸς κέντρου, τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα, τῷ περικυλινδεῖσθαι. προστυγχάνοντα[2] δ' ἑκάστοτε ἑκάστοις, τοῖς

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by the latter tense. Motion, on the other hand, is necessarily continued or incomplete action, and is therefore expressed by the present. Such verbs, however, as παύω, παύομαι, λήγω, do not so much express *positive rest*, as a ceasing of previous action, which, being a continuous idea, admits of a present form.

12. Τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων. "You mean, then, we will reply (to our imaginary interlocutor) that those which receive the faculty or property (δύναμιν) of things at rest in the centre (another mode of saying, *the property of* being at rest, &c.) move in one, just like the revolutions of those wheels that are said to stand." Another, and perhaps a better way would be to take μέσῳ with λαμβάνοντα, instead of ἑστώτων, after this order, τὰ ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων δύναμιν. Ficinus renders —*quæ in medio stare possunt.*

13. See Note XXI., App.

14. See Note XXII., App.

15. ὁμολογούμενα, to be taken adverbially for ὁμολογουμένως. Ἀδύνατον . . . πάθος, "a state of things (πάθος) which, as one would expect, could not possibly take place."

1. ἐν πολλοῖς, the opposite of ἐν ἑνὶ. "On many centres of motion." Or rolling on a plane, instead of revolving on a fixed point, such as Sextus Empiricus styles τοπικὴν μετάβασιν. Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hypot., iii., 8 and 64.

2. προστυγχάνοντα. "As they meet continually with individual

ἑστῶσι μὲν διασχίζεται, τοῖς δ' ἀλλήλοις ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαντῶσι καὶ φερομένοις εἰς ἓν γιγνόμενα μέσα τε καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν τοιούτων συγκρίνεται. λέγω γὰρ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα ὡς σὺ λέγεις. καὶ μὴν καὶ συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξάνεται, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει[3] τότε ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ· μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς, δι' ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται. γίγνεται[4] δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ' ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην,[5] εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης, εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα, αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν. ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὄν,[6] ὁπόταν μένῃ· μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν, διέφθαρται[7] παντελῶς. ἆρ' οὖν κινήσεις πάσας εἰρήκαμεν ὡς ἐν εἴδεσι λαβεῖν μετ' ἀριθμοῦ, πλήν γε, ὦ φίλοι, δυοῖν;

ΚΛ. Ποίαιν δή;

ΑΘ. Σχεδόν, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἐκείναιν, ὧν ἕνεκα πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις τανῦν.

ΚΛ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. Ψυχῆς ἦν ἕνεκά που;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη[8] κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα αἰεὶ μία τις· ἡ δ' ἑαυτήν τ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε συγκρίσεις[9] ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν, αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς, ἄλλη μία τις αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων.

ΚΛ. Ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.

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opposing objects, by those that stand they are divided, while with others that meet them (being borne from opposite directions) they unite, so that the centres and intervening parts come together into one."

3, 4, 5. See Note XXIII., App.

6. See Note XXIV., App.

7. *διέφθαρται.* "It is utterly destroyed," that is, "the thing which before *was*, no longer *is*." See Notes XXIII. and XXIV., App., on the words *φθίσις*, *αὔξησις*, *φθορὰ*, *εἰμὶ*, and *γίγνομαι*.

8, 9. See Note XXV., App.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου, θήσομεν ἐνάτην αὖ,[10] τήν τε ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα, ἐναρμόττουσαν πᾶσι μὲν ποιήμασι, πᾶσι δὲ παθήμασι, καλουμένην δὲ ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ταύτην δὲ δεκάτην σχεδὸν ἐροῦμεν.

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίνα προκρίναιμεν[11] ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐῤῥωμενεστάτην[12] τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως;

ΚΛ. Μυρίῳ[13] ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὐτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας, ὑστέρας.

ΑΘ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ῥηθέντων μεταθετέον[14] ἓν ἢ καὶ δύο;

ΚΛ. Ποῖα φῄς;

ΑΘ. Τὸ τῆς δεκάτης ῥηθὲν σχεδὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.

ΚΛ. Πῇ;

ΑΘ. Πρῶτον[15] γενέσει τέ ἐστι καὶ ῥώμῃ, κατὰ λόγον· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν τούτου δεύτερον, ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ἀτόπως ἔνατον.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἆρα ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον; καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτ' ἔσται

10. See Note XXV., App.

11. *τίνα προκρίναιμεν.* This is the common reading. It is evident, however, that *ἂν* should be supplied.

12. See Note XXVI., App.

13. *μυρίῳ.* Hyperbolical measure of excess. "By ten thousand times."

14. *μεταθετέον.* "Must we change the order in one or two particulars?"

15. *πρῶτον.* The meaning of this is, that what was last or tenth in the order of the previous investigation, becomes first in the order of nature and in the degree of importance; and that which we before wrongly called the ninth, becomes now the second. See Notes XXV. and XXVI., App.

ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον; ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἄλλο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη, πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;

ΚΛ. Κάλλιστα εἶπες· συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις.

ΑΘ. Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν. εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίν' ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων;

ΚΛ. Τὴν αὐτὴν δή που κινοῦσαν. ὑπ' ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μήποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως.

ΑΘ. Ἀρχὴν ἄρα[1] κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἐστῶσι γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν κινοῦσαν, φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν· τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα, δευτέραν.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου,[2] τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην[3] γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηΐνῳ, ἢ ἐνύδρῳ, ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ ξυμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι;

ΚΛ. Μῶν ἄρά με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν[4] αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν ὅταν αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῇ;

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1. ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων. "Seeing, then, that it is the principle of all motions, the first among things that stand, and being self-moving among things that move, we will say that it is the oldest and strongest," &c.

2. ἐνταῦθα λόγου. "In this part of our argument." Compare such expressions as ποῦ γῆς—πῖ γῆς—εἰς τόδ' ἀπορίας—ἵν' εἴ κακοῦ—ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω.

3. ταύτην. Supply κίνησιν.

4. ζῆν προσεροῦμεν ὅταν αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῇ; "Shall we call it *life* (or

ΑΘ. Ναί, ζῇν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῇν ὁμολογητέον;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλο.

ΑΘ. Ἔχε δὴ[5] πρὸς Διός· ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἓν μέν, τὴν οὐσίαν·[6] ἓν δὲ, τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· ἓν δὲ, ὄνομα. καὶ δὴ καὶ[7] ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΑΘ. Τοτὲ μὲν[8] ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ, τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν· τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον προτεινόμενον, ἐρωτᾷν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

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to live) when a thing itself moves itself?" *ζάω*, *to live*, and *ζέω*, *to boil*, *to bubble*, *to bubble up*, are unquestionably of the same radical idea. Effervescence or fermentation from the action of heat, taking place in matter otherwise apparently motionless, would be the phenomenon which of all others would most readily *suggest* to the primitive mind the idea of *self-motion*, and would thus be taken as a symbol of *life*.

5. *Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός*. "Hold there by Jove." An important position is gained. Let us secure it, and then advance to another view of the subject. Compare Gorgias, 490, A. The usual rendering of this phrase, *age dum*, does not seem to us to give its peculiar significance.

6. *ἓν μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν, κ. τ. λ.* "One thing the essence, one the *λόγος* or reason of the essence, and one the name." See Note XXVII., App.

7. *καὶ δὴ καὶ*. This phrase generally denotes an application of a preceding proposition. "And accordingly, respecting every such essence, there must be always two questions."

8. *τοτὲ μὲν . . . . . τοτὲ δὲ*. "At one time, the name being presented, we demand the *λόγος*, reason or definition; at another time, the *λόγος* or reason being given, we ask the name."

ΑΘ. Ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον[9] ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ὄνομα μὲν, ἄρτιον· λόγος δὲ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν,[10] ἄν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι, τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄν τε τοὔνομα, τὸν λόγον· ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμὸν προσαγορεύοντες, ταὐτὸν ὄν;

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ὦι δὴ ψυχῇ[11] τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν

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9. *δίχα διαιρούμενον.* This may be taken impersonally. "It is divided into two," or generally, "there is or there may be this division into two, both in other things and also in respect to number." *τούτῳ δὴ.* "To this thing, that is, this division"—*τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν,* "namely, that which has respect to number, the NAME (*ὄνομα*) is *ἄρτιον*; but the *λόγος* (notion, reason, or definition) is *a number divisible into two equal parts.*" And this is the *λόγος* or notion given in the eighth book of Euclid's Elements of Geometry, in these very words.

10. *μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν.* The whole passage may be thus freely rendered: "Do we not in both respects substantially predicate the same, if, being asked in respect to the notion, we give the name (of the thing of which it is the notion), and being asked in respect to the name, we give the notion (to which the name belongs)—predicating of the name as subject, *ἄρτιον,* and of the notion as subject, *a number divided,* &c., being substantially the same." After all, there seems no little confusion in the sentence. The two questions may be thus stated: 1st. What is the name of that whose notion is *a number divided,* &c.? To this the answer is *ἄρτιον.* 2d. What is the notion of that whose name is *ἄρτιον* or even? To this the answer is *ἀριθμὸς εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη διαιρούμενος*—*a number divided or divisible,* &c. We have placed a comma after *ὀνόματι,* although differing in this respect from the editions of Bekker and Ast. The following seems to us to be the order of the latter part: *προσαγαρεύοντες ὀνόματι, ἄρτιον, καὶ (προσαγορεύοντες) λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, ταὐτὸν ὄν (ἐν ἀμφοτεροις προσαγορευόμενον).* See Note XXVIII., App.

11. See Note XXVIII., App.

ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν[12] φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἥνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν;

ΑΘ. Φημί γε. εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν[13] μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων, καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις; ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν;

ΚΛ. Οὔκ· ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι' ἕτερον[14] ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδὲν, δευτέρα τε καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν,[15] τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή;

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἴμεν[1] ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώ-

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12. See Note XXVIII., App.

13. ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι. Ποθοῦμεν prægnantem sensum habet, est enim: *num quid adhuc desideramus* (*existimantes*) *non satis demonstratum esse, &c.*—Ast. We see no necessity for this explanation of Ast, but would prefer directly connecting ποθοῦμεν with δεδεῖχθαι, without resorting to any ellipsis or prægnant construction. "Do we yet feel the want of its being sufficiently shown," &c. Μὴ here occurs in the usual manner, and with the usual force which it has after verbs containing in themselves the sense of a negative either expressed or implied, such as those of *forbidding*, *preventing*, *want*, &c.; and in such cases it is not to be rendered by itself, but regarded as strengthening the quasi denial of the governing word. Ποθοῦμεν may be ranked in this class, and, alalthough a verb of want or desire, invariably takes an accusative.

14. See Note XXIX., App.

15. πολλοστὴν. For remarks on this word, see Note XXIX., App.

1. εἴμεν. The common reading is ἦμεν, but as the optative is clear-

ματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ, δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.

ΚΛ. *Ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.*

ΑΘ. *Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα.*

ΚΛ. *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.*

ΑΘ. *Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα*[2] *μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος.*

ΚΛ. *Ἀνάγκη.*

ΑΘ. *Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν*[3] *καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων; εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;*

ΚΛ. *Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;*

ΑΘ. *Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν*[4] *ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι;*

ΚΛ. *Τί μήν;*

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ly required, we have with Ast substituted *εἶμεν*, which is used for *εἴημεν*, the *η* in this form being often dropped in the dual and plural. *Κυρίως* is a stronger word than *ὀρθῶς*. It means "by authority—as an established truth—or as something which we may now assert with confidence."

2. See Note XXX., App.

3. *τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν καλῶν.* "Soul is the cause of the good, and fair, and right." It is not, however, simply the efficient cause regarded objectively, but the very subjective ground of their existence, without which they could have no being, whether there was a universe of matter or not. Where soul is not, there can be no harmony, no beauty, no right, no good. And so, also, it not only makes its own paradise, but its own earth, and its own hell. Without it there is no discord, no deformity, no evil.

4. *διοικοῦσαν — ἐνοικοῦσαν,* "pervading — inhabiting — indwelling."

ΑΘ. Μίαν, ἢ πλείους;[5] Πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶϊν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Δυοῖν[6] μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος, καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. Εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ[7] πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι, βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως· χαίρουσάν,[8] λυπουμένην· θαῤῥοῦσαν, φοβουμένην· μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν· καὶ πάσαις[9] ὅσαι τούτων ξυγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις, τὰς

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5. *πλείους.* The general sense of the passage is best preserved by rendering this word, not *many*, but *more than one.*

6. *δυοῖν.* See Note XXXI., App., on the Platonic doctrine of the evil principle.

7. *ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα.* Ψυχὴ is here used collectively as the antithesis of matter, for all souls, including the spirits of men and angels (or *δαίμονες*), as well as the Divine soul, which he regards as the principium or fountain of the whole genus. The doctrine, that even the human soul was older than body, was taught by Plato, yet not in the sense in which it is commonly understood. It has, however, no necessary connexion with his present argument against the atheists.

8. *χαίρουσαν.* The sudden change here from the infinitive to the participle seems made on purpose for variety. Χαίρουσαν, however, if any should choose so to regard it, may be taken with *ψυχὴν* as the accusative before these infinitives. The order would be thus: *αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι (τὸ) ψυχὴν χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, κ. τ. λ. βούλεσθαι σκοπεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.*

9. *πάσαις*, connect with *κινήσεσιν αἷς* above. Πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις, "first working motions," viz., those of soul—such as *βούλεσθαι σκοπεῖσθαι*, &c. Δευτερουργοὺς αὖ, "second working motions," corresponding to order second of motion described some ways back—"second causes," or "motions of matter produced by impulse" (*ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο μεταβολὴ*). The author has in view the classification made page 27, line 16, and also 30, line 15. This we believe to be the true sense of the passage, but a glance at the position of the participles and infinitives above suggests another division, which, although it may not have been intended, is yet most important and true. It will be seen that these participles all express *feelings* of the

δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων, ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν· καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας, θερμότητας, ψύξεις· βαρύτητας, κουφότητας· σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν· λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν· αὐστηρὸν, καὶ γλυκὺ, καὶ πικρόν· καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς[10] ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαμβάνουσα αἰεὶ θεὸν, θεὸς οὖσα, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα· ἀνοίᾳ δὲ ξυγγενομένη, πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει;

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Πότερον[11] οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ

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moral nature, while the infinitives denote the motions or exercises of the intellect. Now the passions or feelings being the most essential part of the soul, and that which excites the intellect to action, may, in respect to the latter, be styled πρωτουργοὶ (*first working*), just as the exercises of soul generally are πρωτουργοὶ, or *first working*, when compared with the secondary motions of matter. Παραλαμβάνουσαι, "taking along with themselves (as co-operatives or auxiliaries) the δευτερουργοὺς κινήσεις σωμάτων," namely, *second causes*, or *the laws of nature*.

10. καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς. Ὅις, although neuter, refers to the above recited δευτερουργοὺς κινήσεις of matter. Καὶ, if judged according to the English idiom, would be redundant as a connective. It may, however, retain its place as an intensive particle. Καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς is to be rendered as οἷς καὶ πᾶσιν. So Cornarius regards it—*quibus omnibus si anima, quæ Dea est, utitur*, &c. Or it may be taken in the order of the words, only regarding καὶ as intensive instead of connective, so that πᾶσιν is not additional, but only a collective term for all the things mentioned before—"And all which," or "even all (those second working motions) which the soul using—itself being Divine, and taking along with it that Divine thing νοῦς—rightly and happily guides all things; but when conversant with folly, it ever doeth the contrary," &c. Θεὸς here, according to a common Platonic usage, is equivalent to θεῖος.

11. πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος, "which of the two souls (lately mentioned), do we say, has the control of the heavens, &c.—the one wise and full of virtue, or the one that hath neither of these qualities?"

καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φαμέν; τὸ φρόνιμον, καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες; ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον; βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα;

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Εἰ μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ ξύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων, νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ[12] καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει, καὶ ξυγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντός, καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. Εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακήν.

ΚΛ. Καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. Τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει; τοῦτο ἤδη χαλεπόν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τανῦν προσλαμβάνειν.[13]

ΚΛ. Εὖ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον[14] ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾷν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἧι προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς,[15] τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κι-

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12. Νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ. See Note XXXII., App.

13. προσλαμβάνειν here has nearly the sense of ξυλλαμβάνειν, "to take part with, to assist you in the answer."

14. ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον. Compare with this the similitudes in the sixth book of the Republic, intended to illustrate the idea of the ἀγαθὸν; also, the comparison of the dark cave in the beginning of the seventh book, and the representation of the demeanour of those who, after coming out of its obscurity, are supposed to look directly at the sun, without making use of such helps as are furnished by the reflections of mirrors and of water.

15. Ἧι προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς. "Let us take as an image (since

νήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν· ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ, κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι.

ΚΛ. *Κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις.*

ΑΘ. *Μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τόγε τοσοῦτον τῶν τότε ἔτι, ὅτι τῶν ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν.*

ΚΛ. *Ναί.*

ΑΘ. *Τῶν δ' αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐν πλείοσι φερόμενα.*

ΚΛ. *Ἔστι ταῦτα.*

ΑΘ. *Τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν*[1] *τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τῶν ἐντόρνων οὖσαν μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.*

ΚΛ. *Πῶς λέγεις;*

ΑΘ. *Τὸ*[2] *κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτά, καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν, τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα*[3] *φοραῖς,*

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we cannot look upon *νοῦς* directly with our mortal vision) that one of the *ten motions* to which mind or reason bears a resemblance." These motions are called *seven* in the similar place of the Timæus, page 34, A. The ancient writers, when treating of physics, all varied in the enumeration, and sometimes the same writer varies from himself, as Plato does in this, and in the passage of the Timæus referred to.

1. *τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν.* The Attic connects masculine adjectives and pronouns in the dual, with feminine nouns—a rule, however, which is not universal. The common reading here has *τοῖν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένοιν*: also, below, *οὐσῶν* instead of *οὖσαν.* We have made the corrections on the authority of Eusebius, Ficinus, Stephanus, and the Cod. Voss., besides being alsolutely required by the exigentia loci.

2. *τὸ* belongs to *νοῦν κινεῖσθαι*, several lines below.

3. *ἀπεικασμένα* is neuter, because it refers both to *νοῦν* and *κινήσιν.* The order of this rather complicated sentence would be as follows: *λέγοντες (τὸ) νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κινῆσιν, (ἀμφότερα) ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς ἐντόρνου σφαίρας, κινεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαὐτως, καὶ ἐν τῷ αυτῷ, καὶ περὶ,* &c. . . . *οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν,* &c. That

οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων.

ΚΛ. *Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.*

ΑΘ. *Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε*[4] *μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως, μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ, μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτά, μηδὲ πρὸς ταὐτὰ φερομένη, μηδ' ἐν κόσμῳ, μηδ' ἐν τάξει, μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις, ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη ξυγγενής.*

ΚΛ. *Εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα.*

ΑΘ. *Νῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαῤῥήδην*[5] *εἰπεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ*[6]

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which is here styled *motion in one*, is not to be regarded as the same, in all respects, with the motion of a sphere, otherwise it would not be said to be likened to it. It is rather to be taken as a general term, the opposite of *motion in many*, *κίνησις ἐν πολλοῖς*, or motion accompanied by change of place. This, then, would be that higher species of motion, which, without change in the cause, produces motion in other things, itself remaining wholly in one, and is therefore likened to the motion of a sphere, which of all others presents to it the best similitude. It is the tenth of the above-mentioned enumeration, or the *αὐτοκίνησις* of soul.

4. *οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε.* See Note XXXIII., App.

5. *διαῤῥήδην.* The way is now prepared for answering clearly the great question, whether it is the good or the evil soul which governs the universe.

6. *τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν.* Ast here would substitute *τήν γε* for the common reading *τὴν δὲ.* By such a change the *μὲν* preceding would be left alone, and *φατέον*, with all that follows, made dependant upon *ὡς.* In which case it must be taken as the proposition which the speaker thinks can now be so clearly affirmed—all from *ἐπειδὴ* to *πάντα* inclusive, being brought in by way of parenthesis as a preamble to the sentiment. The order in that case would be thus: *νῦν δὴ, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι εἰπεῖν ὡς φατέον τήν γε οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν,* &c., "but now, since it is soul that directs all things for us, there is no longer any difficulty in asserting, that we must say, that soul, &c., either the best soul or the contrary, conducts the revolutions, at least, of the heavens." This proposition, however, besides being a mere unmeaning repetition of the first clause, had been clearly asserted before. We would, therefore, prefer the common reading (*τὴν δε*), by

οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν—

ΚΛ. Ὦ *ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων, οὐδ' ὅσιον*

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which this part of the sentence, with its principal or governing word *φατέον*, is referred directly to *ἐπειδὴ* by the connective force of *μὲν* and *δὲ*, leaving *ὡς* without any dependant clause expressed; so that the whole sentence might be regarded as unfinished or designedly abrupt, for the purpose of introducing with more effect the answer of Clinias, in which the proposition designed is brought out. This is no uncommon device in the Platonic writings, by which the most important truths are evolved from the person with whom Socrates or the chief speaker is conversing; thus furnishing a fine illustration of that *maieutical* process in which Socrates so gloried as his peculiar method. The whole passage, in accordance with this view, may be thus presented: *νῦν δὴ, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν φατέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψυχὴν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν περιάγειν, χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαῤῥήδην εἰπεῖν, ὡς*—ΚΛ. Ὦ *ξένε*, &c. "But now, since soul (as had been shown) is that which guides all things, and since, also, we are compelled (from this premise) to say that therefore soul, either the best soul or the contrary, carefully and orderly conducts the revolution of the heavens, there is no longer any difficulty in affirming clearly that"—he would have said, as the the apodosis to *ὡς*, which had been suspended—"that it is the best soul which doeth this," and that we are shut up to this conclusion; but at this point Clinias takes the proposition out of his mouth, and impatiently announces it in his own words: *ὦ ξένε*, (*there is no need of so long a preamble*) (*ἀλλὰ*), *but* (*from what has been said*) *it would be impious to affirm otherwise than that the soul which hath all virtue guides*, &c. This impatience of Clinias, for what seemed to him the inevitable conclusion, is finally expressed by the word *ἀλλὰ*, which often, like *γὰρ*, refers to something supposed to pass rapidly through the mind of the speaker, although not expressed—as in this case, in the negative words we have supplied before *ἀλλὰ*, or something equivalent. The great objection to Ast's substitution of *γὲ* for *δὲ* is, that it makes the whole proposition merely a repetition of what had been clearly affirmed before, and does not prepare the way naturally for the abrupt answer of Clinias.

ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.

ΑΘ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην,[7] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ' οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Περὶ ἑνὸς[8] δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἡμῖν ἄστρα ἁρμόττοντες φανοῦνται.

ΚΛ. Τίνος;

ΑΘ. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα[9] μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδείς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντος τῶν ζώων· ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς[10] πολλὴ τοπαράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι,[11] νοητὸν δ' εἶναι.

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7. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην. See Note XXXIV., App.

8. Περὶ ἑνὸς. Supply ἄστρου, which, in Greek, is often used for the sun and planets, as well as the fixed stars.

9. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, &c. Compare the well-known passage Xen., Memorabilia, iv., c. 3, 14.

10. ἐλπὶς. This word in Greek has a much larger signification than *hope* in English. It means here, and in many other places, *expectation*, or, rather, *ground of expectation, or belief*. So, also, the verb ἔλπομαι.

11. ἀναίσθητον—περιπεφυκέναι. This should be rendered not simply, "is not by nature an object of perception," but rather, that "it is so in consequence of being above the nature of the sense," being of a higher order of essence. Such is the force of περὶ. Ast would amend as usual, and read περιπεφυκέναι νοητὸν μόνον. νῷ δὴ, &c., placing a comma after αἰσθήσεσι, rejecting εἶναι, and connecting περιπεφυκέναι with νοητὸν. There is, however, no need of this. Περιπεφυκέναι bears more naturally upon ἀναίσθητον αἰσθήσεσι, or, rather, upon αἰσθήσεων understood. Ἔναι, which Ast wholly rejects, is far better adapted to the word νοητὸν. See Note XXIV., App., on the difference between ἐιμὶ and the other substantive verbs, such as γίγνομαι and φύω, when used with philosophical correctness. Such an expression as περιπεφυκέναι νοητὸν would be at war with

νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι[12] *λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε.*

ΚΛ. Ποῖον ;

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον εἴπερ ἄγει ψυχή, τριῶν αὐτὴν ἓν λέγοντες δρᾷν, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα.

ΚΛ. Τίνων ;

ΑΘ. Ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα[13] ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ σώματι, πάντη διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντη περιφέρει· ἤ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὕτη πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα· ἢ τρίτον, αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας θαύματι, ποδηγεῖ.[14]

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι δρῶσαν ψυχὴν πάντα διάγειν. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον[15] ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτε ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα[1] ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτ'

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some of the best-established Platonic distinctions, although it might perhaps be used by the author in a careless manner. Περὶ gives this word the sense of superiority, in the same way as in *περίειμι* and *περιγίγνομαι*. The whole may be thus freely rendered: "We have great reason for believing that this whole genus, being imperceptible to all the senses of the body, is above (the nature of) the senses, or is by nature above the senses, and is peculiarly an object of intelligence (*νοητὸν εἶναι*). Let us, therefore, apprehend by mind alone," &c.

12. *διανοήματι*. For a most philosophical and acute discrimination between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια*, *νόημα* and *διανόημα*, *νόησις* and *διανόησις*, see the Republic, close of the sixth book. They seem to be used here for the sake of amplification, and with little apparent difference of meaning between *νόημα* and *διανόημα*.

13. *ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα*. See Note XXXV., App.

14. *ποδηγεῖ*. As the second was represented as *impelling* or *pushing*, so this purely spiritual unembodied influence is more properly described as *guiding*, *monstrans viam*.

15. *αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον*. "The better part of it," namely, *this soul*; if, with Stephanus, we read *τὸ ἄμεινον*, *sed quære*.

1. *ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα*. See Note XXXVI., App.

ἔξωθεν, εἶθ' ὅπως,[2] εἶθ' ὅπη, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα. ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. Ναί,[3] τόν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον ἀνοίας.

ΑΘ. Ἄστρων δὲ δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν, καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν; εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως; εἶθ'[4]

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2. ὅπως, *quomodo*; ὅπη, *qua parte*. θεὸν here is equivalent to θεῖον. See Remarks, page 33, 10. We must not, at all events, interpret the term by our own theology, which attaches to Deity and Divinity the highest sense of an uncreated intelligence. In the Greek usage, as we have seen, the word includes all above man, and Plato even applies it to the δαίμονες.

3. ΚΛ. Ναί, τόν γέ που μὴ. Whatever excellences (and they are certainly of a very high kind) this treatise on laws may possess, it is undoubtedly, as a dialogue, inferior to many of the others in point of dramatic skill. Clinias and Megillus are too much men of straw; although, perhaps, it was one part of the author's design to contrast their simplicity and unreasoning faith with the philosophical acuteness of the chief speaker. They seem, however, to us, to assent too readily, and sometimes before we can well suppose from their characters, as here delineated, that they fairly understand some of the propositions presented. While involved in these continuous abstract discussions, with the argument all managed by one person, we would gladly find relief in one of those vigorous logical contests, of which we have so fine a specimen in the Gorgias, as exhibited in the long-protracted struggle of the unprincipled yet bold Callicles against the most powerful reasoning that Socrates could command. In respect to dramatic excellence, the Gorgias, Phædon, and Protagoras are unrivalled by any similar productions of ancient or modern times.

4. εἶθ' ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖ. The common reading is εἶθ' ὅστις, which seems to have been introduced from the two preceding examples of that word. We have not hesitated to follow Boeck in reading εἶθ'. Ast would substitute ἔσθ' ὅστις. "We will say that they are Gods, whether being in bodies, and being animated, they

ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖ, ὑπομένει μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξένε, παραφρονῶν[5] οὐδείς.

ΑΘ. Τῷ μὲν τοίνυν μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ,[6] ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, εἰπόντες ὅρους[7] ἀπαλλαττώμεθα.

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order the whole Heaven, or in whatever way and manner it may be—and then (*εἶθ'*), or, in the second place, can any one who admits these things adhere (to the opinion) that all things are not full of Gods or Divine powers?" The last clause is a consequence or inference from the first, and therefore well introduced by *εἶτα*, which is an inferential particle, used when the conclusion is so plain, that surprise is expressed that any one should think it could be otherwise. It is on this account generally, as in the present case, brought in abruptly and interrogatively without any connective; as, for example, Aristophanes, Acharn., 311:

ταῦτα δὴ τολμᾶς λέγειν
ἐμφανὼς ἤδη πρὸς ἡμᾶς; εἶτ' ἐγώ σου φείσομαι;

sometimes in the very beginning of the sentence:

εἶτ, εἰ δίκαια, τοῦτον εἶπειν αὖτ' ἐχρῆν.

Acharn., 561.

It is easy to see how much more force and vividness is given to the passage in this way, than by the tame reading which Ast proposes. It may be thus paraphrased: "What else can we do, but to say that they are Gods; and then, if this is admitted, who will have any difficulty with the necessary conclusion (*à fortiori*) that they are everywhere?" Ὑπομένει may be well rendered by the vulgar English phrase, "will any one stick to it?" that is, obstinately *persevere* in the denial? This declaration, that "all things are full of Gods," was a saying of Thales, and is thus referred to by Aristotle, De Anima, lib. i., 8: *καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι ᾠήθη.* Compare, also, the treatise De Mundo, ascribed by some to Aristotle, and generally published among his works, ch. vi.: *καθόλου δὲ, ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἁρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν πόλει δὲ* ΝΟΜΟΣ, *ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἡγεμών—τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ.*

5. *παραφρονῶν.* "Beside one's self,"—*deranged.*

6. *ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ.* This does not refer to time absolutely, but to the state of the argument.

7. *εἰπόντες ὅρους.* "Imposing terms," viz., those that follow.

ΚΛ. Τίνας;

ΑΘ. Ἢ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν, τιθέμενοι ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἶναι πρώτην, καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσα τούτων ξυνεπόμενα εἴπομεν, ἢ μὴ δυνάμενον βέλτιον λέγειν ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι, καὶ ζῆν θεοὺς ἡγούμενον εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον. ὁρῶμεν οὖν εἴτε ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῖς οὐχ ἡγουμένοις θεοὺς εἰρήκαμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί, εἴτε ἐπιδεῶς.

ΚΛ. Ἥκιστά γε, ὦ ξένε, πάντων[8] ἐπιδεῶς.

ΑΘ. Τούτοις μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ λόγων[9] τέλος ἐχέτω· τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν[10] δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον.[11] Ὦ ἄριστε[12] δή, φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεούς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι[13] ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν

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8. πάντων, connect with ἥκιστά γε. A very strong negative.

9. τὸ λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω. Equivalent to οἱ λόγοι τέλος ἐχέτωσαν. Compare τὸ λόγων with τὰ τῶν διακόνων, for οἱ διάκονοι, Soph., Philoct., 497; and τὸ τῶν θηρίων, for τὰ θήρια, Plat., Republic, viii., 563, c.

10. See Note XXXVII., App.

11. παραμυθητέον. "We must give *him* also a word of exhortation."

12. Ὦ ἄριστε—ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεούς. "That you believe in the existence of Gods," that is, "as far as the fact of your belief to that extent is concerned, we may say, that a certain kindred or innate feeling (συγγένειά τις), imparted by or derived from the Divinity (θεία), leads you," &c. Or, συγγένεια θεία may mean what the philosopher elsewhere styles the Divine part of man, or the Divine in the human—a Divine affinity or kinsmanship—as we style conscience the immediate representative of the Divine nature in the human soul. ξύμφυτον should be connected with τιμᾶν and νομίζειν, "a natural honouring," &c., which, however, is supposed to be sufficiently rendered by acknowledging their existence, like Epicurus and his followers, who pretended greatly to magnify and *honour* the Gods, when they assigned them a life of perfect repose, *extra mundum,*

Semoti ab rebus nostris longeque sejuncti.

13. τύχαι. "The fortunes of wicked and unjust men, both in public and private life." Compare the speech of Polus in the Gorgias, 471, A.

οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις[14] *δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι*[15] *ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις. ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους*[1] *ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τανῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών,*[2] *ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης προστυχὼν πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισί, δι' αὐτὰ*

14. For the common reading *δόξαι*, we read, with almost all the commentators, *δόξαις*, which is not only necessary to the sense, but required as the antithesis of *ἀληθείᾳ*. *Ἐμμελῶς*, "*considerately, orderly, methodically*, with a proportionate regard to all the circumstances of the case."

15. *ὑμνούμεναι*. This was one of the charges made against the poets in the third book of the Republic: *ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσι περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι ἐισὶν ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί· δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι.* Repub., 392, A. The same charge is made by the prophet against the Israelites. "*And now we call the proud happy, yea, those who do iniquity are exalted.*" Malachi, iii., 15. On the words *εὐδαίμονες εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι*, see Note XXXVIII., App.

1. *πρὸς τέλος ἀνοσίους*. See Note XXXIX., App.

2. *ταράττῃ τανῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών*. The common reading places a comma after *τούτοις*, and connects *ἰδὼν* with what follows. In this state, it has given a good deal of trouble to some of the commentators, especially to Ast. The difficulty, however, may be removed, as we think, by the reading adopted, although the location of the word would be rather unusual. *Ταράττῃ ἰδὼν* is equivalent to *ταράττῃ ἰδεῖν*, "you are troubled at the sight." *Αὐτόπτης προστυχὼν*, "happening to be an eyewitness." The whole may be thus freely rendered: "Or—when beholding men growing old, who continue unholy even to the end of life, leaving children and children's children in the highest honours, *you are* troubled at the sight; or, when hearing by the ear, or happening to be an eyewitness of the impious and dreadful deeds which have occurred in the lives of certain persons, you yet behold them, by reason of these very crimes, advancing from a low condition to the highest power, then it is evident that you blame," &c. Some editions omit *ὁρᾶς* altogether as redundant; but by the disposition we have made of *ἰδὼν*, it is not only admissible, but necessary.

ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ[3] μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεούς, ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων, διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν[4] ἐθέλων· ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τινος ἀλογίας ἅμα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν[5] θεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ' εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος[6] πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ' ἐάν[7] πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι[8] λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες[9] τὸν ἑξῆς

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3. *δῆλος εἶ.* A peculiar Græcism, equivalent to *δῆλον ἐστί σε μέμφεσθαι.* It would be good Greek, and perhaps still more Attic, to say *δῆλος εἶ μεμφόμενος.*

4. *διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων.* *ἂν* is joined to participles as well as to verbs, when the participle can be resolved into a subordinate clause. "When you would not be willing, if you followed that natural feeling." See Remarks on *ξυγγένεια* (12), page 42.

5. *δυσχεραίνειν.* A most significant term, although not easily transferred to the English. It means, literally, *to disrelish*, that is (in this connexion), "to get rid of the innate moral sense or *taste* spoken of above, under the term *ξυγγένεια.*" Or it may refer to the wholesome prejudices mentioned in note on 8, 3.

6. *πάθος.* Some would reject this word as having crept in as a repetition of the *πάθος* above. It may, however, be taken as in apposition with *τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα.*

7. *ἀλλ' ἐάν.* This place may be freed from its difficulties if we read *οἷόν τε*, regard *ᾖ* understood as subjunctive to *ἐὰν*, and refer *γενώμεθα* to *ἵνα*, instead of *ἐάν*, as is generally done. Ordo, *ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἔλθῃ . . . ἀλλ' (ἐάν πως οἷον τ' ᾖ) ἵνα γενώμεθα δυνατοὶ ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι . . . πειρώμεθα*, &c "That it may not increase, but that (if possible) we may be able, &c. . . let us try."

8. *ἀποδιοπομπήσαθαι.* On the peculiar force and significance of this remarkable word, see Note XL., App.

9. *συνάψαντες.* "Having connected our next argument with that which we so thoroughly (*διὰ*) concluded (*διεπερανάμεθα*) against the man, who did not hold that there were Gods." *ᾧ* is to be referred to *διεπερανάμεθα*, although in the dative by the attraction of *σὺν* in *συνάψαντες.* Connect *πειρώμεθα* with *προσχρήσασθαι.* "Let us endeavour to use as an additional argument."

λόγον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τοπαράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τανῦν προσχρήσασθαι. σὺ δ', ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν.[10]

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σὺ οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾷ· ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις.

ΜΕΓ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τάχ' ἂν ἴσως[11] εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουον γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς

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10. διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν. There is yet an allusion to the strong flood mentioned, 21 (14): καθάπερ εἰ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν. In that place it was figurative of the dark and profound argument respecting self-motion (αὐτοκίνησις), the depths of which had to be so carefully sounded by the Athenian before the others could venture to follow him. Here there is an allusion to a like difficult argument soon to follow, respecting a special Providence. Διαβιβῶ is Attic future for διαβιβάσω.

11. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τάχ' ἂν ἴσως. The common reading gives this to the Athenian. The words ἤκουον and παρῆν below, show beyond doubt, that it belongs to Megillus. There are, it is true, several various readings, but they have all evidently arisen from a desire to accommodate some ancient error, which gave this passage to the Athenian. τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, "just now spoken," referring to the argument by which it was shown that it was the best soul (ψυχὴ ἀρίστη) which moved and guided the heavens and the earth. What is said reminds us of the speech of Clinias, 4 (3). Here, as well as in that place, surprise is expressed that it should be thought necessary to resort to laboured and recondite arguments to prove so plain a thing as the doctrine of a special Providence. "Do this," Clinias says, "and we, as far as is possible, will do what you tell us." And then Megillus, the simple-minded Spartan, breaks in, "But it could not be any very difficult affair to show," &c. From the position just proved, namely, that it was the best soul that moved, &c., they, in their simplicity, directly infer, or, as we might say, leap at once to the truth of a special Providence, although the Athenian or Socrates, having in view more stubborn disputants, wishes to enter more minutely into the argument.

νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.

ΚΛ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε[12] ἐπήκουον.

ΑΘ. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξετάζωμεν,[13] τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν, νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι, φαμὲν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δ' ἐναντία, κακίας;

ΚΛ. Φαμέν.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν, αἰσχρὰ, τούτων, τὰ δὲ, καλὰ φήσομεν;

ΚΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ,[14] ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν.

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12. *καὶ σφόδρα γε.* Ast thinks that this also is the language of Megillus: *Megilli sunt verba egregie in Spartanum convenientia.* We cannot see why they do not agree as well with the character of Clinias. Besides, had it been the same speaker, we can hardly believe that he would have used *ἐπήκουον* so soon after *ἤκουον.* The word *κοινῇ,* in the following answer of the Athenian, seems to imply that both the others had uttered their assent to what had been said. Γὲ, when connected with such words as *σφόδρα, μάλιστα, σχεδὸν,* &c., seems not so much to qualify the *sense* as the *force* or vehemence of the expression; by which we mean, that it makes a sort of apology for the term, implying that a stronger one might perhaps have been used, but that the speaker means to keep within bounds. Thus, Clinias says: *σφόδρα γε,* "earnestly to say no more, or to use no stronger expression, did I give heed to it." In this way, although a limiting particle, it does, in an indirect manner, increase the force of the term to which it is attached.

13. *συνεξετάζωμεν.* The common reading here is *συνεξεταζόντων,* which neither suits the vulgar text preceding it, nor any of the various readings proposed. The change is made on the authority of the best commentators, and the Latin versification of Ficinus—*communiter investigemus.*

14. *καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν.* Τῶν and *ἡμῖν* are neither of them

ΚΛ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ, ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς;[15]

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' εἰς τοὐναντίον.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

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governed by *προσήκειν*, but by *μετὸν* below, which may have a dative of the person and a genitive of the thing. Ast regards *τῶν* as governed by *προσήκειν*, but he is clearly wrong. *μετὸν* is used for *μετεῖναι*; and thus taken for the infinitive, there is no anomaly in the neuter plural *ὁπόσα*. In this use of the participle for the infinitive, the Greek resembles the English more than the Latin. Compare the Philebus, 22, E.: *οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο*. There should be a comma after *εἴπερ*, which is not to be connected with *ὁπόσα φλαῦρα*, but is to be taken elliptically, or with the ellipsis supplied, thus: *εἴπερ (τινὲς εἰσὶν οἷς μέτεστι)*. *ὁπόσα φλαῦρα* is to be referred to *τῶν μὲν*. The order of the whole, with the ellipsis supplied, would be as follows: *καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἐροῦμεν προσήκειν μετεῖναι τῶν ὁπόσα φλαῦρα—εἴπερ (τινὲς εἰσὶν οἷς μέτεστι)*. "And we will say, that to us (if to any beings) it pertains to have a share in those things that are bad, but to the Gods there is not the least participation," &c. For this use of *εἴπερ*, compare Aristotle's Politica, ii., 6: *χρησίμου δὲ οὔσης θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ—πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*. Aristot., Ethic. Nicomach., v., 9, 9: *οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ—βλάπτεται μόνον*. Aristophanes, Nubes, 227:

ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ ταῤῥοῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; εἴπερ.

15. ΚΛ. *Καὶ πῶς*; "And how should we?" ΑΘ. *Ἀλλ' εἰς τοὐναντίον*. *Ἀλλὰ*, like *γὰρ*, frequently refers to something understood, supposed to pass rapidly through the mind of the speaker. It also always implies a negative, if not expressed. This use of these little particles gives singular beauty as well as force to the Greek language. They thus carry along with them variety and fulness of meaning, at the same time without encumbering or weakening the sentence with too many words. By silent implication they keep us from losing sight of previous propositions. Thus, *ἀλλὰ* here carries along with it, or keeps in mind, the whole of the preceding sentence, being pregnant with a denial of the question. "No, we cannot assign *ἀμέλειαν ἀργίαν*, &c., to the virtue of soul, but (*ἀλλὰ*) to the contrary."

ΑΘ. Τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις[1] εἰς τοὐναντίον.

ΚΛ. Τοὐναντίον.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν δή; τρυφῶν[2] καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε (ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι) γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσιν ἡμῖν.

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1. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις, that is, "the opposites of τρυφὴ ἀργία, &c., must be assigned εἰς τοὐναντίον; that is, εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς.

2. τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε . . . πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. Ast, as usual, is for emendation here, and thinks this could be made better by inserting after γίγνοιτ' ἂν the word ἐχθρὸς or μισητός, for which he deduces an argument, not very intelligible, from μισεῖ below. It may, however, be read as it stands, and regarded as an application, to human affairs, of the previous sentiment, by supposing θεὸς understood after τοιοῦτος, and by taking away the interrogation which is found in most editions. The order would be thus: τοιοῦτος (θεὸς) πᾶσιν ἡμῖν γίγνοιτ' ἂν τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς ἔφασκεν εἴκελον εἶναι, &c. "Such a Deity would be to us all τρυφῶν, ἀμελὴς, &c.; in short, one whom (ὃν), or just such a one as the poet said was like," &c. The only real difficulty in the passage is in ὃν, which, as it stands, is somewhat harsh. The relative we should expect would be οἷον, corresponding to τοιοῦτος. From its position, however, in the order of the words before its correlative, it may be regarded as affected, through a species of attraction, by the words immediately preceding. Had it followed τοιοῦτος, it would probably have been οἷον, in which case the sentence would have presented no difficulty. The form of words in Greek is frequently affected by distance or contiguity, so as to be different from what would be required by strict grammatical dependance. See remarks on the word πολλοστὴν, Note XXIX., App. The view taken in respect to ὃν is confirmed by similar examples which occur a few lines below: οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον ὅ γε, instead of τοιοῦτον οἷόν γε. So, also, page 49 (5), in the words ὦ δὴ προσήκει, &c. The poet here referred to is Hesiod:

> τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες, ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς
> ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν.
>
> *Works and Days*, 278.

It may be that we have ὃν, instead of οἷον, to accommodate it to the language of the verse quoted; a circumstance which often interferes with the strict grammatical dependence of a sentence.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών.[3]

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν[4] οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ· τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.

ΚΛ. Οὐ μὲν δή. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Ὅτι δὴ προσήκει[5] μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκο-

3. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Ast would subjoin these words to ἔφασκεν, and make them a part of what was said by the Athenian. They undoubtedly refer to ἔφασκεν, yet it is perfectly agreeable to the Greek idiom to regard them as the answer of Clinias. There is a great deal of vivacity in such an elliptical reply. It is equivalent to ἔφασκεν, ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Our own language admits of it; as, *e. g.*, when it is asserted that one said so and so, the reply may be, *and most correctly too.*

4. οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν. A most important truth. *God hates that, and that only, which is unlike himself. The Divine character is the ground and sanction of the Divine Law.* It must never be called in question: τῷ πειρωμένῳ τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. "No allowance is to be made to him who would even attempt to utter such a thought."

5. Ὅτι δὴ προσήκει. Ὅτι is the relative of τοιοῦτον some distance below. If it had immediately followed it in the construction of the sentence, it would perhaps have been more properly οἵῳ δή. The same reasons apply here that were given in respect to ὅν a few lines above. The order of the sentence would be as follows: κατὰ τίνα λόγον οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοῖμεν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον ᾧ (οἵῳ) δὴ προσήκει, &c. "By what reason (or why) should we not act absurdly in praising such a being as the one to whom it belongs to act and to exercise care in a special manner, *and yet* the mind of this being should care only for the great, *while* it neglects the small." When δέ occurs a number of times in a sentence, there is a difficulty in putting it into anything like tolerable English, without too much circumlocution. The first δέ indicates an opposition between the two main members of the sentence; the second, between two subordinate clauses. In such cases the subordinate δέ is best rendered by our word *while*, in order to avoid the awkward repetition of the conjunction *but*.

πῶμεν δὲ ὧδε· ἆρ' οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει[6] ὁ πράττων εἴτε θεὸς, εἴτ' ἄνθρωπος;

ΚΛ. Ποίω δή;

ΑΘ. Λέγομεν· ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ.[7] ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ,[8] ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.

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6. τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει, namely, neglects small things.

7. ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. Stephanus here would read ὅδε. Else, he says, δέ must be regarded as redundant, or otherwise the sentence would remain suspended. According to this view of Stephanus, the following would be the order: ὅδε ἀμελεῖ, ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ, &c., ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ εἰ διαφέρει. "He neglects, either thinking that it makes no difference, &c., or through sloth and effeminacy, if it does make a difference." We think, however, there is no need of this supposition, or of regarding the δέ as redundant. There is a μὲν implied (if it is not rather lost by a corrupt reading) after or before διαφέρει. In that case, δέ has its usual force of opposition or contrast, and should be rendered *while*, as above. The alternative intended, and also the antithesis made by the δὲ in the subordinate member—εἰ (μὲν) διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ—would be clearly expressed thus: "We say, then (ὁ πράττων πράττει), the doer doeth thus, either supposing that it makes no difference to the whole, when small things are neglected, or else (he doeth thus) through indolence and effeminacy, if, in fact, it does make a difference, while yet he neglects them."

8. μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν. This is appended by way of explanation or epexegesis of the preceding ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον, &c. The order would be thus: οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον, &c., τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων (τῷ) μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ (τούτων) ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν γίγνηται ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, which may be freely rendered thus: "When it is impossible to take care of all things, then no one, whether it be a God or any inferior being, can be justly charged with neglect of those things, be they great or small, in respect to which, he is wanting in the requisite power for a special Providence." Or, in other words, there can be

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Νῦν δὴ δύ' ὄντες[9] τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι[10] ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι· παραιτητοὺς[11] δὲ ἄτερος, ὁ δὲ, ἀμελεῖν τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν, θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων[12] εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα; ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. Οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Τί δαί;[13] δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστι θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους[14] ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες.

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐ-

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no neglect where there is no power. In such a case, *μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is not the same with *ἀμελεῖν*. See Note XLVI., App., *On the Peculiarities of certain Negative Forms of Verbs*. *θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν* is equivalent to *τὶς εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε φαῦλος ὤν*. So, also, *σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων* may be viewed as equivalent to *εἴτε σμικρῶν εἴτε μεγάλων*, "whether small or great." Or, it may be regarded as understood, as in the Republic, vi., 486, B.: *οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις. τὸ ποῖον; εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής.* "Surely you will not omit this (circumstance). What circumstance? Whether docile or dull."

9. *δύ' ὄντες.* The two supposed objectors.

10. *οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι.* "Who admit, both of them, that the Gods exist, while the one says that they are easily propitiated, and the other, that they are regardless of small things."

11. *παραιτητοὺς.* See Note XLI., App.

12. *τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.* "All such things as are capable of being perceived by the sense and by the understanding."

13. *τί δαί;* Δαί has the same analogy to *δή* that *ναί* has to *νή*. It differs from *δή* only in a prolongation and sharpening of the voice to express surprise or wonder, which is its usual office. "But really!"

14. *ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους.* See Note XLII., App.

τοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τοπαράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους ὁμολογοῦμεν; δειλίας γὰρ[15] ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία· ῥᾳθυμία δὲ, ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν. οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπόν,[1] εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τοπαράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο· ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τὸ γιγνώσκειν τοὐναντίον;

ΚΛ. Οὐδέν.

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα,[2] ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε, καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν[3] ὧν δὴ πράττουσι, διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, οὐ ποιεῖν;

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15. *δειλίας γὰρ.* Connect this with what is said page 46, 10: *ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας.* See Note XLIII., App.

1. *τὸ λοιπὸν.* "For the rest of our argument." *τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν.* "Which have a relation to the whole."

2. *θῶμέν σε λέγοντα.* "Shall we put you down as saying that the Gods are ignorant, and that even when they ought to exercise a care, they through ignorance neglect it; or, that knowing that they ought, yet still, as the meanest of men are said to do, who know better, &c.; so they (the Gods), through the overpowering influence of pleasures and griefs, do not do what they ought?" *Δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.* A mode of expression very common with the nominative neuter participle of *δεῖ* and of the compounds of the substantive verbs. It is nearly equivalent to the genitive absolute, being, however, more closely connected with the reasoning of the sentence in which it stands, instead of denoting, like the latter, a mere accessory circumstance of time or place. "It being necessary," or "when they ought," &c.

3. *βελτίω πράττειν.* Stephanus, on the authority of Eusebius, would here read *βέλτιον πράττειν, melius esse alia facere. βελτίω πράττειν,* however, is more strictly in accordance with the purest

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ τάγε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα[4] τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον[5] αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζώων ἄνθρωπος.

ΚΛ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά[6] φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῶα, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.[7]

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς. οὐδετέρως[8] γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντίως[9] ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πεφυκότε;

Greek idiom. Compare the examples, χαλεπὰ or χαλεπώτερα ὁρᾶν; also such phrases as ῥᾴδια μαθεῖν, καλὰ ἰδεῖν, λόγος δυνατὸς κατανοῆσαι, ἡδιστὴ πίνειν, ἀξία θαυμάσαι, and others, which are generally expressed in Latin by the supine, *difficile visu*, *mirabile dictu*, &c. In such cases, of an infinitive dependent on an adjective, the Greek usage of the active, instead of the passive, corresponds to the English idiom. As we say, *hard to learn*, *cruel to behold*, *better to do*, instead of *better to be done*, although some might regard this last example as hardly admissible.

4, 5. ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα . . . . . θεοσεβέστατον. See Note XLIV., App.

6. θεῶν κτήματα. See Note XLV., App.

7. οὐρανὸν ὅλον. This is here evidently put for the whole animated universe, like Paul's πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις, Rom., viii., 22, "*the whole creation, the whole creature world.*" σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα, "be they great or small." See page 50, (8.)

8. οὐδετέρως. "In neither respect," that is, whether you take the ground that we are small or great. ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι. The participle, in such connexions as this, often has the force of a conditional clause, "*if they are most provident*," &c.

9. ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντίως. "Have they not (that is, have not sense and power) reciprocally an opposite nature in respect to ease and diffi-

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὁρᾷν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ[10] χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα· φέρειν δ' αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων.

ΚΛ. Καὶ πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον[11] ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν,

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culty?" τὸ περὶ αἰσθήσεως is equivalent to τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, or ἡ αἴσθησις; and both taken together constitute a nominative for the dual verb ἐστὸν.

10. τὰ σμικρὰ. We may say in Greek, χαλεπώτερόν ἐστι τὰ σμικρὰ ὁρᾷν, or τὰ σμικρά ἐστι χαλεπώτερα ὁρᾷν. See Remarks, page 52, (3), on the words βελτίω πράττειν.

11. Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον. Ast would place a comma after δὴ, and render according to the following order: ἰατρῷ δὴ βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ θεραπεύειν τι προστεταγμένον, &c. "To a physician who is willing and able to heal something committed to his care," &c. In this view αὐτῷ below is made redundant. This interposition of the pronoun, it is true, is not unusual in a long and complicated Greek sentence; yet still it seems to us in this place more natural and easy to regard προστεταγμένον as the nominative (some would call it the accusative) neuter impersonal absolute, like δέον, page 52 (2). It is true, this usage generally takes place with the neuter participle of δεῖ, or of the impersonal compounds of the substantive verb, such as ἐξὸν, προσὸν, παρὸν, and the kindred ὑπάρχον, yet we not unfrequently find it extended beyond these limits. The same usage occasionally prevails in respect to παρασχὸν, τυχὸν, δόξαν, sometimes with δοκοῦν, προσῆκον, and now and then with passive participles generally; as, Thucyd., i, 125, δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς, "when it was determined by them." So, also, with εἰρημένον and ὄν joined with adjectives; as, αἰσχρὸν ὄν, "it being base," or, *quum turpe sit*—ἄδηλον ὄν, δυνατὸν ὄν, &c. See Kühner, 312. If the rule may in this case admit of being extended to προστεταγμένον, which is somewhat akin to δόξαν δεδογμένον and εἰρημένον, the sentence may be thus rendered, and according to the following order and punctuation: Ἰατρῷ δὴ βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ προστεταγμένον, ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν, ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς τὸ πᾶν αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελουμένῳ, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι; "When, to a physician who is both willing and competent, it is appointed to heal any whole, will his work, as a whole, be in a condition creditable to him, attending, or if he attends only to the great portions, while he neglects the small?" Take

βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ, τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελουμένῳ, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι,[12] ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν;

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς, οὐδ' οἰκονόμοις, οὐδ' αὖ τισὶ πολιτικοῖς, οὐδ' ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ σμικρῶν, πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν[13] τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν τόν γε θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν[14] ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα[15] τε σοφώτατον, βουλόμενόν τ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνά-

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ἐπιμελουμένῳ as a conditional clause, like ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι, on which we remarked a short distance back. In this way θεραπεύειν is governed by προστεταγμένον, and αὐτῷ comes in easily in the order of the sense.

12. ἐπιμελουμένῳ . . . ἀμελοῦντι. See Note XLVI., App.

13. ἄνευ σμικρῶν. See Note XLVII., App.

14. Ἀξιώσωμεν. Some would here prefer the reading ἀξιῶμεν on account of the particle μὴ, which, it is contended, cannot be joined with the 1st aorist subjunctive active. To this rule of the grammarians there are, however, so many cases in direct opposition, that it may well be doubted whether the common reading should be changed on account of it. See many of these cases, Matthiæ, Gr. Gram., 728, and the emendations by which he proposes to make them conform to this rule.

15. τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα. This is to be connected with δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον above. Had it immediately followed, it would have required only the connective τέ in μήτε, and would probably have read thus: μήτε τοίνυν τόν γε θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον εἶναι, μήτε θεὸν ὄντα (ἀξιώσωμεν), &c. "Let us not deign to think that the Deity, of all others, is inferior to mortal workmen, nor that, being a God most wise, with the will and the power, &c., he should take no charge of those small things, the care of which is so

μενον, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναι σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων[1]—

ΚΛ. *Μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτ' ἀληθὲς διανόημα διανοοίμεθ' ἄν.*

ΑΘ. *Δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη μάλιστα μετρίως*[2] *διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν.*

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easy," &c. The δὲ in this case is occasioned by the parenthetical or explanatory clause, *οἱ τὰ προσήκοντα*, &c. There is an opposition, or, rather, contrast between this clause and what follows, and this contrast is denoted by δὲ, which, in consequence of its position and relation to a subordinate part, appears harsh and difficult to be rendered. It is a rule in English composition, that there should be no grammatical dependence between a parenthesis and the other members of a period; or that it should be so introduced, that it may be taken out without altering the grammatical relation of the other parts. The propriety of such a rule may be doubted. At all events, the Greek writers allowed themselves much more freedom in the construction of their periods; and hence the frequent occurrence of what grammarians style *anakoloutha*, and suspended sentences. Perhaps, on the whole, it would be better thus to regard the passage before us as suspended, for the sake of the stronger impression. After speaking parenthetically of the exact care exercised by human artists, the writer breaks out in the following unfinished contrast: "But that God, being most wise, possessed of power and will, &c., should neglect small things like some idle and cowardly being, while he concerns himself about the great"—The impatient and characteristic interruption of Clinias then comes in with admirable effect—*No, we can hold no such opinion; we can entertain no such false and unholy sentiment.* In this way far more power is given to the sentence than could be imparted by the most perfect regularity.

1. *τῶν δὲ μεγάλων.* "While he does concern himself about the greater." See the remarks on the best mode of rendering δὲ in certain cases, page 49, 5 and 50, 7.

2. *μετρίως.* "Properly, both in manner and degree." *τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν.* "The one who loves to impute neglect to the Gods—who querulously arraigns the Divine Providence." Ordo —*φιλαιτίῳ θεῶν περὶ τῆς ἀμελείας.*

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι[3] τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.[4]

ΑΘ. Ἐπῳδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν.

ΚΛ. Ποίων, ὦ ἀγαθέ;

ΑΘ. Πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα,[5] ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δ' εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι[6] ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι·[7] ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς

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3. *τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι.* See Note XLVIII., App.

4. *ὀρθῶς.* Stephanus, whom Ast follows, and whom Eusebius and Ficinus seem to countenance, would connect *ὀρθῶς* with the preceding *λέγειν*, making the whole, from *τῷ γε* to *ἔτι τινῶν*, the language of the Athenian. *Alioque λέγειν, sine hoc adverbio quem usum hic haberet?* STEPH. *Μὴ λέγειν* itself, however, in the sense of "speaking improperly," or of "saying nothing to the purpose," is so common in Greek, that we much prefer the vulgar text, which gives *ὀρθῶς* to Clinias, making it very similar to the reply of the same speaker, page 49 (3), *ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών*, on which we have remarked. There is great vivacity, and much that is characteristic of the simple-hearted Clinias in this interrupting assent. It is principally directed to the word *βιάζεσθαι*, and intimates that, in his view, the argument had been perfectly irresistible, so that nothing more need be added. As much as to say—you are most correct in declaring that you have *forced* him; your argument is, indeed, most triumphant. And then this brings on very naturally the subsequent reply of the chief speaker: "And yet there seems to me to be need in addition of something of a more persuasive kind." *τινῶν ἐπῳδῶν.*

5. *συντεταγμένα.* Not simply "appointed by" (although this sense is included), but "so arranged as to co-operate (*συν*) with the universal guardian."

6. *ἄρχοντες.* See Note XLIX., App.

7. *ἀπειργασμένοι.* This word must have here the sense of *consti-*

τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον[8] ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν. σὲ δὲ λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις[9] ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνεται[10] πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾗ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ[11] γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον[12] βέλτιστον· μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται. σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ[13] τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν[14] τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη[15] σώματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς δι' ἑαυτὴν[1] ἢ δι' ἑτέραν ψυχήν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔρ-

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tuted, *appointed*, or *organized*, although such an application is somewhat unusual. Εἰς *μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον*, "to the most minute division." Τέλος must be taken abverbially, as equivalent to *τελέως*. Ὧν must be referred to *τούτοις* and *συντεταγμένα*.

8. *ξυντείνει βλέπον*. "Looking tends." The participle, being a favourite part of speech with the Greeks, is often thus used in connexion with a verb; in this manner becoming equivalent to two verbs in English, as though it were *βλέπει καὶ τείνει*.

9. Γένεσις. See Note L., App.

10, 11, 12, 13. See Note LI., App.

14. *κατὰ δύναμιν*, &c. "According to the power of the common generation," that is, as far as it is possible for both these ends to be jointly accomplished, viz., the good of the individual and the good of the universe at the same time.

15. *συντεταγμένη*. The common reading here is *ἐπιτεταγμένη*. We have, however, followed Eusebius and Stephanus, who refers to several old manuscripts as authority. Συντεταγμένη makes a much better sense, and is much better adapted to the context. It may be rendered here, "soul appointed to act *in co-operation with* body."

1. *δι' ἑαυτὴν*. "By its own internal action." *δι' ἑτέραν ψυχὴν*. "Through the influence of another soul." This is one of those cases in which *διὰ* with the accusative would be said to signify the instrumental cause, a sense which it generally has with the genitive. Even here, however, we may perceive a difference. It denotes a spiritual instrumentality, either of soul upon itself, or of one soul upon another, and may, perhaps, be more appropriately rendered *by reason*

γον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ, ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης μοίρας λαγχάνῃ.

ΚΛ. Πῇ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἥιπερ ἂν ἔχοι λόγον[2] ῥᾳστώνη ἐπιμελείας θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον[3] ἀεὶ βλέπων πλάττοι τις, μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἐμψύχον,[4] καὶ μὴ ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα, πλήθεσιν ἄπεις[5] ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης[6] κοσμήσεως· νῦν δ' ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς αὖ λέγεις;

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of, than *by means of*, although the two expressions sometimes come nearly to the same thing, *means reason* and *motive*, in regard to spiritual agencies, having often the like relation. The sentiment is this: "The adaptation of the soul to its appropriate state is its own work. Nothing, then, is left to the chess-player but to transfer the pieces thus adapted to their proper stations." Μετατιθέναι—*calculum quasi retractare*, "to take back or change a piece." We render πεττευτῇ, *chess-player*, by way of accommodation to a well-known game, in order to give more force to the simile. ψυχὴ here means more properly *vis animæ*, than the substance of soul itself.

2. Ἥιπερ ἂν ἔχοι, &c. See Note LII., App.

3, 4. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. For an extended explanation of this difficult passage, and of what follows for some distance, see Note LIII., App.

5. ἄπειρα. Supply μετασχηματίσματα.

6. Μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως. "Displaced arrangement," that is, requiring a new arrangement at every act of providential interference; a displacing of the whole order of the chess-board at each move. See the comparison of the πεττευτὴς a short distance back, where we have also the verb μετατιθέναι. Μετασχηματίζω would mean here, *to transform immediately*, without intermediate means (*media*) or successive generations of cause and effect. Μεταβάλλει, on the other hand, although active in form, has an intransitive or middle meaning, signifying a change from internal causes in the things themselves, whether innate or implanted.

ΑΘ Ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον[7] δὲ ὂν γενόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί, (γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζώων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου) καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα ξυνιδὼν ἐμηχανήσατο[8] ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμηχάνηται[9] δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο, τὸ, ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι, καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς[10] ἀφῆκε ταῖς

7. *ἀνώλεθρον . . . αἰώνιον.* See Notes LIV. and LV., App.

8. *ἐμηχανήσατο. Excogitavit.* This word savours somewhat of Plato's peculiar doctrine of the necessary existence of evil, arising out of that depravity which was connected with matter, in the constitution of things. It seems to represent the Deity as struggling with this disorder, and employing all the resources of his wisdom in devising plans to counteract its influence. See Note XXXI., App., on the doctrine of the good and evil principle. *Ποῦ κείμενον.* "In what situation lying," *ubi quæque pars sita est*, or "in what manner each part might be so disposed as in the best and easiest manner to give the victory to virtue, and the least advantage to wickedness or evil."

9. *μεμηχάνηται.* A change is here made from the aorist to the perfect tense, to intimate that it is a finished, settled, or established mode of proceeding, employed at the present time as well as in the first origin of things. The aorist *ἐμηχανήσατο* had reference to single and individual parts and acts; *μεμηχάνηται* has regard to the whole, *πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο.* It is best rendered here as a present: "He contrives this in reference to the whole, namely, what kind of a situation everything which becomes of a certain quality must receive and inhabit." See Note LVI., App.

10. *τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς.* This expression is equivalent to *τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ποιόν τι.* In the words *ἕδραν, οἰκίζεσθαι,* and *τόπους* above, we may yet discover the metaphor of the stones and the builder, made use of page 55 (13). Like the comparison of the dark and dangerous flood, it lingers long in the writer's mind, and affects, un-

βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.

ΚΛ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός.

ΑΘ. Μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ' ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα[11] τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν· μεταβάλλοντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης[12] τάξιν καὶ νόμον. σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν[13] μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω, κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα μεταπεσόντα, εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων, ὅσα Ἅιδην[14] τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσι[15] ζῶντες διαλυθέντες τε τῶν σωμάτων· μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάβῃ, διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμίξασα[1] γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα[2] καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον, ὅταν δὲ τἀναντία, ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεθιδρύσασα τὸν αὐτῆς βίον.

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consciously perhaps, his language, even where there was no designed reference to it. This method of carrying along metaphors contained, yet half concealed, in single words and phrases, is a peculiar beauty of Greek composition, by no means confined to their poetry, although this abounds with the richest examples of it.

11. *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.* See the close of Note LVI., App.

12. *κατὰ τάξιν εἱμαρμένης.* See Note LIV., App.

13. *σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν.* For an extended explanation of this difficult passage, and of what follows, see Note LVII., App.

14. *Ἅιδην ἐπονομάζοντες.* See Note LVIII., App., on the Greek *Ἅιδης*, compared with the Hebrew שְׁאוֹל and בֵּית עוֹלָם.

15. *φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσι.* See Note LIX., App., on the similar fears of Hell which have existed in all ages.

1. *ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμίξασα.* Compare this with 2 Peter, i., 4: *ἵνα γίγνησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως.*

2. *διαφέροντα.* Connect this with *τόπον*, although such a construction is rather harsh and unusual. On this passage, and especially the word *ἅγιον*, see Note LX., App., on *the spirituality of some*

Αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν οἱ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,[3]

ὦ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε, ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν· κακίω μὲν γιγνόμενον, πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχάς, ἀμείνω δὲ, πρὸς τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον, ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις,[4] πάσχειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἃ προσῆκον δρᾷν ἐστι τοῖς προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς.[5] ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μήποτε οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς[6] γενόμενος ἐπεύξηται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν. ἢν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἔταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες,

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of the Platonic views in regard to the future blessedness of the soul, and the capability, which many parts of the Platonic writings possess, of being accommodated to a higher system of truth.

3. Αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν οἱ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσι. This is an undoubted hexameter line, evidently intended as a quotation. What immediately follows, although the language of the writer, and designed only for prose, is yet capable of being reduced to the same measure by a slight transposition, and by pronouncing θεῶν in one syllable, as must frequently be done in the Greek poetry,

Ὦ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε, δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀμελεῖσθαι.

The Platonic writings furnish many examples of a similar kind, which by slight changes, and sometimes with no change at all, may be reduced to a pleasing rhythm. They were, in all probability, not designed, but flowed spontaneously from the well-tuned ear and harmonized spirit of this poetical philosopher. Nothing could more perfectly describe the exquisite softness and polish of his own Greek, than what he says of Theætetus, in the dialogue of that name, page 144, B.: οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος.

4. ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις. See Note LXI., App., on the mystical senses of this word.

5. προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς. "Like to like."

6. ἀτυχὴς. Ficinus here evidently read εὐτυχὴς without εἰ, for he renders the passage thus: *Quare nec tu neque ullus alius optet confidatque se adeo felicem fore ut judicium hoc Decorum effugiat atque exuperet.* It is capable, however, of a very good sense according to the common reading. "Neither do you expect, nor if any other is in like unfortunate condition (that is, exposed to the Divine justice), let him ever boast he shall escape (or survive) the justice of Heaven." Περιγενέσθαι—*superesse.* The same remarks apply to εἰ here, as to εἴπερ, page 46 (14). It is equivalent to οὔτε ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς γενόμενος, εἴπερ ἐστι τοιοῦτος, ἐπεύξηται, &c.

χρεών τε ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τοπαράπαν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ[7] ποτὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς. οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ' ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος, εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ· τίσεις δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν, εἴτ' ἐνθάδε[8] μένων, εἴτε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου διαπορευθείς, εἴτε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἀγριώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς[9] τόπον. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη, τῶν, οὓς σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ σμικρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας, ἀνοσιουργήσαντας, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον πράξαντας, ᾠήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι, κᾆτα, ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις,[10] αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἡγήσω κα-

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7. *οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς.* Ἀυτῆς refers here to Δίκη, or the Divine Justice or Law personified. See Note LXII., App., *on the Divine Omniscience, and the remarkable resemblance between this passage and certain declarations of the Scriptures.*

8. *ἐνθάδε.* "*In this world*, or in Hades after having passed through (*δια—πορευθεὶς*) this world." In the same way, *ἐκεὶ* is often used for *the other world.* There is a power in these brief adverbs, when thus employed, that no descriptive terms could equal. They are several times used in this manner in the Gorgias, especially in the passage where Socrates is pointing Callicles to that final and Divine tribunal, where he will stand so much more in need of a defence and of an advocate, than in the Athenian courts—*χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ* 'ΕΝΘΑΔΕ, *σὺ* 'ΕΚΕΙ—*No less than I would* HERE (*that is, before a human bar*), *will you be speechless and dizzy* THERE. Gorgias, 527, A. With how much effect are they employed by Euripides, when Medea, in making her last address to her children, says so concisely, yet with such fulness of meaning:

> Εὐδαιμονοῖτον· ἀλλ' 'ΕΚΕΙ· τὰ δ' ΕΝΘΑΔΕ.
> Πατὴρ ἀφείλετ':
> Would that ye might be blessed, but THERE; all HERE
> Your father's hand hath ruined.
>
> *Medea*, 1069.

9. *διακομισθεὶς.* The intensive sense of *διὰ* comes directly from its primitive local sense: *through, thorough,* significant of completeness. Here both offices unite: "*carried through all intervening states to the remotest bounds.*"

10. *ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις,* &c. "In the events of their lives, as in mirrors, you think you have seen (reflected) the neglect of all things by the Gods." This fine simile is exceedingly descriptive of those

θεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν· οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν,[11] *ὅπη ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμβάλλεται. Γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἤν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ' ἂν τύπον*[12] *ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον ξυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν*[13] *τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σε πεί-*

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who look only upon the *surfaces* of things, *superficial men*, *ἄνδρες ἐπιπόλαιοι.* It suggests the similar comparison, by the Apostle James, of those "who behold their natural faces in a glass:" *ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ*, James i., 23. *Πράξεσιν αὐτῶν.* Not "their deeds," but rather, "the events of their lives," namely, "their seeming or superficial prosperity in the midst of all their crimes." *Πρᾶξις* sometimes has almost the sense of *πάθος*, and may mean a *condition* or *state*, thus differing from the derivatives of *ποιέω*, and even from most verbals of a similar form terminating in *ις*. As in the Trachiniæ of Sophocles, 151:

> *Τότ' ἄν τις εἰσίδοιτο, τὴν αὐτοῦ σκοπῶν*
> ΠΡΑΞΙΝ, *κακοῖσιν οἷς ἐγὼ βαρύνομαι.*

Πρᾶξις is also a technical term, used in reference to the stage or tragedy. It is so applied by Aristotle, in his Art of Poetry, to that event which constitutes the leading action of the drama. There may be some such allusion here to human life, and especially the life of such as are here referred to, in the light of a drama, a tragic *πρᾶξις*, which has not yet been wound up, or come to its catastrophe, and the issue of which has not yet been seen. *Τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν.* The genitive, having a much more extensive significance in Greek than the corresponding possessive case in English, and embracing many more relations, frequently gives rise to constructions which appear to us very harsh. Thus here, *θεῶν* bears to *ἀμέλειαν* the relation of agent, while *πάντων* has to it the relation of object. Instead, however, of governing them both by *ἀμέλειαν*, it would, perhaps, be better to regard *θεῶν* as an ellipsis for the more usual expression of the cause or agent, *ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν.*

11. *Οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν.* See Note LXIII., App., *on the doctrine of a final judgment.*

12. *τύπον.* On the use of this word, see Note LXIV., App.

13. *εὐδαιμονίαν . . . δυσδαίμονα.* The location and context of these words in this passage, and a few lines above (*ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονες γεγονέναι*), furnish an admirable illustration of the remarks made Note XXXVIII., App., on the difference between *happiness*, in the usual

θει Κλεινίας ὅδε καὶ ξύμπασα ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ὅ, τι λέγεις, καλῶς ἄν σοι ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς[14] *ξυλλαμβάνοι· εἰ δ' ἐπιδεὴς λόγου τινὸς ἔτι ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε,*[15] *εἰ νοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ θεοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλονται, ἔγωγε οὐ παντάπασι φαύλως*[1] *ἂν φαίην ἡμῖν*

worldly sense of the term, and *blessedness*. The passage may be paraphrased: "Without giving heed to this type of life, that is, without keeping in mind this general notion (see Note LXIV., App., *on the word τύπον*) of their contribution (*συντέλειαν*) to the good of the whole, you will be able to form no right judgment respecting *blessedness* or its opposite." Or, if we take the other view of *συντέλεια*, adopted in Note LXIII., App., and regard it as including the idea of *end, consummation, final reckoning*, &c., we then have a sentiment almost the same with the famous declaration of Solon to Crœsus, related by Herodotus, lib. i., 32, and which sometimes appears in the tragic poets as an ancient saying; as in the beginning of the Trachiniæ of Sophocles:

Λόγος μὲν ἐστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανεὶς
ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν
θάνοι τις . . . .

14. *Ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς.* There cannot be a doubt but that this is to be taken here in its purest and highest sense, as referring to the *One Ineffable Supreme*—the *One True God* of Socrates and Plato. "The Deity himself, the very being whose existence and Providence we have been proving—may he assist you." Had he referred in any way to the local Divinity of Athens or Pallas, he would have used the feminine *αὐτὴ*.

15. *πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε.* "Keep listening (as the present imperative here most impressively signifies) while we address ourselves to the third head of our argument." This is evidently spoken not to the two companions who, with the speaker, formed the *γερουσία* mentioned above, but to the imaginary young disputant so frequently referred to. It has been shown, 1st, that GOD IS; 2d, that he exercises a special Providence; which two propositions are almost equivalent to what the apostle assigns as the objects of faith, Heb., xi., 6. It now remains to be shown that he is not easily propitiated, or turned away from the right, by the offerings and sacrifices of the wicked.

1. *οὐ παντάπασι φαύλως.* The speaker evidently looks back with

ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· τὸ δὲ παραιτητοὺς αὖ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τοῖσιν ἀδικοῦσι δεχομένους δῶρα, οὔτε τινὶ συγχωρητέον παντί[2] *τ' αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν τρόπῳ ἐλεγκτέον.*

ΚΛ. *Κάλλιστ' εἶπες· ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.*

ΑΘ. *Φέρε δὴ*[3] *πρὸς θεῶν αὐτῶν, τίνα τρόπον παραιτητοὶ γίγνοιντ' ἂν*[4] *ἡμῖν, εἰ γίγνοιντο αὖ; καὶ τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τι-*

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a good deal of satisfaction, to what he regards as his master-piece in this argument: the subtle disquisition about self-motion. On the word *παραιτητοὺς*, see Note XLI., App.

2. *παντὶ τρόπῳ.* He seems to regard this as the most important position of the three, as being, in fact, more vital to the soul's highest interests than any speculative belief in the Divine existence, or in a Providence without it. Hence, he says, "there must be no yielding here, and no pains must be spared in the refutation of this pernicious error," namely, that the wicked can easily propitiate the Deity by gifts.

3. *Φέρε δή.* Δὴ never wholly loses its force as an inferential particle. It has, however, much less strength as an illative than *οὖν* or *ἄρα*. It imports in such a connexion as this, a going on of the argument, a transition to another head, with an implication that something previous had been proved in a solid and satisfactory manner. It implies, therefore, when thus employed in argument, a consciousness of strength, and an anticipation of victory. Hence, when joined with *ἄγε, φέρε, λέγε*, or with imperatives generally, it has been most appropriately styled *δὴ hortativa.*

4. *γίγνοιντ' ἂν.* "Would they *become* propitiated or placable?" The use of *γίγνοιντο* instead of *εἶεν* implies that they are to be regarded as previously angry. There is in the Protagoras, 340, c., a still more striking example, in which the true sense wholly depends on the distinction between these two substantive verbs. It is there shown that the two propositions *χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν*, and *χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν*, instead of being the same, as Protagoras rashly supposed, are, in fact, so widely distinguished, that one is true and the other false. *For a bad man to become good in his own strength is not only difficult, but impossible. For one who has become, or who has been made good, or who is so by nature, TO BE good, is not only not difficult, but delightful.* Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγε τὸ χαλεπὸν ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ΈΜΜΕΝΑΙ.

νες[5] ὄντες; ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν που γίγνεσθαι τούς γε διοικήσοντας[6] τὸν ἅπαντα ἐντελεχῶς[7] οὐρανόν.

ΚΛ. Οὕτως.

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5. *τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τινες.* "Who being, or of what kind being?" In these two questions *τίνες* refers to the offices the Gods are supposed to hold to men, and *ποῖοί τινες* to the nature of those offices, or the manner in which they are discharged. The answer to *τίνες* is contained in the word *ἄρχοντας* below. The answer to *ποῖοί τινες* is suggested in the specification of the several *kinds* of rulers set forth.

6. *διοικήσοντας.* "Who are going to administer." The future here is used, not in reference to the actual state of things, but subjectively, to the state of the argument. "Who on our scheme are going, &c., or whom we are *going to represent* as actually administering." So, also, the mathematician employs *ἔσται* and *ἔσονται* in the statement of his demonstration, although there is no sequence or futurity, except in the mode in which the mind conceives of the relations of truths, which in themselves are older than time or space. Subjectively, to the demonstrator, they may appear, and be stated as consequences yet future.

7. *ἐντελεχῶς.* "*Actually*, as opposed to *potentially*." Corresponding to *ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ*, as opposed to *ἐν δυνάμει*. Hence the noun *ἐντελέχεια*, so much used by Aristotle, as contrasted with *δύναμις*. Philologists have differed much about the etymology of this word. The derivation, however, from *ἐντελής*, *perfect*, *complete*, and *ἔχω*, seems satisfactory, both as respects form and meaning. That which exists only *ἐν δυνάμει* is *inchoate* and *imperfect: activity*, *energy* (*αὐτοκίνησις*) is its completion and perfection. The word *actually*, in English, has come to signify not much more than *truly*, *as matter of fact*, and is therefore not a good representative of *ἐντελεχῶς*, although it is difficult to find any other substitute for it. There is another word, *ἐνδελέχεια*, *continuance*, *duration*, which some confound with this, as is done by Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 22: Quintum genus adhibet, vacans nomine; et sic ipsum animum *ἐντελέχειαν* (*ἐνδελέχειαν*) appellat, quasi quamdam *continuatam motionem*. The etymology of *ἐνδελέχεια* is very uncertain. Τὸν *ἅπαντα οὐρανόν* is here put for the whole universe—the Heavens and all things they contain. It is very much like the Hebrew expression תַּחַת כָּל הַשָּׁמַיִם, as Job, xxviii., 24: *He looketh under the whole Heaven*, or —שְׁמֵי שָׁמַיִם, *the Heaven of Heavens*, that is, *all space—the universe.*

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τίσι προσφερεῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ τίνες τούτοις, ὧν[8] δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν μείζοσιν ἐλάττονας; πότερον ἡνίοχοί τινες ἂν εἶεν τοιοῦτοι ζευγῶν ἁμιλλωμένων, ἢ πλοίων κυβερνῆται; τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀπεικασθεῖεν στρατοπέδων ἄρχουσί τισιν. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ νόσων πόλεμον[9] εὐλαβουμένοις ἰατροῖς ἐοικέναι περὶ σώματα, ἢ γεωργοῖς περὶ φυτῶν γένεσιν εἰωθυίας ὥρας χαλεπὰς διὰ φόβων[10] προσδεχομένοις· ἢ καὶ ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν[11] ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων[12] δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη[13] δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ

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8. ὧν is genitive by reason of *τυγχάνειν—quos assequi possimus*, or, quorum compotes esse possimus.

9. *νόσων πόλεμον.* The language employed above respecting contending chariots and commanders of camps, suggested the representation of the physician in the same style, as carrying on a war with diseases. In all this, however, he has in mind the allusion which soon follows to what he styles *μάχη ἀθάνατος*, the grand and universal conflict between the powers of good and evil, on which we have dwelt at length, Note LXVI., App. Εὐλαβέομαι. "*To be careful, circumspect, cautious.*" Hence *to be timid, fearful*, especially *to be occupied with religious dread, to be devout towards God*; although in this last sense, as Prof. Hacket, in his Notes to Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, has well observed (page 92), it is seldom, if ever, found in classic usage. The primary conception of the word, from εὖ and *λήβω, λαμβάνω*, is *to handle carefully, to touch with caution.*

10. *διὰ φόβων.* An adverbial phrase similar to *διὰ φιλίας, δι' αἰσχύνης*, &c., *with fear* or *timidly*. It sometimes has the form *διὰ φόβου*. The common reading is *διὰ φόβον*, which is certainly incorrect. Compare the phrase *δι' ἀπεχθείας*, Æsch., Prom. Vinc., 121.

11. *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν.* This admission could only have referred to the fact of the mixture of good and evil in the world, and which may be regarded as expressed in what is said page 32, line 3. Plato has in no other part of this book, except in the present passage, told us which he thought had the preponderance.

12. *πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μὴ.* For an extended examination of this passage and the doctrine contained, see Note LXV., App.

13. *μάχη ἀθάνατος.* On this remarkable expression, see Note LXVI., App.

τοιαύτη, καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς[14] *δεομένη· ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες,*[15] *ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων· φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης· σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη*[1] *καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσι.*[2] *βραχὺ δέ τι καὶ τῇδε ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐνοικοῦν ἡμῖν σαφὲς ἴδοι. ψυχαὶ δή τινες*[3] *ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκοῦσαι, καὶ ἄδικον λῆμα κεκτημέναι, δηλονότι*[4] *θηριώδεις,*[5] *πρὸς τὰς τῶν φυλά-*

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14. See Note LXVI., App.

15. *θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες . . . κτήματα θεῶν.* See Note LXVII., App.

1. *σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη.* See Note LXVIII., App., on the ancient division of the four cardinal virtues.

2. *ἐμψύχοις δυνάμεσι.* "Animated, spiritual, or moral powers and faculties," in distinction from physical agencies, or what he elsewhere styles second working motions, or second causes.

3. *ψυχαὶ δή τινες ἐπὶ γῆς.* Δὴ, as an inferential particle, relates back to what precedes *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ*, &c. What followed came in by way of parenthetical ejaculation, suggested by the previous metaphorical allusions and mention of *πόλεμος* calling up to mind the great conflict of the universe, as presenting a bold and striking contrast with the petty conceptions of the men whose doctrine he is disproving. He now returns to them, and resumes the more natural order of the argument, which had been interrupted. "There *are*, then, (it seems), certain souls dwelling upon the earth," &c., namely, such as would measure the Gods by themselves, and attribute to them all those imperfections and weaknesses which pertain to such earthly guardians and rulers as we have mentioned by way of comparison.

4. *δηλονότι.* This is generally given as two words, *δῆλον ὅτι.* The construction, however, seems to require that it be taken and written as one: *δηλονότι—as is clear, evidently*, &c.

5. *θηριώδεις.* There should, we think, be a comma after this word. The usual rendering, *ferocious*, would not here be in harmony with such expressions as we have below—*πείθουσι θωπείαις λόγων, καὶ ἐν εὐκταίαις ἐπῳδαῖς.* It might much better be translated *brutal*, or, rather, *brutish*, referring not so much to the wildness and fierceness of their dispositions, as to the stupidity and beastly grossness of their conceptions. It is meant by these terms to indicate men who have no right notions, any more than the beasts, of their

κων ψυχὰς ἄρα κυνῶν, ἢ τὰς τῶν νομέων, ἢ πρὸς τὰς τῶν παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν προσπίπτουσαι, πείθου-

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true relations to God and the universe. Aristotle, in his Ethic. Nicomach., vii., 1, seems to use the term in this sense, to denote a state as much below what is properly human as the Divine is above it; although he applies the epithet to a class of men: *ὥστε ἡ θεία ἕξις ἂν εἴη δηλονότι τῇ θηριωδείᾳ ἀντιθεμένη.* It would seem here to correspond well to the Hebrew בַּעַר, as used Psalm xlix., 11; lxxiii., 22; xcii., 7. Proverbs, xii., 1; xxx., 2. The sentiment, Psalm xcii., 7, is strikingly in harmony with the whole train of thought in which Plato here indulges respecting the views such men entertain of the Divine justice. *The brutish man* (בַּעַר, *θηριώδης*) *knoweth not, and the gross man* (כְּסִיל from כָּסַל, *carnosus pinguis fuit*) *understandeth not this, that when the wicked flourish, it is that they may be destroyed forever.* To make *θηριώδεις* agree with *ψυχὰς* would be exceedingly harsh, not only in respect to the construction, but also as regard the sense.

ἄρα κυνῶν. There is a peculiar force and elegance in this particle *ἄρα*, when thus employed. The *ἢ*, which follows twice, justifies, as in similar cases, the supplying of another *ἢ*, or, rather, an *εἴτε*, before it, and then it will be in all respects parallel to the Iliad, i., 65:

Ἐιτ' ἄρ' ὅγ' εὐχωλῆς ἐπιμέμφεται, εἴθ' ἑκατόμβης.

Hogeveen styles it, in such cases, *ἄρα conjecturalis.* This, however, is but little, if any, significant of its real force. Even in such an example it does not wholly lose its power of concluding. Neither, as he supposes, does it denote the reason why Apollo was angry. That he had reason for anger was taken for granted from the fact. *Since* he *was* angry, *therefore* the prophet was to tell the cause, whether it was on account of a vow or a hecatomb. So, in this passage, we may render: "Being evidently brutish, and approaching (or falling upon) their keepers, be they dogs or shepherds, or rulers of the highest grade, they would persuade them by flatteries," &c. That is, *since* they are brutish (*therefore ἄρα*), it matters not to them whether they be dogs or shepherds, &c.: *because* they are of this gross and animal nature, they make no distinction between the highest and the lowest class of guardians, but stupidly imagine that they all may be influenced alike. Thus the inferential force of *ἄρα* is *felt* in giving vividness and a great addition of meaning to the sentence, while yet it is free from the encumbrance and clogging ef-

σι[6] θωπείαις λόγων, καὶ ἐν εὐκταίαις τισὶν ἐπῳδαῖς (ὡς αἱ φῆμαί φασιν αἱ τῶν κακῶν) ἐξεῖναι πλεονεκτοῦσί σφισιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πάσχειν μηδὲν χαλεπόν. φαμὲν δ' εἶναί που τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα τὴν πλεονεξίαν[7] ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ πολιτείαις, τοῦτο αὖ τὸ ῥῆμα μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν.

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν, τὸν λέγοντα ὡς εἰσὶ συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς[8] τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ, καθάπερ κυσὶ λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν, οἱ δὲ, ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις, συγχωροῖεν τὰ ποίμνια διαρπάζειν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν φασκόντων παραιτητοὺς εἶναι θεούς;

ΚΛ. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τίσιν οὖν δὴ τῶν προῤῥηθέντων ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους φύλακας εἶναι θεοὺς οὐκ ἂν καταγέλαστος γίγνοιτο ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν; πότερον κυβερνήταις, λοιβῇ γε οἴνου κνίσσῃ τε παρατρεποιένοις[9] αὐτοῖς, ἀνατρέπουσι δὲ ναῦς τε καὶ ναύτας;

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fect of a formal argumentative statement. This use of ἄρα, γὰρ, ἀλλὰ, &c., when employed with reference to what is supposed to exist in the mind, rather than in the expression, is one of the most striking beauties in the Greek language. If θηριώδεις here must have the sense of *ferocious*, or, like a wild beast in respect to disposition, it should be taken in connexion with πρὸς τὰς ψυχὰς, and in that case would imply, that having been ferocious towards their keepers, they afterward seek reconciliation by flatteries, &c. Ast connects θηριώδεις with πρὸς ψυχὰς, although he gives it the comparatively weak sense, *agrestes*. *Animos igitur quosdam, &c., patet agrestes ad custodum animos.* Whatever view, however, we may take of θηριώδεις, its relation to ἄρα will remain the same.

6. πείθουσι. See Note LXIX., App.

7. πλεονεξίαν. See Note LXX., App.

8. ἂν αὐτοῖς, &c. See Note LXXI., App.

9. παρατρεπομένοις. "Turned *aside* from the path of right." The

ΚΛ. Μηδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' οὔτι μὴν ἡνιόχοισί[10] γε ἐν ἁμίλλῃ συντεταγμένοις, πεισθεῖσιν ὑπὸ δωρεᾶς ἑτέροισι τὴν νίκην ζεύγεσι προδοῦναι.

ΚΛ. Δεινὴν γὰρ εἰκόνα λέγοις ἂν λέγων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον.

ΑΘ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς γε, οὐδ' ἰατροῖς, οὐδὲ γεωργοῖς· οὐδὲ νομεῦσι μήν, οὐδέ τισι κυσὶ κεκηλημένοις ὑπὸ λύκων.

ΚΛ. Εὐφήμει.[11] πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πάντων φυλάκων εἰσὶ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν οἱ πάντες θεοί;

ΚΛ. Πολὺ γε.

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metaphor in the word suggests the conception of a deviation from a right line. It is evidently intended to furnish a case of paranomasia with ἀνατρέπουσι.

10. ἡνιόχοισί. All these datives are to be referred to ὁμοίους above. It is not the reinsman here who offers the prayer, but who is supposed to be prayed unto; and yet, although in this respect the cases are not similar, we cannot help thinking that Plato had in mind some of those prayers which Homer occasionally puts into the mouth of his heroes, for aid not only in the accomplishment of wicked purposes, but also in very trivial circumstances. As, when they pray for assistance in the gamès, in the horse-race, and especially when the goddess Pallas, in aid of her favourite knight Diomed, assumes the reins and overturns the chariot of Admetus. Iliad, xxiii., 390.

11. Εὐφήμει. A strong and earnest word of caution. "Be careful how you speak—speak words of good omen." It was employed in the sacrifices to caution the people against the utterance of any inauspicious words during the religious rites. There is a very fine and impressive example of its use in the Republic, lib. vi., 509, B., where, at the suggestion of Glaucon, that Ἡδονή, or Pleasure, might be The Good, Socrates cries out, εὐφήμει, "utter words of good omen, or be cautious in your language;" intimating that there might be blasphemy in the very conception. The same feeling is excited here by the bare thought, that the course of the argument had required him, however necessarily, to connect the mention of the Deity with such comparisons as had been used.

ΑΘ. *Τοὺς δὴ κάλλιστά τε πράγματα φυλάττοντας, διαφέροντάς τε αὐτοὺς φυλακῇ πρὸς ἀρετήν, κυνῶν χείρους καὶ ἀνθρώπων μέσων*[12] *εἶναι φήσομεν, οἳ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν ποτε προδοῖεν ἕνεκα δώρων παρὰ ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν ἀνοσίως*[13] *δεδομένων*;

ΚΛ. *Οὐδαμῶς· οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς ὁ λόγος. τῶν τε*[14] *περὶ πᾶ-*

12. Μέσων. "Men holding a middle rank between Gods and the brute animals." Ast's rendering, *mediocribus*, is a very poor one, because it would denote those who held a middle rank among men themselves, or *ordinary men*. Μέσος, however, may perhaps have here the same sense with *μέτριος*, *just*, *equitable*, although we do not recollect any example of such usage. This meaning of *μέτριος* undoubtedly came from that old system of ethics founded on the saying *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, and which Aristotle afterward made the foundation of his doctrine of *Ethical Means*.

13. *ἀνοσίως δεδομένων*. Compare Proverbs, xxi., 27: *the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination.*

14. *τῶν τε περὶ πᾶσαν . . . . . ὄντων*. Ast would read *τῶν γε*, and connect this (to *ὄντων*) with the preceding sentence. In accordance with which view he renders: *Neque tolerabilis est haec oratio hominum in quovis impietatis genere versantium.* There is no difficulty, however, in connecting *τῶν* (as in the common reading) with *ἀσεβῶν* following, if we may regard the repetition as arising from the length of the intervening clause, and also as intended to add force and vehemence to the whole sentence. "*Of all those* who are conversant with every species of impiety, this man who so tenaciously holds to this opinion would, *of all wicked men*, most justly seem to be esteemed the worst and most impious." Ἀντεχόμενος, "holding firmly to," like one who braces himself against something for the purpose of giving tenacity to his grasp. The word implies that men cling much more obstinately to this doctrine than to Atheism, or even the denial of a Providence. By connecting *τῶν τε*, or *τῶν γε*, with the preceding, we should also destroy the fine effect of the passionate burst of indignation which is so characteristic of Clinias, and which is so forcibly expressed by the words *οὐδαμῶς*, &c., when standing by themselves. Κινδυνεύει, in this passage, may be regarded in the same light as at page 18 (2). See remarks on the word in that place. So, also, here the primary sense appears through the secondary. "*He is in danger* of being judged, he *runs a risk* of being thought, or he is *liable* to the imputation," &c.

σαν ἀσέβειαν ὄντων κινδυνεύει πως ὁ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀντεχόμενος πάντων ἂν τῶν ἀσεβῶν κεκρίσθαι δικαιότατα κάκιστός τε εἶναι καὶ ἀσεβέστατος.

ΑΘ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ προτεθέντα τρία, θεοί τε ὡς εἰσί, καὶ ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς παντάπασιν ἀπαραίτητοι, φῶμεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί[15] που.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ σύμψηφοί γε τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἐσμέν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν εἴρηταί γέ πως σφοδρότερον[1] διὰ φιλονεικίαν τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου γε μὴν ἕνεκα, ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, πεφιλονείκηται, μή ποτε λόγοις ἡγῶνται κρατοῦντες ἐξουσίαν εἶναί σφισιν ἃ βούλονται πράττειν οἱ κακοί, ἃ δὴ καὶ ὅσα[2] καὶ οἷα περὶ θεοὺς διανοοῦνται. προθυμία μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα νεωτέρως εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν γέγονεν. εἰ δέ τι καὶ βραχὺ προὔργου πεποιήκαμεν εἰς τὸ πείθειν πη τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἑαυτοὺς μὲν μισῆσαι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία πως ἤθη στέρξαι, καλῶς ἡμῖν εἰρημένον ἂν εἴη τὸ προοίμιον ἀσεβείας πέρι νόμων.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλὰ ἐλπίς· εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε τοῦ λόγου γένος οὐκ αἰτιάσεται τὸν νομοθέτην.

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15. *φῶμεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί που.* This is something like the mathematician's *ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι, quod erat demonstrandum.* It is the formal conclusion of the long argument or preamble to the law which is now to follow against those impious men, who have given the lawgiver so much trouble.

1. *σφοδρότερον.* This is said in reference to the apparently harsh epithets which have been used in this third branch of the discussion against those who abused the doctrine of the Divine placability, and especially to the strong language a few lines above. The other parts of the argument, instead of needing apology in this respect, were marked by a peculiar mildness towards his supposed perverse opponents.

2. *ἃ δὴ καὶ ὅσα καὶ οἷα.* "Whatever things, and however enormous, and however bad." *Ὅσα* often, when the context requires it, is to be taken in a bad sense, implying not simply the number or quantity, but the *enormity* of the things referred to. So, also, *οἷα* not only imports quality, but sometimes a bad quality, *of whatever kind*, that is *however wicked.*

ΑΘ. Μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον τοίνυν λόγος,[3] οἷος ἂν τῶν νόμων ἑρμηνεύς, ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν, προαγορεύων ἐξίστασθαι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀσεβέσι τρόπων τῶν αὐτῶν εἰς τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς. τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις, ἀσεβείας ὅδε ἔστω πέρι νόμος· Ἐάν τις ἀσεβῇ λόγοις εἴτ' ἔργοις, ὁ παρατυγχάνων ἀμυνέτω, σημαίνων πρὸς ἄρχοντας· τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων οἱ πρῶτοι πυθόμενοι, πρὸς τὸ περὶ[4] τούτων ἀποδεδειγμένον κρίνειν δικαστήριον εἰσαγαγόντων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀκούσασα ἀρχὴ μὴ δρᾷ ταῦτα, αὐτὴ ἀσεβείας ὑπόδικος γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι τιμωρεῖν[5] ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων. ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ἑκάστῳ[6] τῶν καθ' ἓν ἀσεβούντων τίμημα. δεσμὸς μὲν οὖν ὑπαρχέτω πᾶσι. δεσμωτηρίων δὲ[7]

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3. *μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον λόγος.* The whole law is regarded as consisting of three parts: the preamble or argument, the declaration or exhortation, and the penalty. The first has occupied nearly the whole of the book, the second is despatched in a single sentence, and then all that remains is to specify briefly the several punishments for the several grades of impiety.

4. *πρὸς τὸ περὶ.* Ordo—*εἰσαγαγόντων πρὸς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀποδεδειγμένον κρίνειν περὶ τούτων.* The tribunal here referred to may be found described in the ninth book of the Laws, 855, D.

5. *τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ.* "To avenge the law." It sometimes has this same sense with the dative: *τιμωρεῖν τινι*, "to avenge any one." In the middle voice, "to take revenge, or to avenge one's self." The noun *τιμωρία*, as well as *τίσις*, generally has reference to vindictive, in distinction from preventive or remedial punishment.

6. *ἐν ἑκάστῳ.* Ast would read here *ἓν ἕκαστον.* The construction, in the common reading, is somewhat unusual, but not sufficiently so to justify the correction proposed. *Τίμημα* would mean, originally, *an estimate, a fine;* but it is applied to any species of punishment, and may be rendered here, generally, *pœnam* or *pœnas.* Ordo—*τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον τίμημα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν καθ' ἓν ἀσεβούντων,* equivalent to saying—*in each individual case of each, or according to each particular offence.*

7. *δεσμωτηρίων δὲ.* This is the common reading. Stephanus and Ast would put a comma after *πᾶσι*, read *γὲ* for *δὲ*, and thus connect the whole of this, down to *φήμην τινά*, as an appendage to the preceding short sentence. Without this, it is said, the sense must remain suspended. It may be a question, however, whether this con

ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τριῶν, ἑνὸς μέν, κοινοῦ[8] τοῖς πλείστοις περὶ ἀγοράν, σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν σωμάτων, ἑνὸς δέ, περὶ τὸν τῶν νύκτωρ συλλεγομένων ξύλλογον, σωφρονιστήριον[9] ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἑνὸς δὲ αὖ κατὰ μέσην τὴν χώραν, ὅπηπερ[10] ἂν ἔρημός τε καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος ᾖ τόπος, τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην[11] τινά. περὶ

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sideration alone is sufficient to justify the change, although so slight. Such cases of suspension do occur in the Platonic writings, in places where all efforts at correction fail; and in the present case some might suppose even the irregularity to be more tolerable than the attaching so long an appendix to so short a clause, and by so feeble a connective. We would suggest, moreover, whether it would not be better to connect this with περὶ ἀσέβειαν δὲ ὄντων below. There is, it is true, something awkward in making the enumeration of offenders an apparent inference from the number of prisons, yet still there is something of a natural connexion between the two ideas, so that the one might easily suggest the other, although in an inverted order.

8. κοινοῦ τοῖς πλείστοις. "Common to the people at large," that is, to the ordinary class of offenders. Σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τῶν σωμάτων. This is precisely the phrase of the English common law—*for the safe keeping of the body—in corporis custodiam.*

9. σωφρονιστήριον. *The police prison*, or, more properly, *the house of correction*, the place where lawless people are *sobered.*

10. ὅπηπερ. "In the very spot in which." ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος. These particles, thus combined, form the strongest superlative in the power of the Greek language. The three are seldom found in this manner in one expression. It may be styled *a double super-superlative.*

11. ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην. Φήμην here may be regarded as having the force of an adjective—*famosam.* Or it may be rendered, "having in common fame (κατὰ φήμην), or by common report, the appellation," &c. The first prison was for safe custody; the second for correction, discipline, or reformation; the third, the prison of vengeance (τιμωρίας), of strictly *penal* restraint, intended for examples, and not for the good of the offender. Plato seems to have in mind the departments in Hades, which he specifies in the Gorgias, and to represent human laws as proceeding by the same grades with their brethren of the other world: οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί, οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου NOMOI, as he styles them in the Grito, 54, C. This prison would be analogous to that division in Hell to which the ἀνίατοι, or *incurable*, are

ἀσέβειαν δὲ ὄντων,[12] αἰτίαις μὲν τρισίν, αἷσπερ καὶ διήλθομεν, δύο δ' ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας γενομένων, ἓξ ἂν γίγνοιντο, ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια γένη τῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἁμαρτανόντων, οὐκ ἴσης οὐδ' ὁμοίας δίκης δεόμενα. οἷς γὰρ ἂν μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι τοπαράπαν, ἦθος φύσει προσγένηται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακούς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν[13] τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν· οἷς δ' ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα[14] εἶναι πάντα, ἀκράτειαί[15] τε ἡδονῶν

consigned as everlasting admonitions, and spectacles of the Divine vengeance: ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Αἴδου ἐν τῷ ΔΕΣΜΩΤΗΡΙΩΙ, θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. Gorgias, 525, C.

12. περὶ ἀσέβειαν δὲ ὄντων. An elliptical mode of expression, which may be thus rendered: "Those who are conversant with impiety, being so from three causes which we have described, and there being two classes from each such cause, there would be, of those who offend against Divine things, six kinds worthy of discrimination, and requiring neither an equal nor a similar sentence."

13. τῷ δυσχεραίνειν. "By having a disrelish for wrong doing," that is, a dislike arising from habit, prejudice, or an early bias of the mind remaining in spite of their Atheism.

14. θεῶν ἔρημα. Nothing could convey a more vivid idea of the horrors of Atheism than this expression. Every meaning of the word ἔρημα crowds at once into the serious mind; a universe *deserted, lonely, solitary, waste, forsaken—a wilderness* full of horror and desolation in proportion to its boundless extent. Probably the best antidote to Atheism, when it happens to invade the mind, and more effective than any speculative argument, would be to yield up the soul for a season to the deep gloom of so insupportable a thought. Of course we mean not the hardened and scoffing Atheist, but one to whom the most transient shade of skepticism on this point is a source of pain. To quote again the line of Empedocles, we may well say, in reference to such a one,

δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

The expression θεῶν ἔρημα seems used here by Plato as an antithesis to that of Thales, referred to page 41, θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα.

15. ἀκράτειαι. See remarks on this word in connexion with σωφροσύνη ἀκολασία, &c., Note LXVIII., App.

καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαί τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι, τὸ μὲν μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς ἀμφοῖν[1] ἂν ἓν ὑπάρχοι κοινὸν πάθος· τῇ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων λώβῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὸ δὲ πλείω κακὰ ἐργάζοιτ' ἄν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ[2] τε ἂν περὶ θεοὺς παῤῥησίας εἴη μεστὸς καὶ περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ ὅρκους, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἄλλων καταγελῶν τάχ' ἂν ἑτέρους τοιούτους ἀπεργάζοιτο, δίκης μὴ τυγχάνων· ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων[2] μὲν καθάπερ ἄτερος, εὐφυὴς δὲ ἐπικαλούμενος, δόλου δὲ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν μάντεις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μαγγανείαν κεκινημένοι.[3] γίγνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τύραννοι καὶ δημηγόροι καὶ στρατηγοί, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιβεβουλευκότες,[4] σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλουμένων μηχαναί.[5] τούτων δὴ πολλὰ μὲν εἴδη γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ δὲ νόμων ἄξια θέσεως δύο, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν[6] τὸ οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ἄξια θανάτοιν[7] ἁμαρτάνον, τὸ δὲ νουθετήσεως ἅμα καὶ δεσμῶν

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1. *ἀμφοῖν.* This word relates back to the preceding sentence, notwithstanding it had been apparently fully closed and takes in both classes, as far as they hold the atheistic sentiment in common although with different practical results.

2. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ.* See Note LXXII., App., on the different species of Atheists, according to the Platonic division. *Δοξάζων . . . . εὐφυὴς.* See Note LXXII., App.

3. *κεκινημένοι.* "Who are most strenuously and violently engaged in every species of juggling or legerdemain."

4. *ἐπιβεβουλευκότες.* Not simply "those who attempt private mysteries," *mysteria privata molientes*, as some render it, but, rather, "those who, by means of such mysteries, plot to deceive other men." We would, therefore, regard *τελεταῖς* as the dative of the instrument.

5. *μηχαναὶ σοφιστῶν.* The abstract is used here for the concrete. It is an expression equivalent to *οἱ ταῖς μηχαναῖς σοφιστῶν χρώμενοι*, "those who use sophistical arts."

6. *τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν.* See Note LXXII., App.

7. *οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν θανάτοιν.* That is, either one or two deaths would be too small a punishment for him. No one will think this sentence too severe, who has carefully studied those specimens of

δεόμενον. ὡσαύτως δὲ[8] καὶ τὸ θεοὺς νομίζειν ἀμελεῖν δύ' ἕτερα γεννᾷ, καὶ τὸ παραιτητοὺς ἄλλα δύο. τούτων δὴ ταύτῃ διεστηκότων, τοὺς μὲν ὑπ' ἀνοίας, ἄνευ κάκης ὀργῆς τε καὶ ἤθους γεγενημένους, εἰς τὸ σωφρονιστήριον ὁ δικαστὴς τιθέμενος νόμῳ, τιθέσθω μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἐτῶν πέντε. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἄλλος συγγιγνέσθω, πλὴν οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου[9] κοινωνοῦντες, ἐπὶ νουθετήσει τε καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ὁμιλοῦντες.[10] ὅταν δ' ὁ χρόνος αὐτοῖς ἐξέλθῃ τῶν δεσμῶν, ἐὰν μὲν δοκῇ τις σωφρονεῖν αὐτῶν, οἰκείτω μετὰ τῶν σωφρό-

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this abominable character to which we have referred, Note LXXII., App.

8. *ὡσαύτως δὲ.* The doctrines, that there was no special Providence, and that the Gods were easily propitiated, gave rise also, each respectively, to two species of offenders, distinguished by characters analogous to those above presented, and requiring each a different mode and gradation of punishment; the mildest form of which was to be imprisonment in the *σωφρονιστήριον*, or house of correction, for a term not less than five years. Such a law, among us at the present day, would be thought greatly to infringe on men's *religious liberties*—on the precious *right* to be an Atheist or blasphemer.

9. *νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου.* See Note LXXIII., App.

10. *ἐπὶ νουθετήσει τε καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ὁμιλοῦντες.* "Conversing with them for admonition, and for the *salvation of the soul.*" It is interesting to meet thus in a heathen writer with that very expression with which from infancy we have been accustomed to associate the most sacred ideas of Christianity. We may, perhaps, have given it too much of a Scriptural aspect in our rendering of *σωτηρία*, —the term, as thus presented by Plato, being undoubtedly to be taken in a somewhat lower sense—yet still, with all qualifications, what an immense difference does such language, employed in such connexions, make between him and all other philosophers and legislators either of ancient or modern times. The phrase *σωτηρία ψυχῆς* seems also to have been intended by way of antithesis to the expression *σωτηρίας σώματος*, some distance back, page 76 (8). In this view, the *σωφρονιστήριον* was not only intended, *in corporis custodiam, for the safe keeping of the body*, but also for the *well-being, health, or salvation of the soul.*

νων· ἐὰν δὲ μή, ὀφείλῃ δ' αὖθις τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. ὅσοι δ' ἂν θηριώδεις[11] *γένωνται πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι*[10] *μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν, καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρημάτων χάριν ἐπιχειρῶσι κατ' ἄκρας*[11] *ἐξαιρεῖν, τούτων δὲ ὃς ἂν ὄφλων εἶναι δόξῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον αὐτῷ κατὰ νόμον, δεδέσθαι μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν μεσογείων δεσμωτηρίῳ· προσιέναι δὲ αὐτῷ μηδένα ἐλεύθερον μηδέποτε, τακτὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων αὐτοὺς τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν λαμβάνειν, ἀποθανόντα δὲ ἔξω τῶν ὁρίων ἐκβάλλειν ἄταφον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερος συνθάπτῃ, δίκας ἀσεβεί-*

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11. *θηριώδεις.* See remarks on this word, page 69 (5). The manner in which it is used here seems to confirm the view that was there taken. In this place reference is had to the character described, page 78, as *δόλου καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης*, which corresponds poorly to *θηριώδεις* in the sense of *ferocious*. Guile and jugglery, which are the leading traits, are not in keeping with such a meaning, although perfectly consistent with such beastly views of the Divine nature as may be entertained by an Atheist, or a Simon Magus, or such a one as is described Note LXXII., App.

10. *ψυχαγωγῶσι.* This term, in its primary sense, is applied to Mercury as conductor of the souls of the dead to Hades. In a secondary sense, it is employed of those who pretended to raise ghosts by magic arts: *qui imprecando et cantando animas ex inferis in terram evocabant.* A third meaning is *to cajole or allure the soul by flatteries or sophistry.* It is thus applied by the buffoon Aristophanes to Socrates himself, in the Comedy of the Birds, 1551:

Λίμνη τις ἔστ' ἄλουτος, οὗ
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης.

Plato uses the word here in both the two latter senses.

11. *κατ' ἄκρας.* Compare the Iliad, N., 772.:

Νῦν ὄλετο πᾶσα κατ' ἄκρης
Ἴλιος ἀιπεινή.

Sometimes it is written as one word, *κατάκρας*, as in Soph., Antig., 200.

ας τῷ ἐθέλοντι λαγχάνειν ὑπεχέτω. παῖδας δὲ ἂν μὲν καταλίπῃ[12] τῇ πόλει ἱκανούς, οἱ τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι[13] καὶ τούτων, ὡς ὄντων ὀρφανῶν, ἐπιμελείσθων μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἄλλων, ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἂν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν ὄφλῃ τὴν δίκην. κοινὸν[14] δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον κεῖσθαι χρεών, ὃς ἐλάττω τε εἰς θεοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ πλημμελεῖν ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνοήτους γίγνεσθαι ἧττον, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι θεοπολεῖν παρὰ νόμον. ἔστω γὰρ νόμος ὅδε τοῖς ξύμπασι κείμενος ἁπλῶς· Ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω. θύειν δ' ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων· καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ ἱερείαις ἐγχειριζέτω τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἁγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής· συνευξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ' αὐτοῦ συνεύχεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ γιγνόμενα τῶν τοιῶνδε χάριν ἔστω. ἱερὰ[15] καὶ θεοὺς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾷν τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἔθος τε γυναιξί τε δὴ διαφεροντως πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι πάντη καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ἀποροῦσιν, ὅπῃ τις ἂν ἀπορῇ, καὶ τοὐναντίον, ὅταν εὐπορίας τινὸς λάβωνται, καθιεροῦν τε τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ

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12. *παῖδας δὲ ἂν μὲν καταλίπῃ.* This to others must have been intended as the most solemn and impressive part of the law, much more so than the casting of the unburied body beyond the boundaries of the state. The children of the Atheist were to become orphans immediately after his sentence to solitary imprisonment, that is, after his *civil death.* The domestic relations were to be regarded as no longer existing in the case of the man who had sundered, as far as in him lay, his relations to God. In the language of the Jewish law, *he was to be utterly cut off from his people.*

13. *οἱ τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι.* These were to be the fifteen oldest Nomophulakes, who were to have the general charge of all matters relating to orphans, wills, wards, and wardship. They are mentioned book eleventh of the Laws, 924, C. They were to be divided into five classes of three each, to serve successively, each class for one year.

14. *κοινὸν ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον.* See Note LXXIV., App.

15. *Ἱερὰ καὶ θεοὺς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἱδρύεσθαι.* See Note LXXIV., App., on *private innovations in religion.*

καὶ θυσίας εὔχεσθαι καὶ ἱδρύσεις ὑπισχνεῖσθαι θεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσι[1] καὶ παισὶ θεῶν, ἔν τε φάσμασιν ἐγρηγορότας[2] διὰ φόβους καὶ ἐν ὀνείροις, ὡς δ' αὕτως ὄψεις πολλὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντας, ἑκάσταισί[3] τε αὐτῶν ἄκη ποιουμένους βωμοὺς καὶ ἱερά, πάσας μὲν οἰκίας, πάσας δὲ κώμας, ἔν τε καθαροῖς[4] ἱδρυομένους ἐμπιπλάναι, καὶ ὅπῃ τις ἔτυχε τῶν τοιούτων. ὧν ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντων ποιεῖν κατὰ τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον νόμον· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἕνεκα τῶν ἀσεβούντων, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ταῦτα κλέπτοντες πράξεσιν,[5] ἱερά τε καὶ βωμοὺς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱδρυόμενοι, λάθρα τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως οἰόμενοι ποιεῖν θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς, εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐξάνοντες, αὐτοῖς τε ἐγκλήματα πρὸς θεῶν ποιῶνται, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτρέπουσιν, οὖσιν αὐτῶν βελτίοσι· καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ[6] τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. τὸν

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1. θεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσι καὶ παισὶ θεῶν. See Note LXVII., on *the doctrine of the Dæmons or Genii.*

2. ἐγρηγορότας. *When awake, vigilantes,* as opposed to ἐν ὀνείροις. This presents a case of *anakolouthon*, and is to be referred to the datives γυναιξί and ἀσθενοῦσι above. Διὰ φόβους here, as Ast observes, is to be taken as equivalent to πεφοβημένους, *perterritos.*

3. ἑκάσταισι. The feminine is used in reference to ὄψεις, the last mentioned, although the word belongs equally to φάσμασιν and ὀνείροις.

4. ἔν τε καθαροῖς. *Sub dio, in the open air.*

5. κλέπτοντες πράξεσιν. In this expression the verbal noun πράξεσιν has the force of the verb, and the participle κλέπτοντες is used like a qualifying adverb, as though it had been λάθρα πράττοντες.

6. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ. We have here the ancient universal doctrine of *The State* as an *organic whole* or *body*, with a national conscience, in distinction from the *very modern* notion of a mere *mass* or *aggregate* of individual wills. As an *organic whole*, it was morally responsible for every part. Crime unpunished not only infected the moral health, but brought also justly *imputed guilt* upon the entire corporate organization. No reader of the Old Testament can doubt that this doctrine was taught there in all its apparent severity. We need only refer in proof to the case of Achan, Josh. vii., 25, and other striking examples of those who *troubled*, or *wrought*

μὲν δὴ νομοθέτην ὁ θεὸς οὐ μέμψεται. κείσθω γὰρ ὁ νόμος οὗτος, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι θεῶν ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱερά· τὸν δὲ φανέντα κεκτημένον ἕτερα καὶ ὀργιάζοντα πλὴν τὰ δημόσια, ἐὰν μὲν ἄδικον μηδὲν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ἀνοσίων εἰργασμένος ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνὴ κεκτῆταί τις, ὁ μὲν αἰσθόμενος καὶ εἰσαγγελλέτω τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν, οἱ δὲ προσταττόντων εἰς τὰ δημόσια ἀποφέρειν ἱερὰ τὰ ἴδια, μὴ πείθοντες δὲ ζημιούντων, ἕως ἂν ἀπενεχθῇ. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀσεβήσας μὴ παιδίων ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν ἀσέβημα ἀνοσίων γένηται φανερός, εἴτε ἐν ἰδίοις ἱδρυσάμενος, εἴτ' ἐν δημοσίοις θύσας ἱερὰ θεοῖς οἱστισινοῦν, ὡς οὐ καθαρὸς ὢν θύων, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω· τὸ δὲ, παιδίων ἢ μή, κρίναντες νομοφύλακες, εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον οὕτως εἰσαγαγόντες, τὴν τῆς ἀσεβείας δίκην τούτοις ἐπιτελούντων.

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folly in Israel. The same sentiment may often be found in the Greek poets. Compare, especially, Hesiod, Works and Days, 223:

> *Πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα,*
> *ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται.*
> *τοῖσιν δ' οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,*
> *λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί.*
> *οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν· μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι,*
> *Ζηνὸς φραδμοσύνῃσιν Ὀλυμπίου· ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε*
> *ἢ τῶν γε στρατὸν εὐρὺν ἀπώλεσεν, ἢ ὅγε τεῖχος,*
> *ἢ νέας ἐν πόντῳ Κρονίδης ἀποτίνυται αὐτῶν.*

EXTENDED NOTES

AND

DISSERTATIONS,

SUGGESTED BY PASSAGES IN THE TEXT, ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF THE

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY,

ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED WITH THE HOLY SCRIPTURES;

TOGETHER WITH

SOME EXPLANATIONS OF DIFFICULT PASSAGES AT GREATER LENGTH THAN WOULD BE CONVENIENT IN MARGINAL OBSERVATIONS.

EXTENDED NOTES

AND

DISSERTATIONS.

I.

The Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations, and the Ancient Doctrine generally on this Subject.

PAGE 2, LINE 8. *Ἐις δὲ γονέας.* A misconception of the end and scope of the Republic, or, as it should be more properly styled, The Dialogue on the Nature of Right or Righteousness (*περὶ δικαίου*), has subjected the name of Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with maintaining, in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any design that it should serve as the model of any actual existing polity. Whether, however, this be regarded as a right view of the Republic or not, and whatever we may think of the justice of the charge to which he may there be thought to have exposed himself, there can be no doubt that in this treatise (*περὶ νόμων*), in which he means to appear in the character of a serious legislator for a really *practicable*, if not existing state, he takes special pains to remove the reproach to which, even in his own day, he had been subjected on account of the passages referred to. This long dialogue on legislation was the work of his old age, and in it he strives to set in the highest light the sanctity of the domestic, and especially the filial and pa-

rental relations. For the strongest proof of this, we might refer, among many other passages, to what is said in the ninth book, 881, A., and especially to that most striking and beautiful passage, lib. xi., 931, A., in which he speaks of the veneration of children towards their parents as a *religious*, rather than a merely moral or political duty, and not only this, but also as involving acts partaking of the nature of religious worship. We would recommend to the student the close study of the whole argument, not only for its exceeding moral beauty, but also as a most triumphant refutation of the charge that Plato, like some modern reformers, would have destroyed the family state. *Γονέων δὲ ἀμελεῖν, οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος νοῦν ἔχων ξύμβουλός ποτε γένοιτ' ἂν οὐδεὶς οὐδενί. φρονῆσαι δὲ χρὴ περὶ θεῶν, κ. τ. λ.* In this passage he not only sets in the highest light the sanctity of the relation, and of the duties resulting, but would deduce from it a method of indirectly reforming the grossness of some parts of religious worship, by substituting the holy feeling of filial veneration for the idolatrous adoration of household images of the Gods. He would have their place occupied by the venerable *living form* of the aged sire or grandsire, as the household *ἄγαλμα*, or image of the Eternal Father. *Πατὴρ οὖν ὅτῳ καὶ μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες ἐν οἰκίᾳ κεῖνται κειμήλιοι ἀπειρηκότες γήρᾳ, μηδεὶς διανοηθήτω ποτὲ ἄγαλμα αὐτῷ, τοιοῦτον ἐφέστιον ἵδρυμα ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχων, μᾶλλον κύριον ἔσεσθαι, ἐὰν δὴ κατὰ τρόπον γε ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ θεραπεύῃ ὁ κεκτημένος.* "If any one hath a father, or mother, or grandparents worn out with age, and laid up as sacred relics in his house, let him never suppose, as long as he possesses this altar of the domestic hearth, that any other *ἄγαλμα* or sacred image is more worthy of his adoration, provided he knows how to worship it aright." And again, 931, D., *Ὀυκοῦν διανοηθῶμεν ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸς θεῶν τιμιώτερον ἄγαλμα ἂν κτησαίμεθα πατρὸς καὶ προπάτορος πα-*

ρειμένων γήρᾳ καὶ μητέρων τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἐχουσῶν— οὓς ὅσον ἀγάλλῃ τις τιμαῖς γέγηθεν ὁ θεός. "Let us, then, believe that we can have no religious image more precious in the sight of Heaven than a father, or grandfather, or mother worn out with age, and that in proportion as we honour or delight in them with a religious joy (*so ἀγάλλη, whence ἄγαλμα, may be rendered here, as in Pindar, Olymp.*, i., 139), in the same proportion does God himself rejoice." If this is idolatry, it is certainly far more innocent than that which is practised by the professedly Christian Church of Rome. What a beautiful and affecting picture is here presented! The aged and infirm parent not only revered in the secret sanctuary of the heart, but actually regarded, if not as the very household deity of the secluded domestic temple, yet, in truth, as the best visible representation or *εἰκὼν*, through whom homage was to be rendered to the Invisible God. Sophocles seems to have had in mind something of this same beautiful conception in the Antigone, 703:

> *Τί γὰρ πατρὸς θάλλοντος, εὐκλείας τέκνοις*
> *Ἄγαλμα μεῖζον;*

There is not the same high meaning to *ἄγαλμα* here as in Plato, although in other respects the language is strikingly similar. It more strongly resembles Proverbs, xvii., 6: תִּפְאֶרֶת בָּנִים אֲבוֹתָם, where the Hebrew word תִּפְאֶרֶת has a striking affinity to the Greek *ἄγαλμα*, being like it, too, used in a religious sense, as in Psalm lxxviii., 61, where it is applied to the ark of the covenant.

As a consequence of this religious relation, Plato attaches great importance to the blessing and curse of a parent, and in this he is in accordance with one of the most ancient and universal doctrines that have ever prevailed among mankind. After reciting the examples of Theseus, Œdipus, and Amyntor, he thus proceeds: *ἀραῖος γὰρ γονεὺς ἐκγόνοις*

ὡς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ἄλλοις δικαιότατα, 931, C. "For the curse of a parent (to give a free rendering) comes loaded with calamity to children in a way that is true of no other relations." Wherefore, as he says in another passage, *πᾶς δὴ νοῦν ἔχων φοβεῖται καὶ τιμᾷ γονέων εὐχάς, εἰδὼς πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιτελεῖς γενομένας*, 931, A. "Every one that hath reason both fears and honours the prayers of parents, knowing well that often, and to many, have they been fulfilled." How deeply this sentiment was impressed upon the minds of the Grecian poets, and how important an element it forms of their most tragic representations, we may learn from the dismal effects and long train of calamitous consequences which they set forth as following the imprecations of Œdipus upon his unnatural sons. The sad story of Hippolytus, who, although innocent, is represented by Euripides as perishing under a father's imprecation, exhibits the same doctrine, although in a most perverted and distorted form. The dying cry which the poet puts into the mouth of the wretched young man,

ὦ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ δύστηνος ἀρά,

shows how awful was the calamity which the ancient world universally regarded as involved in a parent's curse. The converse doctrine, namely, the importance of the parental blessing, is certainly one of the most clearly taught truths of the Old Testament. How consonant it is, both with the language and spirit of Scripture, no one need be told who recollects the value attached to the blessing of the Patriach Isaac, and the declarations of the dying Jacob to the twelve heads of Israel, besides many other passages which are founded upon the same idea.

It was a prominent principle in all the ancient systems of law and religion that the relation of parent and child gave rise to *religious*, rather than merely *civil* obligations. Hence Aristotle says, *ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις ὡς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι*

αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. *Ethic. Nicomach.*, viii., 12, 5. They belonged to the class of duties styled *ὅσια*, in distinction from those that were only *δίκαια*, and their violation was regarded among offences committed directly against Heaven. Something of this feeling has come down and affected even modern languages. Hence we speak of filial *piety* or *impiety*. On this account the Bible makes this relation the subject of the first commandment immediately following the direct duties we owe to God, and hence, too, the Jewish law punished the crime with such unrelenting severity, as though, if permitted to pass with impunity, it would be the fruitful source of every violation, both of the laws of Heaven and Earth. The filial and parental tie seems to have been regarded as a continuation of that which bound us to God, and hence, in strictest harmony with this view, Plato regards the man who had sundered the latter as having utterly annihilated the duties and obligations of the former. On this account, as we have seen in a passage on which we have already commented, page 81, the children of the Atheist were to be regarded as orphans, and placed under the care of the state.

The importance of this relation in a political point of view, may be inferred from the fifth commandment itself. The promise annexed has generally been referred to individuals. It appears to us, however, to have more of a political aspect, and to be addressed to the nation collectively. The language certainly seems to favour this idea: "that thy days may be long *in the land* which the Lord thy God giveth thee;" intimating that the long continuance of their national polity in the land of Canaan would depend, more than on anything else, on the preservation of this fundamental conservative article; on the reverence with which this duty should be regarded, as forming the connecting link between the civil and the more purely religious, and as being the source and guarantee of every inferior domestic

and political obligation. For undoubted examples of the same and similar language, used in the national instead of the individual sense, see Deuteronomy, iv., 26, 40; v., 30; vi., 2.

In accordance with this universal sentiment of antiquity, Plato, in the passage at the beginning of these remarks, and in other places in the Laws, enumerates duties to parents as immediately succeeding those which are owed to God, and ranks their violation as next in enormity to public and private *sacrilege*. Compare the fourth book of the Laws, 717, B., and especially a most remarkable passage in the ninth book, 881, A.: *Πατρὸς γὰρ ἢ μητρὸς ἢ τούτων ἔτι προγόνων ὅστις τολμήσει ἅψασθαι ποτὲ βιαζόμενος αἰκίᾳ τινί, μήτε τῶν ἄνω δείσας θεῶν μῆνιν, μήτε τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τιμωριῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ καταφρονῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων εἰρημένων παρανομεῖ, τούτῳ δεῖ τινος ἀποτροπῆς ἐσχάτης. θάνατος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔσχατον, οἱ δὲ ἐν Ἅιδου τούτοισι λεγόμενοι πόνοι*, &c. "If any one shall dare to treat with violence father or mother, or any one of his or their progenitors, having before his eyes neither the fear of the powers above, nor of the vengeance of the world beneath, but, despising the ancient and universal traditions of mankind, shall break through all law, for such a one there is need of some most extreme remedy. Death, then, is not this greatest or most extreme remedy, but something still beyond this, even those *pains of Hell* which are said to await these enormous offenders." The whole passage is full of dreadful meaning, which can with difficulty be transferred to the English. We have no word which comes up to the Greek *ἀποτροπή*. It is applied to the most solemn religious act by which we may *avert* the wrath of Heaven for some enormous wickedness, and hence the terms *ἀποτρόπαιος*, *ἀποτροπιασμός*, *inauspicious, that which is to be averted by sacrifice, an expiation or turning away of the Divine wrath*, and, in a secondary

sense, *whatever is most odious or an utter abomination.* In all lists of great crimes, as presented to us by the poets, one of the worst abodes in Tartarus is ever assigned to offenders of this description, and thus Paul classes those who are guilty of violence towards their parents among the *unholy* and *profane: ἀνοσίοις καὶ βεβήλοις πατραλῴαις καὶ μητραλῴαις.* 1 Timothy, i., 9.

The holiness of the family relation is intimated, in the ancient mythology, by the worship of Vesta; and the perpetual cherishing of the domestic affections, as affording the vivifying and fructifying warmth by which all social and political institutions must be preserved, is represented in the Eternal Fire. Well did Cicero say, *in aris et focis est Respublica.* This intimate connexion is set forth by the Greek and Latin poets in almost every form of expression. Virgil presents the holy alliance in one line:

> Sacra Deûm sanctique patres.
>
> *Georg.*, ii., 473.

And this seems but a reiteration of the precept, Leviticus, xix., 2, and of the order in which the religious and family duties are there given. *Speak unto all the congregation of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy. Fear ye every man his father and his mother. I am the Lord your God.*

The obligation of filial obedience, as the fountain of all moral and political virtues, is thus beautifully set forth in a fragment of Euripides from Stobæus:

> Ἔγω δ' ὅ μὲν ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ ἄρξομαι λέγειν
> ἐκ τοῦδε πρῶτον· πατρὶ πείθεσθαι χρεὼν
> παῖδας, νομίζειν τ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι δίκην.
>
> *Eurip. Alopa.*

So, also, in a still more striking fragment of the same poet, in which duties to parents are ranked next after those due the Gods, and before mere political obligations:

τρεῖς ἐισὶν ἀρεταὶ ἃς χρὴ σ' ἀσκεῖν ὦ τέκνον,
ΘΕΟΥΣ *τε τιμᾶν, τούς τε θρέψαντας* ΓΟΝΕΙΣ,
ΝΟΜΟΥΣ *τε κοινοὺς Ἑλλάδος · καὶ ταῦτα δρῶν*
κάλλιστον ἕξεις στέφανον εὐκλείας ἀεί.

Eurip. Antiope.

We have dwelt the longer on this, because we think that Plato's views here, and in many other places in the Laws and other dialogues, furnish a complete refutation of the charge, which might otherwise be drawn from the fifth book of the Republic; and because, at the present day, even with all the declarations of the Bible, the relation seems to be becoming divested of that sanctity which it anciently possessed. In the theories of some, it is placed even below civil duties. So far from being thought to possess any religious character, it is denied that it forms a subject even for political legislation. It is ranked among *imperfect obligations*, and is never with us, except in some few cases of pauperism, enforced by law. Why, when so many inferior subjects are made matters of legislation, this fundamental and all-conservative relation should have so little space assigned to it in our jurisprudence, it would be difficult to say. The effects, however, which will inevitably result, in loosening the whole political structure, can be far more easily and with more certainty predicted. The relation and the duties resulting are also attacked by spurious reformers, who, under the name of a cold and heart-hardening universal benevolence, or *love to being in general*, would utterly break up all the family ties, and destroy all the associations connected with that holy word, Our Home. These men sometimes, in their ignorance, make stale second-hand quotations from Plato, and we would wish to rescue him from their profane grasp.

II.

The Words προοίμιον and παραμύθιον. The Preamble, the Advisory or Argumentative Part of the Law.

PAGE 2, LINE 16. Τὸ παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ ῥητέον ἃ δεῖ πάσχειν. "The lawgiver (*νομοθέτη, understood*) must declare what each one must suffer, after having put under, by way of hypothesis or foundation, an exhortation or preamble." Another reading has *προοίμιον*, which is followed by Ficinus. They both, however, would possess nearly the same significance. Προοίμιον would literally mean "a preface or preamble;" *παραμύθιον*, "an exhortatory exordium," containing the ground or reason of the law. This the philosopher deemed essentially and peculiarly necessary in those institutions that related to religion. Such an exhortation or argument, by way of preamble, nearly the whole of this tenth book may be considered, as only the last few pages are devoted to the preceptive declaration, and the penal statute founded upon it. In a more limited sense, however, the *παραμύθιον* here intended is contained in what immediately follows. In like manner, Cicero, in evident imitation of Plato, introduces in his treatise De Legibus a similar *προοίμιον*, in which he makes religious belief and reverence the only true foundation of law and of every form of civil polity. It may be found in that noble passage, lib. ii., sec. vii.: Sit igitur hoc a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et, qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili ac vera sententia. Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque

non putet? aut ut ea, quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Utiles esse autem opiniones has, quis neget, quum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ salutis sit fœderum religiones, quam multos Divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit, quamque SANCTA SIT SOCIETAS civium inter ipsos, *Diis immortalibus* interpositis tum *judicibus*, tum *testibus*. Habes legis PROŒMIUM: sic enim hoc appellat Plato.

What a striking contrast between the sentiments of these noble heathen, and those of many modern political theories, constitutions, and boasting bills of rights, from which the very names of God, religion, Christianity, or the least allusion to any bond (*religio*) by which the visible state is connected with the invisible world, are as carefully excluded, as though they were the deadliest foes to the political happiness of mankind.

On this subject we may compare also the sublime *προοίμιον* in the Timæus, or the Dialogue in which Plato attempts to set forth the *universal code of laws* which govern both the physical and intelligible universe. The preamble or *προοίμιον* there, is found in that remarkable passage, in which he divides all things into what he styles, *τὸ* ΌΝ *μὲν ἀεὶ γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τὸ* ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν· τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. That which eternally IS and hath never generation, and that which is ever BECOMING or being generated, and never truly IS; the one received by the intelligence with reason, always BEING in the same relations, the other received by opinion with irrational sense, ever becoming, perishing, and never truly, and in the highest sense, having a substantive being.—Timæus*, 27, P. This he evidently intends as a preamble to the system of physical and psychological *legislation* contained in that wonderful dialogue; for after

dwelling upon the above distinction at some length, preparatory to the statement of the universal laws of mind and matter, Timæus is thus addressed by Socrates: *τὸ μὲν οὖν* ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ *θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ* ΝΟΜΟΝ *ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε.* "Since in such a wonderful way we have received from you the *preamble*, next in order propound to us the *law*." Timæus, 29, C.

III.

Subjective Sense of the Word ἀληθεύω.

PAGE 4, LINE 9. *Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς ἐισὶ θεοί*; "Does it not, then, seem to be an easy matter to affirm, *in all truthfulness*, that there are Gods, or that the Gods exist?" *Ἀληθεύω*, although it includes in its signification the *utterance* of truth, and there are many passages in which it must be so rendered, has yet reference rather to truth of *feeling* than to truth of expression, to that which belongs to the subjective state of the soul or the moral diathesis, rather than to that which is the result of scientific, or speculative, or casuistical argument—what the Psalmist styles, "*truth in the inward parts*." Paul seems to include much of this sense as he uses the term, Ephesians, iv., 15—*ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ*: not so much "speaking the truth," as our translation has it, but rather, as is shown by the context, and especially by the word *ἀγάπη*, "being truthful, or of a *true heart in love*." So, also, Galatians, iv., 16—*ὥστε ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν γέγονα ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν*; "Have I become subject to your hatred while I am true (in heart) to you?" It may refer, in this last example, to the declaration of truth, but even if that is supposed to be included, the subjective sense of the word is still predominant. Hence we may best render *ἀληθεύοντας*, in the passage at the head of these remarks, adverbial-

ly, thus: "In all sincerity, in all truthfulness, in consistency with the truest and purest sentiments of our nature." The other rendering, which would refer it merely to the declaration of truth, would be comparatively tame, besides producing a pleonasm in *λέγειν.* Our translation is also in perfect keeping with the character of the honest and truthful Clinias, as he is, with great dramatic skill, represented to us throughout this whole argument. He uses the language of a man who never had felt a doubt on the subject. This is a favourite word with Plato, and frequently to be found in his writings in this subjective sense. For a very excellent example, see the Theætetus, 202, B.: *ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ,* 'ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ *μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὔ.* The sentiment is, that the *soul* may be subjectively in harmony with the truth, so as cordially to embrace it in its creed before scientific knowledge, or an objective presentation of it to the speculative reason. It may have the *life* before it possesses a clear apprehension of the *doctrine.* This may be, and often undoubtedly is, the case in religion; but those who would, on this account, undervalue logical and doctrinal statements, or what they rather disdainfully style systematic theology, are in danger either of a mysticism, in which all clear perceptions of truth are utterly lost, or of taking opinions upon the mere testimony of others, or on the credit of a blind tradition, without either light in the reason, or any true warmth in the affections

We have an illustration of this truthful state of mind in the course which Clinias pursues in the next reply—*πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος,* &c. He enters upon the argument with all the confidence of an easy victory. He appeals at once to the most obvious phenomena, not so much as scientific proofs of the Divine existence, but rather as visible representations of a manifest Divine power. "The Heavens *declare* (to all whose souls are prepared for it) the glory of

God." But as though this had too much the appearance of speculative reasoning, he retreats again to his stronghold, the feelings of his own nature, and appeals to the common and universal sentiments of mankind. This, with the bare aspect of the heavens, he deems enough for those who were true-hearted (*ἀληθεύοντες*) concerning the Gods. We are taught in the Holy Scriptures, that not only a true belief, but also unbelief in respect to the Divine existence, has its seat primarily in the affections rather than in the intellect. "The fool hath said in *his heart*, there is no God." The Hebrew word here is sometimes used for the understanding; still, like the Greek *φρένες*, with all its cognates, such as *φρονέω*, *φρόνησις*, *φρόνημα*, &c., it generally refers to the intellect, not so much in a speculative or scientific aspect, but rather as modified by the state of the affections or moral powers.

IV.

The Orphic Poetry.

Page 5, Line 12. *Οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων.* "Some in poetry and some in prose." It is very uncertain what prose writings are here referred to. Those in poetry must have been the works of Homer, Hesiod, and perhaps of Orpheus. The term *παλαιότατοι* (*most ancient*) would seem to refer to some productions older than the Iliad and the Theogonia. These might be styled *παλαιὰ*, in comparison with the period of Grecian literature in which Plato lived, which, although many centuries posterior in time, was not separated from them by any distinct literary epoch prior to the Persian wars. They could not, however, be well entitled to the epithet *παλαιότατα*, which, as it is introduced, and as the context shows, is meant to designate the most remote of two distinct periods, in reference

to which it is intimated, there was a progression, if we may so style it, from the cosmological to the theogonic or mythological. The first, or most ancient class, were of the former description. They were more philosophical than the latter, more taken up with the origin of things, that all-absorbing question which so engrossed the early mind: *ὡς γέγονεν ἡ* ΠΡΩΤΗ ΦΥΣΙΣ *οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων.* They were pantheistic rather than polytheistic, manifesting a departure, but still a less departure from the primitive religion than is denoted by the latter stage. (See Note 9, page 5.) All these marks correspond well with the nature of some of the hymns styled Orphic, under which name a few fragments, whether spurious or not, have survived to our own day. Although these are generally regarded as productions of a much later age, yet, from the frequent reference made to Orpheus by the Greek poets, it would seem almost certain that a collection of hymns under this name existed in the most ancient times, forming that copious fund or storehouse of rich poetical appellations, from which Homer, and subsequently Æschylus, were supplied, besides being the source of whatever is pantheistical or mystical in the Grecian tragedies. The existence of forgeries is evidence that there must have been originals in imitation of which they were composed, and an ancient philosophy and theology, which had once exerted great influence on the human mind, to serve as their plausible and probable foundation.

In connexion with the passage before us, compare lib. iv., 716, A.: *Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων.* This is almost the very language of one of the so-styled Orphic fragments now extant, and is directly referred to Orpheus by the scholiast on the place:—*Θεὸν μὲν τὸν δημιουργὸν σαφῶς, παλαιὸν δὲ λόγον λέγει τὸν* ΟΡΦΙΚΟΝ, *ὅς ἐστιν οὗτος,*

Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.

Should any one say that this resembles very much the language of Thales, or some of the philosophers of that period, and that, therefore, the ignorant old scholiast had been imposed upon by one who had affixed a fabulous name and given a poetical dress to some of their dogmas,—why, we would reply, may not Thales and others have derived this peculiar mode of expression from a still earlier source, and why this disposition to charge the scholiasts and Christian fathers with combining to produce such useless and yet elaborate forgeries as some critics are constantly connecting with their names? We say useless, because a philosophy and theology, such as appears in these hymns, did, beyond all question, exist at a very early period, and the poetical dress, had it not been real, would have added nothing to the argument they sought to derive from them. For places in the ancient writings, in which reference is made to Orpheus and his poems, the reader is referred to Plato, Ion, vol. iii., p. 134, Leip.; Convivium, vii., 219; De Legibus, vi., 230; Cratylus, ii., 263; Aristotle, De Anim., i, 8; Euripides, Rhesus, 947; Hippolytus, 967; Cicero, De Nat. Deor., i., 38; Diod. Sic., iv., 25; Just. Mart., Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 17; Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christ., xv., 64, 65.

V.

Plato's Regard for Antiquity and the Ancient Mythology.—His Use of the Word Θεοί.

PAGE 6, LINE 1. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐπιτιμᾶν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν. "It is hard to find fault with them, seeing they are ancient things." We discover, in this and similar expressions, Plato's conservative spirit and reverence for antiquity, struggling with his conviction of the importance of having the minds of the young imbued with higher notions of the Divine Nature than could be obtained from the ancient poets. The same feelings are manifested in that passage in the Republic, in which he dismisses Homer, with the rest of the poets, from his imaginary City of the Soul, although, at the same time, he sends him away with a garland of honour on his head. "Should such a one (he says) come to our city, wishing to exhibit his poems, we would, indeed, reverence him as something sacred, and wonderful, and delightfully pleasant, yet still would we say that no such man could abide with us: ἀποπέμποιμέν τε ἂν εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν, μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέψαντες, and we would send him away to another state, having poured myrrh upon his head and crowned him with a wreath." Republic, 398, A. We find, however, everywhere, in his works, a strong attachment to the ancient myths, wherever they contained nothing gross or offensive to his views of morality; a number of which, and those, too, distinguished for the feeling of awe and sublimity with which they inspire the reader, he has himself presented in some of the most important and philosophical of his dialogues.

It is exceedingly interesting to contemplate the peculiar condition of this philosopher, endeavouring to reform what he felt he had no power or commission to abolish. Having no Divine warrant, like the Hebrew prophets or the apostles

of Christ, he did not dare to enter upon an exterminating crusade against all the rites, opinions, and traditions held sacred in the Athenian worship. The Grecian reformer was too well acquainted with human nature not to fear lest, in destroying the monster Superstition, he should call up another of a still more horrid aspect—Atheism. He did not wish utterly to pull down existing institutions, while he had no new revelation, whose authority might replace, with increased vigour, the departed reverence for those ancient myths, the probable remains of truths once communicated from Heaven, yet mysteriously abandoned to all the corruptions and distortions of the human mind. He probably thought that out of some of the better parts of the Grecian mythology there might be constructed a system, which, while it recognised the One Eternal Supreme, placed at an immense distance from all things created by him or emanating from him, might, at the same time, admit of inferior powers, retaining the individual names at least, (if not the characters), which had been consecrated by the popular superstition. That he did believe in such an Eternal and Ineffable Supreme (*ὁ γεννήσας ἀΐδιος πατήρ*, Timæus, 38, A.,—*ὁ κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μένων ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ*, Rep., 381, C.,—*ὁ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνων*, 380, D.), every reader of his works must admit. He undoubtedly erred in supposing that the pure worship of such a glorious Being could be consistent with any kind of religious homage paid to inferior powers; yet we should remember that the same error has been committed by the largest portion of the professedly Christian Church, and that we are to judge Plato, not as a Christian under the light of revelation, but as a heathen philosopher struggling with difficulties, of the magnitude of which we have no just conception. These remarks are deemed necessary in reply to the charge often made against Plato, of countenancing the polytheism of his countrymen, and which

may be found set forth in its strongest light in a tract by Jacob Zimmerman, contained in the ninth volume of the *Amœnitates Literariæ*.

A misconception in regard to the Platonic theology has arisen from his use of the word θεοὶ. The Greek writers, whether poets or orators, generally meant by it nothing more than supernatural beings of a higher order than men. The word, in itself, had attached to it none of those more metaphysical conceptions which belong to our term *Divine*, as significant of the uncreated and eternal. There was, therefore, no philological inconsistency in its being applied to those beings whom Plato elsewhere calls δαίμονες, and who, in his scheme, may be regarded in the same light with the angels or sons of God, mentioned in the Holy Scriptures.

In respect to the objection which might be made to his use of the plural, it may be remarked, that throughout this whole argument with the atheist, θεὸς may be substituted for θεοὶ, without at all affecting its validity, and we should by so doing come nearer to the philosopher's true meaning, than by retaining the common term, with the misconception arising from our modern notions; that is, we should better translate his spirit by adopting a slight mistranslation of the letter. Θεοὶ is often to be taken collectively for the whole of the superhuman Genus, however inferior and dependent some parts of it may be in respect to another, and is equivalent, in the discussions which follow, to τὸ θεῖον or τὸ δαιμόνιον. Another suggestion, which it may be proper to make here, is, that by the phrase θεοὶ κατὰ νόμους, the writer means not directly the Theogony and worship established by law at Athens (although even this he would touch with the hand of a wise reformer, and not of a reckless destructionist), but rather the *cultus* of the Supreme and inferior Divinities, as it should be set forth by the lawgiver in that pure system of polity which he contemplates in the present treatise.

VI.

Philosophy and Character of Anaxagoras.

PAGE 6, LINE 6. *νέων . . . . . σοφῶν.* "Of our modern wits, or wise men;" that is, comparatively modern, although all to whom he refers did not live in Plato's own time. He seems chiefly to have had in mind Anaxagoras, who, notwithstanding his speculative theism and his boasted doctrine of the Νοῦς, was yet regarded by Plato as giving an atheistical tendency to the age in which he lived. In regard to his theology, Anaxagoras is best known by the position, in which he so much gloried, "that mind was the cause of all things," and in physics, by the unpopular dogma, "that the sun was nothing but a mass of ignited stone, instead of an animated being," as was commonly believed, and as Plato seems to teach in this book. The character of this philosopher may be understood from the boasting he himself made, and which his friends made for him, in regard to the first of these doctrines; as though, in this respect, he had in any way advanced beyond the more modest Thales, or had discovered a truth which had been concealed from the beginning of the world to his own day. Socrates seems to have had a right view of him in the Phædon, where he charges him with setting out with the doctrine that Νοῦς was the cause of all things, as a mere speculative tenet, and then making no use of it in subsequent parts of his philosophy; that is, never ascending above second causes, or rising from the physical to the moral (*τὸ βέλτιστον*), but ever assigning, as the chief motive powers, *ἀέρας τε καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα*, *gases, and fires, and fluids*, as the words may be rendered in accommodation to the same spirit in modern physical philosophy. "Having once (says he) heard one reading a book of Anaxagoras, and saying, that *Nous* was the disposer and the efficient cause of all things, I was highly delighted with the

declaration, and it seemed to me to be admirably said; and I thought, that if Νοῦς (or Mind) thus arranged all things, everything must be placed in that position in which it was *best* for it to be; so that no other study remained for man, in regard to both himself and *other things*, but the investigation of that which was (morally) most *excellent and best* (or, in other words, moral causes), and that this was the only true science of things. But in this wonderful hope (of discovering the universal science, or science of sciences) I was greatly disappointed; for as I read on I find the man making no farther use of his boasted Νοῦς, nor assigning any other cause in the disposal and arrangement of the world, than airs, and æthers, and waters, and other similar things many and strange. And he seemed to me to act precisely as if any one saying, that Socrates doeth whatsoever he doeth by mind or *reason*, should then, in attempting to assign the causes of my actions, assert that I now sit here for these *reasons*, namely, that my body is composed of bones and nerves, that my bones are solid and have joints, and that my nerves contract and relax; wherefore that the bones being raised up in their joinings, the nerves, by *reason* of tension and relaxation, make me to bend my limbs, and that for this *reason* I now sit here: and so, also, in respect to our conversing, should assign other similar causes of the phenomena of speech, such as voices, and aërial vibrations, and sounds (*φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς*), and ten thousand other such agencies, all the while neglecting to assign the true *reason* (of reasons), that because it seemed good (*βέλτιον*) to the Athenians to condemn me, therefore it seemed better to me to sit here, and *more just* to submit to the sentence they had imposed. Since, as I verily believe, had it not been for the last-mentioned *reasons*, these nerves and bones would long before this have had me away to Megara or among the Bœotians, being set in motion by an opinion of the best (*τοῦ βελτίστου*), if I had not

thought it more *just* and *better* to remain than to fly." Phædon, 97, 98. We recommend the close study of this whole passage, and the admirable sketch it presents of such theists as Anaxagoras, to every student who wishes to know the essential difference, on this most vital point, between the Socratic and other ancient systems of philosophy. How strongly does it remind us of many modern books of physical science, in which the name of God may, perhaps, appear in a preface or some introductory note, while all the rest is not merely silent, but directly adapted to produce an atheistic turn of thought, by suffering the mind to dwell on nothing else than *ἀέρας τε καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα*, gases, and fluids, and fires, or imponderable agents. The opinion which Plato entertained of this philosopher is also significantly expressed, although he does not mention his name, in the eleventh book of the Laws, 967, A. B. C., a passage which is more freely examined in Note XIII., on the atheistic doctrine of *φύσις*, *τύχη*, and *τέχνη*.

The *Νοῦς* of Anaxagoras can hardly be regarded as a personal being, or as a *ψυχὴ ὑπερκοσμία*, distinct from the world, of which it might be considered the *informing law*. The atheist may admit the dogma without changing his creed. La Grange undoubtedly believed that there was *Νοῦς*, or reason, in the Heavens, even a science so profound, that all the powers of his highest mathematical analysis could barely follow the laws of motion in which it was displayed; and yet La Grange was an atheist. The Heavens had no interest for him except as they formed a splendid diagram for the illustration of his calculus, and as long as the moral element was wanting it made no difference what name was inscribed upon it, whether *Νοῦς* or *φύσις*, or a God possessed of mere intelligence, to whom we were nothing, and who was nothing to us, except as affording subjects for the exercise of the speculative intellect. This *Νοῦς* of Anaxagoras had no respect to moral as final causes, which,

as Socrates shows, were studiously excluded from his philosophy. It was only another name for the physical truth of things, in which the atheist contends there may be science on his hypothesis, as well as on any other. It was an abstract intelligence, displayed wholly in physical adaptations, without either a general or special providence. It might be regarded as the *instinct of the universe*, working in the great whole, as some of its emanations in minute portions, blindly, unconsciously, without personality, and knowing everything but itself. However incomprehensible this may be, it is still the highest reach of that philosophy which makes no account of any *moral* attributes in the Deity, but regards him as a mere impassible intelligence. We have no hesitation in preferring pantheism if it embrace, although inconsistently, that moral element, without which there can be no true personality, either to Νοῦς or ψυχή.

Plato evidently regarded this philosophy as no better than practical atheism, notwithstanding it sets out so pompously, and apparently so religiously, with the dogma aforesaid. He seems here to condemn its modern advocates, the *νέοι σοφοί*, as he styles them, equally with that ancient superstition which they so much derided. Anaxagoras was of a spirit the very opposite of that which pervades all the teachings of Socrates. He was inclined rather to insult and shock the popular superstitions than gently to remove them, or turn to good account whatever of truth they might possess, and that, too, not in the spirit of enthusiastic religious zeal, which we cannot help respecting even when we are compelled to condemn, but in the mere conceit of a little fancied progress in physical science. Like the modern Galileo, whose name is so frequently in the mouths of the scientific enemies of religion, he evidently rejoiced more in the thought, that this very small advance raised him somewhat above the religious notions of his countrymen, than in any honest wish or desire to elevate those

popular views which placed him, as he supposed, in such egotistical contrast. He seems to have been a regular priest and poet hater, and there is, therefore, no cause for surprise that he should have called forth the enmity and prejudices of those whom he had, from no higher motive than vanity, attacked.

This spirit was manifested in the declaration, a few lines below referred to, that the heavenly bodies were only masses of earth and stones, and that the sun was a ball of melted ore. For this he was charged by the Athenians with atheism, and justly too; for he who assails the common belief of any people, without putting anything better in its place, or who attempts to destroy false notions of the Deity, without teaching, as Socrates and Plato did, the doctrine of the one eternal and ineffable, yet personal Supreme, the head of a moral government, and directing all things with final reference to moral ends, is in heart no better than an atheist, whatever refined speculative notions he may have in the abstract about Νοῦς or intelligence being the cause of all things. It is probable that the condemnation of Socrates was mainly effected in consequence of his views having been misunderstood by the unthinking Athenian mob, and confounded with those of Anaxagoras.

Plato did undoubtedly hold that the Heavenly bodies were animated personal beings; but when here and in subsequent passages he styles them θεοὶ, it is only in the sense of beings superior to men. The simple doctrine, therefore, for it goes no farther, that the Heavenly bodies were animated beings, was no great heresy either in philosophy or religion. (See Note XXXIV., where this subject is more fully discussed.) It was far better than the speculative semi-atheism of Anaxagoras, or even of some modern naturalists, who have only substituted for the abstract Νοῦς of the Grecian philosopher the symbols and equations of the differential and integral calculus. One religious con-

ception of God as a moral governor, the light in which Plato and Socrates chiefly regarded him, and which may exist in connexion with the most absurd notions of the physical universe, does yet belong to a philosophy almost infinitely removed above the mere scientific theism of such men as Anaxagoras, Galileo or La Place.

VII.

The Divine Justice, the Ground of Human Law.

PAGE 9, LINE 1. *Σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν ἔιη.* "For this is just the fairest and most excellent *preamble* to all laws, or to every system of law," namely, *ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων.* "That the Gods not only *are*, but that they are also good, and that, moreover, they have an esteem for justice beyond anything that is felt among men." *θεοί* here, as we have remarked before, is used as a collective term for the whole of the Divine Nature, being equivalent to *τὸ θεῖον*, or *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, and should be rendered in the singular, if we would do full justice to the thought. See Note V. The sentiment is this: It is not enough simply to believe in the Divine existence. God is something more than the dynamic principle of the universe. Neither is it enough to connect with this the notion of infinite knowledge. God is something more than the *Νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, something more than mere intelligence. The law should present him to us in the far sublimer idea of a Being clothed with the moral attributes of justice, and of a special, or, rather, moral providence. It is this, and not a merely speculative or scientific theism, which must lie at the foundation of every true system of legislation. We may talk as loftily as we please of The Supreme Intelligence, or The First Cause, or

The Great Idea, it is still practical atheism, until along with this there is recognised The Lawgiver, The Judge, and The Moral Governor, the constant and interested Witness of our every act, the ground and sanction of the solemn appeal of the oath. "That such views (says Cicero) are useful and necessary, who will deny, when he reflects how many things must be confirmed by an oath, how much safety there is in those religious rites that pertain to the solemnization of contracts, how many the fear of the Divine punishment keeps back from crime; in short, *how sacred and holy a thing Society becomes* when the Immortal Gods are constantly presented (in the Law) both as judges and witnesses." Cic., De Leg., ii., vii. We would even venture to assert, that a gross anthropopathy or anthropomorphism, if it retain such views of the moral attributes of the Deity as a God of Law, is every way to be preferred to the most metaphysical or philosophical notions of the Divine Nature and its impassibility, which reject them, or do not even assign to them the most prominent place.

VIII.

Universality of the Belief in a God.

Page 10, Line 10. *Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πάντων ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις.* Compare with this what Clinias says, page 4, line 14: *καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς.* By Greeks and Barbarians, the former always meant all mankind, and, therefore, the belief in a God is here declared to be coextensive with the race. If any man might rely on his own unaided reason, who will venture to say that Plato would not have been justified in thus trusting himself to it? And yet, profound as he was in the investigation of truth beyond the most, if not all, of his fellow-men, he never hesitates to ap-

peal to the common sentiments, the *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι* of mankind, and to throw himself upon them often with a confidence which he yielded to no speculative argument. Hence his fondness for those ancient myths, under which were concealed, in various forms, the opinions universally held respecting the moral government of God and the doctrine of future retribution. This was not, as Warburton supposed, a mere accommodation of himself to those vulgar dogmas, which he did not wish to destroy, because he deemed them useful. All that has been said by writers of that school, and by the ancient authorities on whom they pretend to rely, respecting the exoteric and esoteric teaching, we believe to be wholly unsupported by any parts of the *genuine* dialogues of Plato. No man was farther from his true spirit than Warburton, and, without an appreciation of this, his learning only led him to misunderstand the philosopher in some of his most serious discussions. If ever Plato is deeply earnest, it is when he gets engaged in the discussion of a traditionary myth, which he can regard in some measure as standing in the place of primitive revelation, or can find relief from the uncertainties of his own speculations, in what he could trace as the universal voice of humanity. We need no stronger proof of this, than is found in the manner in which he closes the long discussion in the Gorgias (in some respects the most perfect and rigidly conducted argument to be found in his works), with the mythical representation of the final judgment; as though, without this appeal to the authority of ancient and universal tradition, human reason could never freely and satisfactorily prove that a life of sensual pleasure, or of worldly ambition, was not better than one spent in acts of virtue and the cultivation of philosophy. He was the last man to spurn such aid, in order to gratify that pride of intellect, that would adopt no conclusions to which it had not arrived through the independent exercise of private judgment. He knew

too well the direct tendency of such a spirit to darken the understanding, and to lead to error instead of truth.

We would not, however, confound this with a modern affectation which has sought to support itself by the authority of our philosopher. Plato, it should be ever borne in mind, had no Bible, and he did well, therefore, and exercised his highest reason in seeking for a Divine revelation in those universal sentiments of all people and nations, which were as ancient in time as they were extended in space, and which could most truly be said to be, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus.* This object of his reverence was something far different from the *vox populi* of the demagogue, who is often most successful when he can array the artificial and transient feeling of one generation, or one nation, against what he would style the antiquated prejudices of mankind. It was rather that *vox humanitatis*, which, by its universality at all times and in all regions, gave evidence of having been once the *voice of God*, remains of a primitive inspiration, however darkened it may have been by human depravity—opinions which had not been the product of the speculative reason, but which, under the conserving influence of a higher principle, had maintained their ground in spite of the opposition of human depravity, and the consequently superinduced darkness of the human understanding. It was this *vox humanitatis* to which Hesiod seems to allude:

φήμη δ' οὔ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα πολλοὶ
λαοὶ φημίζουσι· θεός νύ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή.

Works and Days, 709.

Compare, also, Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i., 43: Solus enim videt, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat *sine doctrina* anticipationem quamdam Deorum? quæ *πρόληψις*

appellatur, &c. Quum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est esse Deos, quoniam *insitas* eorum vel potius *innatas* cogitationes habemus. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. And again, lib. ii., 12: Itaque inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat. Omnibus enim *innatum* est et in animo quasi *insculptum* esse Deos.

Still more to the same effect, Tusc. Disp., i., 30, where we find the best definition of the Law of Nature that has ever been given. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet), omnes tamen esse vim et naturam Divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus efficit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. *Omnis autem in re consensio omnium gentium* LEX NATURÆ *putanda est.*

IX.

Antiquity of Atheism.

Page 11, Line 12. *Γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες.* "There have always been more or less who have had this *disease* of atheism." It has been maintained that there were no philosophical atheists, professedly so, before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato, however, asserts that some such have existed from a very early period, and in this he is borne out by Aristotle, who tells us that most of the earliest philosophers, especially those of the Ionic school, assigned only material causes of the universe: *τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων.*

Aristotle, Metaph., i., 3. A distinction, however, should be made between those who were professed atheists, such as Democritus and Diagoras, and those who were inclined to an atheistical mode of philosophizing, while they yet professed to be theists, although of an impure and inconsistent species. In this latter class the world has always abounded. On the other hand, it is most conclusively shown by Cudworth, that, although this materializing school was ancient, the first philosophy was *spiritual*, and that the subsequent atheism arose from a perversion of the atomical theory, which, when truly held, and according to the views of those who originated it before Democritus, was not only favourable to, but one of the firmest supports of a pure theism. Plato, in this passage, styles atheism *a disease*, as though it were something unnatural, a corruption, *διαφθορὰ* (see page 4, line 18), a departure from those innate sentiments or *προλήψεις*, of the race of which he and Cicero speak so emphatically. So, also, the apostle treats it as a degeneracy from a primitive better state, Rom., i., 28. He speaks of this tendency as a *darkness of the spirit*, *καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος καρδία αὐτῶν*, Rom., i., 21 : as *a reprobate mind or reason*, *ἀδόκιμον νοῦν*, 28, to which men "had been given up, because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge." We cannot read these Scriptures without calling to mind a similar sentiment expressed in a fragment of the old poet Empedocles :

Δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

Ah wretch! whose soul dark thoughts of God invade.

If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!

X.

Principle of Authority.

PAGE 12, LINE 6. *ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς ἀνασκοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου.* "If you will take my advice, you will patiently wait, repeatedly examining whether it is thus or otherwise, learning from others, and therefore, and in a most especial manner, from the Lawgiver." Notwithstanding the earnest recommendation to most diligent study and inquiry, and in perfect consistency with it, Plato holds that the acceptance of established opinions must go before and guide the exercise of private judgment; not to supersede or dispense with the necessity of the latter in its proper time and place, but because the state of mind which submits to lawful authority affords the surest guarantee of subsequent mental independence, instead of that counterfeit which is often nothing more than a slavish fear of a creed, and which loses all true independence, in its premature efforts to avoid what the best and wisest of mankind have long regarded as established.

The next sentence contains a thought of the highest practical importance: *ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μή τολμήσῃς περὶ θεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεβῆσαι,* "but during this period see to it that you venture upon nothing impious or unholy." That is, religious obligation must be revered, and pious emotions cherished, before the young soul can reason about them, and there is no period, however short, that we have a right to remain atheists until we are able to prove by induction the existence of a God. He who thus *honours reason*, by following its first dictate, submission to authority which God himself has established, will doubtless leave those who have been taught to pursue a different course, far behind him in all the severer and more abstruse depart-

ments of philosophy and theology. Throughout this whole treatise, it should be borne in mind that *νομοθέτης* means rather the ancient founder of a state or of a religion, than a temporary or subordinate magistrate; so that "to learn of the Lawgiver," is to consult with deference and respect, as one great means of forming right opinions, the civil and religious constitution of the state in which we may be born.

XI.

Degrees of Atheism.—Peculiarity of Plato's Style.

PAGE 12, LINE 13. *Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν*, &c. The author now proceeds to the discussion of speculative and practical atheism in its three degrees, which may be thus stated:

1st. An absolute denial of the existence of a Deity.

2d. The opinion that, if a Deity exists, he does not concern himself about us, or in other words, the denial of a Providence.

3d. A sentiment clearly allied to the second; that if a Deity exists, and if he even exercises a physical care or providence over the world regarded as a physical production, still he is in a great measure, if not wholly, indifferent to moral conduct, and that, therefore, his displeasure, should it be ever excited, is easily appeased, not by repentance, nor by an atonement that God himself has provided, but by self-imposed votive offerings and superstitious services

We expect a direct argument on the first head, conducted in the usual manner by an appeal to evidences of design in the phenomena around us. This mode of proceeding is adopted in the discourses recorded in the Memorabilia, and there is, also, an admirable specimen of it in Cicero's treatise De Natura Deorum. Such a line of argument, however, although quite a favourite with modern theolo-

gians, was not that which would first suggest itself to the ancient mind, but a more abstruse speculation, and one which had a more intimate relation to the great question about the first origin of things, the first life and motion in matter, whether to be regarded as eternal, or as having had a distinct origination from some older essence. This, also, we fully believe, is the way in which the subject would present itself to such a mind as Socrates, notwithstanding it is generally considered that the plain and practical mode of reasoning ascribed to him by Xenophon is more in accordance with the truth, than the metaphysical character in which he appears in the Dialogues of Plato. At all events, this is the mode adopted here by the Athenian, who undoubtedly represents Socrates, and he also takes a very peculiar method of introducing it. In the commencement of his reasoning on the first head, he takes his hearers by surprise, by suddenly suggesting that they had unawares fallen upon the discussion of a most important principle, which deserved to be disposed of before going on with those more popular views which had just been mentioned. It has, at first, the appearance of being accidental, but one familiarly acquainted with the Platonic method will recognise here the usual ironical resource the author employs when he wishes to enter upon a discussion more than usually subtle—namely, the apparently undesigned eliciting of a question in relation to it from the one with whom the dialogue is maintained. The chief speaker seems, or affects, suddenly to remember something essential to the argument, and which they were in danger of having entirely forgotten, although it is evident that it is the main thing which has been kept in view from the beginning, notwithstanding its seeming incidental introduction. Frequent examples of this may be found in the Protagoras, Republic, and Theætetus, especially the last. It is, in fact, so purely Platonic, that it may be regarded as one of the best signs,

as far, at least, as the style is concerned, by which we may distinguish a genuine from a spurious dialogue.

XII.

Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements.

PAGE 13, LINE 15. *Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα.* It is generally assumed that in the use of these terms all the ancient philosophers meant four simple, indestructible, and incomposite elements; being the *primordia*, or *ἀρχαὶ*, by the union or composition of which all other things were constituted. Hence many a superficial sneer by popular lecturers at the ignorance of the ancients in respect to chemistry and the number of simple substances. This view of the matter, however, is far from being correct. Some, it is true, maintained the above doctrine nearly in the terms which we have employed, and as it would be stated by a modern chemist. Among these, if we understand Aristotle aright, was Empedocles. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ τέσσαρα, τὰ δὲ πάντα μετὰ τῶν κινούντων, ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν.* Aristotle, De Gen. et Corrup., i., 1. By the two moving powers here are intended his poetical personifications of Love and Discord, *Ἔρως* and *Ἔρις*, or, as they would be styled in the language of modern science, Attraction and Repulsion, which, together with the four elements, made the number of original principles or *primordia* to be six. Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus maintained that the elements were infinite, not only in number, but in form. *Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ἄπειρα, καὶ Λεύκιππος, καὶ Δημόκριτος· ταῦτα δὲ ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὰς μορφάς.* The doctrine which the first of these held respecting the *homœomeriæ*, or similar parts, is well known. Aristotle represents him, on this subject, as in every respect the direct opposite of Empedocles. *Ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται*

λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. Ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα, καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα. De Gen., &c., i., 1. "For the latter says that fire, and water, and air, and earth are four elements, and more simple than flesh and bone, and others of the *homœomeriæ*, while the former contends that these are simple elements, but that earth, and air, and fire are compounds." See Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, lib. i., where there is a long, but not very clear account of some of the ancient opinions on this subject. Compare, also, lib. iii., 3.

In general, however, we are quite satisfied that, even when they used the term *στοιχεῖα*, most of the ancient writers on physics had in view *elemental states* of bodies, without reference to their composition, rather than simple substances or *elements* in the sense in which modern chemistry would define the term—that is, as substances incapable of being changed, or of passing one into the other from a *change of state*. It was in this sense of *elemental states* that Parmenides held to two, *πῦρ* and *γῆν*, or the *solid* and the *æthereal*, regarding the *fluid* and the *aërial* as only mixed modifications: *οἱ δὲ εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ.* Arist., De Gen., &c., ii., 3. In like manner, Aristotle himself declares that they are not simple substances as actually found in nature, but ever compounded of one another, although in their ultimate state he seems to regard them as pure: *οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ μικτόν, κ. τ. λ.* Lib. ii., 3.

At all events, we have no doubt, from several very decided passages, as to the manner in which these terms are employed by Plato, whatever meaning may be attached to

them in the sentence at the head of these remarks, as the supposed language of the atheistical philosophers. He was so far from regarding them as strictly elements (*στοιχεῖα*) in the modern chemical, or even ancient Greek sense of the word, that he would not even rank them in that second stage of combination which he styles *συλλαβή*. See the Timæus, 48, B.: *Τὴν δὲ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ γῆς φύσιν θεατέον, καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων πάθη. Νῦν γὰρ ὡς εἰδόσι πῦρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ἀρχάς, αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός· προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἐν* ΣΥΛΛΑΒΗΣ *εἴδεσι ἀπεικασθῆναι.* "We must contemplate the nature of fire, water, air, and earth, before the generation of the Heavens; for now, as though we spoke to those who well knew what fire is, and each one of the rest, we talk of principles, and regard them as the elements (*στοιχεῖα, also used for the letters of the alphabet*) of the universe, when they ought not to be likened even to the species of the syllable." It is very clear likewise, from other passages, that Plato views them not as elements, but as elementary states (*καταστάσεις*), in which all bodies must exist, however varied in other respects their compositions; namely, as *solid*, *fluid*, *gas*, or that fourth condition which the ancients generally denoted by the term fire (*πῦρ*), but which modern chemistry would style the class of *imponderable agents*. These are *heat*, *light*, the *electric*, the *galvanic*, and the *magnetic* influence, which, although having five different names, are coming to be more and more regarded by our most scientific men as only modifications of one and the same principle. In other words, earth (*γῆ*), as used by Plato and many others of the Greek philosophers, was simply their scientific term for *solid* (*τὸ στερεόν*, to which it is sometimes equivalent), whether the substance was earth, or wood, or precious stones,—*ὕδωρ* for *liquid* or *fluid*, &c., and *πῦρ* for all that modification more subtle than air, of which they had some tolerably clear

views, as the seat of higher agencies than were usually cognizable by the senses, and of which they regarded the visible fire as the lowest representative form.

Whoever wishes to see the views of Plato on these subjects more fully stated may consult that portion of the Timæus, where he treats at great length of the primary constitution of bodies, and which, although erroneous in the details of its numerical ratios (as every a priori or theoretical attempt of the kind must be), contains evidently the germ of the modern chemical theory of *definite proportions*. These four *states*, or καταστάσεις, with all other intervening compound modifications, were, in fact, regarded but as varied manifestations of one simple essence (ὕλη), which receives all forms, itself having no form, and is therefore (ἄγνωστον) unknown and incapable of being known: since all physical knowledge is possible only in respect to those things which have number and λόγος, *ratio* or *reason*; and therefore elements, which are strictly such, are in their very nature ἄλογα, or incapable of being objects of scientific contemplation, except in their binary or trinary combinations. As he says in the Theætetus, 202, B., οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ, τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς.

All modifications of this simple essence were (φαινόμενα) phenomena or appearances, having nothing absolute except in the idea manifested by them, no indestructible material nature of their own, but continually passing into and out of each other, or, in other words, ever *becoming* (γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα), instead of absolutely *being* (ὄντα) in themselves distinct and imperishable substances. Thus, in the Timæus, 49, C.: Πρῶτον μὲν ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, λίθους καὶ γῆν ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ ὁρῶμεν· τηκόμενον δ' αὖ καὶ διακρινόμενον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα· (συγκαυθέντα δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ) ἀνά-

παλιν δὲ συγκριθὲν καὶ κατασβεσθὲν, εἰς 'ΙΔΕΑΝ *τε ἀπιὸν αὖθις ἀέρος πῦρ· καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα ξυνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον, νέφος καὶ ὁμίχλην· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον ξυμπιλουμένων, ῥέον ὕδωρ· ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ, γῆν καὶ λίθους αὖθις· κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὡς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν.* "For, in the first place, what we call water (*fluid*), when condensed, we behold *becoming* earth (*or solid*). Again, dissolved and separated, we behold this same thing becoming air (*or gas*). The air (*gas*), heated or being burned together (*if συγκαυθέντα be a right reading*), becomes *πῦρ*, and *πῦρ* again having its particles more closely united and condensed by cold (*κατασβεσθέν*), departs back again into the *idea* of air. Again, we see the air, when condensed, *becoming* cloud or vapour, and from them, when still more compressed, converted into flowing water. Finally, from water we behold again earth or solids, thus in a circle appearing successively to give birth or generation to each other."

Of the unknown elementary *ὕλη* he thus speaks: *διὸ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ* ΜΗΤΕΡΑ *καὶ ὑποδοχὴν, μήτε γῆν, μήτε ἀέρα, μήτε πῦρ, μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ' ἀόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές. μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες, οὐ ψευσόμεθα.* "But as for the *mother* and recipient of everything which *becomes* an object of sight and sensation, let us call it neither solid, nor air, nor fire, nor fluid, nor anything which springs from these, nor anything from which these are (directly or immediately) generated, but the invisible species, having no form of itself, yet capable of receiving all. Should we say that it is something which partakes in some most obscure way of the intelligible, and that it is most difficult to be apprehended, we should not mistake." Timæus, 51, A. The term *ἀόρατος* is not confined to the sense of sight, but is employed generally for all that region which is beyond the sphere of

sensation, or does not come under the cognizance of any of the senses. Sometimes, in its Platonic import, it is used for *the intelligible*, and is equivalent to *νοητόν*, but that does not seem to be the case here. There is, no doubt, an allusion in the above to Thales and Anaximenes, the former of whom held that water, and the latter that air, was this elemental principle, or *mother* of all things.

The Greek philosophers and poets generally regarded *πῦρ* as a modification of matter more subtle than air, and nearer to that simple elementary substance or *ὕλη* which was the basis of them all. Modern chemistry has experimentally developed this a priori idea of the ancient mind, in the discovery of that class of agents styled *imponderable*. Most abundant proof could be given, that by this term *πῦρ* was not meant merely the element, as commonly understood, which goes by that name (although this was included), any more than by the term *γῆ*, when thus philosophically used, was intended only the earthy matter beneath our feet. Another name for this fourth modification was *αἰθήρ*. Some, indeed, made this a higher form than *πῦρ*, as the author of the treatise De Mundo once ascribed to Aristotle: *λέγω δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὕδατι, ὕδατος ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι, κ. τ. λ.* Ch. iii., p. 143. In general, however, all who held to but four modifications regarded the two last mentioned as one and the same. The peculiar region of the æther or fourth state was supposed to be all of space above the atmosphere, although at the same time interpenetrating and diffused through all below it. There seems to be an allusion to this in Æsch., Prom. Vinc., 1090:

ὦ πάντων
αἰθὴρ κοινὸν φάος εἰλίσσων,

where the poet clearly regards it as the source of vision, and seems to have held respecting it something like the modern undulating theory of light. At least, we can make

no other sense of *εἰλίσσων*, which, in connexion with *αἰθὴρ* and *φάος*, suggests at once to the mind that waving or enlarging spiral motion that the air undergoes in the propagation of sound, and which, in the theory referred to, is supposed to take place in that universal fluid whose vibrations or undulations give rise to the phenomena of vision. In respect to the antiquity of this opinion, there is a remarkable passage in Aristotle's Meteorologica, lib. i., c. 3. On account of its length, we give only a very concise version. "We have already (he says) spoken respecting the first element, what power it hath, and how that the whole universe above us is full of that substance (*ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος*). And this opinion is not only entertained by us, but seems to have been a *very ancient* supposition, and to have been held by the primitive men; for that which is called æther received of old the appellation which Anaxagoras seems to me to have regarded as the same with the fire. For he says that all the upper regions are filled with fire (*τὰ ἄνω πλήρη πυρὸς εἶναι*), and yet he calls the same power, or the influence which pervaded that portion of space, the æther. And in this he was right; for that substance which remains forever unchanged men very naturally suppose to be a God, and Divine in its nature (*τὸ γὰρ* 'ΑΕΙ *σῶμα* ΘΕΟΝ *ἅμα τε* ΘΕΙΟΝ, *κ. τ. λ.*), and they accordingly defined such a substance by the name *αἰθήρ* (equivalent to *ἀεὶ θεός*, or *ἀεὶ θεῖον*), as though it had no identity with anything that pertains to us. *Thus must we say, that not once, or twice, or a few times, but with almost infinite repetitions, the same opinions come round in a circle* (*ἀνακυκλεῖν*) *among men.*" We think little of Aristotle's etymology of *αἰθὴρ* in this passage, but if this doctrine of the universal æther was, as he says, so ancient, and if it was held to be the cause of light and vision, it is certainly a remarkable confirmation of the closing sentiment, that this same opinion should now be becoming everywhere a

favourite with our most scientific men, especially when modern wits had for so long a time made themselves merry with what they styled the ancient absurdities respecting a plenum and a vacuum.

There is no doubt that Aristotle himself held light to be an undulating motion in a fluid affecting the sensorium of vision, as the undulations of the air affect that of the ear. This fluid he styles *τὸ διαφανὲς*, and says that colour affects it, *οἷον τὸν ἀέρα*, as the air; *ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος, κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον· οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος, οἰόμενος, εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξὺ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς, καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον.* "But by this fluid *being continuous* the sensorium is affected; for Democritus is not right in the supposition, that if all the intervening space were a vacuum, we might see so sharply as to discover an ant in the sky. This, however, is impossible without an intervening medium," &c. Aristot., De Anima, ii., 7.

In the Pantheistic Orphic hymn, quoted by the author of the treatise De Mundo, and by the scholiast on Plato, De Leg., iv., 716, A., to which we have already referred, the æther is represented as the seat of the Divine intellect, or, rather, as the Divine or universal sensorium:

> *νοῦς δὲ οἱ ἀψευδὴς βασιλήϊος ἄφθιτος* ΑΙΘΗΡ
> *ᾧ δὴ πάντα κλύει καὶ φράζεται.*

Whether this fragment be spurious or not, it is unquestionably of a very respectable antiquity. We have a similar sentiment, although in a style less pantheistic, in that common Homeric line,

> *Ζεῦ, κύδιστε, μέγιστε κελαινεφὲς* ΑΙΘΕΡΙ ΝΑΙΩΝ,

and which, although immeasurably inferior, can hardly fail to call to mind the Scriptural declarations, *Who alone dwelleth in light inaccessible — Thou coverest thyself with light as with a garment.* The sublimity of this is heightened

by the thought that light, or, rather, the universal undulatory æther which causes the sensation, is itself *invisible*. The Greek conception has a tinge of pantheism, and of the doctrine of the *anima mundi*. The Hebrew, besides its inexpressible sublimity, represents God as separated from the universe and veiled in thick darkness by the *intervention* of that very substance, which is the cause of light and knowledge to every portion of the worlds he has created. The Orphic and Homeric expressions, it is not absurd to suppose, arose from perversions of that purer idea which we find in the Bible. Similar language is frequently to be met with in the tragic poets, and sometimes a knowledge of its Orphic application and origin is absolutely necessary in illustrating passages which would be otherwise most obscure. As when Sophocles, in one of the sublimest choral odes in the Œdipus Tyrannus, speaking of the antiquity of Law, represents it as born of the heavenly æther,

οὐρανίαν δι' αἰθέρα
τεκνωθέντες,

or, in other words, the offspring of that universal sensorium or Divine Νοῦς, which, according to the Orphic hymn, hath its peculiar dwelling-place in the æther. From this manner of employing the term, it became one of the names of Jove himself, being regarded as his peculiar province in the division of Saturn's kingdom, as to Juno was allotted the air or lower atmosphere, and to Neptune the water.

Ἀήρ and *αἰθήρ* are sometimes confounded by the poets, although the distinction between them is, on the whole, tolerably well observed. Ἀήρ is regarded as the source of *respiratory*, and of the lowest animal life; *αἰθήρ* of the higher life of sensation, and even of the intellect—the life of the spirit. Hence, as the one is from *ἄω*, *ἄημι*, *to breathe*, the other is from *αἴθω* (old root *ἀΐω*), *to burn*, *to be hot;* in the same manner as the first expression of the idea

of life (*ζάω*, *ζῆν*) was most naturally associated with the appearance of self-motion in fermentation or ebullition. (See page 27, note 4, on the words *ζῆν* and *ζέω*.) Hence we cannot help thinking that there is some connexion between *αἰθήρ*, *αἴθω*, and the verb *αἴσθομαι*, *αἰσθάνομαι*. On this matter, some of the old poets and materializing philosophers may have indulged in views similar to what are now held by not a few modern savans, respecting the influence of an aethereal magnetic or galvanic fluid in the production of motion, sensation, and even thought. Hence Aristophanes, in the Clouds, 570, styles the æther *βιοθρέμμονα* :

Ἀιθέρα σεμνότατον βιοθρέμμονα πάντων.

The scholiast thinks that it is here used for *ἀήρ*. The higher sense, however, best accords with the term *σεμνότατον* and other expressions of this writer, who, when he chooses to lay aside his buffoonery, is the most philosophical of all the Grecian poets, although much inclined to a materializing pantheism. In another place, in the style of the Orphic hymn and Homer, he calls it the dwelling-place of Jove,

Ὄμνυμι τοίνυν αἰθέρ' οἴκησιν Διός.

Thesmoph., 279.

Αἰθήρ or *πῦρ*, on the one hand, and *γῆ* on the other, being the two extremes, are frequently spoken of together as the cogenerating causes, or male and female parents of all material existences. As in Æsch., Prom. Vinct., 88 :

Ὦ δῖος αἰθήρ ——— ———
——— ——— *παμμῆτόρ τε γῆ.*

So, also, in a fragment of Euripides, from the drama of Chrysippus,

γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ.

On like grounds, in the dissolution and death of animate objects, this semi-materializing philosophy and poetry taught that the more refined or spiritual parts returned to

the higher element from which they derived their origin, while the denser returned to the earth. The *πνεῦμα* (spiritus) ascended to its kindred *αἰθήρ*, the fluids and grosser matter sank into the bosom of their mother *γαῖα*, as in the line of Euripides which so strongly calls to mind Ecclesiastes, xii., 7:

> *Ἐάσατ' ἤδη γῇ καλυφθῆναι νεκρούς,*
> *ὅθεν δ' ἕκαστον εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀφίκετο*
> *ἐνταῦθ' ἀπελθεῖν·* ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *μὲν πρὸς* ΑΙΘΕΡΑ
> *τὸ σῶμα δ' εἰς* ΓΗΝ.
>
> *Supplices*, 533.

Compare Orestes, 1085, and Helena, 1023:

> *ὁ νοῦς*
> *τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει*
> *ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον* ΑΙΘΕΡ' *ἐμπεσών.*

Compare, also, the line of the fragment of the Hypsipyle from Stobæus, 108, in which we have the very language of the English Church burial service; *earth to earth—dust to dust:*

> *ἄχθονται βροτοὶ*
> *εἰς γῆν φέροντες γῆν.*

In the case of the more gross and animal, it was supposed that the *πνεῦμα*, being borne down by the attraction and weight of the earthy and sensual, and being unable to extricate itself from it, sank into still lower forms, until purified and set free by the penetrating and cleansing *fires* of Hades. See the Phædon, 81, D.

We cannot conclude this long and yet, as we trust, not altogether irrelevant excursus, without giving an extract from a fragment of Euripides, in which there is most beautifully expressed this departure of the elements to their native homes, and which we cannot help thinking to be genuine, notwithstanding it is strongly controverted by Valckenaer:

Χωρεῖ δ' ὀπίσω, τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας
φύντ' ἐς γαῖαν, τὰ δ' ἀπ' αἰθερίου
βλαστόντα γονῆς εἰς οὐράνιον
πόλον ἦλθε πάλιν· θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν
τῶν γιγνομένων· διακρινόμενον δ'
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου
μορφὴν ἰδίαν ἀπέδειξεν.
Valckenaer, Diatrib. in Eurip., Frag.

XIII.

Atheistical Doctrine of φύσις, τύχη, and τέχνη.

PAGE 13, LINE 16. *Φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων.* "They say that all these things are by *nature* and *chance*, *but* none of them by *art*." That is, these first four states, namely, *πῦρ*, *ἀήρ*, &c., were the production of *τύχη* and *φύσις*, whatever meaning they might have attached to these terms: the second stage, which resulted in the larger compounded bodies (arising from the composition of these four elements, or from their mixed combinations, when considered as *states* or conditions of existence), was regarded as chiefly the work of *τύχη*. *Τύχη δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ἢ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρά, κ. τ. λ.* In this department *τύχη* was the presiding power, although its influence was modified by those *adaptations* which belonged to *φύσις*, and to which reference is made in the above expression, *ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως*; that is, although the original impulses and motions were the result of chance, a *φύσις* or *natural necessity* directed everything to its most *fitting* place, so that, after long wanderings in this wide domain of *τύχη*, a *plenum* at length found its rest in a *vacuum*, warm was neutralized by cold, convex adapted itself to concave, hard things found

their repose in soft, influences constantly tending on all sides to an equality, at last brought many bodies to a spherical shape and to a circular motion, until finally in this way a universe was formed: *κόσμος ἁρμόττων τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ οἰκείως πως*; these various adaptations or *fittings*, after they had once *happened* to take place, becoming more and more stable by nature (*φύσις*), and a certain habit (*ἕξις*), which everything had a tendency to maintain when once assumed.

After this immense region of *φύσις* and *τύχη* came the small province of *τέχνη*, or *art*, which was itself supposed to grow out of (*φύεσθαι*) and to be long posterior to the two first; according to the atheistic dogma, that mind, of which *art* or *τέχνη* is the offspring, is the last production of the generative power of the universe. Here we have the *doctrine of progress* in all its consistency; and why might not a God be the last result or consummation of this ascending scale, instead of being the beginning, as he is in that a priori view, which commences with the idea of the perfect, and from thence descends to the lower and the imperfect? We see not how, even on this scheme most ingenious as it is, the atheist can expect to find relief from his tormenting theophobia, or escape that object of his greatest dread, *a superhuman being*, whether he styles him a God or a Dæmon.

If nature, *φύσις* and *τύχη*, have thus, after ages spent in lower productions on our earth, finally worked out the soul of man (or whatever else they may style that peculiar matter in us which wills, and thinks, and feels), why may not these agencies, during the long cycles of eternity, and in the infinitude of space, have given birth to a being excelling us in power as much as we surpass the lowest orders of vegetation? And what security have they as to his moral character, or what grounds for supposing that he would possess any moral character at all. The same progressive

influences which, on our narrow scale, have called into being *ichthyosauri*, and *megatheria*, and mammoth monsters, such as sometimes now affright us by their exposed relics, may have given birth, on the immense field of the universe, to

Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimæras dire,

to a God or Gods of a more horrid nature than ever crossed the imagination of the Gnostic, or than ever figured in the wildest legends of Thibet or Hindostan. Indeed, we have every reason to believe that this monstrous Hindoo system, which should be styled a theogony rather than a theology, sprang in this very manner from an ancient atheism, which had been the offspring of a still earlier pantheism. It seems evidently to recognise such an older φύσις as Plato's atheists talked about, and the history of its Gods is only a history of successive generations from this primeval nature, each of a more horrid species than its predecessor.

We say the atheist has no security against this, unless he takes shelter in that a priori idea of God which comes from the necessities of our own minds, inseparably connecting with it the notion of goodness, and of infinite perfection of every kind. But, then, this is a very different being from that *last production* of nature, which can never rise above its parent, or possess any other than physical attributes. Should they startle at the idea of such a superhuman being, whose malevolence might be commensurate with his power, and assert that it is improbable or impossible, the declaration proceeds only from an instinctive reverting to those ideas which belong to a directly opposite system, commencing with the moral instead of the natural, and making the *necessary* idea of God the ground of all truth. We are confined to so minute a portion of the universe, that no a posteriori induction, aside from any such necessary a priori idea, or some special revelation, can ever produce a firm conviction or a confiding trust in the Divine benevolence.

Neither has the atheist any security against a Hades or unseen world, filled with the most ghastly apparitions; and it is a fact, as has been remarked by Bayle, who was himself a skeptic, that many of this unhappy class have had most horrid fears of ghosts and hobgoblins. Their great champion Hobbes furnishes a noted example of this. Some might regard it as an inconsistency, and yet their system can allege nothing against the position that such appearances are not the mere fictions of a diseased imagination, but have a real existence *in rerum natura*. Who can assign any bounds to the working of φύσις and τύχη? The atheist cannot even be sure that he may not, on his own hypothesis, live again. Eternity is very long, and viewed in reference to it, everything ceases to be improbable, except what is inconsistent with the attributes of an à priori God. But remove this idea, and what hinders us from supposing that, in the endless changes of matter, the same atoms which now form the atheist's body, and give rise to the energies of his soul, may again come into the same combinations, may recreate a brain with the same particles, having the same figure, site, and order, and, of course, producing the same thoughts and sensations, or, in short, renew an existence, in all respects identical, which may recollect all the misery of the past, and can only indulge the same awful anticipations for the hopeless and godless future.

Plato seems to have already had in mind a class of semi-theists or semi-atheists, such as we have been considering, who might believe in a kind of Deity younger than Nature, and yet possessed of vast power and intelligence. After alluding to the common opinion that astronomers must be atheists, because they are so in the habit of resolving all the phenomena of the Heavens into necessities (ἀνάγκαις) and natural laws, he mentions a class who acknowledged the existence of mind in the motions of the celestial bodies,

but who strangely regarded this mind as itself the result, and not the author of Nature: *Λέγουσί τινες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, διανοηθέντες δὲ ὡς νεώτερον, ἅπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ.* "Some say that it is Nous, or Mind, that orders all things in the Heavens. But, then, these same persons, erring as to the nature of soul, in that it is older than bodies (or matter), and supposing it to be younger, they again, as we may say, upset all things, and especially themselves. For all these things appear to them to be full merely of earth, and stones, and other inanimate bodies, dividing among themselves (or to which they assign) the causes of the universe. This is what has produced so many atheistic impieties, and so many difficulties in the treatment of these matters. Hence, also, have come those abusive charges which the poets have made against philosophers, comparing their declarations and dogmas to the confused yelping of dogs." De Legibus, xii., 967, A. There is one important inference to be drawn from this passage. Plato evidently maintains that no one can be a consistent theist who does not hold that spirit is older than matter. The position that matter is eternal would be in direct opposition to this, and therefore he could not himself have maintained that doctrine, whatever appearance of it there may be in some obscure passages in the Timæus. See this more fully examined, Note L., on the ancient dogma, *De nihilo nihil fit.* On this subject of *τύχη* and *φύσις*, compare Aristotle, Physic. Ausc., lib. ii., ch. 4.

XIV.

Atheistical Doctrine that Law and Religion were not by Nature, but by Art.

PAGE 14, LINE 16. *Οὕτω δέ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν, οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ.* This is simply mentioned as one of the inferences from their doctrine, namely, "that legislation or law was not by nature, but by art." It was, however, just the inference that Plato deemed of the most dangerous consequence, and against which he directs all the strength of his reasoning, both here and in many other parts of his dialogues. Compare the Gorgias, and especially that long argument of Callicles (482, C.), in which he advances this same doctrine, namely, that law, and right (*τὸ δίκαιον*), and religion are not by nature, but by human appointment, which is equivalent to what the atheist here is supposed to mean by *τέχνη*, as something junior and posterior to nature: *ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος, κ. τ. λ.* Gorgias, 483, A.

It is a doctrine which in all ages has had its advocates, and in modern times has been specially revived by Hobbes and his followers. It is this inference that gives atheism all its interest. As a speculative tenet for the intellect merely, it would have no charms even for the darkest mind. If this creed be true, then not only religion, but also all morality, and all right views of law, are without any foundation either in God, or in any *nature of things* proceeding from him, or in any *nature* at all implying a moral sanction and which necessarily suggests the idea of something older, and higher, and stronger than itself. They are all, in that case, the offspring of *Τέχνη*, or Art. That is, they have only a human origin; since, in this creed, Art is the result of the junior production, Mind; or, in the language which Plato ascribes to the atheist, *ὑστέραν ἐκ τούτων γενομένην* ΘΝΗΤΗΝ *ἐκ* ΘΝΗΤΩΝ. They can, therefore, have only

human sanctions, and it is this conclusion which, to the depraved soul, gives atheism all its value, while, if the intellect alone were concerned, it would shrink from it as from the very "blackness of darkness" itself.

The ancient atheists saw that there could be no true natural morality without the belief in a God, and they did not pretend it. As in the moral and political philosophy of Plato, the Deity was the beginning, middle, and end: *ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός (ὥσπερ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων*, lib. iv., 715, or, as he says in another place, *ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα*, 717; so, on the other hand, he justly represents those against whom he is here contending, as holding to no conscience, no law, no right and wrong, as well as no religion and no God. They reasoned, however, like their modern followers of the school of Hobbes, in a vicious circle. From an atheistic assumption, they proved that law was not by nature, but by art, and then from this latter position, taken as established, they argued that Divine worship, being enjoined by law, was also by art, and not by nature: *θεοὺς εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισι νόμοις*. Page 14, line 20.

We see the absurdity of the thing in the way Plato states their positions and their *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*; yet, by concealing this vicious and circular mode of reasoning, such writers as Hobbes have seemed to make out a most formidable argument. This atheistical dogma, that religion is the creation of law and the civil magistrate, is most strikingly set forth in the following fragment attributed by Sextus Empiricus (Advers. Mathem., lib. ix., sec. 54) to Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, and by Plutarch (De Placit. Philosoph., i., 6 and 7) to Euripides, who, he says, utters these sentiments in the character of Sisyphus instead of his own, through fear of the Areopagus. We give these verses in full, because of their intrinsic interest as one of

the most remarkable remains of antiquity, because they set forth in all its strength the substance of all that has ever been said on this head from that time down to the present, and because they furnish a specimen of most finished poetry, of a higher stamp than atheism could have been supposed to employ in the utterance of its dark oracles:

Ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
Καὶ θηριώδης, ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρέτης,
Ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄεθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν,
Οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.
Κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
Θέσθαι κολαστὰς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ᾖ
Γένους βροτείου, τὴν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχῃ,
Ἐζημιοῦτο δ', εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
Ἔπειτ', ἐπειδὴ τἀμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
Ἀπεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ,
Λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
Φῦναι πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ,
Γνῶναι δ' ἔπος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρὼν, ὅπως
Εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἂν λάθρα
Πράσσωσιν, ἢ λέγωσιν, ἢ φρονῶσί τι.
Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ΤΟ ΘΕΙΟΝ *εἰσηγήσατο,*
Ὡς ἔστι Δαίμων, ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ
Νόῳ τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων φρονῶν τ' ἀεὶ,
Προσέχων τε ταῦτα καὶ φύσιν θείαν φορῶν,
Πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται,
Ἐς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.
Ἐὰν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλεύῃς κακὸν,
Τοῦτ' οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς θεούς· τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν
Ἓν ἐστι θείων. τούσδε τις λόγους λέγων
Διδαγμάτων ἥδιστον εἰσηγήσατο,
Ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ.
Ναίειν δ' ἔφασκε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνταῦθ', ἵνα
Μάλιστά γ' ἐκπλήξειεν ἀνθρώπους, ἄγων
Ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόβους εἶναι βροτοῖς
Καὶ τὰς ὀνήσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,
Ἐκ τῆς ὕπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἵν' ἀστραπῆς
Κατεῖδ' ἐναύσεις, δεινὰ δ' αὖ κτυπήματα
Βροντῆς, τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέπας,
Χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ.

Ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστέρας σπέρχει μύδρος,
Ο ϑ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμβρος ἐκπορίζεται.
Τοιούσδε περιέστησεν ἀνθρώποις φόβου
Στοίχους, καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατῴκισε
Τὸν Δαίμον' ὀγκῶν, ἐν πρέποντι χωρίῳ.

A most masterly refutation of this atheistic dogma, especially as it was, in more modern times, advanced by Hobbes, may be found in Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe, in which there is a most thorough and conclusive examination of the general doctrine, that morality and religion are not by nature, or from the Divine mind, but are strictly conventional, that is, by human law. Plato also touches upon this subject in the Theætetus, 172, B., where he sets forth the unavoidable conclusions of that *flowing* philosophy, which, rejecting *ideas*, and making man, or, in other words, sensations the measure of all things (*μέτρον πάντων*), utterly sweeps away all morality, all religion, all law, in short, all foundations whether of a civil or religious kind: *Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν (φασι), καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρά, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα (ξυμφέροντα εἶναι) ϑῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ· καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου, οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν* 'ΟΥΣΙΑΝ *ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν, τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ.* Theætetus, 172, B., C.

They assigned a rather higher rank to the idea of *the beautiful* (*τὸ καλὸν*) than to that of *the right*. *Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τοπαράπαν φύσει.* Page 14, line 23. "*The beautiful*, they said, was partly by nature and partly by law (that is, conventional agreement or custom), but the *Just* (or Right) had no foundation at all in nature," or, in other words, was the creation alone of arbitrary enactment.

The doctrines of an immutable standard of morals and of an immutable standard of taste must go together. Both are necessarily and consistently rejected by the atheist, and both should be strenuously maintained by all consistent theists. Physical, moral, intellectual, and religious beauty, although not the same, can all be traced to one common foundation. All are harmonies; all spring from one root, and all are alike unmeaning notions, unless connected with that idea of God in which the Beautiful, the Righteous, and the Good (*τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δίκαιον*) are all embraced and regarded, not only as older than human art (*θνητὴ τέχνη*), but also than *φύσις*, or Nature itself. Compare the argument of the atheist Callicles, in the Gorgias, 485: *ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλὰ νόμῳ δέ, κ. τ. λ.*

XV.

The Figure Aposiopesis.

Page 15, Line 8. *Εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν.* The apodosis here is wanting, or, rather, interrupted in a manner, which, although frequent in Greek, would not be admissible in the English. This silent omission has sometimes a much more powerful effect than any expression of the apodosis, especially in the case of threatening and admonitions. The answer, in such examples, seems to be left entirely to conscience, as though it could not possibly mistake the proper response. There are very powerful and numerous instances of this in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and from thence in the Hebraistic Greek of the New. One of the most striking may be found, Luke, xiii., 9: *κἂν μὲν ποιήση καρπόν—εἰ δὲ μήγε.* Compare, also, Luke, xix., 42; xxii., 42; Acts, xxiii., 9; Romans, ix., 22; John, vi., 62. There is a very fine example, Iliad, i., 135:

ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί—
εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν . . .

See, also, the ninth book of the Laws, 854, C., *καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι τὸ νόσημα·—εἰ δὲ μὴ*, &c. We have also an example very similar to the present in the Protagoras, 325, D., *καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἔχων πείθηται—εἰ δὲ μὴ*, &c., where, in the same manner, the answer is left to the inward voice, and the writer hurries on to the second condition as the principal clause. See, also, the Republic, ix., 575, D., *οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν—ἐὰν δὲ μὴ*, &c.; Thucydides, iii., 3, *καὶ ἢν μὲν ξυμβῇ, ἡ πεῖρα·—εἰ δὲ μὴ*, &c.; Plato, Symposion, 220, D., *εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, κ. τ. λ.* This has been most appropriately and beautifully styled by grammarians *aposiopesis*, or an omission arising from an excitement of the feelings, in which a gesture or a look is supposed to supply the place of the voice. Although these and similar cases may by some be regarded as defects or irregularities in the Greek language, every scholar who has any claim to taste or philosophy must regard them as its highest beauties. It is a great pity that our own tongue had not more of this flexibility, and did not admit more licenses of a similar kind, instead of being so stiffly confined in that strait jacket which has been put upon it in the rules imposed, for the most part, by pedantic, unphilosophical, and unclassical writers on English Grammar; for such, with some few exceptions, have been the great mass of those who have taken upon themselves to lay down the laws of this science, and to sit in judgment on Lowth and Murray. To return, however, to the sentence before us: if it is desired to avoid the aposiopesis, this may be done by taking all from *καὶ περὶ* to *γράφων* inclusive, as a parenthesis, and then bringing in what follows as a repetition with an apodosis to *εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν*. The only thing in the way of this is the particle *δέ*, the insertion of which, however, may be regarded as occasioned by the

prodosis having been, in a measure, lost sight of in consequence of the length of the intervening parenthesis.

XVI.

Argument for the Existence of a God from Motion.

PAGE 18, LINE 22. *Ἀηθεστέρων λόγων.* "*Unusual, or out of the common track.*" Reference is had to those subtle disquisitions respecting motion which are soon to follow. They are so called, because differing from the common and more obvious arguments generally made use of, such as those arising from evidence of design, and the more striking phenomena of the visible world, to which Clinias had so readily alluded in the commencement of the discussion. Plato thinks it best to begin at the beginning, or, as he elsewhere styles it, the fountain-head of the error: *τὴν πηγὴν ἀνοήτου δόξης.* If the least power or property of motion is conceded to matter, or to the least particle of matter *per se*, all is given up to the atheist, at least as far as the physical world is concerned. The whole cause is surrendered to the enemy. If this is granted, or not denied, then it would not be hard to admit that matter may also have an adaptive as well as a moving property, a tendency to an accommodation of itself to the circumstances in which it is placed, or, according to the doctrine just taught, a disposition to *fit* itself to those conditions in the universe into which it may be thrown by its own self-moving power, acting only under the direction of *τύχη*, or chance: *ἢ ξυμπέπτωκεν πάντα ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρὰ, κ. τ. λ.* Here we are in the dark region of occult qualities, and we can as well conceive of the one property as of the other. In fact, it is easier for the mind to admit this doctrine of an adaptive power, after conceding that of motion, than to receive the latter first as

an independent starting-point. In this view, then, all arguments from fitness fall to the ground, unless the first motion is shown to be the offspring of τέχνη, and not of τύχη, or even of φύσις. If we only give the atheist time enough —and eternity is very long—he may fancy that, on his theory, everything will at last fall into its proper place (ξυμπίπτει οἰκείως πως), and commence the natural discharge of its only and long-sought appropriate office

Plato, therefore, takes his stand on the first position, namely, that the mere motion of matter implies the existence of Spirit as an older and higher essence, or, in other words, that Spirit alone is *self-moving*, because it alone possesses that duality which resolves itself at the same time into *subject* and *object*. The term αὐτοκίνησις is not to be confined to local motion, but may refer to any change in the state or condition of a thing. It may, therefore, be predicated of mind, or pure spirit, independent of space. In this sense volition is αὐτοκίνησις, or self-motion, even although it may never be exhibited outwardly. That matter cannot possess this, in either acceptation of the term, is an affirmation rendered *necessary* by the very laws of mind. It is involved in the term itself, or rather in the idea of which the term is the real, and not merely arbitrary representative, and may therefore be called a *logical necessity*. Although the argument may have something of the *a posteriori* form, it is nevertheless strictly *a priori*. It is a conclusion not derived from *experience;* for in truth, aside from the essential idea which the laws of our minds compel us to create, all our mere experience of matter is directly opposed to it. As presented to our senses, it seems to be ever in motion, and this phenomenon exhibits itself more constantly the more closely and minutely it is examined; so that if experience alone were to be consulted, or, to use the language of some of our Baconians, if nature alone were to be interrogated, motion would appear to be the law, and rest

(if absolute rest were ever to be discovered) the exception. Notwithstanding all this, the mind cannot divest itself of that idea (whether innate, or acquired, or suggested) which it hath of body, as distinguished from space; and whenever this idea is clearly called out, the soul doth affirm of *necessity*, and in spite of all the phenomena of experience to the contrary, that matter cannot move itself. The same necessity compels it, also, to declare that matter cannot continue motion by virtue of any inherent power, any more than it can commence it, and this, too, notwithstanding the opposing dogma so confidently laid down in all our books of natural philosophy. We have the constant observation of ten thousand motions, commenced and continued without the visible intervention of any spiritual agent, and apparently the result of innate properties, and yet, when the mind remains sound and true to itself, all this does not at all weaken the innate conviction, that every *κίνησις* implies the existence of an originating *will* or *spirit* somewhere, however many the impulsive forces that may seem to have intervened between that will and its ultimate object. When the mind is in a healthy state, we say it is compelled to affirm, and does affirm this, with the same confidence as the proposition that the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, or that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Even this, notwithstanding it lies at the foundation of mechanical and dynamical physics, is ultimately to be resolved into a *logical necessity*, that is, a necessary affirmation into which the mind is driven by those laws of its own, that form not only our highest, but our only idea of truth. Hence, having the idea, or that notion under which it is forced to think of matter, the soul affirms that two bodies occupying the same space are *one* body, because the last *differentia*, or *ἑτεροιότης*, is destroyed.

XVII.

Soul Older than Body.

PAGE 19, LINE 16. Σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη. Compare with this Timæus, 34, B.: Τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου συνέρξας εἴασεν. ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο. "God did not create soul, as we now speak of it (in the order of our argument), posterior and junior; for he would not have suffered an elder thing to be ruled by a younger. Wherefore he constituted soul, both by virtue and by birth, to be prior to and older than body, as the mistress and ruler thereof." The term ψυχὴ is used here in a less sense than in the tenth of the Laws, where it includes all that is immaterial, and is employed in a peculiar manner for God as distinguished from φύσις. It, however, means much more, in this passage of the Timæus, than the soul of man. The philosopher is speaking of soul collectively, the *animus mundi*, or Soul of the Universe, as distinct from, inferior to, and dependent upon, the Deity who had constituted it (συνεστήσατο, ἐμηχανήσατο), and yet as the source and fountain from which all other souls emanate or are generated, whether of men or of the inferior Divinities, according to that verse of Pindar, Nem., Carm. vi., Σ., α., 1, 2:

> Ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ
> μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
> ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι.

If soul is older than body or matter, then the properties or innate powers (συγγενῆ) of the former must be also before those of the latter. Wherefore, as he says below, δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος (τὰ

συγγενῆ ψυχῆς), *πρότερα ἂν εἴη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων* (*τῶν προσηκόντων σώματι*). "Thought, and providence, and reason, and *art*, and *law*, must have been before hard, and soft, and heavy, and light." It is evident that the term *σῶμα* here is not taken for *organized* substances, but is in all respects equivalent to our word matter; for he mentions only those elementary properties which belong to it, or were supposed to belong to it as matter, such as hardness or resistance, weight, &c. So that there is nothing in this word against the inference we have drawn respecting Plato's opinion on the eternity of the material world, whether regarded as organized or unorganized. It seems to us perfectly clear that in every sense of the word, as used by the modern philosophy, he held matter to be junior to soul.

The order of the argument, it should be observed here, is the direct opposite of what is commonly styled the *a posteriori*. In the latter, we proceed from evidences of fitness in matter to a soul or *art*, which, for all that this method can oppose to the contrary, may have been the offspring of an older *φύσις*, of whose adaptations its designs may be only an imperfect imitation, whether regarded as proceeding from the soul of man, or of some superhuman being. In the other, the older existence of spirit is first established, and then it is inferred, even before experimental induction, that there *must be* such evidences of design, because *art* and *law*, which are properties of soul, must be older than the material structures in which they are exhibited. On the scheme of the atheist, or the naturalist (the worshipper of *φύσις*), only some of the smaller and latest productions were the work of *τέχνη* making its appearance in the latter cycles of the universe. In the other view, which the author here presents, *τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ.*

"The great and first works would be the works of *art*, while the things of nature, and even nature herself, would be posterior to, and ruled by art and mind."

There is likewise another view which is essential to the full interpretation of the passage, namely, that not only was it impossible that these phenomena of matter should exist *objectively*, without the previous existence of soul as an *efficient cause* of that substance of which they are phenomena, but also that they could not exist *subjectively* without a soul of which they constitute the sensations. In this sense, also, is it true that spirit must be older than *hard*, and *soft*, and *visible*, &c. Compare the passage in the Phædon, in which he refutes the doctrine that the soul is only a harmony, by showing that its pre-existence is essential to harmony itself, and that, where the former is not present, the latter is nothing more than dead strings, and chords, and tensions, and relaxations, and vibrations of the air, but has as harmony no real or true being. It is clear that the same reasoning may be carried down through all the elementary properties of matter.

XVIII.

Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood.

PAGE 21, LINE 3. *Σκοπεῖτε οὖν, καθάπερ εἰ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, κ. τ. λ.* The common reading is *εἰ καθάπερ*. We have ventured to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on the authority of Stephanus. "Consider, then, as if we three had to cross a violently flowing river," &c. The Athenian here most graphically compares himself and his two companions, just entering upon this most profound and difficult argument respecting motion, to men who are about to plunge into a deep and rapid torrent, and who, therefore, need the

utmost caution in the examination of every step, lest, if at any point they should lose a firm foothold, they might be overwhelmed in floods of darkness, and carried down the stream of doubt, without any chance of recovery. The comparison is admirably sustained, and even when it seems to be dropped, does nevertheless continue to affect the discourse, and tinge the style with a metaphorical hue for many sentences; as in the expressions, *λόγος σφοδρότερος καὶ ἄβατος—παραφερόμενος*, page 22, and *ἐχόμενοι ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος*, page 23. Cicero was very fond of imitating Plato, and we cannot help thinking that he had this passage in his eye, and meant to institute a similar comparison in respect to himself, when placed in like circumstances in reference to another great truth. *Itaque dubitans, hæsitans, circumspectans, multa adversa reverens, tamquam in rate in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio.* Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 30.

So, also, in the Phædon, after exhausting the direct arguments for the immortality of the soul, Socrates "trusts himself to the best of human reasons (that is, to the old and unbroken tradition respecting the doctrine) as the safest vessel to which the soul could be committed, and on which alone, although in continual danger of shipwreck, it could be expected to outride the storms of doubt; *unless, perhaps, it might hereafter find a surer vehicle in some Divine revelation, or λόγος θεῖος, which Heaven might yet condescend to make known to men.*" We do not know which to admire most, the sound philosophy, the unaffected humility, or the striking imagery, with which the whole passage abounds. *Δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπη ἔχει, ἢ εὑρεῖν, ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον· εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον, ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ* ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΕΙΟΥ *τινος,*

διαπορευθῆναι. Phædon, 85, E. We take *ἀνθρώπινος λόγος*, in this passage, not in the sense of reason or argument, but rather as it is used in the Gorgias, 523, A., at the introduction of the mythical representation of the judgment after death: *ἄκουε μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον.* In the word *σχεδίας* above, Plato seems to have had an eye to Homer's account of the shipwreck of Ulysses, in his voyage on such a vessel from the island of Calypso, and thus to intimate that this *βέλτιστος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων* could be regarded as at best only a temporary support, until the coming of that more sure (*βεβαιότερος*) word of Revelation. Can we doubt that the soul of our philosopher would have rejoiced in the announcement that there was even then in the world a "*sure word of prophecy, like a light shining in a dark place,*" and that he would have surrendered all his speculative reasoning for the security and comfort of such an assurance?

XIX.

Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. Striking Examples of this from other Dialogues.

Page 22, Line 11. *Ἄγε δή, Θεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον.* "*If ever we ought to call upon God, let it be done now.*" Many professed Christian writers, both metaphysicians and theologians, might here take a lesson from the heathen philosopher. What more sublimely appropriate than this petition for Divine aid in an argument against those who denied the Divine existence? The dark, violent, and almost impassable torrent upon which they are about to embark is yet kept in mind, and in view of this the soul is led to seek for some aid out of itself. There is, we think, an allusion to some of those prayers which Homer puts into the mouths of his

heroes, as they are about to engage in some arduous and perilous contest; it may be to the prayer of Ajax for light in that desperate battle (lib. xvii., 645) in which Jove covers the whole field of conflict with thick darkness; or, perhaps, in still greater consistency with the metaphorical imagery here employed, to the prayer of Achilles, in the twenty-first book of the Iliad (273), when in danger of being overwhelmed by the rising floods of the angry and turbulent Scamander:

> *Ζεῦ πάτερ, ὡς οὔτις με θεῶν ἐλεεινὸν ὑπέστη,*
> *ἐκ ποταμοῖο σαῶσαι.*

Whether this be so or not, it is in this case a prayer which the purest Christianity need not blush to acknowledge and admire. There are several interesting examples of similar invocations in others of the Platonic dialogues, either put into the mouth of Socrates or of some speaker by whom he is evidently represented. We have but little doubt, too, that in these remarkable peculiarities of character, Plato accurately represents the model he so closely observed, and with whom his own intellectual existence may almost be regarded as identified. We may note, among others, the invocation in the fourth book of the Laws, at the commencement of his system of positive legislation for the state; a work which certainly, of all others, should never be attempted without a deep feeling of the necessity of Divine assistance. *Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέ τε, καὶ ὑπακούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι, συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους*, 712, B. "*Let us invoke the aid of God in the construction of our state. May he hear us, and when he has listened to our requests, may he kindly and propitiously come to our assistance, that he may jointly with us arrange in order the state and the laws.*" How much higher a light than this is boasted of by those modern law-makers who

have endeavoured, as far as they could, to banish the voice of prayer from our legislative halls! Compare, also, the Philebus, 25, B: *Θεὸς μὲν οὖν (ἡμῖν φράσει) ἄν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηται.* Here, too, the subject, in the discussion of which the Divine aid is invoked, is of the very highest importance, being no less than a most profound analysis of the radical difference between physical or sensual, and spiritual pleasure; a theme, in his estimation, so holy, that, when again alluding to it in the sixth book of the Republic, he utters the same word (*εὐφήμει*) which was employed in driving all profanation, whether of speech or action, from the sacrificial altar, Rep., vi., 509, B.

Perhaps, however, the most striking example of an invocation of this kind may be found in connexion with that sublime procœmium of the Timæus, to which we have already alluded. That too, it should be borne in mind, is a treatise on law, or, in other words, the legislation of the physical and intellectual universe, embracing equally the laws of mind and matter: *Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πη μέλλοντας, εἰ γέγονεν, ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη θεούς ἐπικαλουμένους εὔχεσθαι πάντας κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν*, 27, C. "Even those who have but little of sobriety, in the undertaking of any affair, whether of small or great consequence, always call upon God. Much more, then, when about to engage in a discussion respecting the universe, *whether it is generated or eternal*, ought we to invoke God by prayer, that what we say may be, first of all, according to his mind, and then consistent with ourselves."

Page 23, Line 1. *Σπουδῇ πάσῃ παρακεκλήσθων.* The prayer on the present occasion has all the conciseness and simplicity that characterize all the recorded petitions of

Socrates. Compare the last he ever uttered, for an easy death, just before taking the cup of poison in the prison, Phædon, 117, B: *Ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε, καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ.* The longest specimen is that remarkable prayer at the end of the Phædrus, or the dialogue on Spiritual Beauty, which we cannot resist the temptation of quoting in full: *Ὦ ΦΙΛΕ ΠΑΝ τε καὶ ἄλλοι θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν, τἄξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια· πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων*, 279, B. "*Oh thou beloved Universal Numen, and ye other Divinities, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever of externals I may possess may be all in harmony with my inward (spiritual) being. May I regard the wise alone as rich; and may I have just so much of gold as no other would take from me but the virtuous man.*" The last sentence is somewhat obscure, but the whole petition approaches the spirit of the Gospel, although lacking some of the essential requisites of a Christian supplication. It may justify us in hoping that its author, had he received the revelation for which he longed, would not have remained "far from the kingdom of Heaven;" but it furnishes no grounds for the extravagant language of one who said, in his enthusiastic admiration of the heathen sage, *sancte Socrates ora pro nobis.* He is represented here, however, as receiving a strengthening of his confidence, and some degree of assurance from his supplication; for he says immediately, "*holding fast to this (that is, the hope of Divine aid) as by some sure cable, let us embark,*" &c.; still keeping up the metaphor of the dangerous flood.

XX.

The Great Question of the Ancient Schools, Do all Things flow? &c.; with a Sketch of some of the principal Materializing or Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the Ionic, and to the Physical School of Elea.

PAGE 23, LINE 4. Κᾶτα δέ, ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἄρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; For the common reading κᾶτα δὲ, established by the concurrence of all the manuscripts, Ast would substitute κατὰ τάδε, connecting it with φαίνεται in the preceding sentence; and in this he follows Eusebius and the version of Ficinus. We think the common reading is correct, and that Ast and Ficinus have mistaken the spirit of the passage. The Athenian, entering alone in this dangerous flood, to try, as he says, its depth and strength, before calling upon his companions to follow, assumes for a time the parts both of interrogator and respondent. He consequently supposes an objector from the atheistic or Ionic school, adopting some of the peculiar phraseology or cant terms of that sect, and taking him up in the midst of his positions in some such way as this, "*And so, then* (καὶ εἶτα δε), answer me, if you please, one of these three questions: Do all things stand, and does nothing move? or is the opposite of this the case, namely, that all things move and nothing stands? or do some things move and some things stand? Give me, I say, an answer to these old queries, which have so long perplexed our schools of philosophy." To which supposed objector the Athenian replies by taking the third hypothesis as his starting position in this argument. There is much vivacity in this mode of introducing the discussion about motion, and κᾶτα (καὶ εἶτα) is the very particle by which it is best effected; it being used to introduce a sudden inference, and implying a previous ar-

gument, in the midst of which the objection is supposed to be made. If any alteration of the established text is to be allowed, we think it should consist in changing *δέ* into *δή*. On the particle *εἶτα*, see note, page 40.

Whatever else may be intended, there can be no doubt that there is here an allusion, at least, to the same questions which are so fully discussed in the Theætetus, and stated there several times in nearly this same language. See, especially, Theætetus, 180, D. These were the famous problems which so divided, first the Ionic and Italian schools, and afterward the physical and metaphysical schools of Elea; embracing, however, a much wider range than the merely dynamical points to which Plato, in the present argument, confines himself. There is an allusion to them in the Memorabilia, lib. i., c. i., 14: *καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι πάντα, τοῖς δὲ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι.* In this language was stated the great debate between those who referred all things to sensation, making it the measure of all reality, or what Plato styles *τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν* (Theætetus, 179, C.), and those who held to a higher and immutable world of ideas (*τὴν ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν, the immoveable essence*), the real and only *ἀληθῶς ὄντως ὄντα*, while they regarded the objects of sense as continually moving, changing, never for a moment remaining the same, and having nothing about them (aside from the idea, or *λόγος*, which, by its connexion alone, imparted to them a temporal reality) that could constitute real being (*οὐσίαν*) in the highest and truest senses of the word. They formed, as we have elsewhere observed,* the grand line of separation between two ever opposing systems of philosophy, and right views, in almost every department of knowledge, are more or less connected with these subtle inquiries when viewed in their widest relations. Their odd phraseology may be more fully interpreted thus: What constitutes real-

* Discourse on the True Idea of The State, Andover, 1843.

ity? Are all things in a perpetual flux? Is there nothing in the universe but phenomenal facts and sensations, or is there a world of truth and being separate from, and independent of, the perceived and apparent—not merely as generalizations of the mind, but as realities, more stable than the earth, more permanent than the old rolling heavens—*ideas* fixed, immoveable (*ἀκίνητα*), eternal, which were never born, and which can never die—the *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, the *ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντως ὄντα*, from which all individual things derive reality, and by partaking alone of which they become the true objects of science, or *ἐπιστήμαι* instead of *δόξαι*.

There is quite a full account of the systems of philosophy, of which these questions were the symbols, to be found in the dialogue Theætetus. Plato there makes Homer (whether sportively or not, it is difficult to determine) the head and founder of that Ionic school which held that *all things flowed;* and this because the poet represents Oceanus and Tethys as the original and mother of Gods and men. We greatly doubt whether in this Homer had any philosophical or mythical sense at all. If, however, anything of the kind was intended, there would seem to be nothing more than an allusion to the doctrine afterward advanced by Thales, that water was the *ἀρχή*, or originating element of the universe, and so the matter is viewed by Aristotle, *Metaph.*, i., 3. This doctrine of Thales was, in all probability, derived from a corrupt and perverted tradition of the Mosaic account of the creation, where it is said that "*The Spirit of God was brooding over the waters*," and the succeeding hypotheses of Anaximander and Anaximenes, one of whom held that *air*, and the other that *infinite space* was the first principle of the universe, were only attempts to refine upon what seemed to them the grosser element of Thales.

In the later writers, however, who may be regarded as being in the line of this school, these speculations, and the

phraseology employed in reference to them, assumed a different aspect, and were applied to the moral and mental, as well as the physical world. In the Theætetus, Socrates is represented as thus setting forth their doctrine: *ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν* ΕΙΝΑΙ *οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ* ΓΙΓΝΕΤΑΙ· *καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοί, πλὴν Παρμενίδου, ξυμφέρεσθον, Προταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας· κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος εἰπών,*

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως, 153, A. "That there was nothing absolute, or which existed *per se*, but that from impetus, and motion, and mutual mixture arise all things of which we predicate the verb TO BE, not correctly predicating, because, in truth (to use terms aright), nothing really IS, but all things are ever BECOMING. And in this all our wise men successively agree except Parmenides, namely, Protagoras, and Heraclitus, and Empedocles; and of the poets, the chief in each kind, namely, Epicharmus in comedy, and Homer in tragedy, when he says that Oceanus is the origin of the Gods, &c., by which he means that all things are the offspring of flowing and motion."

The distinction here is clearly stated. This school very consistently refused to apply to things the higher term of being, *ἐστί*, but preferred the word *γίγνεται*. Nothing, they said, really and truly IS, but all things are ever *becoming;* and this was correct, if there existed nothing else except matter, sensation, and their joint phenomena. In another place, Theætetus, 160, D., Plato gives us more particularly their individual opinions, or, rather, the favourite

and peculiar terms in which each expressed the common doctrine of their *flowing* philosophy. In the language of Homer, Heraclitus, and all that Ionic tribe, *πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον*, as Plato styles them, *οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, all things were ever flowing like water.* Others of them, of whom he sportively makes Theætetus the representative, were fond of saying, *αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι, that knowledge and sense were the same*, or only different names for the same thing. The favourite expression of Protagoras was, *πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι*, that *man was the measure of all things*, by which he meant to refer all things to sensation, or to the present feelings and opinions, or present remembrances, of the individual man. On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Logic., i., 8) tells us that Heraclitus was noted for taking the collected reason of the race (as the representative of the universal and Divine reason) for the criterion of truth; but this is utterly inconsistent with the account Plato here gives, and the manner he associates him with those sensualists of the flowing school who allowed of nothing fixed or eternal.

If the account of Heraclitus, given in the Theætetus, be correct, he was well entitled to the appellation Ὁ Σκοτεινός, not for his profundity, as some would represent it, but because he maintained the *darkest* system of sensual philosophy that ever shed night over the human intellect. Well might he weep, as Lucian represents him, over his ever-flowing universe of perishing phenomena, where *nothing stood—οὐδὲν ἔμπεδον, ἀλλ' ὅκως ἐς κυκεῶνα πάντα συνειλέονται, καί ἐστι τὠϋτὸ τέρψις ἀτερψίη, γνῶσις ἀγνωσίη, μέγα μικρόν, ἄνω κάτω περιχορεύοντα, καὶ ἀμειβόμενα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος παιδιῇ*, "nothing was fixed, but, as in a mixture, all things were confounded; where pleasure and pain, knowledge and ignorance, great and small, were the same; where all things up and down were circling round in a

choral dance, and ever changing places as in the sport of eternity." *Lucian, Vitarum Auctio*, 303. There was something in the hard atoms and dry mechanical theory of the laughing Democritus which left room for a spiritual world, although he himself was an atheist; but the soft, flowing, sentimental, and, as some modern cant would absurdly style it, transcendental sensualism of Heraclitus (if he is not grossly misrepresented), was atheism in its darkest form. And yet there are other accounts which make him talk very piously about the Supreme Numen and the immortality of the soul.

Parmenides was a man of a very different stamp from all the others mentioned by Socrates. He, however, with Melissus, seems to have gone much too far in the opposite direction. In his famous doctrine of the *one and all*, if Plato rightly represents him, he maintained that *all things stood*. In other words, not content with saying that the world of immutable or ideal truth was a reality, he contended that it was the only reality, and that sense, instead of being knowledge, was wholly delusion; thus verging round to that point where some species of sensualism and a hyperspiritualism apparently meet; of which, in modern times, we have had a remarkable example in Hume and Berkeley. *Διισχυρίζετο ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, Theætetus*, 180, D. *Ἀΐδιον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἀποφαίνεται Παρμενίδης, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐκβάλλει ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.* Euseb., *Præp. Evang.*, i., 8. "For Parmenides represents the whole as immoveable, and utterly banishes the senses from the realm of truth."

He was a man who seems to have made a very deep impression upon the mind of Socrates when young, and to have exerted a strong influence over his opinions. At least, we may so judge from the following passage in the Theætetus, which has every appearance of truth, as presenting a real incident in the life of Socrates, and a real expression

of admiration towards one whom he seems to have most highly esteemed: *Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου,** *αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.* "Parmenides, to apply to him the language of Homer, seems to me at once revered and awful: for I enjoyed his company once when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me in all things to possess a noble depth of soul." *Theætetus*, 184, A. This biographical incident alone seems to us sufficient proof that Plato more correctly sets forth the philosophy of his master than Xenophon, notwithstanding the general opinion the other way; and that the most metaphysical dialogues of the former give a truer representation of the mind and manner of Socrates, than the more plain and practical Memorabilia. We infer this on the ground that there could not have been so warm, so unaffected, and so long-cherished an admiration, had there not been a great congeniality of soul; and we have, therefore, every reason to believe, that much of what formed the peculiar features of the mind of Socrates may perhaps be traced to the deep impression made upon him by the idealistic and metaphysical Parmenides. Compare, also, the Sophista, 237, A., where he styles him *Παρμενίδης ὁ μέγας*, The Great Parmenides. In a similar manner, in the beginning of the Cebetis Tabula, he is ranked with Pythagoras, and his name is used as descriptive of the profoundest wisdom: *ἔμφρων καὶ δεινὸς περὶ σοφίαν λόγῳ τε καὶ ἔργῳ Πυθαγόρειόν τινα καὶ Παρμενίδειον ἐζηλωκὼς βίον.* From this passage in the Theætetus some have inferred that Plato was guilty of an anachronism in the circumstances mentioned in the beginning of the dialogue Parmenides. A careful examina-

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* Iliad, iii., 172:

Αἰδοῖός τέ μοί ἐσσι, φίλε ἑκυρέ, δεινός τε.

tion, however, will show, as we think, that such an inference is without any real foundation.

We would remark generally respecting some of the philosophers of the Ionic school, that we cannot accurately sit in judgment on their doctrines, or decide whether they were really, and in the grossest sense, atheistic materialists or not, unless we can determine what they included in their term *πάντα*, when they said that *all things* flowed. If they merely meant thereby that the material world was ever flowing, this might have been consistent with a pure theism, and they might have even drawn arguments from this view of things in favour of a higher attention to the spiritual and supernatural. Such may possibly have been the case with Heraclitus. The sophist Protagoras, we have reason to believe on other grounds, was an unqualified atheist. Of Empedocles, who is also in Plato's list, we hope better things, judging from many of the fragments of his poetry that have been preserved, and especially that line which we have already referred to, pages 77, 115.

They have doubtless suffered in the extravagances of their followers, some of whom carried their doctrines to a most ridiculous extent. One of them, as we are told by Aristotle (*Metaph.*, iii., 5), heraclitized (*ἡρακλειτίζειν*) to such an extent, that he denied that any one could leap twice, or even once, over the same stream, or that it was possible to speak the truth in any case whatever, because the terms of every proposition were changing and becoming false in the very process of articulation. Hence he finally concluded not to open his lips, but, to every question, made no other reply than simply to move his finger: *ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον.* Some, on the other hand, carried the propositions that sense was knowledge, and that man was the measure of all things, to such an extreme, as to affirm that everything was true, and that there could be nothing false; the seeming oppo-

site of the former, but, in reality, only the same absurdity in another shape. This last extravagance, however, brought its own antidote along with it; for, if all things were true, the proposition which denied this dogma was equally true with all the rest, and so, like the famous syllogism respecting Epimenides the Cretan, the result was an everlasting circle of alternate contradictions. See *Aristot.*, *Metaph.*, iii. (iv.), 5. *Cicero*, *Academ. Posteriorum*, i., 12.

This school of sophists, as Socrates tells us in the Theætetus, were likewise famous for a quibbling and eristic logic, yet had a great aversion to that sober and truth-evincing system of dialectics which was carried on by question and answer. A somewhat ludicrous account of this may be found page 180, A., B., &c. Their logic was like their philosophy, ever flowing, and incapable of being reduced to any firm and fixed conclusions. "You can do nothing with them (says Socrates), nor can they among themselves arrive at anything certain and satisfactory, but take special care that, neither in their language nor in their philosophy, shall there be anything which has firmness or stability (*στάσιμον*); but against this they are continually warring, and, as far as they can, would banish all rest from the universe." This, although not the same, has some resemblance to the modern doctrine of eternal progress, which, of course, is eternal imperfection, and which allows of nothing fixed or established, any more than the ancient tenet that *all things flowed, and that nothing stood.* This philosophy, too, like some of the sophisms of our own day, had "a wonderful alacrity at sinking" down into the vulgar mind, and of inspiring *the masses* with the most exalted opinion of the doctrine and its teachers; "so that the very coblers (*οἱ σκυτοτόμοι*), when they had *imbibed* or become *inspired* with this profound system of fluxions, abandoned at once that foolish old notion, that some things stand (*ἐπαύσαντο ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι*

τῶν ὄντων, and when they were told *that all things were moving*, they greatly honoured those who taught them this," as being a most comforting and democratic doctrine. See Theætetus, 180, A., B., &c.

In the Cratylus, which, although, in the main, a sportive *jeu d'esprit*, does yet abound in very many most important and serious views, Plato dwells at some length on two theories of language which may be derived from these two systems of philosophy, in one of which the idea of motion, and in the other that of rest, are made respectively the basis of an inquiry into the primitive etymological structure of words. After most ridiculously deriving *οὐσίαν* (*ὠσίαν*), or essence, from *τὸ ὠθοῦν* (*pushing or impulse*), because, on this hypothesis of Heraclitus, *τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδὲν*, "all real existences were ever moving on, or pushing ahead, and nothing stood still" (401, C.), he comes to speak of Kronus and Rhea (*ῥέα*), when Socrates, in his old ironical method, suddenly affects that in this name there is suggested to him this whole flowing philosophy. "Oh, my good sir (he exclaims), I have just discovered a whole hive of curious lore, *σμῆνος τι σοφίας— Λέγει γάρ που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει, ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, κ. τ. λ.*" "Heraclitus somehow says that all things are moving, &c., and, in his comparison of existences to the course of a stream, he even says that one could not twice enter into the same river.* Do you suppose, then, that he who originally gave names to Rhea and Kronus, the progenitors of the other Gods, had any other philosophy than this of Heraclitus? or do you

* He would seem to mean something more here than a mere illustration. Since all being is compared to one ever-moving stream, the expression, that we cannot twice enter the same river, would signify, that neither our own personal identity, nor the identity of the universe, can remain for two consecutive moments.

think that through mere accident he gave these flowing names to both? Just as Homer makes Oceanus and Tethys the original and mother of the Gods, and I think Hesiod also. But Orpheus surely says,

> *Ὠκεανὸς πρώτιστα καλίῤῥοος ἦρξε γάμοιο·*
> *ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν.*

See how all these things accord with one another, and how they tend to these doctrines of Heraclitus." *Cratylus*, 402, A., B.

At the conclusion of the first part of this etymological excursus, in which he sportively finds the origin of so many words in this ancient flowing theory, he assigns as the cause of it all the want of stability in their own brains (to adopt a modern phrase), which they mistook for the everlasting change of things and truths themselves. "I think (says Socrates, with grave irony) that I indulged in no bad surmise, when I just now supposed that the very ancient men (*οἱ πάνυ παλαιοί*), who gave names to everything, just like many of our modern wits (*τῶν νῦν σοφῶν*), in consequence of their getting frequently turned round in their search into the real nature of things, became dizzy, and then things themselves appeared to be *whirling around*, and to be borne in every direction. Wherefore they blame not the internal state of their own souls as the real cause, but say that this is the very *nature of things*, that there should be nothing firm or stable, but that all things flow (*πάντα ῥεῖν*), and are full of motion, change, and generation." *Cratylus*, 411, C., D. And again, 439, C., he thus characterizes the whole school under an ironical allusion to the old authors of language: "They seem to me to have thus thought (namely, that all things are in motion), but, in reality, it is not so. For the fact is, that they themselves are utterly confounded, like men who have fallen into a whirlpool, and would wish to drag us in after them. For con-

sider this, O most excellent Cratylus, of which I am often dreaming,* can we in truth affirm that there are such realities as the Beautiful, the Good," &c.? *ὃ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω, πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ* ΤΟ ΚΑΛΟΝ *καὶ* 'ΑΓΑΘΟΝ *καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὕυτως*

In this philosophy, too, he shows that there could be no true moral or political science, no law, no real State, no social or civil rights, with their corresponding obligations. See the Theætetus, 172, B., and the remarks thereupon, page 138. There could be no science, he affirms, of any kind, for it must necessarily be grounded on the eternal and immutable. *Αἴσθησις* would take the place of *ἐπιστήμη*, and nothing could be really *known:* *'Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὐδέν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο· καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη.* Hence he draws the sublime conclusion, that, since the very laws of our being compel us to affirm the real, and not merely relative existence of these ideas, therefore there is something which is eternal and immutable, or, in the language of the ancient schools, *all things do not flow, but some things stand.* *Εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ* ΚΑΛΟΝ, *ἔστι δὲ τὸ* ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, *ἔστι δὲ* ΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ, *οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ.* "*But if there is something which eternally knows, and something which is eternally known—if there is THE BEAUTIFUL, and THE GOOD, and THE JUST, then things do not all seem to me to be similar to motion or a flowing stream.*" *Cratylus*, 440, B.

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* *ὀνειρώττω.* No word could better express that peculiar state of mind in which Socrates (or Plato) often contemplated his favourite doctrine of ideas. Sometimes he seems to be perfectly assured of the real existence of the *καλὸν*, &c., the Fair, the Just, and the Good. Again, he appears perplexed with doubt, and, at other times, seems to have but a glimpse, *as in a dream*, of some such bright reminiscences of a better state.

XXI.

Mathematical Use of the Word λόγος.

PAGE 24, LINE 6. *ἀνὰ λόγον.* The common reading is *ἀνάλογον*; the other, however, is unquestionably to be preferred. It would signify here *proportionally, certa quadam ratione.* This is called in Latin *ratio*, and in Greek *λόγος* (especially in all mathematical writings), because a simple quantity or magnitude, irrespective of the relation it bears to another as a multiple or a divisor, cannot be an object of science, or be contemplated by the mind. It remains only an object of sense, *αἰσθητόν*, being, to the intellect, *ἄλογον*, and therefore *ἄγνωστον.* See the Theætetus, 202, B. It is this relation or ratio which becomes the true *νοητὸν*, or real object of the mind, while the sensible figure serves only as the diagram by which it is exhibited. Hence it is styled the *λόγος*, *ratio*, or *reason.* It is that which is *predicated* of its subject, and hence is its *λόγος*, or *word*, as well as *reason;* because, when viewed as simple quantity or magnitude, nothing can be said about it, no truth affirmed respecting it.

This *λόγος*, or *reason*, ever implies a third thing or middle term, namely, the common measure or divisor to which both quantities must be referred, and by which we are enabled to predicate the one as a part, or multiple, or any certain ratio of the other. The *λόγοι* or ratios are absolute and immutable verities of science, as all *νοητὰ* must be, while the *αἰσθητὰ* by which they are suggested are mutable, flowing, and without anything which can be styled absolute. They likewise are capable of being compared among themselves, and thus give rise to others—ratios of ratios, *ad infinitum.* In modern works the simple radical meaning of the term is lost sight of, because we use the Latin *ratio* without any reference to its primary sense, as

the same with the Greek λόγος, and hence the great vagueness which prevails in most minds respecting this plain mathematical idea. In some of our older mathematical works, such as the English editions of Euclid's Elements by Dee and Barrow respectively, our own word *reason* is everywhere properly employed instead of *ratio*. By this means the metaphysical notion of ratio is kept before the mind as the intelligible, by which what would otherwise be merely, as magnitude, an object of sense, becomes known to the intellect as an object of science. See Proclus, Commentary on Euclid's Elements, lib. i.

All mathematical truths, and especially the geometrical, are ultimately to be resolved into a comparison of ratios. For even parallelism, and other properties which would seem to have no connexion with it, do, after all, depend upon certain equalities or correspondences, from which they derive their λόγος, notion, or definition. So that all mathematical science is finally brought down to those innate ideas of the τὸ ἴσον, &c., which are discussed in the Phædon, and of which visible magnitude is only suggestive. Even a straight line involves this idea of the τὸ ἴσον, or simplest ratio. It is that which lies *evenly*, *equally*, or, as it is expressed by Euclid, ἐξίσου, between its extreme points; that is, having nothing capable of being predicated of the one side and not of the other. Playfair and others seem to have entirely misunderstood the expression, and to have greatly bungled in their efforts to amend, by substituting a far more complex idea for this old and perfect definition of Euclid. Any one who is capable of consulting his own consciousness, must acknowledge that the language of Euclid best expresses that innate idea of straightness, which we ever apply, as the perfect ideal exemplar, to the determination of visible figure.

From this use of the word λόγος it is, that those magnitudes and numbers whose ratio cannot be expressed by

other numbers—that is, which have no common divisor by which one may be predicated as any arithmetical part or multiple of another — are called *ἄλογα*, and in modern works, *irrational.* Two magnitudes, however, may be arithmetically incommensurable or irrational, like the side and diagonal of the square, the circumference and diameter of the circle, or what are styled surds among numbers ; and yet, in all these cases, there may be, and often is, a geometrical representation which renders them rational, and may be styled the expression of the ratio, *λόγος*, or reason, just as well as though they were embraced by some common numerical divisor.

Much on this subject of quantities, styled *ἄλογα*, or irrational, may be found in Euclid's Laws of the Musical Canon, as contained in Meibomius. All concords, let it be remarked, are founded on rational numbers, while the irrational ever produce discords under all circumstances. The first have a *λόγος* or reason, and the soul, when the sounds suggest it, perceives this reason in its supersensual being, although unconscious of the intellectual process on which it depends ; and hence a delight which mere sense could never furnish. Where this process is made objective, and thus presented to the mind, it is called *science.* It would not be difficult to refer to the same ideas of equality and ratio all the fundamental elements of the beauty of figure and motion.

XXII.

Paradox of Circular Motion.

Page 24, Line 8. *Διὸ δὴ τῶν θαυμαστῶν ἁπάντων πηγὴ γέγονεν.* This is stated as a sort of strange paradox, that one motion should be at the same time greater and less, or should give rise to different velocities, according as the rev-

olution was nearer to, or more remote from, the centre, while there was but one impulse distributing itself proportionally, *ἀνὰ λόγον*, to every part. The paradox, however, arises from confounding circular, or angular, with rectilineal motion. The idea of the latter arises from a compound comparison of two elements, namely, the space passed over, and the time employed in the passage. Hence, there being no absolute measure of space, there can be nothing absolute about rectilineal motion. The other must be always referred to the centre of motion, and the time occupied in one revolution; or, in other words, one must be referred to space and time, the other to time only. The latter may also be said to have something absolute about it, since there is an absolute standard of angular space. Hence the motions of the inner concentric circles of the same great circle, moving on one centre, identical with the centre of the circle, are all the same when thus measured, although varying infinitely when referred to other points. The velocity of the hour hand of a watch, that revolves once in twenty-four hours, is the same with that of the earth on its axis. If the same hour hand could be conceived of as extending to the moon, the tangential velocity of its extremity would be greater than the orbit motion of that body—exceeding many thousand miles a minute—and yet its absolute velocity, taken as a whole, would be that same slow and almost imperceptible motion which apoears in our timepieces.

XXIII.

The Words φθίσις, γένεσις, πάθος, and φθορά.

PAGE 25, LINE 5. *φθίνει . . ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται.* This word *φθίνει* (*φθίσις*) is applied to a diminution of the number of parts or particles of which a body is composed, without a change of the essential idea, law, or nature. It is

the opposite of *αὐξάνεται, αὔξησις.* *Ἀπόλλυται* is used where the very law, nature, or idea of a thing (that which makes it what it is) is taken away. It is the opposite of *γίγνεται.* The one would express the difference between a fat man and a lean one, the other between a living man and a dead body. *Φθίνω* is generally intransitive, but is sometimes used in a transitive sense, as in the Iliad, vi., 407:

Δαιμόνιε φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος.

Φθίνω and *φθίμενος* are applied by the poets to the dead, but more in a metaphorical than a strictly philosophical sense. When thus poetically used, they still retain something of their primary meaning, and suggest the conception of *the wasted, the emaciated, the weak* (*ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα*), as though the ghostly state were but a *diminution* of their former life. In the same manner the poets use *καμόντες, the wearied, the deceased.* The Hebrews seem to have had something of the same metaphorical conception in their word רְפָאִים

Mere increment or diminution is said to take place as long as the *καθεστηκυῖα ἕξις, the constituting state,* remains (*διαμένῃ, continues through, or survives the change*). But it may be destroyed both ways (*ἀμφότερα*), that is, by *φθίσις,* or *αὔξησις,* when carried so far that the law of the body becomes affected. No increment or decrement which does not take away that *ἕξις,* or state, which makes a thing what it is, can ever amount to that great change denoted by *φθορὰ,* and the verb *ἀπόλλυμι.* Until this takes place, the real or essential identity remains, although that phenomenal identity may have been affected, which depends on the numerical sum or aggregate. So that we may say, that, if every particle of matter has been removed and replaced by others, still, if during the process the *καθεστηκυῖα ἕξις* is preserved, it is the *same body,* although not the same *matter;* and if, on the other hand, no single material particle be lost, yet

if, in any way, this *ἕξις* has been destroyed, it is no longer the same, but there has taken place the *γένεσις* of something else, having a different name, a different law, and a different identity, or, as is said a few lines below, *μεταβαλὸν εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς*, "passing into another state, it is utterly destroyed;" the thing which before *was*, no longer *is*, whatever may have taken its place. See Note XXV., on the difference between *γένεσις* and *ἀλλοίωσις*.

The next question is, What is *γένεσις*, or generation? It is rather abruptly put by the supposed interlocutor, yet still is naturally enough suggested by what precedes: *Γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ' ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ*; to which the succeeding answer is given: *Δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην, κ. τ. λ.*, "It is evident (*that generation takes place, or that the peculiar πάθος under which it takes place is*) whenever a principle (*ἀρχὴ, here put for the originating idea, the principium, or law of life to anything*) receiving growth, (*that is, being developed in the outward or material*) passes into the second change, and from this into the next, and so on, until, coming as far as to three, it arrives at such a state as to become an object of sensation." This is certainly rather obscure, but perhaps as well expressed as was possible, in the attempt to set forth the transition from the law of life to its material organic development. *Τριῶν* would seem to refer to the three mathematical dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness, which every object of sense must possess in some degree; or it may be intended as an indefinite number, representing the stages, be they more or less, through which the thing generated must pass, until it become an object of sensation, visible, tangible, &c.

XXIV.

Philosophy of the Verb TO BE. Platonic Use of εἰμί and γίγνομαι.

PAGE 25, LINE 11. *Μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν. ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὂν ὁπόταν μένῃ· μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς.* The tenses here are emphatic, and must have their precise meaning. "While thus changing and moving, it is in the act of being generated. It really *is*, when it becomes fixed and *stands;* but after it has passed into another state, it (that is, the former thing) is utterly destroyed." *Μένῃ* is to be taken here in its philosophical sense, as opposed to *μεταβάλλει*, and for *ἕστηκε*, in the language of the schools, as opposed to *κινεῖται*, or to that which is in a constant flux or motion. This, however, can only strictly be applied to the law or idea, and in this sense it includes what Plato so often expresses by the phrase *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά*, &c., as that which remains unaffected amid the material mutations to which it is constantly subject.

It may be, however, that *ὄντως ὂν* is not to be taken here in the highest philosophical sense, as opposed to *γιγνόμενον*, but more according to the vulgar usage of the substantive verb, as signifying the real being, not simply of the law or idea, but of the generated material object itself, during that period in which it suffers no *πάθος*, or change of state. It is because they are always suffering change or flux, like a river ever passing away, and never for two successive moments preserving the same numerical or aggregate identity, that even some of the ancient philosophers who were theists denied that generated material things were at all entitled to the epithet *ὄντως ὄντα*. Plato, however, clearly regards their identity as not depending upon number and the aggregate mass; but as long as they suffer

no *πάθος* by which *ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἕξις* is taken away, he does not hesitate to apply to them this higher substantive verb, although entitled to it only by partaking for a time of that idea, to which it truly and in itself belongs. Modern scientfic men seem to be making rapid advance to this position of some of the ancients, that, in the material world, all things are ever flowing, and nothing stands. Would that we could say, that they all held as firmly as Pythagoras, Plato, and Parmenides, to a higher and far more real universe of truth, in which all was stable, immutable, and eternal as the throne of God.

There is a most important distinction between the verbs *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*, on which we would here dwell at some length, although almost every page in Plato's dialogues might have given occasion for such an excursus. In fact, many portions of this writer are not fully comprehensible, in their highest intended meaning, unless the philosophical distinctions between these words are kept constantly in mind. They are often emphatic, and used antithetically, when the careless reader little suspects it; and thus sentences most pregnant in meaning seem frequently to contain mere truisms, or propositions of a most unmeaning character. In defining the Platonic sense of these words, we rely directly on the authority of the philosopher himself, in the Timæus, 27, P., 28, A. From this passage alone, had there been no other, we are justified in saying, that *εἰμί*, in its highest sense, expresses *essential*, *eternal*, *necessary*, *self-existent*, *independent*, *uncaused being or essence*, *having no dependence on time and space*. The other, *γίγνομαι*, expresses *phenomenal*, *temporal*, *contingent*, *dependent being*, *generated in time and space*.

This philosophical distinction is more clear in Plato than in any other Greek writer, because the subjects he discussed led him to be more precise in the application of those primary meanings of the terms in question, which grew not

out of philosophy, but must have been coeval with the first roots of this most spiritual language. Whatever his nominal themes may be, whether ethical, æsthetical, physical, or metaphysical, they are, in his treatment, almost always made ultimately to turn, in a greater or less degree, on the distinctions in the modes of being expressed by these two verbs. However he may commence, the argument seldom proceeds far before we are engaged in the consideration of the eternal, the immutable, the one in the many (*τὸ ἓν ἐν πολλοῖς*), the *ἀεὶ ὄντα*, in contrast with the temporal, the changeable, the individual, and the generated. The difference between the classes of ideas expressed by these two verbs must be kept in mind everywhere in reading his more serious dialogues; and in many parts it may be said to form the key to some of his most valuable thoughts. The key passage, in which they are placed in most remarkable contrast, is one which we have already partly quoted for another purpose (*page* 96), but whose importance will justify its being presented again. In the Timæus he defines the two grand departments into which all being or substance is divided, namely, on the one hand, the *sensible world*, with its *phenomena*, and, on the other, the *intellectual world*, including soul as the oldest essence, and also those eternal truths, ideas, or principles, which Plato seems to have regarded as entitled to the name of entities—as existences, in fact, even more real than matter itself, although their dwelling was not in the world of time and space: *Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ* ΟΝ *μὲν ἀεὶ*, ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ *δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ* ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *μὲν*, ΟΝ *δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ* ΟΝ. *πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι. παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν.* And again, in continuation of the same distinction: *Σκεπτέον οὖν δὴ περὶ παντός, πότερον* ΗΝ *ἀεὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ* ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*

τινος ἀρξάμενος. *Timæus*, 28, A., C. In another part of this same passage he contrasts *οὐσία* (or *essence*) with *γένεσις*, as knowledge with opinion, 29, C. It must not be expected always to find these two verbs used with this philosophical precision even in Plato. In mere narration, confined simply to the assertion of facts, without reference to the nature of the objects, *ἦν* and *ἐγένετο* are often confounded, and used one for the other. In such cases the substantive verbs simply perform the office of an asserting copula, without any respect to the mode of being. Even here, however, we often find in careful writers a marked difference in their application. The plain historian Herodotus, whenever his subject requires it, presents the contrast strongly, as in lib. iii., 53: *ἔνθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε δὲ ἀεὶ ἦσαν*. In the dialogues of Plato, however, the distinction, whenever important, is ever carefully preserved; and we may say, generally, from a review of the Platonic writings, that in all cases which require care in the use of terms, *ἐστί* is the appropriate word to express that which IS necessarily, such as the existence and attributes of the Deity, the independent existence of incorporeal substance, the eternal truth of moral distinctions. Thus, for example, the sentence *ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν*, would imply far more than simply the assertion of a fact. In this expression, when used with philosophical strictness, *ἐστί* performs the office of a predicate as well as of a copula, and that predicate, moreover, includes the *mode* as well as the *fact* of being. There is expressed by it, without the aid of any other words, a general and most important proposition, namely, that the idea of goodness is not merely relative or accidental, or the result of the mind's generalization from outward acts, but an absolute, eternal verity; that it has an absolute existence in the Divine mind, and that there is a fixed foundation for the absolute, and not merely relative nature of moral distinctions. In the sciences, this

term would be peculiarly appropriate to the enunciation of the truths of geometry and numbers. In mathematical propositions the ideas of cause and effect have no place. There is no *γένεσις*. One truth is essentially connected with another, or, rather, seen in it as eternally abiding. The appearance of sequence arises from the necessities and imperfections of our own minds, compelling us to state them in time; and yet it is strictly true, that every property of every mathematical figure, and every corresponding mode of generating, contains in itself every other property, and that, as far as theory, irrespective of convenience, is concerned, any one of them might, with equal truth, be made the fundamental *λόγος*, or definition from which all the rest should be evolved. Mathematical propositions, strictly speaking, have no relation to time, being eternally true, without past, succession, or future. We may, without contradiction or absurdity, conceive of a period when it may cease to be true, that bodies attract in the inverse ratio of the squares of their distances, but never when it shall be no longer a truth, that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides. To make use of the verb *γίγνομαι*, therefore, in the enunciation of a mathematical theorem, would be introducing a foreign and altogether heterogeneous idea. This latter substantive verb would be most appropriate to physics or natural philosophy, to the ever moving phenomena of nature regarded as under the law of cause and effect, as having a beginning and an end, as *γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα*; although even these may be stated as absolute truths, and, generally, are thus stated when the mind conceives of them as involving ultimately something that is necessary and eternal. It is by reason of some such *à priori* conception, whether it be correct or not, that the primary laws of physics come to be expressed in the same language with the axioms of the pure mathematics.

Even the etymological origin of these two verbs may, without any extravagance of fancy, be supposed to betoken the vast difference between them. The primary elements of the one (*εω ε ει*) are found in the most æthereal of the vowels. The other (*γαω γ*) has for its ultimate radical the hardest, and, we might almost say, the most earthly of the guttural mutes; for it is the origin of the term for earth (*γῆ*), and, of all letters, is most easily associated with the conceptions of the sensible or tactual. Plato, although a very poor philologist, seems to recognise the connexion: *γῆ γὰρ γεννήτειρα ἂν εἴη ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος· τὸ γὰρ γεγάασι γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει.* *Cratylus*, 410, D. *Τῆς γλώττης δὲ ὀλισθανούσης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ τοῦ Γ δύναμις.* *Ib.*, 427, B.

These distinctions clearly exist, and are probably coeval with the first elements of the language. They do not, however, as we have remarked, appear so obvious in ordinary use; their full power being evinced only in the discussion of those truths, in which are involved the very ideas that are radical in the words themselves. On this account they are so distinctly marked in many passages in Plato. The spirit of the difference, however, is diffused throughout the Greek literature, and is probably to be found, to some extent, and under various forms of expression, in almost every known language. May we not believe that, in this way, God, who may be regarded as the author of language as well as of everything else, has provided an antidote against that materialism to which our depraved nature is so continually tending. It is surely no small protection against this, that there are to be found (and perhaps in every tongue) terms which, whatever may have been their origin, must ever be irreconcilably at war with the sensual or atheistic hypothesis.

The great truth of the real existence of *incorporeal substance*, as something independent of, and not posterior to, or

a result of matter, lies at the foundation of all faith and all religion. We verily believe, too, that whosoever will carefully examine his own consciousness must admit, that a latent doubt of this lies at the bottom of all skepticism, in all its various forms. It is all to be resolved into materialism, a system into which such a verb as ἐστί, in its purest philosophical sense, could not consistently enter. The existence of an Eternal Spirit, independent of the organization of the world by which he manifests himself—the real existence of our own souls as something in the order of nature, if not of time, prior to, and independent of, the organization of our bodies; the consequent immateriality and immortality of the soul; the eternal existence of all which are styled necessary truths; the eternity of moral distinctions; the existence of moral attributes as the highest part of the Divine character, and the solemn verities of the Christian faith and the Christian redemption, as flowing necessarily from the above truths in their relation to man—all these are, in every thinking and well-balanced mind that has received a religious or Christian education, parts of one system; all are inseparably connected together, so that a doubt of one is a doubt of all, and a firm conviction of one brings with it a satisfactory belief in all the rest. The prime element which runs throughout, is a firm faith in the reality of *incorporeal substance*, or that there is something in the universe besides the sensible world and its phenomena, some other God or soul than that pantheistic power which is only another name for their combined manifestation—in short, some *ψυχὴ ὑπερκοσμία*, as the origin and cause of the *ψυχὴ ἐγκοσμία*, as well as of the material world in which its energies are displayed. Yet it must be confessed, that there is a downward tendency in our fallen race to atheism. We do not like to retain God in our knowledge. We find this tendency (unless checked, as it ever has been, by Divine interpositions at special times of grace) gradually infecting

individuals and nations, giving an atheistic tinge to language, and corrupting and finally destroying religious belief. There is, at the beginning of this, the opposite of the conviction before mentioned—a secret and almost unconscious skepticism, a suspicion, a fear, and in some, perhaps, a hope, that *all is nature*, that all is generation (*γένεσις*), or the mere succession of phenomena; that there is nothing *καθ' ἑαυτὴν*, absolute, necessary, eternal, self-existent, or, in other words, *ὡς οὐδὲν ἕστηκε*, *that nothing stands.*

Now we cannot help indulging the thought, however extravagant it may appear to some, that the Divine Author of our race, "who careth for us," and who arranges all things to bring about his own eternal decrees, does exert a providential control over so important an instrument as speech, and that in these two substantive verbs, so distinctly marked in their primary sense, their philosophical applications, and their numerous derivative and kindred terms, he has stamped upon the noblest language of earth, an indelible impression of the eternal distinction between the classes of substances denoted by them, and of the real existence of those great truths so fundamental to all others, the chief of which is, "*that HE IS, and that he is the rewarder of those who diligently seek him.*" Especially would this seem to be a sober conclusion, when we consider how, in the providence of God, this same language was intended to be the medium of a Divine revelation, and the teaching of a widespread Christian theology. The modern tongue which comes the nearest to it in this respect is the German. And may we not regard this, too, as intended, by its high spiritual character, to resist effectually the neology and naturalism which have been attempted to be conveyed through it? May we not hope, that, after all the extravagances of the German mind, the conservative, religious, and spiritual influences which in this and other respects exist in their native Teutonic, will yet hold them firm to those great truths

which are the foundation of all faith. Materialism can at best only babble in other languages: it cannot speak at all in Greek or German, without the use of words which must continually remind it of its absurdities and contradictions.

The English, and most of the modern languages of Europe, are very deficient in the expression of the distinction conveyed by these verbs. Words, it is true, may be found, which may be forced into a sort of awkward correspondence; but they want that unction, that naturalness, that direct and easy contrast with the opposing terms, which would show that they are in harmony with the genius and spirit of the language. Hence the almost impossibility of a faithful and yet lively translation of Plato into the French and English. If we needed proof how poorly the Latin is adapted to this purpose, it may be found in the version of the Timæus by Ficinus, and even in the translation of the same dialogue by Cicero, of which a large fragment yet remains.*

We may trace the distinction between *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*, even where we may not suppose it to have been directly in

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* Among all modern authors, there is no one in whose writings these Greek words seem more wanted than in those of the English Plato, Ralph Cudworth. He often seems to labour with the stiff Latin, and the still more clumsy English, when the Greek *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι* would have helped him at once out of all difficulty. As, for example, when speaking of the eternity of truth, and of its independence even of the creating or generating power of the Divine will, he says, that "it cannot be *made*, but *is*;" he means just what Plato would have expressed by the words, *οὐδέποτε ἐγένετο ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀλλ' ἀεί ἐστι. Intellectual System of the Universe*, vol. iii., p. 376, *Eng. ed.* And again, vol. iii., p. 405, where he wishes to tell us in English, that "the perfect triangle, &c., really *is*, although it never yet *existed*, and never may *exist* in *rerum natura*." As we feel for our imperfect language, and for the difficulties of our most admirable author, we cannot help thinking how easily the Greek enables Aristotle to express the same thought by the same words, *ἀεί ἐστι, οὐδέποτε ἐγένετο.*

the mind of the writer, but to have arisen (perhaps unconsciously) from its adaptedness to the truth intended to be conveyed. Thus, for example, in the first verses of the Gospel of John, the one is applied to the Eternal *Λόγος*, the other to the sensible world, which derived its *γένεσις* from him. We might, in defence of this position, say at once, that the terms were specially suggested by the Holy Spirit, the real author of the passage, without supposing John himself to have had any acquaintance with the Platonic writings, or to have intended any philosophical contrast. But without this, we can recognise the distinction as growing directly out of the genius of the language, although, in the expression of truths in which it did not enter, either verb, or both, might have been used, without anything special to attract observation. But John was treating of a subject which, of all others, called for the contrast; and that, too, whether *λόγος* is used here for a personification of the Supreme Reason, or for the Eternal Son of God, the second Person in the Trinity. There is, then, no absurdity and no extravagance in supposing that the words are here used, not in their ordinary narrative sense, but with special regard to their primary differences, when employed in philosophical strictness. This may be more clear of one of them than of the other. *Ἦν* or *ἐστί* may be applied to the lower class of existences—and it is this that has rendered necessary the qualifying adverb, *ὄντως*, which we find so frequently in the Platonic phrase, *ὄντως ὄν*—but *ἐγένετο* cannot well be used for the higher. One the least familiar with the genius of the Greek language must feel the impropriety of the expression, *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐγένετο ὁ Θεός*; unless it had been actually intended to teach the fabulous generations of such gods as Hesiod treats of in his Theogonia, who all came from an older *φύσις*, and were *generated* out of Chaos and the broad-bosomed Earth:

Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος ΓΕΝΕΤ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί.
Hesiod, Theog., 117.

A much more clear and striking example from the Scriptures may be found John, viii., 58. Here we have the most remarkable antithesis, and here we feel confident in saying, not only that the philosophical distinction was intended, but that, without it, the designed idea could not have been expressed: Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ ἐγώ ΕΙΜΙ.—*Before Abraham came into being, or received* his *γένεσις*, I AM, *eternally and essentially AM, WAS, and ever* SHALL BE: for *εἰμί*, here, like the Hebrew אֶהְיֶה, Exodus, iii., 14, seems to include all tenses. To be convinced that this juxtaposition of words was not accidental, or used merely for the sake of variety, let us compare the other modes that might seem to be equivalent, namely, *πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ εἶναι ἐγώ εἰμι*, or *πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ ἐγενόμην*; and the difference is not only to be perceived, but felt. In consequence of our using the solitary verb *to be* for both modes of existence expressed by *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*, the English fails, and ever must fail, in setting forth the truth in all its fulness. It is not extravagant to suppose that our Saviour here intended, and the Jews understood, a direct reference to Exodus, iii., 14—*I AM that* I AM—where the Septuagint employs the participle of *εἰμί* as a name or personal appellation of the Deity, corresponding to the Hebrew אֶהְיֶה, or יְהוָה, namely, Ὁ ὢν *hath sent me unto you.* There seems, also, good reason for the opinion that this term, Ὁ ὢν, may, in some other passages, have the force of a descriptive appellation (as one of the Divine names), instead of being a mere participial copula. As in the noted passage, Rom., ix., 5—Ὁ ὢν, *ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς, εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.—Of whom, according to the flesh* (*κατὰ σάρκα*), *was Christ, The Jehovah, God over all, blessed forever.* The Hebraism,

κατὰ σάρκα (לְפִי הַבָּשָׂר), is the only form of expression in that language, which at all corresponds to the Greek *κατὰ γένεσιν*; and, by keeping this in mind, we find that there is the same contrast, Rom., ix., 5, as in John, i., 1, 2, 14: *καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.* Transfer the Hebraistic idiom to more philosophical Greek, and this contrast would be thus set forth: *κατ' οὐσίαν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—κατὰ γένεσιν, σὰρξ ἐγένετο.* Compare, also, Rev., i., 8, Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν. We are aware of the objections to all this, and have no expectation that it will have much force with those who entertain different views in theology; but some such impression of a reference to Exodus, iii., 14, is very naturally left on the mind of one who believes, on other grounds, in the Divinity and eternal self-existence of the being here styled The Logos. This impression receives strength, also, from the supposition that the language of the Septuagint version of Exodus, iii., 14 (ὁ ὢν), had already passed into a descriptive appellation, and been ranked among the Old Testament names of the Deity.

Should it be thought that we are too much inclined to represent Paul and John as Platonizing, or as indulging in the use of philosophical language, we would simply refer, in the case of the former, to Acts, xvii., 28: Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα καί ἐσμεν.—"In him we *live*, and *move*, and *are*." The allusion here, as well as in other parts of that chapter, to the language of the Greek schools is too plain to be mistaken; and it does not seem extravagant to suppose, that the Apostle had in mind the Greek and Hebrew names respectively of their Supreme Deity. The etymology of Jehovah is suggested at once by Exodus, iii., 14. It may be called the proper name of God, or, as he styles it himself, *his memorial to all generations*—The Essentially Existent one (ὁ ὢν); the Being who has life in himself, and who is the source of existence to everything else. In spiritual substances, *life* and *being* are the same.

The two roots in Hebrew expressive of these two ideas, namely, חָיָה and הָיָה, are so nearly alike, that they may be regarded as from one source, and, in some cases, as nearly synonymous. Hence the appellation so common in the Old Testament, *The Living God.* To say that this is intended merely to distinguish the God of the Jews from the dead idols of the Heathen, or from their deified dead men, is not to give it half its meaning. None of the Heathen nations, any more than the Romanists of modern times, were ever so besotted as to worship their idols without regarding them, in some measure, as the representatives of living and immortal beings. The epithet, therefore, must have had a higher significance, and seems to refer to this name Jehovah—The Being that not only exists, but exists *necessarily*—who has life in himself, unoriginated and uncaused—that Divine existence which the mind is compelled to admit a priori, as the ground of the belief in all other existences, or as a necessary truth, the contrary of which, when fairly presented, cannot be admitted without bringing darkness over every other truth. Hence the appeal so often found in the Old Testament, "*As I live*, saith the Lord," is used to denote the highest ground of certainty. Gesenius and other German critics, indulging their propensity ever to undervalue the testimony of the Scriptures, and to lessen our reverence for their antiquity and sacred authority, assign an Egyptian origin to this name, and deduce it from an inscription upon the temple at Sais, as given by Plutarch: *Ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὂν καὶ ἐσόμενον.*—"*I am that* which has been, is, and shall be." This inscription, although, perhaps, itself comparatively modern, may have contained an old Egyptian sentiment; and yet such an admission would not militate at all against the pure Hebrew origin of the name, and its derivation from ideas existing in the patriarchal ages, or in that common early theology which was transmitted pure to the Jew, while it was

corrupted by every other nation. To the same early source must we look for the notion on which was grounded the etymology of the Greek *Ζεύς*, and which presents so strong a contrast with the corruptions of the subsequent mythology. Although it may not be precisely the same with the primitive idea of the Hebrew term, there certainly seems some approach to it. There is no need of travelling, as some have done, to the Sanscrit for the origin of this term. It seems as purely Greek as *Θεὸς* and *Δαίμων*, and nothing can be more simple, or less liable to the charge of being forced, than the etymology which Plato gives us in the Cratylus. He derives *Ζεύς*, *Ζῆνα*, from *ζῆν*, *to live:* *Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων.*—"For to us, and to all other beings, there is no one who is more properly the cause of life than the ruler and king of all things." At all events, it is sufficient for our present argument, that this was the received and probably well-known philosophical etymology in Paul's time, and we have every reason, therefore, to suppose that he alludes to it in this famous passage of his sermon at Athens. In the words *ζῶμεν* and *ἐσμέν*, we have the radical Greek and Hebrew ideas combined in one description, composed of terms severally significant of *motion*, *life*, and *essence;* as though Paul had said, he is our *Ζεύς* and our Jehovah: "For in him we *live* and *are*, as some of your own poets have said," &c. We are no more required, by this view, to suppose that the Apostle meant to exercise any false liberality towards the corrupt polytheism or idolatry of Athens, than that his most evident allusion to the language of their schools was designed as any sanction to the follies and monstrosities of some parts of their philosophy and poetry.

For some of the more striking of the many passages in Plato's dialogues, in which there is this marked antithesis between *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*, see the Theætetus, 153, E.,

155, A., 157, D.: *λέγε τοίνυν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν*, &c.; Republic, 525, C.: *φιλοσόφῳ δὲ, διὰ τὸ τῆς* ΟΥΣΙΑΣ *ἁπτέον εἶναι,* ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ *ἐξαναδύντι*: 526, P., 527, A., 527, B., *τῆς ἀεὶ* ΟΝΤΟΣ *γνῶσίς ἐστι ἡ γεωμετρική, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι* ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΥ, 508, E., P.; Parmenides, 138, E., 141, C., 154, C., D., 161, 162, A., B.; Philebus, 53, C., where he defines physical pleasure, or the pleasure of sense, as ever *γένεσις*, but never *οὐσία*: *ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοπαράπαν ἡδονῆς*; Phædrus, 247, C., D., E.; Hippias, Maj., 294, B. C.; Timæus, 28, A., B., &c., 29, 37, C., D., E.; together with passages from the Sophista, too numerous for citation, and the Phædon, everywhere.

XXV.

Ancient Divisions of Motion. According to Plato. According to Aristotle. Distinction between Γένεσις and Ἀλλοίωσις. The Atomic Theory more favourable to Theism than the Doctrine of Occult Qualities.

Page 25, Line 22. *Ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα ἀεὶ μία τις.* He speaks now of the two *orders* of motion, taking the word *κίνησις* in its most extensive sense, as including all the *species* before alluded to, namely, *circular*, *rectilineal or τοπική*, *separation*, *concretion*, *augment*, *diminution*, *generation*, and *corruption*; or, generally, all that is expressed by the word *μεταβολή*, or *change*, internal or external, according to that definition of Aristotle, *πᾶσα κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή, καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ ὡσαύτως*, *Arist.*, *Metaph.*, x. (xi.), 12. From this it may be seen how much more extensive it is than the corresponding English term. The two kinds of motion here spoken of are not so much to be regarded as species distinct from the others, but rather as

two general ideas, each embracing all the specific varieties mentioned. Plato here, however, must be regarded as unusually careless in his specifications, since, according to the fair import of the language, these two must be considered as species reckoned with the rest, and yet it is evident that this was far from being his intention.

PAGE 26, LINE 2. *ἐνάτην.* It is not obvious, at first, why this is called the ninth, since there are but six mentioned just before it. It would, however, be the ninth according to the following enumeration, taking opposites together:

1. *Περιφορά.*	2. *Τοπικὴ μετάβασις.*
3. *Σύγκρισις.*	4. *Διάκρισις.*
5. *Αὔξησις.*	6. *Φθίσις.*
7. *Γένεσις.*	8. *Φθορά.*
9. *Κίνησις ἕτερον κινοῦσα καὶ ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινουμένη.*	10. *Κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσα καὶ ἕτερα.*

The last two, however, as we have remarked, are not strictly *species*, but *genera*, including, respectively, all the rest; and so, in what follows, the writer proceeds to regard them.

Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh.*, *Hypotyp.*, iii., 8, § 64, enumerates but six species: 1. *τοπική μετάβασις* (*localis transitus*); 2. *φυσικὴ μεταβολή* (*naturalis mutatio*), or *ἀλλοίωσις*; 3. *αὔξησις* (*augmentum*); 4. *μείωσις* (*decrementum*); 5. *γένεσις* (*generatio*); 6. *φθορά* (*corruptio*). Compare Aristotle, *Phys. Auscult.*, vii., 2, where he enumerates three genera, which he afterward divides into a great variety of species, many of which have hardly any other differences than their names: *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς εἰσι κινήσεις, ἥ τε κατὰ τόπον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινούμενα τρία. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον, φορά· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.* "Since, then, there are three causes of motion, namely, in respect to space, in respect to quality, and in respect to quantity, there must be three corresponding motions or movements. The first of these is called *φορά*, the

second, *ἀλλοίωσις* (or change), the third, increment and diminution." The scholiast on the passage of Plato before us has a much better division; first, into *corporeal* and *psychical*, and then into the subdivisions of space, quality, quantity, and essence, on the one hand, and into the last two enumerated by Plato, and here called the ninth and tenth, on the other: *Τῆς κινήσεως ἡ μὲν σωματική, κατὰ τόπον, κατὰ ποιότητα, κατὰ ποσότητα, κατ' οὐσίαν· ἡ δὲ ψυχική, ἢ ἄλλο κινοῦσα ὑπ' ἄλλου δὲ κινουμένη, ἢ ἑαυτήν τε κινοῦσα καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη.* Compare, also, Aristotle, *Phys. Auscult.*, v., 3, viii., 7; *De Generat. et Corrup.*, i., 1, 4.

In this last-cited treatise Aristotle endeavours to present the distinction between *γένεσις* and *ἀλλοίωσις*. His general statement is clear enough: *Ἀλλοίωσις μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταβάλλῃ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσιν· οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν κάμνει, ὑπομένον γε ταὐτό· καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγύλος, ὁτὲ δὲ γωνιοειδὴς, ὁ αὐτός γε ὤν. ὅταν δὲ ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ, μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινος, ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ, ἢ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, τοῦ μὲν ἤδη γένεσις τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά, μάλιστα δὲ ἂν ἡ μεταβολὴ γίνεται ἐξ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητόν.* "Alloiosis takes place when the subject (some object of sense) remains the same, while there is a change in its passions. As, for example, the body is healthy, and again is sick, yet remains the same body; or the brass is at one time round, and at another angular, yet still the same. But when there is an *entire* change, the subject no longer remaining the same, but it being as though from water air, or from air water should arise, such a change is, in respect to the one thing, a generation, and, in respect to the other, a *φθορά*, or corruption," &c.

In applying this, however, it will be found to be only a matter of degrees, unless it is determined what constitutes totality, or an entire change, as also what is meant by *ποι-*

ότης, *property*, or *quality*. This must be viewed in reference to two theories, one of which, or the atomic, considers all *ποιότητας*, or qualities of bodies, as arising from the site, figure, motion, and order of the atoms of which they are composed (*ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππός φασι, θέσει καὶ τάξει τούτων ἐξ ὧν εἰσι*, *Arist.*, *De Gen. et Cor.*, i., 1), and the affections they produce in us; according to which, all change of quality is ultimately to be resolved into topical motion, producing a change in the situation, order, and numerical combination of the particles; such as modern chemistry shows when, the constituent atoms remaining the same in kind, a new substance arises from the difference in their arrangement and proportion; so that, for example, what once was common atmospheric air becomes nitric acid, &c. The other was the theory of occult qualities, in which Aristotle was a believer. This maintained that the figure, site, motions, and order of parts or particles remaining the same, or being identically the same in two respective bodies, they might differ greatly in their *properties;* and there being nothing in the matter in respect to locality, number, proportion, magnitude, motion, or any sensible phenomena, to which this difference could be assigned, it was styled occult. Hence, in one place, Aristotle endeavours to show that two bodies might both be absolutely full, or a *plenum*, and yet one might have a property of heaviness or weight, the other of lightness; one might have a property of hardness and the other of softness, and that the one might even be compressible while the other was incompressible; since the phenomena of thinness (*μανότης*) or density (*πυκνότης*) were no proof of a vacuum, or the contrary.

In this view, *ἀλλοίωσις* and *γένεσις* can only be regarded as differing in degree, *κατὰ τὸ ποσόν*, unless *γένεσις* is taken for the change *κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*, or a change of the occult quality itself, which was entirely independent of the disposition and motions of the parts of the matter. On the

other theory, there is a marked distinction between them, as the one (*ἀλλοίωσις*) would refer to such a change of particles as would only affect the aggregate sum, the other (*γένεσις*) to such a change in site, order, motion, and combination, as would destroy the former *ἕξις*, and give rise to a new one, constituting a new law or nature. *Ἀλλοίωσις* would be a change in the *αἰσθητά*, addressing itself solely to the sense; *γένεσις*, a change in the *νοητόν*, or idea, addressing itself to the intelligence, and constituting the object of science.

The atomic theory has been charged with being atheistical, because atheists have held it. Cudworth, however, very conclusively shows that it is, on the contrary, most favourable to theism, because, allowing to matter nothing but atoms, figure, site, &c., the mind that thinks rigidly is compelled to bring in something to set these atoms in motion, and, since it discards all occult qualities as unmeaning, it is obliged to resort to Spirit as the direct author of all those original impulses of matter which are generally styled properties. See *The Intellectual System*, chapter i., 38–45. On the other hand, this other doctrine, which, at first view, seems more spiritual, as apparently maintaining the existence of a secret something besides the matter, and, therefore, as more favourable to religion than the dry theory of atoms, is, in reality, the great hot-bed of atheism, ever dispensing with the presence of the Deity, as long as these blind occult qualities can be brought in to justify what would fain seem a jealous reverence for the Divine honour.

Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus.

This doctrine seems to have given rise, in the minds of Aristotle and others, to this distinction between *τοπικὴ μεταβολή*, *local change*, or *change in space*, and *μεταβολὴ κατὰ ποιόν*, or change of quality, as the two great and distinct orders embraced under the term *κίνησις*, or motion in its largest sense; whereas, if the other view be correct, the

second is as much local motion as the first, that is, local motion internally, although there may be no departure from the circumscribing space in which the *whole* body is contained; so that all *change* would be motion in the modern sense of the word, and there would remain only the two genera which Plato numbers as the ninth and tenth, and which the scholiast has styled σωματική and ψυχική; all the rest being mere differences arising from direction, degree, separation, or concretion. Plato's division, although somewhat affected by this doctrine of occult qualities, is far less dependent upon it than the others we have mentioned, and what he says of the καθεστηκυῖα ἕξις and its change savours most strongly of the other theory. On other grounds, we are persuaded that Plato's view was more in accordance with the atomic doctrine, which resolved all ποιότητας into the motions, figures, sites, &c., of ultimate particles. This seems to agree best with the spirit of the Timæus; and, indeed, there are some parts of that dialogue which are unintelligible on any other supposition. Cudworth maintains that Plato, as well as Aristotle, was a believer in the occult theory; and that he was led to adopt it because he saw that the other had been held by atheists. We are satisfied, however, from a very careful examination, which cannot be here presented, that this is a mistaken view of his philosophy. It is sufficient to say, that nothing would be so fatal to his main argument in this very treatise, as the admission of any occult quality, which is neither to be resolved into the combination and disposition of the particles, nor into the higher power of spirit ultimately moving upon them. The atheist would ask for no better auxiliary, to resist successfully all that might be advanced about the necessity of that older and self-moving essence, soul. "Give me a place to stand," said Archimedes, "and I will move the world." "Give me occult qualities," the atheist might say, "and I ask the aid of no God in constructing a universe."

XXVI.

Αὐτοκίνησις, or Self-motion of Soul. Energy or Action belongs to the Essence of the Deity. Whether on this View God must have created Worlds from Eternity. Aristotle's Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. His own Doctrine.

Page 26, Line 9. *Πασῶν ἐῤῥωμενεστάτην καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως.* Such strong expressions as these gave occasion to Aristotle to assert, that Plato taught the doctrine that the first cause was an eternal energy or activity ever employed, that is, *ἐνέργεια*, in distinction from *δύναμις*. He even most unjustly seeks to confound Plato's Eternal Spiritual Mover with the everlasting agitation of the self-moving atoms of Democritus and Leucippus: *Διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων. ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, καὶ τίνα, οὐ λέγουσιν.* "Some make it an everlasting activity, as Leucippus and Plato. For they say that there is an eternal motion, but by reason of what, and what, they do not tell us." *Aristot.*, *Metaph.*, xi. (xii.), c. 6. This disparagement of Plato, by associating him with the atheists, Leucippus and Democritus, is merely done to set off his own dogma, that "the first essence was *immoveable*:" *ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιον τινὰ οὐσίαν, ἀκίνητον*; in which proposition, taken in its true sense, we shall see that Plato most fully agreed with him. In another part of this same chapter, he infers, that if there be an eternal *κίνησις*, its very essence must be activity (*ἐνέργεια*), in distinction from power (*δύναμις*): *Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν, μὴ εἶναι. Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια*—"For if it should not energize, there will be no motion; neither if it should energize,

while yet its essence was only (*δύναμις*) power or potentiality. Even in that case, there will be no eternal motion; for that which exists, *ἐν δύναμει*, in potentiality, admits of not-being. *Therefore there must be some such principle, whose very essence is energy.*"

In stating the objections to the doctrine, he misrepresents Plato in his usual manner, by drawing the unsound inference, that the First Cause must have been ever engaged, from its very nature, in the work of creation, and that, therefore, the universe must have been eternal: *ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεί, ἢ περιόδῳ, ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως. εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ἐνεργοῦν*—"So that there could have been no chaos or night for an infinite (or indefinite) time; but the same things must have been ever taking place, either in a circuit or in some other manner, if activity (*ἐνέργεια*) is older than *δύναμις*. But if the same eternally took place in a circuit, then there must have ever been something continually energizing, or putting forth active power." *Metaph.*, xi. (xii.), c. 6.

Aristotle was never careful to do Plato justice; although it would be easy to show—the modern declamation to the contrary notwithstanding—that their philosophy was substantially the same; the main difference arising from the Stagyrite's studious care to adopt, in many cases, a different phraseology, for the purpose of creating the appearance of a wider disagreement than really existed, and from his continual disposition to pervert and misstate Plato's real meaning. His misrepresentation here, whether wilful or not, arises from his utterly confounding the two aspects under which our philosopher defines his tenth species of *κίνησις*, as *ἑαυτήν τε κινοῦσα—καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη*. In the first only did he hold it to be eternal and essential. In this respect, too, however much it may be above our comprehension, he regards it as purely spiritual, or, as the scholiast defines it,

psychical, in distinction from topical motion; as something ever energizing within itself, and only presenting the second aspect when exercised, *κατὰ τόπον*, in the generation, creation, and changes of the topical universe. What Plato meant was this, that the First Cause was something more than *δύναμις*; an eternal *activity* constituting its very essence, yet by no means *necessitating* it to act out of itself, until, by an exercise of will, it should give rise to an outward universe, which, although actuated by, remains clearly distinct from, this everlasting energy.

We have likewise an example of the gross manner in which Aristotle misstates Plato, in another assertion of this same chapter, wherein he charges him with inconsistency in respect to his first Mover or Eternal Soul: *Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἐνίοτε τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν. ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὥς φησι*—"But, surely, neither is Plato able to tell us what he means by that which he sometimes thinks to be the first principle, namely, his self-moving power; for soul, he says (in a certain place), is cotemporary with the heavens, or the material universe." Aristotle undoubtedly would convey the inference, that this is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Eternal Spiritual Mover as laid down in the tenth book of The Laws. The position which he cites is from the Timæus, but the careful reader can hardly fail to see that there, by *ψυχή*, Plato means the *anima mundi*, which he expressly represents as the direct production of the Eternal Father, who formed it together with the body of which it was to be the plastic power; whereas throughout this book, and especially the present argument respecting motion, he employs the term *soul* for the immaterial principle which was prior to all creation and generation of matter—in fact, as another name for the Eternal Deity himself—and this wide difference could hardly have been unknown to one, who must have been familiar with the dia-

logues of Plato, especially such important portions of them as the Timæus and this argument* against the atheists.

One cause of Aristotle's misconception may have been his own unsound definition of motion, which necessarily excluded this tenth species, which Plato makes the ground of all the rest: *πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή. Metaph.*, x. (xi.), c. 12. In other places, however, he seems to mean the same with our author, and even to go beyond him in the sublimity of some of his ideas respecting the first Mover. Compare, for this purpose, the last chapter of the last book of Physics, and the seventh chapter of the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. The First Cause he styles *ἀκίνητον*, not, as we think, in the sense of inactivity or quiescence, but as incapable of being moved, or of deriving its motion from anything external or antecedent. This, instead of being *δύναμις* alone, he himself describes as essentially an Eternal Energy: *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν, μέσον ἐστί τι, ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. Metaph.*, xi. (xii.), c. 7. He sometimes even transcends Plato, and seems to intend the energy of *νοῦς* as something higher than a merely psychical† first mover, if he does not rather mean an *ἀρχή*, or principle of a still higher nature even than this, namely, the moral and final cause of the heavenly motions. We allude especially to that most remark-

* There cannot be a doubt, that, in the passages we have quoted, Aristotle has reference to this tenth book of The Laws; for nowhere else does Plato talk in the same style about motion and the first mover, unless it be in some of the subsequent books of this very treatise. In the Timæus, the argument is conducted in a manner altogether different. This, then, together with other references which Aristotle makes to the Laws, as a production of Plato well known in his day, ought to be conclusive evidence of their genuineness.

† Plato, however, in this argument, evidently uses *ψυχή* for all that is incorporeal, including intellect (*νοῦς*) as well as *life* and motive power.

able passage, where he says "that this ἀρχή, or First Cause, moves the heavens, *as being loved*—κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον," c. 7. By this, Cudworth supposes that he meant to represent a second moving power, or soul of the world, which, "enamoured with this supreme, immoveable Mind, did, as it were, in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens." *Intellectual System*, vol. ii., p. 313, *Eng. ed.* We cannot, however, discover any solid grounds for this opinion, and would rather regard this as a mode of expression, by which the Stagyrite would give the first place in the series of moving causes to moral reasons—what he himself so tersely styles, τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, or *the well and fit*, and what Socrates was fond of denominating τὸ βέλτιστον, the best. It was this principle which produced that motion of the Highest Heavens or sphere, on which all inferior motions depend: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. In this language we think there can be discovered some allusion to Homer's golden chain; and, indeed, the whole style and sentiment of the passage seems far more in accordance with the semi-poetical philosophy of Plato than with that of the dry and rigid Aristotle. Nothing could be more Platonic than this conception of the universe eternally moving on through love of The First Fair and The First Good, attracted rather than impelled, and ever tending to the object of its admiration, as though it were striving to develop, in the harmony of its varied physical influences, that all-perfect idea with which it was enraptured.

We may compare with all this a splendid passage from the Phædrus, of which Cicero has given a version in the first book of the Tusculan Disputations, sect. xxiii.: "All soul is immortal, for that which ever moves must be eternal; while that which moves another, and yet is moved by something else, since it hath cessation of motion, may have cessation of life. But that alone which moves itself, seeing

that it never leaves itself, not only never ceases energizing, but is also the fountain and beginning of motion to all other things. This can never either be born or perish, or all the heaven and earth collapsing must stand still, and never again find a renewed source and origin of motion. For, since it is evident that that which is self-moving is eternal, we need not fear to say that this is the very essence and reason (λόγος) of soul, or, in other words, its very nature," ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς. *Phædrus*, 245, D. We need not remind the reader that in this passage, as well as in the tenth of The Laws, the term *soul* is taken collectively for the oldest soul, as the source of all animation, and including all other souls as in some way proceeding from it.

XXVII.

The Words λόγος, εἶδος, and ἰδέα.

PAGE 28, LINE 9. Ἓν μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν· ἓν δὲ, τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· ἓν δὲ ὄνομα. "One thing the essence, one the λόγος, reason, definition, or notion of the essence, and one the name." Λόγος, when rendered *reason*, is not to be taken for the faculty of the mind to which we give that appellation. It more properly signifies the *reason of a thing;* the reason as existing in a thing, perceived, or, rather, understood by the mind, or the *rationale*. It is not the reason *why* the thing exists, or the final cause, as we often use the term, but, rather, the *constituting cause*, what Aristotle calls τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that which makes anything what it is; a particular modification of the general idea of existence. The λόγος is that which is the object of the mind's intellection (*notio*); that which binds together (primary sense of λέγω) or *gathers* into a unity for the soul's contemplation—that to which alone the ὄνομα, or name, belongs, and without which the thing itself is only an object of sensation.

In reading Plato, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between λόγος, εἶδος, and ἰδέα. The conclusion to which we have arrived, but which we would state with some degree of hesitation, is as follows: Λόγος is the notion or reason of a thing viewed in relation to the mind contemplating it, yet having an existence separate from such a mind; εἶδος, the notion in reference to the thing itself—as the ἓν ἐν πολλοῖς, or one in many, residing in it; ἰδέα, the same, regarded as self-subsisting, apart from mind, and also from the individual things through which it is manifested. The absolute existence of the last is the great question in philosophy. In respect to the second term, which is the one Aristotle is most fond of using, there is no real disagreement between him and Plato. If we reject the third hypothesis, there is still a wide difference between that philosophy which was common to Aristotle, Plato, and Bacon, and that which is now styled the system of Locke.

XXVIII.

Distinction between λόγος and ὄνομα.

PAGE 30, LINE 3. Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα, ὃ δὴ πάντες, ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν. The order of this rather complicated sentence would seem to be this: φῂς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν (καθ') ἥνπερ τὸ ὄνομα προσαγορεύομεν, ὃ δὴ πάντες (προσαγορεύουσι) ψυχὴν, λόγον ἔχειν—τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. "You say, then, that that very essence, of which we predicate that name which all men predicate, namely, ψυχή, or *soul*, hath for its λόγος self-motion, or αὐτοκίνησις." See the notes and explanations accompanying the text.

It may, perhaps, be objected, that Plato is resting these important positions on mere words, to which he assigns his own arbitrary definitions or notions. But what is meant by

the sneering expression, *mere words*, which is such a favourite with a certain class of modern declaimers? What are words—we speak not now of sounds or articulate enunciations, *ὀνόματα* or *ῥήματα*, but of the higher term *λόγοι*—what are words, in this sense, but outward expressions of the inward logical necessities of our own minds? And what can be higher proof for us than those affirmations, which the immutable laws of our own souls compel us to make, in respect to what is included or not included in a certain idea? Whatever belongs to the idea is necessary; so, on the other hand, whatever is necessary pertains to an idea, and the exclusion of any part involves, for our minds, a logical contradiction.

The naming of them, therefore, cannot be arbitrary, except so far as the mere outward sound is concerned. There are certain ideas which are not dependent on language, as some of the nominalists of the school of Locke would hold, but language on them. So far, human speech may be regarded as something supernatural, although its outward dress or vocal forms may have been the result of conventional or accidental usage, instead of any natural adaptedness of sound to sense. We may give to the *λόγος*, or notion, any *ὄνομα* we please. We may call it *ψυχή*, *πνεῦμα*, רוּחַ, נֶפֶשׁ, *animus*, *anima*, Geist, or *soul;* we may etymologically associate this *ὄνομα* with any such sensible phenomenon as we may fancy comes the nearest to the conception, such as *air*, *breath*, *fire*, *æther*, &c.; and in this way the *ὄνομα* may continually change; but the *λόγος* is not conventional. In all languages, even from the earliest periods, it has had a distinct vocal sign—as much so as that of *body*—and we expect, as a matter of course, to find it in every tongue we may investigate. The idea which calls for the name is implanted by God as one of the fixed parts of our being. The metaphysical notion of soul is *self-motion*, *self-energy*, *αὐτοκίνησις*. Of this notion we

cannot divest ourselves. Hence, after proving, even from physical premises, that there must be somewhere *self-motion*, the mind attaches this λόγος to its ὄνομα, and affirms that this self-motion is soul, ψυχή, Geist, &c.—being the same unchanging notion, whatever be the name—and that this name, although affixed to the flowing and varying sensible phenomenon from which it may have been etymologically derived, ultimately represents the immutable λόγος of which that sensible* phenomenon is the symbol.

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* To dwell on this distinction between ὄνομα (or ῥῆμα) and λόγος at greater length, we may say, that the former simply represents a sensible perception or action (αἰσθητόν), or what Plato sometimes calls εἴδωλον; the latter, a thought, an idea (ἰδέα), the *intelligibile*, *intellectum*, or νοητόν, being no part of the sensible image or action, but suggested or symbolized by it. All words, being a communication from mind to mind, *through matter*, must array the thought, during its passage, in the garments of the flesh, or, in other words, must originally represent something sensible. The ὄνομα, then, in reality, goes no farther than this sensible image or action, which it primarily *presents*. There are but two stages in the process. The λόγος, on the other hand, goes beyond this, and represents the *intelligibile*, or νοητόν, of which that image, action, or αἰσθητόν, is but the symbol. Here, then, are, in fact, three stages, and the εἴδωλον, or action, which the word, as ὄνομα, *presents*, does itself *re-present* something still behind it. The life of language is gone, when, with respect to abstract terms, the primary sensible images have faded away and become unknown, or, in other words, when this second stage in the process has been left out, and the word stands for the thought, in the same way that x and y represent quantities in algebra.

The same term may be regarded both as ὄνομα and λόγος. For example, the word *circle*, as a *name*, merely presents that round, sensible image, which, as far as the εἴδωλον is concerned, is the same to the vision of an animal as of a Newton; as λόγος, it suggests that cardinal idea, involving all the properties of the figure, which is present to the mind of the mathematician, and of which this εἴδωλον is itself the *word* or representative. This cannot be better expressed than in the language of Plato himself, if the Epistles can in any way be regarded as genuine: κύκλος, τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἴσον ἀπέχον πάντῃ, ΛΟΓΟΣ ἂν εἴη ἐκείνου ὅπερ στρογγύλον καὶ περιφερὲς

It is not a vain support to rely upon language. We may say, in the words which Plato puts into the mouth of Cratylus, *Οἶμαι μὲν μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν, τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν. Cratylus*, 438, C. As is shown in this last-cited dialogue, it follows, in its origin and progress, an inward necessity, and must, therefore, possess inward truth and necessary correctness.* It is a striking proof of its Divine origin (we mean in the bounding, defining, classifying, and combining of ideas, and not in the outward vocal sounds affixed to them), that the atheist or materialist cannot use it as it is, but must change the meaning of its terms to suit non-existent notions, to which it never has been and never can be adapted, without introducing confusion extending far beyond the particular cases of amendment. He must have an entire new dialect, and that, too, one which will ever destroy itself by the contradictions, discords, and jarring inconsistencies which must exist between its parts, in every attempt to express the doctrine of death in words *necessitated* to glow with a life which no efforts can wholly quench.

It has been well observed, that there is no language under heaven in which the atheist, the pantheist, or the man who denies the reality of moral distinctions, can talk five minutes without a logical contradiction, or, in other words, *a war of ideas.* Should they form a new one, and take the utmost pains to adapt it to their philosophy of darkness, it will be found to be built on a disarrangement of the necessary and logical elements of speech, and must soon perish by reason of its own innate contradictions. No such Babel, formed in opposition to the high decree of Heaven, can ever

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ὄνομα καὶ κύκλος. "The *word* circle, representing the idea of equality in every direction, from extremities to a central point, is the *λόγος* of that to which roundness, and periphery, and circle, are the names." *Plat., Epist.*, vii., 342, B. Compare, also, the *Theætetus*, 201, 202; *Sophista*, 221, A.

* See Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Cratylus.

stand. The ideas of incorporeal substance, of eternal verities, of moral distinctions, cannot be separated from language. The proof of soul and of God is stamped upon it as indelibly as it is written on the firmament of heaven itself.

Some of the views we have been endeavouring to set forth may be found admirably stated in Varro's account of the Platonic or Socratic philosophy, especially in respect to the importance it attached to innate notions and words as representatives of them, in Cicero, *Acad. Poster.*, viii.: Tertia deinde philosophiæ pars, quæ erat in ratione et in *disserendo* sic tractabatur; quanquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esset judicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem (*νοῦς*) volebant rerum esse judicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper esset, (*τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα*), simplex et unius modi (*ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως*) et tale quale esset. Hanc illi *ideam* appellabant, jam a Platone ita nominatam: nos recte speciem (*εἶδος*) possumus dicere. Sensus autem omnes hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo eas res quæ subjectæ sensibus viderentur, quæ essent ita mobiles (*ῥέοντα*) et concitatæ, ut nihil unquam unum esse constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et *fluerent* omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem (*δοξαστόν*) appellabant. *Scientiam* autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi *notionibus* atque rationibus (*λόγοι*), qua de causa *definitiones* rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. *Verborum explicatio* probabatur, qua de causa quæque essent ita *nominata*, quam etymologiam appellabant. Argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad *concludendum* id quod explanari volebant, in qua tradebatur omnis *dialecticæ* disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusæ.

XXIX.

Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. Impassable Chasm between Spirit and Matter. The Word πολλοστή. Principle of Euphonic Attraction.

PAGE 30, LINE 13. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι' ἕτερον . . . . πολλοστήν, κ. τ. λ. This is a very complicated and awkward sentence, with several anomalies, although the general meaning is quite clear. The following is a very free rendering: "Is not that motion, which takes place in one thing by reason of another, but which never effects that anything shall have motion in itself, by itself—is not such a principle of motion, we say, justly styled *second*, and even the most remote in degree of all such numbers, however great, as any one might choose to use in the computation? being, in truth, that kind of motion or change which is peculiar to a soulless body." The order of the latter part (in which, however, we are compelled to use πολλοστή for πολλοστήν, in consequence of the change of position) would be as follows: δευτέρα τὲ καὶ πολλοστὴ τοσούτων ἀριθμῶν ὁπόσων τις ἂν βούλοιτο αὐτὴν ἀριθμεῖν. The general sense is, that motion by impulse, or the motion of matter, although it may be next in order (δευτέρα), is yet almost infinitely removed from self-motion, or the motion of soul; that is, by a distance greater than any limit assignable in numbers.

It is another mode of saying that there is an impassable chasm between them, by which they are forever parted and assigned to two distinct worlds of being. Materializing naturalists have ever been striving to fill up or bridge this chasm, either by a direct connexion through some most subtle matter, or imponderable agent, or occult quality, or by some *tertium quid* which might identify in one common essence these two motions, or, rather—the great object of all

their strivings—to make the higher a result of the lower. These efforts, however, from the days of Plato to the present, have been all in vain. The distance between the natural and the supernatural, or between the spiritual and material, must ever remain impassable by any uniting essence. The most æthereal motions of matter, even of that class of substances which the ancients included under the general names πῦρ and αἰθήρ, and which the moderns have styled imponderable agents, make no approach to the self-motion or αὐτοκίνησις of Spirit. However subtile and attenuated they may be, yet, as matter, and falling under that one idea of matter to which we have before alluded (page 142), the laws of our minds (from which we cannot escape, and aside from which there is, to us, no such thing as truth) compel us to regard them as destitute of all motion and all property of motion in themselves—in fact, as much so as the most ponderous mass of lead or iron. Plato was deeply sensible of the importance of this fundamental position, and therefore he labours so earnestly, even at the hazard of being thought tedious and prolix, to maintain it. We have made the remark before, and yet its importance and its adaptedness to our present subject will justly warrant its repetition. This point being conceded to the atheist, namely, that self-motion may in some way be an occult property of matter in itself, or that the least and most æthereal atom in the universe could ever get in motion without the aid of that older and higher something to which he has here assigned the λόγος and the ὄνομα; or that there is the distance of a hair's breadth between the ultimate ideas of *change*, *cause*, and the action of spirit—this, we say, being conceded to the atheist, all is lost. If this can be conceived of, or is not at war with the idea, or λόγος, of matter, as given us by the laws of our own minds, then may it also be conceived of as having an *occult* adaptive property, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, which would alike establish materialism in

respect to man, and pantheism (which is, in fact, the same doctrine) in respect to the universe.

Πολλοστήν, as it appears in this sentence, is a very peculiar word. It signifies *one of many*, a fraction whose denominator is a very large number, and hence its name—an infinitesimal part. Compare the Philebus, 44, P.: τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; where it is put in direct contrast with σκληρότατα, as an infinitesimal fraction opposed to a superlative. There is also a peculiar grammatical anomaly in this word. According to the order of its construction in the sentence, it should be πολλοστή, since it regularly refers to δευτέρα, and must be taken in connexion with it. It is, however, made accusative, in consequence of its position after the infinitive, ἀριθμεῖν, and by the attraction of αὐτήν. This differs from the ordinary case of attraction which exists between the relative and antecedent. It may be styled euphonic, because it seems to affect words solely for the sake of euphony, or, rather, homœophony, and on the mere ground of contiguity in location, although very remotely related in all other respects; so much so, that, in this way, great violence is sometimes done to the true grammatical construction. There is no need of resorting to any various reading, or to any conjectural emendation. We have no doubt, from the location of the word, that Plato wrote πολλοστήν, however harsh the construction may appear to us.

The position of τοσούτων also seems very awkward, and yet (although we cannot well keep it in that place when we adopt the order for a literal translation) it is easy to see that, by standing where it does, it has a much stronger emphasis than though it had occurred in the beginning of the clause; as though we should thus paraphrase it in English: "*However great the number, carry it as high as you please, still by so much* (τοσούτων) *is it remote*," &c. This principle of local or euphonic attraction, although it sometimes interferes with grammatical smoothness, is undoubtedly in

accordance with the genius of the language; and no true scholar can endure the attempts which are sometimes made to divest it of this peculiarity by means of pretended emendations.

XXX.

Argument of Ancient Atheists, that Apparent Evidences of Design were only Evidences of Subsequent Accommodation. Things (they said) older than Knowledge of Things, and therefore older than Soul.

PAGE 31, LINE 8. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ πρότερα σωμάτων, κ. τ. λ. The full force of this cannot be appreciated unless we keep in mind the objection against which it was directed. The ancient atheists said that soul was the offspring or result of matter, and consequently younger. Hence what theists would call *evidences of design*, or of mind's preceding matter, they would regard as merely subsequent *accommodations* to an accidental existing state of things, which, had it been any other, would, in like manner, have drawn after it the only uses and accommodations to which it could be adapted; and which, in that case, would have carried with them like appearances of previous design, or, as Lucretius has most concisely expressed it,

> Nil adeo natum est in corpore, *ut uti*
> Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat *usum*.
>
> *Lucretius*, iv., 832.

Thus, for example, they would say, in accordance with their theory, that teeth were not made of a certain shape with the *previous design* that the animal should eat herbs, but that, because they happened to be of a certain form (and there was no reason in themselves why they should be of one form rather than another), therefore nature applied them

to the use, and the only use, adapted to their accidental structure. Again, if certain bodies had, in the course of ages, received from τύχη elongated projections from the main trunk, or an attenuated and flexible shape, or a rounded form, in all these cases, they would have said, and did say, that that *animation* residing in them (which was itself but a junior art, the production of an older φύσις), when it found itself thus *circumstanced*, made the best of its condition, by accommodating the one to a walking, the other to a crawling, and the other to a rolling locomotion. So, also, had they been acquainted with some of the arguments of our modern natural theology, they would have denied that the revolution of the earth on its axis was adjusted to twenty-four hours, with any design that such a period should correspond to designed circumstances in the alternating changes which occur in the economy of the animal and vegetable tribes. On the contrary, they would have contended that, in the eternal and fortuitous dance of τύχη, the earth having received such an accidental impulse as just produced the aforesaid period, nature, in time, accommodated to it the intervals for the exercise and relaxation of human bodies, together with all the periodical vicissitudes which seem to have relation to such a revolution; and that, had this accidental period been of any other length, the same adapting φύσις and τύχη would, long before this, have brought all the earthly economy into perfect harmony with it.

This argument, of which we have given an imperfect outline, they carried to great length, and it is easy to see that it is capable of a most extensive and subtle application. It is difficult, if not impossible, for any one who admits the doctrine of occult properties to any extent in matter, to give a *direct* answer to the objections drawn from it; and yet we believe that not a vestige of any skeptical doubt which it may produce can remain upon the mind, after reading Paley's most valuable work on natural theology. As a specu-

lative argument, this doctrine of *subsequent* accommodation, as opposed to a previous designed use, may have a formidable appearance, but it vanishes on a close observation of nature, because the soul, in such observation, instead of really relying on *a posteriori* facts, cannot divest itself of that *a priori* view which believes in design, and looks for design, and carries along the preconception of design as involved in those ideas of God and truth with which it enters upon the investigation.

Plato, as we have seen, overcomes the difficulty by beginning with motion instead of evidences of design; thence, from this more remote point of view, proving the higher antiquity of soul, then of the acts or exercises of soul, one of which is *βούλησις*, *purpose*, or *design*.

Another subtle objection from this same school was, that knowledge, being the *knowledge of things*, must, therefore, have been posterior to things; hence that mind was younger than matter. In this they, of course, rejected the doctrine of any other knowledge than that of things, or that the mind or intellect contained, in any sense, its own ideas or *intelligibles* (*νοητά*); making it to be all from without by way of impression from the external world.* If this be

* Should it be said that the objection may be stated in the same way in respect to ideal or eternal truth, and that there must have been *νοητά* before *νοῦς*, or truth before knowledge, the only reply is, that God is at the same time, and from eternity, both *νοῦς* and *νοητόν*, *intelligens* and *intelligibile*, or *intellectum*. It is the absolute necessity of some such view which suggested to the most profound minds of antiquity the idea of a plurality in the Divine nature, a distinction of two hypostases, at least, with a third, *ψυχή*, to which they were related, and in which they were united. Instead of being contrary to reason, it was the highest result to which she arrived (if the truth was not rather obtained from some primitive revelation), as her only refuge against the cheerless and incomprehensible conception of an eternal, solitary monadity, or the equally difficult conception of a necessary, eternal, outward universe, towards which the Divine love and the Divine intelligence might be directed.

atheism, as it most assuredly is, when held in relation to the Divine Mind, what shall we think of the corresponding doctrine when applied to the human soul? If we start from the conclusions to which such inquiries lead us, it should be borne in mind, that the only possible defence against them must be found in that ideal philosophy which supposes a knowledge belonging to *mind, as mind*, whether it be Divine or human, entirely independent of *things*, or of any outward world. The above atheistic objection is also expressed by Lucretius, with far more of poetry than piety:

> Exemplum porro gignundis rebus, et ipsa
> Notities hominum Divis unde insita primum,
> Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent?
> Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
> Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
> *Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?*
>
> *Lucretius*, lib. v., 182.

XXXI.

Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. Of Ἀνάγκη, *or Necessity.*

Page 32, Line 2. *Δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι*—"Nothing less than two, at least, the one that does us good, and the one that is able to do the contrary." We have here presented, in the most unequivocal terms, that grand defect in Plato's theology, which occasionally mars, by its presence, almost every part of his otherwise noble system. It is most clear, from this and other passages in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated principles or souls, one good (or the benefactor, as he styles him), the other evil. Neither Plato, however, nor Zoroaster, can be charged with the absurdity of believing in two Supremes. They avoided this by running into the incon-

sistency of supposing that the evil principle, although uncreated, was under the dominion of the good, constantly controlled, and ultimately to be completely conquered by it. This doctrine, likewise, made harsh discord with almost every other part of his philosophy, especially his views of the origin of the universe, as set forth in the Timæus, where no mention is made of a distinct evil *soul*; and yet, when we examine the matter closely, it is difficult to see how he could have come to any other conclusion. Plato had no other guide than reason, aided, perhaps, by a dim and corrupted tradition of primitive truth; and reason can account in no other way for the existence of evil, without charging it upon God as its immediate author. It is evident, from the manner in which he ever speaks on this subject, that he had a deep conviction of the *essential* goodness of the Deity, and that he felt himself sorely pressed by the difficulty of reconciling with this goodness the evil which he saw everywhere existing in the world. On this point, compare what he says in the second book of the *Republic*, 379, B., C.: *οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε, καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω*—"Wherefore is not God really good, and must we not thus ever affirm?" "*Ο δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ* ΑΙΤΙΟΝ. *οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ θεὸς* ΠΑΝΤΩΝ *ἂν εἴη* ΑΙΤΙΟΣ, *ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν*—"But he doeth nothing evil (evidently taking *κακὸν* here in the sense of physical evil), nor could he be the cause of anything evil. The Good cannot, then, be the author of all things, but only of those that are good, while he is never the author of the bad. God cannot, therefore, be the author of all things, as the many say, but only of few things is he the cause to men, &c., *for our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things.*" He does

not, in this place of the Republic, directly speak of the evil principle, but leaves it to be plainly inferred: *Τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλα ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν*—"Of the evils, then, must we seek some other cause, and not the Deity." After this, he proceeds to censure Homer for his myth of the two casks which lie in the court of Jove, one filled with good and the other with evil, from which he dispenses to mortals severally as he will.* When we read the impressive application of this great truth which Achilles makes to the case of Priam, we cannot help recognising the poet as far more orthodox than the philosopher, and as coming much nearer to the true teaching of revelation. He was so, however, because, instead of yielding his mind to the perplexing and insurmountable difficulties which attend every merely speculative view of the matter, he simply gives utterance to one of those universal and unvarying sentiments of the human soul, which could have come from no other source than a tradition of the primeval fall and the woes consequent upon it.

Revelation removes this difficulty respecting the origin of evil, not by solving the mystery, and bringing it down to the level of our understandings, but by imposing silence upon reason, in her attempt to investigate a subject altogether beyond her powers. The Bible does not shrink from the solemn declaration, *I form the light and I create the darkness; I make peace and I create evil; I the Lord do ALL these things*;† and yet, at the same time, it sternly

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Δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει,
δώρων, οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ, ἑάων.
ᾧ μέν κ' ἀμμίξας δοίη Ζεύς, κ. τ. λ.—Iliad, xxiv., 527.

† *Isaiah*, xlv., 7. There can be no doubt, from the mention here of the *light* and the *darkness*, and from the connexion of this remarkable declaration with the prophecy respecting Cyrus, that there must have been intended a special reference to the Zoroastrian or Persian doctrine.

forbids the impious thought, that the Divine Essence can hold any communication with sin. *Thou art of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. Evil shall not dwell with thee.* The caviller may say that this is cutting, instead of untying the Gordian knot; and that, according to this, revelation teaches the apparent contradiction, that God creates evil, and yet is not the author of sin, without which there could be no evil. It is even so. There *is* a contradiction to our understandings, but it is a contradiction to which we must submit, or receive all the contradictions, mysteries, absurd ities, and total darkness of atheism. It has been well observed, that this great difficulty lies, in some form, at the very threshold of every system which has the least title to be styled religious, in order to teach us that some things must be received as matters of faith. This, instead of being at war with reason, is, in fact, its highest dictate. It presents an incipient faith as the only condition on which everything else is to be understood, and declares that we are shut up to it by something higher and stronger than reason itself, even *the necessities of our moral being.*

Let those who, in such a case as this, will not take the Bible as their only guide, devise, if they can, a better system than the one which Plato and Zoroaster felt themselves compelled to adopt, although they must have been well aware of the difficulties, and war of ideas, or first principles, in which it involved them. They could not believe in two Supremes on account of the logical contradiction, and yet, if they held that the evil soul was inferior to, and capable of being controlled by, the Good (as they unquestionably did), the same old objection comes back with all its force. The position to which our philosopher manifests so strong a repugnance is only so changed as to make God the *permissive*, instead of the *positive* author of evil. Small consolation in this; especially when taken in connexion with that melancholy declaration just quoted by us from the

second book of the Republic, that "our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things."

It should be remarked, however, that Plato's evil principle differed, in some most important respects, from the evil spirit made known to us in the Bible. The former, although recognised by him as a *ψυχή*, or soul, was not so much a moral or spiritual, as a physical power. It was the dark, foolish, disorderly, intractable, chaotic, evil spirit of matter (if we may use so paradoxical a term), on which the Good God was ever exerting an influence, in bringing it from chaos into harmony, although that influence was ever resisted, and sometimes exercised with great difficulty. It is to this he alludes in the Timæus, although in this latter work we find no trace of that animation and personality which is assigned to the evil principle in the tenth of The Laws. In the Timæus, too, although possessed of motion and a sort of blind activity, it is a hinderance, or an obstacle, rather than an enemy: *Βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον* πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, κατὰ δύναμιν εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. Θέμις γὰρ οὔτ' ἦν οὔτ' ἔστι* ΤΩΙ 'ΑΡΙΣΤΩΙ *δρᾷν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ* ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΝ—"For God, wishing that all things should be good, and that there should be

* On this and some few similar expressions in the Timæus has been grounded the argument for the common position, that Plato held to the eternity of matter, and that it possessed a principle of its own, independent of the creating and constantly energizing power of the Deity. Should it be admitted that our philosopher is justly chargeable with inconsistency, still we contend that the positions assumed in the Laws in respect to the inertness of matter, and the superior antiquity of soul, should have the greater weight, inasmuch as the extracts from the Timæus are merely incidental declarations, whereas the latter form the very heart and substance of one of his most studied and elaborately-prepared arguments. See farther, on this subject, Note L., *On the Ancient Doctrine, De Nihilo Nihil fit.*

nothing bad, thus taking in hand the visible (or material), never at rest, but ever moving about in a strange and disorderly manner, as far as he could reduced it from disorder to order. For it is not permitted (*οὐ θέμις*, it is morally impossible) for the *Best Being* to do anything else than the *best*." *Timæus*, 30, A. So, also, in that trinity about which so much has been said, and which but faintly appears in any parts of his authentic dialogues, the *ψυχή*, or third hypostasis, seems to be rather a benign physical influence, than to make any approach to that renovating moral power which is revealed in the Scriptures. If we should dare to institute any comparison, we would say that it has more resemblance to the רוּחַ of Genesis, i., 2, and Psalms, civ., 30, than to the *πνεῦμα* of Paul and John.

The truth is, that, on this great and difficult subject of the existence and origin of evil, the mind of Plato seems to have wavered, and to have had different opinions at different times. Here he very briefly, yet very distinctly, avows his belief in a *personal evil soul.* In the Republic he leaves it as a matter of inference, contenting himself with the declaration, that God is the author of good, and of good only, while, at the same time, he asserts that the evil predominates, at least in the present state. In the Timæus, it is a lower order of being, the dark and chaotic principle of matter, possessing something of a positive character, yet still without anything psychical or animate in its nature. In the Politicus, or Statesman, there is a view, in some of its features, allied to this, yet capable of being resolved into what modern theologians would call a mere permission of evil, as a negative principle, deriving its power from occasional withdrawals of the Divine presence and superintendence. This we gather from that most singular myth, in which he represents the universe as subject to alternate revolutions of immense length, during one of which good and perfection predominate, while, in the other, although the good, for a

long time, exerts an influence, through habit, even after the withdrawal of the Divine Presence, yet evil and disorder, being introduced by degrees, increase more and more, until, finally, Old Chaos comes again, and total destruction would ensue, did not God once more resume the long-abandoned helm. It is a portion of Plato's works on which but little attention has been bestowed, and yet, in consequence of its always having seemed to us to possess a deep theological interest, we give the passage to our readers at some length, and in a very free version: "God himself, at one time, guides this universe (*ξυμποδηγεῖ*), and turns it round. Again, he abandons it to itself, when the periods of its destined times have received their full complement; when, being animate, and having had wisdom implanted in it from him who harmonized it at the beginning, it commences of its own accord to move in a contrary direction; and this tendency to a retrograde motion arises from an innate necessity of its nature. For to be ever in the same relations (*κατὰ ταὐτὰ*), and uniform, and the same, pertains alone to those things which are most divine; but the nature of matter has no share in this dignity. What we name, therefore, the heavens or the universe (*οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον*), hath partaken of many blessed things or qualities from him who generated it; still, it has communion with matter, and, on this account, it is impossible that it should be altogether exempt from change, although, as far as it is capable, it moves on in one regular course, in the same and according to the same relations. It is in this way that it gets this property of unrolling, or rolling back, consisting, at first, in the slightest conceivable change or parallax of its previous motion. For anything always to turn *itself* is impossible, except for Him who is the supreme controller of all moving things; but for this Being to act in a changeable manner, or to turn things, now in this direction, and now in the contrary, is impossible (*οὐ θέμις, is morally impossible*). For

all these reasons must we say, that the world neither turns itself forever, nor that it is forever turned by God in contrary circuits. *Neither must we suppose that two Gods* with opposing purposes conduct its revolutions* (*μήτ' αὐτὸν στρέφειν ἑαυτὸν ἀεί, μήτ' αὖ ὅλον ὑπὸ θεοῦ στρέφεσθαι ἀεὶ διττὰς καὶ ἐναντίας περιαγωγάς, μήτ' αὖ δύο τινὲ θεὼ φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν*), but, as has been said (and which, in fact, is the only supposition left), that, at one time, it is guided by a Divine cause; during which period it receives again the acquired power of life, and an immortality not innate, but imparted to it from the Demiurgus; and then, again, that it goes by itself, being abandoned so long, that even many ten thousand years may be occupied in the revolution." *Politicus*, 269, P.

The myth then proceeds to describe the alternate periods. The first, or that which is under the direct care of the Deity, is represented as the golden age, during which time the earth produces all things spontaneously, without cultivation, and, in general, the order of all things is from death to life.† This was the reign of Saturn. Good was

* This is in direct opposition to the doctrine laid down in The Laws, where he maintains that there are at least two souls, one good and the other bad, occupied in the movements of the universe. Here, however, he seems to be very much averse to such an opinion, as inconsistent and unnatural. Some would say that this furnishes conclusive evidence that the one or the other, or both of these dialogues, are spurious. If such an argument could be held legitimate, the conclusion would certainly be against the Politicus, since the doctrine of The Laws was followed by all the subsequent Platonists, and regarded as an undoubted position of their master; but, in truth, instead of invalidating either, it only shows how a great mind wavered on the deepest question in philosophy and theology.

† It might, however, seem, to some, to be rather a species of inverted death, as during this period the order of all things is so changed, that the old commence a process of return to the vigour of middle age, manhood returns to youth, youth to boyhood, boyhood to infancy, infancy to entire disappearance from the stage of life. In

predominant, although there is no little confusion in the account which this splendid myth, in other respects so clear, gives of this period. It at last, however, comes to an end, and when the complement of the times had been filled up, and the change must take place, then, it is said, *the Divine Pilot, letting go the helm, retires to his secret place of observation, and destiny and innate tendency are left to turn back the revolutions of the world*: *τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη· τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν Εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία*, 272, E. At the same time, the other *Δαίμονες*, to whom, as presiding divinities, or angels,* the various parts of the universe had been allotted in subordination to the Supreme Ruler, hear the signal, and retire from their respective provinces. Then commences the predominance of evil. Nature, through all her works, gives signs of wo. First, a strange tremour or commotion (*σεισμὸς πολὺς*) is felt in every part of the abandoned world. After a while, however, to employ Plato's imagery, the vessel ceases from the tumultuous surging which at first ensues, and enjoying a calm, gets at length into the new course in which it is destined to proceed. The world goes on for a season with some degree of regularity, in consequence of influences being yet exerted by those laws and principles to which it had been accustomed in that previous state when it was directly under the Divine

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continuation of the same wild and strange fancy, the dead are said to come out of their graves, and thus to be born again from the earth: *ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὖ, κειμένων δὲ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ ξυνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους, ἕπεσθαι τῇ τροπῇ—συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως.* We can hardly help thinking that in this singular myth may be traced the rudiments of an ancient doctrine of a resurrection. The general idea intended by Plato is clear enough, and yet so much confusion rests upon the details, that it sometimes is difficult to decide to which period they in fact belong.

* See Note XXXIV., on *the Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of*

care.* By slow degrees the former motion, with the order and harmony by which it was accompanied, is diminished, until, having passed the minimum point, it makes a transition to the contrary direction with a constantly accelerated momentum.

It is then that the greatest deteriorations and corruptions take place; first, of the vegetable, next, of the animal world, and, finally, of the human race, until here and there a small and wretched remnant alone survive. The old harmony, the remembrance of which had not before been entirely quenched, is now utterly extinct. The former laws of nature are all reversed, until, finally, when on the very verge of utter ruin—*τότ' ἤδη ὁ θεὸς, καθορῶν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύῃ,† πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ νοσήσαντα καὶ λυθέντα στρέψας, κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν, ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρω ἀπεργάζεται*—" God, beholding it in great extremity, and being concerned, lest, being overwhelmed in disorder and utterly dissolved, it should plunge again into the limitless, formless region of dissimilitude and chaos, once more seats himself at the helm (*from which he had before returned to his secret place of observation, εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπήν*), and having arrested its weak and dissolved parts in their course to ruin, arranges it again in order, rectifies it, and thus renders it immortal," 273, D.

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the Heavenly Bodies; and Note LXVII., on *the Platonic Doctrine of the Demons or Genii.*

* Or, in the expressive language of the original, *τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διδαχὴν ἀπομνημονεύων εἰς δύναμιν*—" *Still, as well as it could, remembering the teaching of its father.*" The allusion seems to be to the fable of Phaëton striving in vain to remember and follow the directions given him by his father, when he so rashly undertook to drive the chariot of the Sun.

† *Lest it should plunge again into the limitless place of dissimilitude.* That is, back again to old chaos. The language strongly calls to mind the תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ of Genesis, i., 2.

We find occasionally in Plato, especially in the Timæus, mention made of *ἀνάγκη*, or *necessity*, as some strong and apparently opposing power, on which the Divine energy was constantly exercised, not so much in directly overcoming, as in controlling and directing it to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes. Thus, in the Timæus, 48, A., he speaks of the generation of the world having proceeded from the combined operation of *νοῦς* and *ἀνάγκη*, mind and necessity. To the former, however, he ascribes a species of authority, yet of a persuasive rather than of a violent nature: *Νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος, τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, οὕτω ξυνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν*—"But, since Mind rules Necessity, by persuading her to bring to the best results the most of things as they are generated; thus, in this way, through necessity overcome by rational persuasion, this universe received its construction."

By *ἀνάγκη*, here, Plato does not mean his *evil soul*, neither does he generally intend any physical necessity arising from motion as a property of matter (although he and the Greek poets* do sometimes apply the term to what we style the laws of nature, and it has something of this aspect in the present passage from the Timæus), but rather a metaphysical or logical necessity, a necessity existing in the idea of a thing, in its *constituting cause*, or that which makes it what it is—in its *λόγος*, or notion—in short, a necessity of the mind, by which it is compelled to include certain *principia* in the very definition of any existing or conceivable thing; and hence he employs in respect to it such terms as *πείθειν*, and *πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος*, words which would have little or no meaning as applied to a purely physical necessity.

* As, for example, Euripides, Troades, 893:

Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν.

For example, in the idea of matter, or rather *body*, impenetrability necessarily enters. Hence, also, the impossibility that two bodies should ever occupy the same space; which we have shown (page 143) to be more of a logical than a physical necessity. God cannot make matter without this. It is no more irreverent thus to speak, than to say that God cannot make matter or body, which is not body, or in any case go contrary to the idea of anything, and yet have it remain the same. Motion is not a necessary property of matter; and when we say this, we mean that there is no law of our minds, as in the above cases, which compels us to predicate it of matter. Other species of logical necessity (that is, *a necessity in the ideas of things*) are the mathematical *ἀνάγκαι*. Hence, the laws of motion, being partly mathematical and partly physical, are necessary, so far as they partake of the former character. It is not necessary that bodies should attract each other in the inverse ratio of the *squares* of their distances: had it been the ordinance of God, it would have been in the ratio of their *cubes*. When, however, the Deity establishes such a motion *as a fact*, it must conform to all the necessities of numbers involved in, and which grow out of, the first simple formula or statement of the law. So, also, in morals, the idea of good may, perhaps, necessarily include the contingency of evil; sin may be necessarily associated, in idea, with misery. In all such cases, Plato would speak of the Deity not as violently overcoming necessity, but as ruling, directing, controlling it, to bring about the purposes of his moral government, or, in other words, using towards it "a kind of rational persuasion."

XXXII.

Platonic Analogy between the Motion of Νοῦς *and* Ψυχή *and that of a Sphere, or of the Heavens.*

PAGE 34, LINE 5. *Εἰ μὲν ἡ ξύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ ξυγγενῶς ἔρχεται, κ. τ. λ.*—"If the whole way and course of the heavens hath a nature similar to the course, and period, and reasonings of mind, and proceeds in a kindred manner, we must certainly affirm that the best soul (*τὴν εὐεργέτιδα*) takes care of the universe." We may compare with this the expressions, *περίοδος νοῦ*—*περίοδος ψυχῆς*, which occur so frequently in the Timæus: *Τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον σῶμα. Timæus*, 43, A. So, also, 39, where there is the same allusion in the expression, *ἡ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος.*

After the description of the visible animal (*ζῶον ὁρατόν*), or material universe in which the new-created soul of the world was to reside, he thus says: *κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος μάλιστα οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν. διὸ δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιαγαγὼν αὐτό, ἐποίησε κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον*—"For he gave to it a peculiar motion of its own, namely, that one of the seven which has the nearest relation (or analogy) to mind and wisdom. Wherefore, guiding it so as to move always in the same relations, in the same place, and within itself, he made it revolve in a circle." *Timæus*, 33, P. We have the same idea a little farther on in this tenth book of The Laws, page 35, line 15: *Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτά, καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν, τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φο-*

ραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε, κ. τ. λ.—"If we say this, namely, that mind and motion in one, &c., being both of them capable of being likened to the revolutions of a sphere, do both of them ever move κατὰ ταὐτά, preserving the same relations, in a uniform manner, in the same, around the same, and according to one analogy and one order, we should not institute an inferior or imperfect comparison."

This was one of the favourite speculations of Plato, and is kept prominently in view in the Timæus; so much so, that, without attending to it, it is impossible to understand many passages in that most profound, yet strange and difficult dialogue. He there describes the soul of the world as being constituted of two essences—τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς—the one conversant with eternal, unchangeable, and necessary truth, νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν; the other, with facts or phenomena, or, as he here styles them in The Laws, the second-working motions of matter, physical laws, or second causes. Corresponding to these, he frequently speaks of two periods, which, in very strange phraseology, he describes as ἡ τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου. The first he likens to spherical or circular motion (φερομένην ἐν ἑνί), and finds its symbolical expression in the steady, unvarying, and eternal revolution of the sphere of the fixed stars or highest heavens (whether regarded as phenomenal or not makes, in this respect, no difference). The other, which he elsewhere styles a bastard reason (νόθος λογισμός), is conceived as represented by the irregular, variant, and sometimes retrograde motions of the lower bodies, and especially of the terrestrial phenomena. Matter and the external world being in a continual flux, he regarded sensation, and that exercise of reason which takes sensation and phenomenal facts for its necessary *hypotheses*, as partaking of all the instability of its ever-flowing foundation. See the *Timæus*, *from* 28, A., *to* 43, B.

There are many things which would suggest this comparison to such a mind as Plato's, combining so much of the imaginative and poetical with the philosophical; and there are also some things to justify it to the soundest reason. Above all other figures, the sphere, in itself, may be regarded as the symbol of perfection, unity, immutability, and eternity. Complete both in sensible and intellectual beauty, its *form* delights the eye, while its *idea* perfectly satisfies the mind. In the contemplation of its motion we find the analogy still more striking. If regarded as representing the psychical self-energy of soul, or of God, it presents a perfect resemblance in the fact, that it is motion or energy, without any change of the place which it occupies as a whole, or, in other words, combining simultaneously and harmoniously the opposite phenomena of motion and rest—rest relative throughout, or taken as a whole, and rest absolute in the centre, while yet it is the source from which motion is diffused outward through every part; as Aristotle describes it, *διὸ κινεῖται καὶ ἠρεμεῖ πως ἡ σφαῖρα. Physic. Auscult.*, viii., 9.

By a higher and more perfect analogy, it may be regarded as representing the intellectual energy of *νοῦς*, or reason, when engaged in the contemplation of immutable truth. Both may be perfectly described by those favourite terms of Plato which occur so often in the Phædon, and that, too, without being regarded as tropical in the one case more than in the other. The everlasting, unchanging motion of the "old rolling heavens," like the perfection, uniformity, and immutability of the eternal ideas, may also be said to be, *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά—ὡσαύτως—ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ—περὶ τὰ αὐτά—πρὸς τὰ αὐτά—ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν τάξιν ἔχουσα.* The argument here is, that that motion of the heavens, which in so many points is analogous to the intellectual energy of the best soul, must have been its direct and first production, and the object of its continual care. When stripped of its

sublime imagery (if we may so regard it), the sentiment is equivalent to that of the Timæus, already quoted: Ὁ μὲν γὰρ (κόσμος οὐρανὸς) κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ (θεὸς) ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. Θέμις δὲ οὔτ' ἦν οὔτ' ἔστι τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. So, also, in the same dialogue, he represents the soul of the world, after its creation by the "Everlasting Father," as commencing its spiritual and *rational* life (ἔμφρονος βίου) with the revolution of the heavens: Ἡ δὲ ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντη διαπλακεῖσα, κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα, αὐτή τε ἐν αὐτῇ στρεφομένη, θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου πρὸς τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον. After this follows that most sublime passage which sets forth the delight of the Eternal Generating Parent at beholding this glorious work of his hands, the ζῶον ὁρατόν, or visible universe, with its informing soul, living and moving on in the most perfect harmony, and the celestial revolutions taking place with all the order and exactness of a creation fresh from the hands of its Maker; at sight of which he is said to have admired, even with astonishment, this image of the eternal powers, and to have rejoiced in it as exceedingly fair and good: Ὡς δὲ κινηθέν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα Ὁ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ ΠΑΤΗΡ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. On reading this passage, one can hardly help feeling that some of the Christian fathers were right in supposing that Plato, in his travels, had had access to the books of Moses; so strongly does it call to mind the declaration, Genesis, i., 31: *And God looked upon all which he had made, and behold, it was good, very good.* Perhaps in some such view as this may we take that remarkable expression of Aristotle, κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, on which we have remarked, page 194. If there were any proof that he held to Plato's soul of the world, we might, with Cudworth, suppose him to

have meant that The Eternal Νοῦς turned round the heavens, not by a direct action upon them, but by virtue of some sympathizing attraction of a pervading plastic soul by which their motions were regulated.

On this subject we may compare what is said by Proclus in his commentary on the Timæus: *ὁ χρόνος διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα μίμησιν κυκλεῖσθαι λέγεται, ὡς καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Νοῦν μίμησιν σφαιρῶσθαι*—"Time, by reason of its imitation of eternity, is said to move in a circle, as the heaven, on account of its imitation of mind, is spherical, or moves in a sphere."* In this he is commenting on the same analogy presented by Plato, *Timæus*, 37, P., where he tells us that as the visible rolling heavens correspond to that soul of the world of which it is the outward *εἰκών*, or image, so is time an image of eternity. As the revolving mirror *seems* to set in motion the heavens, the earth, the trees, and all the objects of the really immoveable landscape, so time is a revolving image or reflection of the fixed eternal state, and so also the visible moving heavens are the sensible and temporal representative of the Eternal Mind: *Εἰκόνα δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινητήν τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καί διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανόν, ποιεῖ, μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί, κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν*—"He thought to make a *moving* image of the *fixed* eternity; and as he arranged the heavens, eternity itself remaining forever in unity (that is, without succession), he made an image of eternity to *proceed by number*, the same which we call time." In the same way, while the Eternal Mind or Reason remains in everlasting unity (*ἐν ἑνὶ*), the visible rolling universe, proceeding by number, may be regarded as its temporal and moving im-

* This comparison of mind to a sphere seems to have been an ancient Egyptian notion; as Iamblichus tells us that they pictured God sitting upon the lote-tree, because its leaves and fruit are *round like the motion of intellect.*

age: *εἰκὼν χρονικὴ καὶ κινητὴ τοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ μένοντος* Νοῦ. From some such idea as this came probably the Latin scholastic term *uni-versum*, involving the ideas of totality and unity, of motion in every part, and yet rest in the centre and as a whole. So, in another place, speaking of the motion of the stars, Plato says, *ὅσα δι' οὐρανοῦ πορευόμενα, ἵνα τόδ' ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελεωτάτῳ καὶ* ΝΟΗΤΩΙ *ζώῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως.* *Timæus*, 39, E.

XXXIII.

The Motions of the Evil Soul Irregular and Disorderly. The nearer an Approach to the Pure Reason, the more of Fixedness and Uniformity. Atheistic Objection from the Unvarying Regularity of the Heavens; from whence was inferred the Absence of Will and Reason.

Page 36, Line 4. *Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως, μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ, . . . μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις, ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη ξυγγενής.* As uniform, regular, immutable, spherical motion, is akin to mind, truth, and wisdom, so the opposite of all these (that of which, a short distance back, it is said, *μανικῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται*) is allied to that error, folly, and disorder, which, in Plato's view, were the chief characteristics of the dark and evil soul. How admirably does he, in the Phædon, teach this same doctrine in respect to the human spirit, although in somewhat different language, and with different imagery. How strikingly does he describe it as reeling and staggering like a drunken man (*πλανωμένη καὶ ταραττομένη καὶ ἰλιγγιῶσα ὥσπερ μεθύουσα*) while occupied solely with the animal life of the visible world; until it withdraws from the turbulence of sense, and becomes assimilated (*τῷ θείῳ, καὶ ἀθανάτῳ, καὶ νοητῷ, καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ*) to the

Divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the moniform, the indissoluble, the *ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ*; or, in other words, that state of *everlasting energy, yet everlasting rest*, of ever-active contemplation, yet eternal quietism, which is reserved for the just in the spiritual world. In this, Plato most certainly agrees with the Scriptures. He differs, however, from no small portion of the modern Christian Church, with whom it is a favourite theory, that the future condition of the saved soul will present a scene of activity in almost every respect similar to the present, and who would transfer to the heavenly state all the bustle, all the action, and even all the physical science of this lower world. One of our most popular religious writers indulges, at great length, in a consideration of the superior advantages which the celestial world will present for the study of the sciences of astronomy and trigonometry; as though the healed spirit could find its everlasting rest in those pursuits that even here had failed to yield it any solid and permanent satisfaction. This modern doctrine would carry all the mutations of sense into that *fixed* and eternal state of which time is but the *moving* image. We cannot, however, find it in the Scriptures any more than in Plato. The ideas which revelation most prominently presents of the heavenly world, and which, we also think, must be most precious to the truly pious soul, are those of repose from the agitations of the present *scene* of probation; of assurance, of light, of absolute certainty or freedom from all doubt, of *eternal rest;* and yet all this in perfect consistency with the most intense moral emotion and the most energetic contemplation of fixed and everlasting truth. We may believe in a progress of the soul, but in a very different sense from that in which the doctrine is commonly taught, and which holds out an ever-restless, never-satisfied accumulation of outward knowledge, as the spirit's employment throughout eternity; a progress which seems to necessitate

eternal doubt and eternal imperfection, and in which, after all, no real advance is ever made, because the position of the soul in regard to the highest truths remains as unchanged as in the present *flowing* world. We find but little, if any, trace of this doctrine of progress in the Scriptures. Revelation seems rather to intimate that, instead of this eternal moving on in the acquisitions of science, the perfection of the soul will rather consist in the beatific vision of those fixed, established truths, which are fundamental in the scheme of our redemption, and in the swelling moral emotions of the heavenly *ἀγάπη*—that *charity* to which all mere *γνῶσις* holds only the relation of a means which is to vanish away, and to be regarded as naught when its great end shall be accomplished. Nothing seems more clearly taught in the Bible than that one of the essential elements of the æonian state is fixedness and certainty. "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face."

In the Divine Soul these two apparently opposite ideas of repose and energy meet in their highest perfection; and whatever may be thought of the philosophical truth of Plato's comparison, it must certainly be admitted that there is a sublime, and even an almost divine beauty in thus taking as the symbol of the Eternal Mind the steady revolution of the "old rolling heavens," ever presenting to us the images of power, of calm yet resistless motion, of an ever-wakeful, ever-energizing Providence, and of everlasting rest.

Plato, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to his dialogue on Laws, adverts to a very common prejudice, which would draw an atheistic objection from the unvarying regularity of the celestial courses. "It should be proof to men," he says, "that the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are under the direction of reason, because they ever do the same, even those things which had been planned and counselled ages beyond our conception. Yet the many think differently, and infer, from the fixedness and uniformity of their mo-

tions, that they have not soul; and so they come to think that the human is rational and animated, because they observe in it variant and irregular motions (which seem to be the *result of will*), but that the divine is destitute of reason, because it ever abides in the same fixed courses: *ἄφρον ὡς μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς*. And yet on this very account should we believe that there is a rational nature in the stars, because it ever doeth the same, and in the same manner, and preserving the same relations: *τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πράττει ἀεί*." *Epinomis*, 982, D., E. In this passage, of which we have given a very free version, he seems to be aiming to show that the stars themselves are animated, yet still the argument is independent of that particular hypothesis. It is equally valid, whether they are regarded as under the control of the Supreme or subordinate intelligences; and the remarks apply with all their force to the position we have in hand, namely, that soul and reason must be steady, uniform, and immutable, in proportion as they are above the turbulence and irregularities of the sensible world; and that this, instead of being hostile to the doctrine of a minute and special providence, is absolutely essential to its perfection. This sublime and beautiful view of the everlasting constancy of the heavenly motions, as representative of the calmness, immutability, and absolute certainty in the operations of *that Divine Will which is ever one with the Divine Reason*, is thus admirably presented by Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero's second book De Natura Deorum, sec. 22: Nulla igitur in cælo nec fortuna nec temeritas nec erratio nec varietas inest; contraque omnis ORDO, VERITAS, RATIO, CONSTANTIA. Quæque his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum terras, infra lunam, quæ omnium ultima est, in terrisque versantur.

In the Timæus, Plato gives us a most vivid picture of the converse of this truth, namely, the turbulence and rest-

lessness of the soul under the overpowering influence of the world of sense and matter. We refer to that remarkable passage in which he represents the inferior divinities, or sons of God, first introducing into the ever-flowing material universe those newly-formed human spirits which had just been generated from the *anima mundi;* if, rather, some parts of the description do not better apply to the infant soul of the world itself: *Καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ (ὁ ἀΐδιος πατὴρ) ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἤθει. μένοντος δὲ, οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν νοήσαντες, καὶ λαβόντες ἀθάνατον ἀρχὴν θνητοῦ ζώου, . . . τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον*—"And he (the Eternal Father) having arranged all these things, abode in his accustomed place (or mode of being). But the sons, having observed the method of the Father, and having taken the immortal principle of the mortal animal, bound the periods of the immortal spirit into the *inflowing* and *outflowing* body." *Timæus*, 42, P. This world of sense he compares to an ever-moving river, or, rather, to a wild and stormy torrent (*κατακλύζον καὶ ἀποῤῥέον κῦμα*), ever ebbing and rising, agitated by tempestuous winds (*ζάλη πνευμάτων ὑπ' ἀέρος φερομένων*), constantly surging, and bearing about with all violence the young spirit doomed to commence upon its ever-restless billows the morning of an eternal existence.

In this condition, while the infant soul is the almost passive subject of impressions, which, through this sea of matter, invade it from without, it is tossed about—*τοτὲ μὲν ἐναντίας φοράς, τοτὲ πλαγίας, τοτὲ ὑπτίας, ἀλόγως, ἀτάκτως*—"sometimes in an adverse direction, sometimes obliquely, now erect, now supine, and, again, like one standing upon his head (*οἷον ὅταν τις ὕπτιος ἐρείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τοὺς δὲ πόδας προσβαλὼν ἄνω*), and seeing all the phenomena of nature strangely inverted, without reason and without order; until (as is the case with

some), through the exercise of the rational principle constantly gaining the victory, and aided by right instruction—*ἐὰν μὲν ἐπιλαμβάνηταί τις ὀρθῇ τροφῇ παιδεύσεως*—it acquires calmness, abstraction, and stability; and having thus escaped from this most fearful disorder, comes at length under the abiding influence of immutable truth as exhibited in the eternal ideas of which matter presents only the flowing and varying diagrams. The whole passage is too long for insertion continuously, and some parts are quite difficult. We would, however, earnestly recommend its perusal to the student, not only for its most sublime imagery, but also for the profound philosophy of human nature which is contained beneath it. See the *Timæus, from* page 42, P., *to* page 44, D.

XXXIV.

Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of the Heavenly Bodies. Ancient Belief that each Nation had its own peculiar Guardian Dæmon or Genius.

Page 38, Line 6. *Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα.* The next question, after deciding the nature of the governing soul, is, whether it is one supreme, or many subordinate (*μίαν ἢ πλείους*), engaged in these offices. Here is another point in Plato's theology which has given offence to some of his warmest admirers. It has also been the subject of peculiar animadversion by Warburton and others, who have been as far as possible removed from the Platonic spirit. They would charge our philosopher here with an absurd polytheism, in making each one of the heavenly bodies either a divinity in itself, or, at least, under the control of a separate divinity. If by this is meant that he did not believe in one Supreme Ineffable Power, the generator and creator of all other existences, whether divine (in the

Greek sense of *θεοί*, as we have explained it, page 104) or human, the answer is found in places of his dialogues too numerous to mention; and especially might we refer to the remarkable passage in the Timæus (41, A.), in which the Eternal Parent thus addresses the inferior divinities to whom he had given being: *Θεοὶ θεῶν ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, κ. τ. λ.* His great object here is to show, in opposition to the atheist, that soul, or *ψυχή*, instead of *τύχη*, guides the motions of the heavenly bodies. Indeed, throughout the whole argument, he evidently regards the being of a God, and of soul generally, distinct from, and not a result of, bodily organization, as facts which involve each other, and which are shown by similar and equivalent proofs. He appears to have considered even a belief in the real entity of the human soul as inseparable from an acknowledgment of the Divine existence; so that the one was, as it were, the ground and guarantee of the other. In this respect, the language of the Hebrew oath, "*as the Lord liveth, and as thy soul liveth*," expressed the true spirit of his philosophy. In consequence, therefore, of his constantly using these terms for each other, we cannot be certain, when he speaks of soul or souls as guiding the motions of the heavenly bodies, whether he means that this was done by the direct agency of the Supreme Soul, or whether it was delegated to inferior spirits; and whether these delegated conducting powers resided severally in the bodies as an animating life, or were separate from them. All these are points which do not affect his main argument. Without making a division into those distinct hypostases which appear in the Timæus, he here uses *ψυχή* as a general collective term for all that is immaterial, or, at least, as a name for the Deity, and all celestial or superhuman powers derived from, and dependent upon, him. This was enough for his argument, without any farther precision or explanation, when dealing with the atheist, who denied all powers above man, be they one or many.

We may even go still farther in our apology, and maintain, that if he did hold that the heavenly bodies were animated, or that they were severally under the care of distinct spirits, there was, in the latter opinion at least, no serious error, even when viewed in the light of revelation itself. The Bible not obscurely teaches that the personal destinies of individual men are, in a measure, under the direction and guardianship of supernatural beings. Churches are said to have their guardian angels, according to Revelations, ii., 1, which we prefer to take in this literal sense, rather than to adopt any other interpretation which has been forced upon it in the controversy respecting ecclesiastical government. The same doctrine is pretty clearly intimated in respect to nations, Daniel, x., 20, 21, where Greece and Persia are said each to have their invisible champion, whether of a good or of an evil nature. There is also a remarkable passage, Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8, which, if taken according to the Septuagint version, would directly establish the same doctrine: *When the Most High divided the nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he appointed the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel*, לְמִסְפַּר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, as it is in the Hebrew, but, *according to the number of the angels of God*—*κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ*—as it stands in the Greek of the Septuagint. We cannot account for the difference, but it certainly seems as though the Greek version was more consonant with the context which follows, and which asserts that *Israel is the Lord's peculiar inheritance*, in distinction from the other nations, who seem to have been left to the subordinate care of other directing powers. This very passage, too, it should be remarked, is quoted by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, xi., 26, to prove that Plato obtained his doctrine of the *Δαίμονες* from Moses. That such an idea prevailed among the heathen nations, especially the Persians, is evident from Herodotus, vii., 53: *θεοὶ τοὶ Περσίδα γῆν λελόγχασι.*

The Bible teaches us also that even the ordinary courses of physical events are under the controlling agency of angelic beings. *He maketh his angels winds, his ministers a flaming fire;* as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews renders it. Science, with all its modern boasting, can affirm nothing in opposition to this. It is a view which interferes not at all with the regularity and the apparent laws of physical phenomena, and, as we have seen, the Bible quite plainly reveals it. Nay, more, may there not be found some countenance there to this very doctrine of Plato? If individuals, and churches, and nations, and every department in nature, have their presiding invisible powers, why not the heavenly bodies? Why not an angel of the sun, of the moon, and of each planet? Did the ancient Hebrew writers mean only physical instead of psychical powers, when they spoke of the *hosts of heaven*, and used that most sublime epithet, יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת, *Jehovah Tsebhaoth*, or *Lord of Hosts?* The Septuagint, by rendering it *κύριος δυνάμεων*, have seemed to refer it to physical rather than to spiritual agencies; but it is a serious question, whether much more than this is not contained in the Hebrew. Was it simply a sublime personification, when it was said, *He bringeth out their host by number; he calleth them all by name?** or when we are told that, at the creation of our earth, *the stars of the morning sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?*† We have no hesitation in preferring this, extravagant as it may appear, to that modern extreme, which would leave such an immense, unanimated solitude between man and the Deity, instead of filling it up, as the old Patristic theology did, with *δαίμονες*, angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers:

With helmed Cherubim,
And sworded Seraphim,

and all that array of invisible beings, whose existence the

* Isaiah, xl., 26. † Job, xxxviii., 7.

Bible does seem to take for granted, although some, in former times, may have carried it to an extravagant extent.

Surely we may still maintain the precious Protestant doctrine, that no one but the Supreme Lord of Hosts is entitled to any the least species of religious adoration, and yet believe in many an order of being, which, although of far higher rank, yet constitute, with man, an immense brotherhood of created intelligences, all intended for the manifestation of the glory of Him, by whom, and for whom, all things were created, whether visible or invisible, whether in the earth or in the heavens. There is some reason to fear that Protestants, under the guise of a hyperspirituality, have gone too far in the opposite direction, to what is really a materializing and physical hypothesis. When we discover a disposition to banish in our minds all intermediate spiritual agencies, and, by magnifying natural causes, to place the Deity at the most remote distance possible, it does really seem as though, if we could or durst, we would dispense with *his* presence also in the regulation of the universe. In all ages, a tendency to that sadduceeism which barely saves the doctrine of the soul's existence in another state, has been held, and justly held, to be near of kin to infidelity, if not to downright atheism. Far better to believe too much on this subject than too little, even if we cannot agree, with Plato, that there is a presiding spiritual superintendence assigned to each celestial body.

XXXV.

Three Hypotheses in respect to the Animation of the Heavenly Bodies.

PAGE 39, LINE 7. Ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ, κ. τ. λ. We have here three hypotheses. The first would make the sun itself an animated being; the second

would regard it as under the direction of an external angel, or Δαίμων, having a material yet highly æthereal body, and making use of a sort of impulsive motion; the third would represent it as under the care of a pure, unimbodied spirit or intellect (ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα), either the Universal Numen, or some delegated power specially assigned to that office. If by the last is meant only a particular exercise of the energy of the Universal Soul (which view is perfectly consistent with his present argument against the atheist, although it does not fully agree with some things he says elsewhere), there would be no need of any defence of Plato against the charges to which we have referred. The second, however, as we have seen, may be held by a firm believer in the Christian revelation. The first is only the doctrine of the *anima mundi* applied to particular parts of the universe. It may be maintained, as Plato did maintain it, in perfect consistency with a pure theism, or a recognition of an Eternal Spirit, not only above the *anima mundi*, but regarded, also, as its creator and constant guide. There is most abundant proof of this in the Timæus, and, indeed, we have every reason to believe that Plato meant no more by his soul of the world, whether in respect to the universe or to particular parts, than Cudworth intends by his famous Plastic Nature, to which, in some places, he seems inclined to ascribe a species of obscure animate existence.* In fact, some such hypothesis must be adopted by those who would make nature a distinct thing from the Deity, or a subordinate cause under the Divine reason and wisdom; as all must do who are averse to the doctrine that God does all things by his own immediate agency, or the systematic intervention of angelic or spiritual beings. The only escape from one or the other of these is in that philosophy of occult qualities, which is a mere play upon words, a mere apology for ignorance, and which, when carried to its le-

* *Cudworth's Intellectual System*, vol. i., page 346, Engl. ed.

gitimate results, is, as we have seen, the most favourable of all hypotheses to atheism.

The independent, unoriginated essence (*αὐτόθεος*), which is above nature and above the *soul of the world*, is called, in the Timæus, *Ἀΐδιος Πατήρ*, and represented as the generator of *ψυχή*, and even of *Νοῦς*. Elsewhere, and especially in the Republic, Plato is fond of styling him *Τὸ Ἀγαθόν*, The Good.

XXXVI.

Γῆς Ὄχημα, or Vehiculum Mundi. Examination of a Remarkable Passage from Euripides.

PAGE 39, LINE 17. *ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον.* This cannot be rendered, *having the sun in a chariot or vehicle;* for the sense evidently requires that the sun itself be regarded as the vehiculum of the indwelling spirit. *Ἐν* here is equivalent to *in loco—ἐν ἅρμασιν—ὡς ἅρματα—in loco currus—for a vehicle.** By a similar phraseology, the body is elsewhere styled *ὄχημα, vehiculum;* as in the Timæus, 41, C.: *ἐμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα.* In that place, however, Plato has reference, not to the animating souls of the heavenly bodies, but to human souls, placed, or, as he says, sown there previous to their more intimate connexion with matter in their earthly existence, that they might learn those universal truths which were to be recalled to recollection in their subsequent stage of being.†

In the Troades of Euripides the same term is applied, in a manner directly the opposite of this, to signify, not the *corporeal vehiculum*, but the animating, moving power. On account of its deep, intrinsic interest, we give the passage in full, and dwell upon it at some length:

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* So, also, *Laws*, xi., 913, C.: *ἐν οὐσίᾳ κεκτῆσθαι.*

† Compare Origen *contra Celsum*, ii., 60. From this came those doctrines which Origen held respecting the pre-existence of souls.

Ὦ γῆς ὄχημα, κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν
Ὅστις πότ' εἶ σὺ δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
Προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου
Βαίνων κελεύθου, κατὰ Δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις.

O Thou who guid'st the rolling of the earth,
And *o'er* it hast thy throne, whoe'er thou art,
Most difficult to know—the far-famed Jove,
Or nature's law, or reason, such as man's—
I thee adore, that, in a noiseless path,
Thy steady hand with justice all things rules.

Euripides, Troades, 890.

We do not know which to admire most, the philosophy or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines. The expression, κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν, relieves them, in our view, from all liability to the charge of pantheism. These words, in the connexion in which they appear, are only applicable to what Plato styles ψυχὴ ὑπερκοσμία; *a soul* which, although pervading, is also, at the same time, *above*, and *distinct from*, the world or universe which it moves; for γῆ here is evidently to be taken in this large sense. The last line, also, can only be referred to a moral power, not only far above pantheism, but also that view which delights in contemplating a God of mere intelligence. It indicates a special moral providence, looking to ends and varied by events, yet at the same time general, administered by unbroken and harmonious laws, pervading all nature, silent in their operation, traversing a noiseless path (δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου); the universal moving power of earth (*mundi vehiculum*); influencing and controlling all things, and yet in its secret springs unsearchable (δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι); ruling in the earthquake, the fire, and the tempest, yet, in itself, not the earthquake, nor the storm, but the *still small voice* of mind, specially and for special ends controlling matter.

So Plutarch, writing of the Divine Logos, or Reason, in

the government of the world, uses almost the very words of Euripides, if he did not rather intend a quotation: *φωνῆς γὰρ* 'Ο ΘΕΙΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ *ἀπροσδεής ἐστι καὶ δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiri.* We may compare with this a passage from Seneca, *Nat. Q.*, lib. ii., 14: Deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse *vehit omnia* (*mundi vehiculum*), qui ubique et omnibus præsto est. Compare, also, a passage of one of the lost tragedies of Euripides, as it is quoted by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, xiii., page 681:

> *Σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ*
> *Ρύμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ'.*

> Thou self-sprung Being that dost all *infold,*
> *And in thine arms* heaven's whirling fabric hold.

The idea expressed by such phrases as those on which we have been just commenting, may have been more ancient than Plato or Euripides, and may have given rise to the mythological representation of the *chariot* and horses of the sun. It is more likely, however, that the poetical representation may have suggested the language here employed. We have also in the Phædrus (246, A.) this same comparison, by which man, in his compound being, is likened to a chariot and horses, with their charioteer, representing respectively his animal and his rational nature.

XXXVII.

Second Grand Division of the Argument. Doctrine of a Special Providence. Mistake of Cudworth.

PAGE 42, LINE 10. *Τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ, κ. τ. λ.* We come now to the second grand division of the subject, and one, the treatment of which will probably be more satisfactory to the reader, pre-

senting, as it does, less of subtle physico-metaphysical discussion, and more that is in strictest harmony with the Holy Scriptures. The author is now to prove the doctrine of a *special providence* against those who speculatively admitted the existence of a Deity, and yet could not believe that he concerned himself with the ordinary affairs of human life; especially, what seemed to them of so little consequence—human sins. Cudworth asserts that "Plato, in his tenth book of Laws, professedly opposing the atheists, and undertaking to prove the existence of a Deity, does, notwithstanding, ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or Universal Mundane Soul, as the self-moving principle, and the immediate or proper cause of all the motion which is in the world. And this (he says) is all the God he there undertakes to prove." This very learned man must have strangely overlooked the latter part of this book, upon which we are now entering, or he could not have made so incorrect an assertion. It is true, that all which his previous argument has required as yet has been the existence of such a Psyche; but he now advances not only above self-motion, or psychical power, to the second hypostasis of intelligence, or Νοῦς (as it may be regarded when viewed according to the statements and divisions of the Timæus), but also to that still higher degree which is above mind or intelligence, and which he elsewhere styles Τὸ Ἀγαθόν; including, in the idea, all moral attributes—justice and severity, as well as benevolence and compassion.

It is of this higher degree, or hypostasis, as we think it may be styled, that Plato, or some later Platonist, thus speaks, in that remarkable passage, contained in what is styled the second epistle to Dionysius, 312, E.: *Περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' εστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα· καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*—"All things relate to the King of all, and on his account are all things, and he is

the cause of all things beautiful; but the second honours pertain to the second, and the third to the third." In other words, He is the *final*, or *moral*, as well as the *designing*, and the *efficient* or psychical cause of all things (*ἕνεκα οὗ πάντα*); for the manifestation of whose moral glory all things are created, moved, and constantly governed.

Every reader must admit that the admirable arguments which follow in the remainder of the book are generally in strict accordance with the Holy Scriptures, and that Plato even reasons on this part of his subject in a more religious manner than many nominally Christian writers; much of whose theology and science might fairly be ranked with the very atheism with which he is here contending.

XXXVIII.

The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c.

PAGE 42, LINE 14. *ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι, κ. τ. λ.* The words *εὐδαίμων*, *εὐδαιμονία*, do not refer simply to a state of present pleasure or enjoyment; for, in that sense, the poets and others were right in asserting, and the philosopher could not deny, that wicked men are often *happy*. *Εὐδαίμων*, in its primitive, etymological import, has a much higher sense than this; a sense derived to it at that time, when *Δαίμων* remained unimpaired in its significance as one of the Divine names, and had not yet been corrupted into that atheistic sense of Fortune which it subsequently acquired in the natural degeneracy of man and of language. From *εὖ* and *Δαίμων*, it would etymologically signify *one who had the favour of Heaven;* and its purest meaning would be best expressed by our good old Saxon word *blessed*. It refers not simply to a man's present state of *feeling* or enjoyment, but to the whole of his being and his relation to the whole; so that

one in the midst of the most acute pain, like the martyrs in the flames, might be *εὐδαίμων*; while another, in the present enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, might be *ἄθλιος*: as Socrates, in the Gorgias, describes the life of the sensualist as *δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος*, and asks if any one would dare to call such *εὐδαίμονας*, or blessed, *ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται*—"even if they have in the greatest abundance all that their souls may desire." *Gorgias*, 494, E. This is also the meaning of Solon in that most celebrated account which Herodotus gives of his interview with Crœsus; although he sometimes uses *ὄλβιος* instead of *εὐδαίμων*, out of accommodation to the language of the sensual Phrygian.

Plato himself clearly gives this as the radical idea of the word, and seems evidently to allude to its etymology when he says, *οὐ γὰρ* ΆΝΕΥ ΓΕ ΘΕΩΝ *μήποτέ τις εὐδαίμων ἐστίν*—"Without the Gods no man can be called *εὐδαίμων*, *blessed*, or *happy*." So, also, in the *Timæus*, 90, D.: *Δεῖ δὲ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον, ἔχοντά τε* ΈΥ *μάλα κεκοσμημένον τὸν* ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ *ξύνοικον ἐν αὐτῷ διαφερόντως* ΈΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ *εἶναι*—"He must be blessed beyond all others who cultivates the divine, and who has ever in harmony within him the indwelling God." The juxtaposition of terms here leaves no doubt that there was intended an allusion to the radical sense and etymology of the word. There is the same allusion in the Orestes of Euripides:

> *Ὅταν δ' ὁ* ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΈΥ *διδῷ τί δεῖ φίλων;*
> *ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς* Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ, *ὠφελεῖν θέλων.*
>
> When God his blessing grants, what need of friends?
> A friend above supplies the soul's desire.
>
> *Euripides, Orestes*, 660.

These lines are quoted by Aristotle in the discussion of the question, *πότερον εὐδαίμων δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή*; *Ethic. Nicomach.*, ix., 9. Even this cold and passionless writer tells us that happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) is a divine thing (*θεῖον*

τι), and without the favour of Heaven cannot grow on the soil of earth: *Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι θεῶν ἐστι δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι* —"If, therefore, there is any other thing which is the gift of the Gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is Heaven's own peculiar boon." *Ethic. Nicomach.*, lib. i., 9. For similar passages, the reader is referred to his *Ethic. Eudem.*, lib. i., 8; *Ethic. Nicomach.*, lib. i., 12; and especially to lib. x., 8, where, treating of *εὐδαιμονία* in its other aspect, as an active exercise of the soul, instead of simply a state of well-being, he defines it to be *a contemplative energy*—*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*—such as we have supposed (page 225) to form the chief element in the bliss of the heavenly world. It is this which, in his view, constitutes the happiness of the Deity, and of that human state which is nearest to the divine. In proof of it, he asserts that no one of the inferior animals can ever be styled *εὐδαίμων*, because the term implies a state possible only in relation to a religious and rational being, or one who could be sensible of the blessedness of the Divine favour: *Τῷ μὲν γὰρ θεῷ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων· τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας· καὶ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν.* Wherefore, as he says in what follows, every such a one is *θεοφιλέστατος*, or most beloved of Heaven. It will be seen how visibly, in all these extracts, can be traced the radical, etymological idea of the term, as it was exhibited in the most primitive Greek, and how very similar it is to the corresponding one presented in the Bible, although the former may not be taken in so elevated a sense, and perhaps never comes up to the full etymological import which may fairly be supposed to be contained in its component parts. The Scriptures speak of it as the blessedness of that man who enjoys the Divine favour: *Blessed is the man* (*or peo-*

ple) whose God is the Lord; blessed are they who dwell in thy house; who remain in the secret place of the Most High; who abide under the shadow of the Almighty. Thy favour is life, and thy loving kindness is better than life.

Δυσδαίμων and *δυσδαιμονία* as clearly express the opposite view, namely, not merely present misery, but the *state* of one visited by the displeasure of Heaven. It is thus repeatedly used by Œdipus, in the Phœnissæ of Euripides, when lamenting his wretched condition as one pursued from his earliest years by the wrath of the Gods, on account of his own sins and his father's impious disobedience to the oracle:

> *'ΑΡΑΣ παραλαβὼν Λαΐου καὶ παισὶ δούς.*
> *οὐ γὰρ, . . .*
> *ἄνευ θεῶν του, ταῦτ' ἐμηχανησάμην.*
> *εἶεν· τί δράσω δῆθ' ὁ ΔΥΣΔΑΙΜΩΝ ἐγώ.*
> *Phœnissæ*, 1626.

In its later applications, *εὐδαιμονία* loses much of its old religious sense, and degenerates into a synonyme of *εὐτυχία*, or *good fortune*, losing almost entirely its etymological reference to the favour of an overruling divinity. In this it shares the corruption of its principal component part, *δαίμων*. For a most striking illustration, however, of the radical primitive difference between *εὐδαίμων* and *εὐτυχής*, we may refer to Euripides, *Medea*, 1225:

> *Θνητῶν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν 'ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ φύσει·*
> *ὄλβου δ' ἐπιῤῥυέντος, 'ΕΥΤΥΧΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ*
> *ἄλλου γένοιτ' ἂν ἄλλος, 'ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ δ' ἂν οὔ.*

> By nature none of mortal race are *blessed*
> When wealth flows in, one man may be more *happy*
> Than others of his race, but none are *blessed.*

The contrast between this beautiful Greek word and the one by which it is generally rendered in our own tongue is very striking. The Saxon *happiness* is from *hap*, signifying *luck*, *fortune*, or *chance*; a sense to which the Greek, as we

have seen, subsequently degenerated. The true etymological meaning, therefore, of *happy*, is that given by Webster, namely, "*receiving good from something that comes to us unexpectedly, or by chance, that is, fortunate, or lucky.*" The same lexicographer says afterward, that "he only can be called happy who enjoys the favour of God;" but this is an idea which was subsequently ingrafted on the pagan root by the Christian theology. The original Saxon word had nothing of the *τὸ θεῖον* or divine about it.

XXXIX.

Atheistic Argument against Providence drawn from the Prosperity of the Wicked. Plato's Language compared with that of the Scriptures.

PAGE 43, LINE 3. Ἢ *καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, κ. τ. λ.*—"When you behold men growing old, who continue unholy even to the very end of life, leaving children and children's children in the highest honours—then are you disturbed at the sight," &c. In what striking language is this same difficulty set forth in the Holy Scriptures, not only as perplexing the mass of mankind, but also as occasioning, at times, painful doubts even to the acknowledged people of God. Compare the complaint of Asaph in the lxxiii. Psalm: *But as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well-nigh slipped. For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked. Wherefore his people backslide;**

* We prefer this rendering for the Hebrew יָשׁוּב, as it may mean to *turn back*, as well as to *turn to*, or *return*; although the latter is the most usual sense in this conjugation. It may also mean, *they turn themselves with astonishment and perplexity, as to some wondrous spectacle;* in which sense it would well correspond to the Greek *ταράττῃ*, as used here by Plato.

and they say, Doth God know? And is there a providence in the Most High? So, also, Job, with still more resemblance to the passage before us: *Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power? Job*, xxi., 7. The sentiment may be frequently met with in classic antiquity. It has formed the constant complaint of the virtuous when desponding, and the standing objection of the skeptic. As in Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, lib. iii., 33–36, where the doubting Cotta goes into a long enumeration of the virtuous men who had been neglected of Heaven, and of the impious who had been blessed, apparently, with the highest prosperity. Speaking of the tyrant Dionysius (sec. 35), he says, Hunc igitur nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec Æsculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit. Atque in suo lectulo mortuus, in rogo illatus est; eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat nactus, quasi justam et legitimam, hereditatis loco, filio tradidit. In the same strain, sec. 32: Dies deficiat, si velim numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si commemorem quibus improbis optime. And then he proceeds to relate the cases of Marius, Cinna, Dionysius, together with the saying of the snarling Diogenes respecting Harpalus: Diogenes quidem cynicus dicere solebat, Harpalum, qui temporibus illis prædo in Pamphylia felix habebatur, *contra Deos testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret.* *Cic., De Nat. Deor.*, iii., 34.

Some minds, otherwise serious and thoughtful, have been almost driven to atheism by it; as is represented in those desponding lines with which Claudian commences one of his poems:

> Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem,
> Curarent Superi terras, an nullus inesset
> Rector, et incerto *fluerent* mortalia casu.
> Nam cum dispositi quæsissem fœdera mundi,
> Præscriptosque mari fines, annisque meatus,
> Et lucis noctisque vires: tunc omnia rebar

Consilio firmata Dei—
Sed cum *res hominum* tanta caligine volvi
Aspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio.—*Claudian. in Rufinum*, i., 12.

But, while it has disturbed the pious in their desponding moods, it has formed the standing jest of the scoffer; as in the story of the atheist Diagoras, *Cicero*, *De Nat. Deor.*, iii., 37: At Diagoras quum Samothraciam venisset, Atheos ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus, "Tu, qui Deos putas humana negligere, nonne animadvertis, ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi pervenerint?" Ita fit, inquit. Illi enim nunquam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt, in marique perierunt. So, also, that malignant buffoon Aristophanes puts a similar profane jest in the mouth of the travestied Socrates:

καὶ πῶς ὦ μῶρε σὺ καὶ κρονίων ὄζων καὶ βεκκεσέληνε,
εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπιόρκους, πῶς οὐχὶ Σίμων' ἐνέπρησεν;
οὐδὲ Κλεώνυμον, οὐδὲ Θέωρον; καίτοι σφόδρα γ' εἰσ' ἐπίορκοι.
ἀλλὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει, καὶ Σούνιον ἄκρον Ἀθηνέων,
καὶ τὰς δρῦς τὰς μεγάλας· τί μαθών; οὐ γὰρ δὴ δρῦς ἐπιορκεῖ.
Nubes, 398.

If either Xenophon or Plato are entitled to the least credit, nothing could be more directly opposed to his real and most cherished sentiments.

XL.

The Singular Word Ἀποδιοπομπέομαι, *and the Remarkable Use made of it by Plato.*

Page 44, Line 9. Ἀλλ' ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι. This is a very peculiar and significant word, used by Plato, in the few cases in which it occurs, to express the strongest abhorrence, and generally employed in reference to some wickedness of peculiar enormity. It signifies, *to*

avert the Divine wrath by expiatory sacrifices or religious rites of the most solemn kind; from ἀπό, Διός, and πομπή, *a solemn religious procession.* In accommodation to the language of a later age, it might be rendered, *to exorcise;* since this term also comes from another part of a similar ceremony, performed for a similar purpose, namely, *to avert, or send away, evil.* We may compare with this the derivative noun, ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, as used, *Laws*, lib. ix., 854, B., C. That passage is deserving of attention, as being, in some respects, one of the most deeply impressive, for its moral bearings, of any to be found in the Platonic dialogues. The subject is sacrilege, and during the discussion the legislator introduces a law against it with this most solemn προοίμιον, or preamble: "One conversing with, and exhorting the man, whom some evil desire, enticing by day and exciting by night, was tempting to the commission of this horrid crime of sacrilege, might thus say—O, sir, it is no evil merely human, nor any temptation sent from Heaven, that urges you on to this sin, but *a certain innate phrensy which grows in men from old and unexpiated sins* (οἶστρός τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων), *ever restless* (περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης), *and calling for vengeance on itself.*" He seems to have had in view a class of men who would be styled, in modern phraseology, *given over*—almost, if not wholly, past their day of grace, or the reach of any reforming means—men in whom sin had become an οἶστρος, a raging disease,* or phrensy, urging them on by a sort of maddening impulse, without the ordinary inducements of gain or sensual pleasure—men under the goadings of a keenly-sensible, yet utterly-depraved conscience, which could only find ease in the commission of greater and still greater enormities drowning the recollec-

* Such as, in the Gorgias, he styles ὕπουλος, namely, apparently healed upon the surface, but ulcerating in the bones below—an old and neglected sore.

tion of the lesser, as though driven to wander about (*ἀλιτηριώδης*) by an ever-restless internal Erinnys.

To such a one he gives this most earnest and solemn advice: *Ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς* ΑΠΟΔΙΟΠΟΜΠΗΣΕΙΣ, *ἴθι ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ξυνουσίας, τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν φεῦγε ἀμεταστρεπτί, κ. τ. λ.*—"When even such a thought should invade your mind, betake yourself at once to the most solemn modes of expiation (*ἀποδιοπομπήσεις*); go as a suppliant to the shrines of the wrath-averting divinities; resort, without delay, to the assemblies of the good; and fly, without turning or looking back, from all the associations of the bad; if, peradventure, thy wretched disease may be rendered lighter." One is strongly reminded of the angel's urgent and alarming exhortation to Lot and his family, when he bids them fly from the impending doom of Sodom: *Up! get thee out of this place; escape for thy life; look not behind thee; tarry not in all the plain; haste to escape, lest thou be swept away.*

We may compare, in respect to this most impressive word, another passage in the ninth book, 878, A., where the legislator is speaking of a house that has been defiled with murder, and of the restoration of a family that has, in consequence, been rendered childless: *τοῦτον πρῶτον μὲν καθήρασθαι καὶ ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι τὸν οἶκον χρεὼν ἔστω κατὰ νόμον.* See, also, the *Cratylus*, 396, E.: *αὔριον δὲ ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν, καὶ καθαρούμεθα, ἐξευρόντες ὅστις τῶν ἱερέων τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινὸς καθαίρειν.* It is applied by Plutarch to an obnoxious person whom they would wish to send away—*to exorcise as a troublesome spirit.* This strong language Cæsar is represented as using in reference to Cato: *Κάτωνος μὲν οὐ παρόντος· ἐπίτηδες γὰρ αὐτὸν εἰς Κύπρον ἀπεδιεπομπήσαντο.* *Plutarch, Cæs.*, 21.

The verb *ἀποπομπέω* has the same meaning, and from this we have a similar word, with the same solemn reli-

gious import, which is used by the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew עֲזָאזֵל, or *scapegoat.* Ἀποπομπαῖος signifies *a victim to be sent away, with solemn religious rites, as an expiation;* and is very similar to ἀλεξίκακος and ἀποτρόπαιος, which are the more common terms in classic Greek. See *Leviticus*, xvi., 8: κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ ἀποπομπαίῳ; so, also, in the tenth verse of the same chapter: τοῦ ἐξιλάσασθαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὥστε ἀποστεῖλαι αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν ἀποπομπήν. Clemens Alexandrinus uses it in the same peculiar sense: ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῇ διοπομπήσει τῶν κακῶν, *Strom.*, vii., 850.*

Plato could not have selected a stronger word to express his utter abhorrence of atheism. By such language, he represents it as that abominable spirit of all evil (if we may use the word *spirit* in so strange a connexion), which he had been endeavouring to *averruncate*, or exorcise, from the souls of the young persons whom he fancies himself so tenderly, yet solemnly, addressing. Some of the expressions used in this passage, and in the parallel place quoted from the ninth book, would almost come up to the Scripture doctrine of demoniacal possession or Satanic influence upon the soul. The word προσιὸν, which almost immediately follows, preserves the metaphor contained in ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι, and is in admirable keeping with the spirit of the whole passage. It suggests here the idea of sudden evil, violently *invading*, and which can only be prevented by the most speedy and efficacious remedies. Viger and Ast would, most absurdly, substitute προϊὸν for προσιὸν, thereby

* It is thus defined by Timæus in his Lexicon of peculiar Platonic phrases: ἀποπέμπεσθαι καὶ διωθεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, συμπράκτορι χρώμενος τῷ Διί. The latter part of the compound may have the general sense of πέμπω, but more probably has reference to πομπή as significant of a solemn religious procession, or ceremony, by which evil was supposed to be averted, and which is alike common to paganism and a corrupted species of Christianity.

utterly spoiling the metaphor, and weakening the force of the whole declaration. One proof that *προσιὸν* is the proper reading here may be derived from the parallel passage in the ninth book, where we have the same image conveyed by a very similar word: *ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων*—"when any such thought shall *invade* you," &c.

XLI.

Defect of Plato's Theology in regard to the Doctrine of Atonement and the Necessity of Expiation.

PAGE 51, LINE 3. *παραιτητοὺς*. The true sense of Plato here, and in the subsequent argument, wherever this word is used, is best given by rendering it *easily propitiated*, as though it had been *εὐπαραιτήτους*. In translating an author, we must take into view not only the peculiar circumstances by which he was surrounded, and the peculiar philosophy and theology by which his mind was influenced, but we are bound to consider, likewise, how far modern philosophy and theology have affected certain terms in our own tongue, which otherwise would have been true representatives of his meaning, instead of conveying—as, under such circumstances, they will be very likely to convey—an idea which was never intended. A due regard to this will sometimes require what may, perhaps, seem a paradox, namely, a slight mistranslation of the letter in order to do justice to the spirit; or, in other words, to depart a little from the etymological sense in order to preserve the substance of the writer's thought. Thus, here, for example, we shall certainly do Plato injustice, if we carry our Christian theology along with us in the interpretation, and give to *παραιτητοὺς* that sense which, standing alone, it would suggest to a Christian mind. The philosopher knew no-

thing of that great atonement which forms the basis of the Christian scheme. His argument is therefore directed against those who held that the Divine displeasure, even for the greatest offences, could be averted by sacrifices, processions, vows, and the mere ritual performances of religion, without repentance, or (which is of still greater moment) without any sense of that need of expiation which was signified by the sacrifices they blindly offered. This *feeling* of the need of expiation was in some obscure way expressed in all the religions of antiquity. The true and perfect *mode* forms that peculiar doctrine of Christianity which distinguishes it from all others, and the belief of which, either in the substance or the type, has been, in all ages, the essential element of the *righteousness which is by faith.*

Could we trace anything of this in the lives or writings of Plato and Socrates, we should indulge more hope of their salvation from it than from any of those moral lessons —truly beautiful and sublime as they are — which have been left to us in their immortal dialogues. We are told, both by Plato and by Xenophon, that Socrates advised his friends to be *diligent in offering their sacrifices upon the altars of their country's religion.* For this he has been generally condemned (at least by Christian writers), as giving a sanction to idolatry; but we have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that in no part of his philosophy did he come nearer to Christianity and its central truth, and that on no other grounds could we entertain such hopes of his salvation; provided we can only believe that, in giving this advice, he had even the most faint allusion to the great and saving doctrine which all sacrifice was primitively intended to represent.

We find, however, but little reference to this need of expiation in the writings of Plato, except, it might be, in the case of such great and almost incurable sinners as are men-

tioned in the passage lately quoted (page 247) from the ninth book of the Laws. A life of ascetic virtue was the remedy which he would in general propose; although, in the pride of philosophy, he was but little aware how utterly defective is any thing which bears the name of human virtue, when laid by the side of that Holy Law which "pierces even to the dividing asunder of the soul and the spirit, and is a discerner of all the thoughts and intents of the heart." To a Christian mind this silence in regard to an atonement is the second great fault in Plato's theology. The other is his doctrine of an original independent evil principle. This being closely connected with the dogma of the innate evil of matter, through which the soul was tainted, led him naturally to teach an ascetic mode of purification to the exclusion of any external, forensic, and vicarious atonement. He preached much and most eloquently against the *lusts of the flesh* as the cause and essence of all depravity; but his philosophy contains but slight recognition of those *sins of the spirit* in which the much-denounced body has no share, and which may be supposed to belong to a purely spiritual being as well as to one who is enclosed in the grossest robes of matter. Hence it is easy to see how these two errors, although apparently so remote, have a common origin and a common seat in depraved and blinded human nature; and how all, whether out of the Church or in the Church, who have endeavoured to rectify it in a manner different from that pointed out in the Bible, have ever stumbled on this same point, namely, the teaching of an ascetic mode of purification, through the penances and mortification of the flesh, not as auxiliary and disciplinary, but as remedial and saving.

In respect to the doctrine of an atonement, the Greek poets are more often in accordance with the Bible, and those traditions which had come down from a remote antiquity, than our philosopher. Even in the very practices

whose superstitious observances he condemns, and justly condemns, there may be manifested that deep sense of the need of expiation which has been felt in all ages—which has formed a part of all false religions, and of all corruptions of the true—and which only finds repose in a believing and intelligent view of the doctrine of the cross. His argument, however, is sound, as directed against some of the practices which prevailed in the Greek religion, and which operated equally with atheism in encouraging the most abominable licentiousness; for their great design was not so much to take away sin, or the consciousness of sin, as to avert its consequences.*

It is the glory of the Gospel that God is *παραιτητός*—that he can be propitiated; while the awful sacrifice by which it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philosophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind—

Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαραίτητοι φρένες†—

while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptuous belief in the Divine placability, against which Plato is here contending, and on which some in our own day would lay so much stress. With such, whether ancient or modern, it is not the Divine mercy which they would exalt—for that has no meaning separate from the Divine justice—but, rather, that idol attribute of their own imaginations, which is so well expressed, in this very argument, by the Greek word *ῥᾳθυμία*; that sluggish indolence, indifference, or good-nature, to use a common expression, which constitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Epicurean and the modern sentimentalist.

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* See remarks on this distinction, note 1, page 4.

† Æschylus, Prom. Vinct., 34.

XLII.

Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Conviction of the Moral Sense.

PAGE 51, LINE 13. *Ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους.* The appeal is here directly to the moral sense. The intelligence and power of the Deity may be matters of inductive reasoning, although even for these, and especially the former, there may be as good a ground of belief in the a priori conviction which every man possesses. But we may safely say that no one really ever resorts to external induction for his own private individual satisfaction in the belief that God is good; although on other grounds, and from other motives, it may sometimes be made the subject of speculative argument. We cannot bear the contrary opinion. Just as by the laws of our minds we are compelled to assert that matter has in itself no inherent property of motion, notwithstanding all mere inductive experience of an ever-restless, ever-moving world is in opposition to such an *a priori* conviction; so, likewise, are we compelled to believe and *feel* that God is good, however much inductive argument from all the facts around us, in this world of disorder, might go towards maintaining the contrary dogma. Even those who assert most strenuously that the Divine benevolence is proved from the observation of external nature carry along with them this a priori conviction, without, perhaps, being aware of the fact, that from it is derived, to their own minds and the minds of others, the main force of every argument by which they would sustain their preconceived hypothesis. Let this innate conviction be utterly banished from the soul, and we might then see, if it were possible to put ourselves in that condition, what is the real strength, or, rather, real weakness of the a posteriori proof. Should even the great mass of facts which fall within the sphere of our observa-

tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would we have to extend this to the immense scale of the universe, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of this innate law of our moral nature? If this world were filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow an induction dare to step beyond its limits? What is our position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimitable eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw any inferences from a *mere induction of facts* as to the moral attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there is some sure foundation for faith in their existence? If, however, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to reverse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our world at least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception—if the Bible tells us that *man is born to sorrow*—if Plato declares that *our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things*—and if the true voice of humanity has responded in all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ—on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Divine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds on worlds should exhibit *facts* to the contrary, would still tell us, that *God is good.*

If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to herself. There is within us something higher than the speculative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither demonstrate nor reject, *If there be a God, he must be good, and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth must do right.* In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says, πέντε ὄντες—*all five of us,* namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence; as

much as to say, Here we all agree—here there is no need of argument; we all admit that, if there is a God, he *must* be good, however much we may differ as to that in which his goodness consists.

XLIII.

Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Providence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philosophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word Ἀνδρεία, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul.

PAGE 52, LINE 2. *Δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος, κ. τ. λ.* By connecting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, *ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας*, we get the whole argument, which may be thus stated: *We admit the Gods to be good: ἀνδρεία is a part of virtue; δειλία is its opposite; ἀργία is the offspring of δειλία: therefore it cannot be through ἀργία and ῥᾳθυμία that the Gods neglect the affairs of men.* He had before proved that it could not be from want of power. This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet in a manner how different from all this parade of argument do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these positions, without reasoning at all about them. *The Lord looks down from heaven. His eyes behold, and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down and our rising up. He understandeth our thought afar off. He never slumbereth nor sleepeth that keepeth Israel. As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good.* This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation; and how poor does our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft-

iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, with all their acknowledged excellences—yea, even from the almost divine Plato himself—to the Holy Scriptures, without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed from Heaven—the voice of God, and not of man?

The term *ἀνδρεία*, here used, would seem, if etymologically considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strictly, *energy of soul*, or *strength of will;* not merely in the sense of physical power, *outwardly* to execute its volitions, but rather as a pure, *internal*, spiritual force, by which one man or one being may differ from another. There may be a *good* will, yet weak; but when this moral strength is added to the other cardinal virtues, the *manly* character is said to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apostle means by the word *ἀρετή* (the same with the Latin *virtus*, from a similar etymology), when he says, *Add to your faith virtue.* In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as *καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς*. Elsewhere, connecting it with all the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as *one who fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while, at the same time, he fears everything which ought to be feared;* thus viewing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that "the truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holiness; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as to fear what ought to be feared, and to be ever bold when

engaged in right and duty" (vide the *Laches*, 199, D.); thus making *ἀνδρεία* the support and life of all the other virtues, according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when genuine, essentially connected; that, where one exists, all exist in a greater or less degree; and that, where one is wanting, all are to be suspected of spuriousness.

In this sense of *energy of will** it is properly applied to the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological inconsistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, "*that whose very essence is energy*"—*ἡ ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐσία ἐνέργειά ἐστιν*; that which *must act* with an intensity of energy proportioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, page 190.

Δειλία is the opposite of *ἀνδρεία*. In some respects it is nearly synonymous with *ῥαθυμία*, *easiness, fickleness, or weakness of will*. *Τρυφή*, *effeminacy, the result of sensuality*. No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a special providence (although they may not see the logical consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may be applied the language of the Bible: *Ye thought that I was altogether such a one as yourselves*. And yet men of this description often assume to be under the teaching of a higher philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who imagine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the objects of God's special regard.

Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously,

* We would ever use the term *will*, in such a connexion as this, in its highest import, as distinguished from *animal wilfulness*, or mere volition, and as ever conjoined with reason; or, as Cicero defines it, *Voluntas est quæ quid cum ratione desiderat.*

and to claim the merit of being very religious, because it graciously admits the Divine existence and intelligence, while yet it denies everything which could make that existence an object of love, or fear, or of any interest of any kind beyond what might be felt in the contemplation of a mathematical theorem. The ancient Epicureans sometimes affected this kind of sentimental religionism,* some specimens of which we find admirably set forth, in all their hollowness, in Cicero's treatise *De Natura Deorum*, lib. i., s. 41: Ac etiam de *sanctitate*, de *pietate* scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncianum aut Scævolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas: non eum, *qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem?* Quid est enim, cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, quum Dii non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? Sec. 42: Horum enim sententiæ omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis Deorum; sed etiam religionem, quæ Deorum cultu pio continetur. Sec. 43: Epicurus vero ex animis hominum *extraxit radicibus religionem*, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Quum enim optimam et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo *gratiam*. Tollit id quod maxime proprium est optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ.

How well, also, might what follows apply to those sentimental followers of Spinoza, who, rapt in philosophical adoration of "the holiness of nature and of the awe of the infinite," do yet, in their high and transcendental spirituality, so vehemently condemn the *sensual* philosophy of Epicurus. At enim liber est Epicurei *de sanctitate*. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. *Quæ enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant?*

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* This word cannot probably be found in any English dictionary, and yet nothing seemed so well adapted to the idea we wished to express, namely, that species of scientific piety which abounds so much in such modern books as Nichols's Architecture of the Heavens, and in the lectures of Dr. Dionysius Lardner.

XLIV.

The True Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. Analysis of the Words Σέβας, Εὐσέβεια, *&c.*

PAGE 53, LINE 2. Οὐκοῦν δὴ τάγε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον, κ. τ. λ. This is said by way of magnifying the importance of man; although, even when regarded as one of the least parts of the universe, he would not, as has been shown, be beneath the care of a special providence. Two things are said to enhance his dignity. He partakes of an animated nature, and he is of all animals the most religious. Compare the Protagoras, 522, A.: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέχει μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ξυγγένειαν, ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε, καὶ ἐπιχεῖρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν—"And since man shares in the divine, he alone, of all animals, through his relationship to the Deity, believes in the existence of Gods, and undertakes to establish altars in their honour." Compare, also, Ovid, *Metamorph.*, lib. i., 70:

> Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ
> Deerat adhuc—
> Pronaque quum spectant animalia cætera terram,
> Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
> Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

Ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα is equivalent here to οἱ ἄνθρωποι; the form of the words being probably affected by the neuter ζῶον. For the same reason we have αὐτό instead of αὐτός which we should have expected. It is by the attraction of ζῶον, understood or implied in ζώων. See remarks on this peculiarity of the Greek language, page 203. It is, however, to be used here as if connected with ἄνθρωπος; and is the same as though we should say in English, *the animal man itself* is the most religious, &c.

The words *θεοσεβέστατον*, *θεοσέβεια*, are etymologically formed on the same idea with the Hebrew phrase, יִרְאַת יְהוָה, *the fear of the Lord*, which is the Old Testament term for *religion* or *piety*. *Δεισιδαιμονία* contains etymologically the same radical conception, but is almost always used in a lower and somewhat bad sense, as, for example, by Paul, Acts, xvii., 22. It partakes of the degeneracy of its component, *δαίμων*; and as that became only another name for Fortune, so this sinks down into superstition, or that fear and worship of Fortune, Destiny, and other imaginary personifications, which is closely allied to atheism. *Δεισιδαιμονία* is seldom, if ever, taken for the pure and reverential fear of God; while, on the other hand, *θεοσέβεια*, or its equivalent, *εὐσέβεια*, is made the parent of all the other virtues, and the first in the estimation of Heaven. Thus Plato speaks of it in the Epinomis, or whoever was the author of that dialogue: *μεῖζον γὰρ μόριον ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείθῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας τῷ θνητῷ γένει. Epinomis*, 989, B. To the same effect Sophocles, in the Philoctetes, 1442:

> *Εὐσεβεῖτε πρὸς θεούς·*
> *ὡς τἄλλ' ἅπαντα δεύτερ' ἡγεῖται Πατὴρ*
> *Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ἡὐσέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς·*
> *κἂν ζῶσι, κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται;*

or, in other words, *all virtues arising out of mere earthly relations are temporary, and must perish. Piety alone survives the grave.* The primary root, *σέβας*, signifying *wonder*, *astonishment*, *awe*, is sometimes used for the very Numen or Divinity himself, examples of which are frequently to be found in Pindar and Æschylus. The verb is sometimes apparently employed for *τιμᾶν*, to signify reverence towards human magistrates. This, however, is only a secondary sense, and the primary still holds its place in the ancient idea that magistrates represented the Divine authority, and that judges stood to us in the place of the Elohim. The

ultimate radical may be the Hebrew שָׁבַע, *juravit*, and this perhaps remotely connected in meaning with שֶׁבַע, the sacred number *seven*.

XLV.

Men compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture. Language of Plato on this Subject in Harmony with the Scriptures.

PAGE 53, LINE 6. *Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* This comparison is quite a favourite with Plato. Thus Socrates says in the Phædon, 62, B.: *Ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι*—"This seems to me to be well said, that the Gods are our keepers, and that we are among their flocks or possessions;" from which he deduces an admirable argument against the lawfulness of suicide. It is worthy of note, too, that this is evidently referred to as a saying which had come down from the olden time; and in this light it furnishes a pleasing evidence of the piety and sound religious philosophy of the primitive or patriarchal ages. The same comparison may be found in Plato's romance of Atlantis, where he speaks of the care which the Gods took of the inhabitants of that blessed isle, and in which he represents them as forming a perfect theocracy: *καὶ κατοικίσαντες οἷον νομεῖς κτήματα καὶ ποίμνια καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον. Critias*, 109, C. Compare the present treatise, page 69, line 2: *ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες· ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων*—"The Gods and Genii are our helpers, for we are the flocks or possessions of the Gods and guardian divinities."

Whatever may have been the origin of the sentiment and of the expression, it is, with the exception of the use of the plural *θεῶν*, not only purely Scriptural in its conception,

but also in the very language. For proof of this, compare Psalm c., 3: *For we are his people and the sheep of his pasture. He hath made us, and his are we;* as the Hebrew, לוֹ אֲנַחְנוּ, in accordance with the *Keri*, should be translated. *He will feed his flock like a shepherd. Isaiah*, xl., 11. From this ancient idea of the resemblance which the Divine as well as kingly authority bore to the pastoral relation, came the noun *ποιμήν*, in that frequent Homeric meaning of ruler or shepherd of the people—

Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν—

as also the verb *ποιμαίνω*, in that sense of ruling which we find in the Septuagint version of Psalm ii., 9; Matthew, ii., 6; Rev., ii., 27; vii., 17; xii., 5; xix., 15.

XLVI.

Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs.

Page 55, Lines 1, 2. *Ἐπιμελουμένῳ . . . ἀμελοῦντι.* Why does the positive, in this word, take the middle or deponent, and the negative or privative the active voice? It may be difficult to explain the philosophy of this and of many other matters in the Greek, yet we would simply advert to the fact, that this is the case with a very large number of verbs; and even to such an extent as to entitle it to be justly regarded as one of the peculiarities, or well-settled idioms of the language. Indeed, we seldom, if ever, find a word strictly negative or privative of the middle form. The active form of the privative, it is true, sometimes slightly varies from what would be the analogical active of the middle or deponent positive in use; yet still, not to such a degree as to affect the principle to which we have adverted. The former is generally in *ω* pure, while the middle or deponent may be in *ομαι*; and sometimes the latter is compounded with a preposition, while the former has only the simple

radical. Sometimes the positive is strictly deponent, while in other cases it has an active voice in use; but even then the privative form in ω is the privative, not of the active, but of the middle; as, for example, *πείθω, to persuade; πείθομαι, to obey or trust; ἀπειθέω, to be disobedient.*

In illustration of this peculiarity, we may mention, as some of the most usual cases, although by no means the whole, *πείθομαι, to obey, ἀπειθέω* (not *ἀπείθομαι*), *to be disobedient; ἥδομαι, to be glad, ἀηδέω, to feel disgust*, or *displeasure; θυμέομαι ἐνθυμέομαι, to be angry, or under mental excitement, ἀθυμέω, to be without spirit, or discouraged; κήδομαι, to be concerned about anything, ἀκηδέω, to be careless or unconcerned; κοσμέω, to put in order, to regulate, κοσμέομαι, to keep one's self in order, or to act in a comely manner, ἀκοσμεω*, the negative, not of the active, but of the middle or passive, namely, *to be without order, or to act in a licentious or disorderly manner; ἔλπω, to raise hopes, ἔλπομαι, to hope, ἀέλπω*, or *ἀελπτέω, to despair; μέλομαι*, or *μελέομαι, ἐπιμελέομαι, to take care of, or be concerned for, ἀμελέω, to neglect; μηχανάομαι*, or *μηχανέομαι, to plan, to invent, ἀμηχανέω, to be without plans, to be at a loss; βούλομαι, to be willing, ἀβουλέω, to be unwilling, or refuse*—although this word has oftener, perhaps, the sense of *inconsiderateness*, or *want of reflection*, as though it were the privative of *βουλεύω—τρομέομαι, to tremble, ἀτρομέω, or ἀτρεμέω, to be undisturbed; φείδομαι, to spare, ἀφειδέω, to be lavish*, or *prodigal.* Compare, also, *χαρίζομαι, ἀχαριστέω—ψεύδομαι, ἀψευδέω, ἀψευστέω—δύναμαι, ἀδυνατέω—σέβομαι, ἀσεβέω*, &c.

It may be observed, that in most of these cases the form with *α* privative is not the direct negative either of the active or the middle; that is, is not simply the denial of a reflex *action*, but expresses rather a negative state of mind. As, for example, *ἀπειθεῖν*, besides being wholly different from *μὴ πείθειν*, is not even equivalent to *μὴ πείθεσθαι*, to

which it seems to have the nearest alliance, but expresses rather that positive condition of the soul from which all acts of disobedience do proceed. So, also, in the passage from the text, *ἀμελεῖν* is not the same as *μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, but rather expresses that sluggish, indifferent, careless disposition, which is so utterly opposed to all right views of the Divine nature. *Μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* may or may not involve criminality, as may be seen from the manner in which it is used page 50, lines 8, 10. It may result from want of power, or a variety of other justifying reasons. *Ἀμελεῖν* always implies fault, and is always to be taken in an unfavourable sense. So, also, *μὴ πείθεσθαι*, or *μὴ πιστεύειν*, may be consistent with freedom from all blame, according to the presence or absence of other circumstances; but *ἀπειθεῖν* must always be associated with condemnation, as implying an unbelieving and guilty condition of the soul. This is the force of the word as used by our Saviour, John, iii., 36: *ὁ δὲ ἀπειθῶν οὐχ ὄψεται. ζωήν—The unbelieving shall never see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.*

For these reasons, perhaps, these verbs fell into an intransitive sense, leaving the denial of the action of the positive form to be expressed by the negative particles. And perhaps, also, because they differ somewhat from the mere negation of the reflex action of the middle, they retain, for distinction's sake, the active form; although, at first view, such privative words would seem, of all others, the most foreign to the ordinary use of that voice.

XLVII.

Great Things cannot Exist without Small. Application of the Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special Providence, Education, and to Politics.

PAGE 55, LINE 5. *Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοῖς χωρὶς τῶν σμικρῶν μενάλα. οὐδὲ*

γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι—"Neither to pilots, nor to commanders, nor to political men, can great things exist without small things; for, as the stone-masons say, neither do large stones lie well together in a structure without the small." This maxim is capable of the widest range. It is not only applicable to stone-masons, and politicians, and to the sublime argument of Plato here in favour of a special providence, but is also of the highest importance in respect to education, and well worthy the attention of all teachers of youth. For want of a patient and laborious care in respect to what may seem the more minute elements of science, a structure is often erected without cohesion or symmetry, and destined. through the looseness of its parts, to fall to pieces almost as soon as completed.

As Plato applies the maxim here to politicians, so, also, Aristotle, in his *Politica*, lib. ii., 2, institutes a similar comparison in respect to government, and shows that it is essential to the very constitution of a sound and healthy state that its individual elements should be small things mingled with great, in such a way as to give coherence and sympathy to the whole. In pursuance of this same idea, he condemns those theorists who, even in his day, advocated the impracticable doctrine of perfect equality, and charges them with being the greatest enemies to that very idea of unity which they would be thought so zealously to maintain. The levelling dogma, he admits, is plausible, and apparently most philanthropic—*εὐπρόσωπος καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν*—but, in the end, instead of being productive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it is fraught with the seeds of all evil both to individuals and to the state. As *unity* implies plurality and variety, so, he declares, there can be no true unity in *sameness*. There can be no *binding* sympathy except in a *community* of higher and lower, lesser and greater interests. As well might one

attempt to construct a wall with round, smooth pebbles, all of the same size and fashion, or produce harmony from strings all of the same length and tension; which, as he justly remarks, might furnish an insipid homophony, but never a true symphony: *ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν, ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.* *Politica*, ii., 2.

There is a singular passage in the Ajax of Sophocles, in which we think there is had in view this same comparison of great and little stones, although the word is not expressly mentioned in the Greek. He also applies it, in the same manner, to those wild and disorganizing doctrines of government, which would destroy all confidence and all mutual support, by exciting an unholy jealousy between the rich and the poor. The passage is interesting, if for no other purpose, to show how precisely the same, in temper and in argument, have been the demagogues of all ages:

Πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ' ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει.
κἀίτοι σμικροὶ μεγάλων χωρὶς
σφαλερὸν πύργου ῥῦμα πέλονται.
μετὰ γὰρ μεγάλων βαιὸς ἄριστ' ἄν,
καὶ μέγας ὀρθοῖθ' ὑπὸ μικροτέρων.
Ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνοήτους
τούτων γνώμας προδιδάσκειν.—*Ajax*, 151.

Which we would thus attempt to render, by way of improvement on Potter's version, in which, we think, he has overlooked the implied simile, and thus failed to bring out its principal beauty:

Thus envy secretly assails the rich.
And yet small stones, unmingled with the great,
Build up a dangerous tower—a frail defence.
The high and low in mutual sympathy
Sustain each other; yet this truth is one
Which fools can never learn.

No one, we think, can fail to admire the still higher and yet most just application which Plato makes of this striking

comparison to the government of the Divine Architect, and to the doctrine of a special providence.

XLVIII.

Gentleness of Plato's Mode of Argument, and its Peculiar Adaptation to the Minds of the Young.

PAGE 57, LINE 2. Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, κ. τ. λ. The propriety of this word will best appear in a paraphrase of the spirit of the whole passage. It suggests some such train of thought as this: "We have now addressed his reason, and by a summary yet conclusive syllogism, *forcibly*, as it were, compelled him to admit the incorrectness of his positions. Still, although his *reason* is silenced, his *feelings* or imagination may yet refuse to surrender, and may revolt at the idea that the Deity is concerned in all the apparently trivial and minute operations of the universe. There seems, therefore, in addition, to be need of some soothing charms (ἐπῳδῶν), some gentle persuasions, to overcome those prejudices or distastes which will not yield to reason."

Ἐπᾴδειν (ἐπῳδή), with its derivatives, is a favourite word with Plato. What a sublime beauty does it possess in the Phædon, where Socrates, after having gone through the strongest and most recondite arguments that reason could array for a future life, makes, as his ground of confidence, the cheering hope which the belief produces in the soul, and those sweet persuasions of a moral kind, which surpass in power all the deductions of the intellect; "for noble is the prize (he says), and great the hope"—καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. And then, after having gone through the mythical representations of the unseen world, he tells us that the soul must ever chant these to itself as some soothing incantation (τοιαῦτα χρὴ

ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, *Phæd.*, 114, D.), and like the dying swan, to which, in another part of this dialogue, he compares himself, sing this song of immortality more sweetly and more clearly the nearer it approaches that period which is to test the great question forever.

Nothing can be more admirable than the tender care which, throughout this discussion, the Athenian is made to exercise towards his supposed youthful disputant. The philosopher knew that very often little direct influence of a moral kind was produced by means of dialectical argument, however excellent it might be as preparatory to the application of other remedies. He knew that, even where it silenced, it not unfrequently hardened the vanquished disputant to a more tenacious hold upon former prejudices. He therefore, in what succeeds, endeavours to make him feel that this is no matter of mere speculation, like any mere scientific theorem, but that he has a deep personal interest in the great arrangements of Providence, and to impress him with the fact, that as a *part* (although a very small one) of an immense *whole*, the importance and dignity of his own position, instead of being diminished, is magnified by this very circumstance. See remarks, notes 11 and 12, page 11; also, explanation of the word δυσχεραίνειν, note 3, page 8.

XLIX.

The Machinery of Physical Events controlled by Invisible Spiritual Agencies. The Doctrine of Plato and of the Bible.

Page 57, Line 12. Ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι. The form and gender of the word ἄρχοντες will not permit us to regard it as referring to any inanimate influences. It can only mean beings of a higher order than man, to whom the lower parts of the universal administration were thought

to be committed. This doctrine, somewhat modified, we believe to be taught in the Holy Scriptures, without supposing that the Jewish writers, any more than Plato, did not firmly hold to that regular and orderly succession of events and phenomena which we style the laws of nature. They manifestly believed in a connexion of cause and effect, extending in a chain from the throne of God to the minutest operations of the visible world;* and yet all along down this golden chain of celestial influences, and in all its vibrations throughout its immense extent, they constantly recognised the control and guidance of supernatural or angelic beings.

Besides revealing the doctrine, the Scriptures sometimes, as matters of historical fact, draw aside the veil from the invisible world, and lay open to us this constant supernatural agency; as in the account of the angel who descended

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* We find this idea in Hosea, ii., 23, which is commonly thus rendered: *And it shall come to pass in that day, I will hear, saith the Lord, I will hear the heavens; and the heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth shall hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil; and they shall hear Jezreel.* The word עָנָה, here used, means, in its primary sense, *to sing*. Hence, secondly, *to pronounce with a measured and solemn voice;* thirdly, *to respond;* fourthly, *to hear;* having, however, no reference to the auricular sensation, which is expressed by another word. It resembles the Greek *μέλπω, μέλπομαι*, or, rather, *ἀμείβομαι*, and conveys the idea of responsive or choral singing. Hence the passage would be more literally, and at the same time more expressively, rendered thus: *And it shall come to pass in that day, I will sing, saith the Lord, I will sing to the heavens; and the heavens shall sing* (or *respond*) *to the earth; and the earth shall respond to the corn, and the wine, and the oil; and they shall respond to Jezreel.* There seems here a reference to that doctrine of the choral harmony of nature, with which the ancient mind was so filled; as though the touching a chord in heaven, when the great Coryphæus or leader of the universal orchestra gives the starting tone, sounds and vibrates down through all the compass of the notes, until it makes its closing cadence in the end designed to be accomplished.

into the pool of Bethesda, or of the destroying angel that appeared with a drawn sword standing over the devoted city of Jerusalem, 2d Samuel, xxiv., 16, 17. In this latter instance, there is no intimation that it differed in any way from the ordinary method by which God sends pestilence upon the earth, except that here the curtain is withdrawn and the supernatural machinery disclosed. No doubt, second causes were here also at work, and the philosopher of that day, had there been any such to investigate the antecedents and consequents connected with the event, might have bid the Jew

Take heart and banish fear;

yet still, all this would not change the fact, so clearly revealed, that behind them all, however far they may have extended beyond the utmost bounds of scientific research, there stood the spiritual power of God, and his delegated minister, directing them, without any violation of their *visible* order, to the production of the decreed result. Let science cease her babble. We all know, the most ignorant as well as the most learned, that second causes are employed in these visitations. The writers of the Bible were no more ignorant of this, as a general principle, than our most scientific savans, although they may have known less of the steps of the process in its minute details. Even here we surpass them only in having traced a few more links in a chain, in which what is yet unknown sinks all differences of the known into insignificance. These links, in the series of *natural* sequences, may reach back to any extent short of the infinite, and yet leave on the other shore room enough for the *supernatural*, in perfect consistency with them. We have, therefore, no reason at all for inferring that the Scriptures meant to represent this as a miraculous intervention. In every case of pestilence, they would have us believe that the destroying angel is abroad in the air, but in this one, for special reasons, the eye of man was

permitted to behold him.* *He maketh his angels winds, his ministers a fiery flame*, as the inspired Apostle renders it, Heb., i., 17; and not, as it would be explained by the rationalizing interpreter, *he maketh the winds his messengers, and the flaming fire his servants.* The angels of the Lord are ever encamped round about the righteous, although we have but one example in the Bible of the glorious vision being revealed to mortal eyes. See 2 Kings, vi., 17.

The great objection to this view, as it would present itself to some minds, would spring from the prejudice to which Plato alludes in the Epinomis, 982, D., E., and on which we have remarked, pages 226, 227. Men are so much inclined to associate undeviating regularity and constancy in physical motions with a nature implying the absence of a special will and reason; as though an animated personal agency must necessarily be sometimes freaky and capricious in its operations as evidences of the exercise of a personal volition. One answer to such an objection is furnished at once by maintaining that all such intermediate spiritual powers are under the constant control of the Supreme Will and Reason, producing the regularity of natural sequence, not as though it needed such sequences at all as indispensable helps to itself, but for *our sakes*, that by means of them, as signs, we might be able to exercise faith in the general constancy of the Divine operations, and regulate our own conduct in accordance with it. When, however, this feeling becomes practical atheism, prevailing to any great extent among mankind, we have reason to believe that God will come forth, as Plato says in the Politicus, from his retired place of observation, break up the long repose of *nat-*

* There are also in the Bible intimations that evil supernatural agents, under the dominion of the Prince of the Powers of the Air, are sometimes permitted to exercise a physical influence in the affairs of our globe, and thus to afflict men with disease both of mind and body. See Luke, xiii., 16; Job, i., 12; ii., 6, 7.

ural laws, and again astonish the world, as in the early times, by displays of *super*-natural power.

Nemesius, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, alluding to Plato's doctrine of providence, describes it as recognising three divisions. The first province is assigned directly, or without media, to the Deity himself, or, as he styles him, the first God. This has respect to the world of ideas, and the general care of the universe as a whole—*προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμπαντος τοῦ καθόλου κόσμου.* The second department is given in charge of the second or inferior divinities, and has relation to those things which are said to be under the law of generation and corruption—*πάντων τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ*—or, in other words, ordinary physical events. The third relates to the conduct of life, and to the distribution of what he styles organic good and evil. *Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.*, p. 345. We know not in what part of Plato's dialogues authority can be found for this precise division, as Nemesius states it, although for the second some warrant may be discovered in the passage which has furnished the ground of this excursus. For farther information on the ancient views in respect to a special providence, we may consult *Cicero, De Leg.*, ii., 7; *Plutarch., De Fato*, 572, E.; *Eusebius, Præp. Evang.*, 630.

L.

The Ancient Maxim, De Nihilo Nihil.

Page 58, Line 2. *ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνεται πᾶσα ὅπως, κ. τ. λ.*—"That all generation, or every generation, takes place for this purpose, and in such a way," &c. This argument would be better accommodated to modern ideas, and, at the same time, lose none of its force or intended meaning in this place, by rendering *γένεσις cre-*

ation. According to the view we have taken of this word, page 187, it would always signify the bringing into being of what did not exist before, so far as the law or idea was concerned; as when from a different disposition of the same matter an entirely new substance is produced—nitric acid, for example, from what before was atmospheric air. Here there is the creation of a new *being*, although not of any new matter. It would not, however, be quite fair to regard it, in this way, as synonymous with our phrase, *creation out of nothing.* The word *γένεσις*, it is true, does generally imply, in Greek writers, a production in some way out of something pre-existent; and yet this something is not necessarily, or *e vi terminorum*, to be regarded as pre-existent *matter.* Many held to a metaphysical phantom which they styled *hyle* (*ὕλη*), and which the more spiritual philosophers may have adopted to save their favourite maxim, de nihilo nihil. From some such idea as this the Septuagint gave the name *Γένεσις* to that book which treats of the *generations* of the heavens and the earth; and in this they had some countenance from the Hebrew word תּוֹלְדוֹת, Gen., ii., 4. Thus, also, they render the Hebrew substantive verb יְהִי, in the account of the origin of light (Gen., i., 3), not *ἔστω φῶς*, but *γενηθήτω φῶς.* In the same way, Psalm xc., 2—*πρὸ τοῦ ὄρη γενηθῆναι*—although, in this case, it is no more than a faithful rendering of the Hebrew יֻלָּדוּ, a word of precisely similar import, implying *successive generation* from something pre-existent—בְּטֶרֶם הָרִים יֻלָּדוּ וַתְּחוֹלֵל אֶרֶץ וְתֵבֵל—*before the mountains were generated, and the earth was born or brought forth.* In this way do the Scriptures, both Greek and Hebrew, speak of the formation of the *present earth*, or of what may be styled the Mosaic creation.

In regard, however, to that *originating act* which took place in the beginning, mentioned Gen., i., 1, a different language is employed in many parts of the Bible. It is

represented as proceeding from a word or fiat—a *calling* of something from a state of non-existence both in respect to matter and form—as Romans, iv., 17: *καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*; where there seems to be a reference to Isaiah, xlviii., 14—קֹרֵא אֲנִי אֵלֵיהֶם יַעַמְדוּ יַחְדָּו—*My hand hath founded the earth, and my right hand hath spanned the heavens; when I called to them they stood up.* So, also, Isaiah, xli., 4—קֹרֵא הַדֹּרוֹת מֵרֹאשׁ—*who called the generations from the beginning.* To such passages we may trace the similar language of Philo, *De Creat.*, 728: *τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι.* Notwithstanding the clear declarations of the Bible, the Greek ideas of origination, connected with the words *γένεσις* and *ἐγένετο*, maintained their ground for some time, and continued to affect the expressions, if not the intended meaning, of some of the earliest fathers. Even the Jewish Philo, at times, uses language which seems to imply the eternity of matter, if not of the organized world. As when he gives us this account of what he styles the philosophy of Moses, in his treatise *De Mundi Opificio*, page 2, B.: "Moses, who had attained the highest summit of philosophy, knew that it was *most necessary* (*ἀναγκαιότατον*) that in existing things (*ἐν τοῖς οὖσι*) there should be, on the one hand, the efficient (*δραστήριον*), namely, the universal mind, most pure and unmixed with anything else, and, on the other hand, something inert, passive, or passible, destitute of soul and motion (*ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον*), which when moved, endowed with form, and animated by the mind aforesaid, should be converted into this most perfect work, the world." Although in this very argument he is disputing against the eternity of the world, yet he seems to regard the ultimate element of matter as one of the two necessary existences, almost as much so as mind itself; and his language greatly resembles that in which Cicero describes the doctrine of one of the ancient schools: De natura autem ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas: ut

altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, eaque efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant: in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quamdam: in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque VIM SINE ALIQUA MATERIA. *Cic.*, *Acad. Post.*, 6. In other places, however, he contends clearly and strongly that even the *hyle*, or unformed principle of matter itself, had been created in the beginning by the direct act of God.

In general, the Christian fathers, with some wavering arising from the systems of philosophy in which they had been first instructed, assert pretty clearly an absolute creation from a state in which there was no pre-existent matter (which we prefer to the expression, out of nothing); although, in stating the Scriptural doctrine, they often use language which was more congenial with the opposite system. The words *γένεσις* and *γενητόν* were employed for creation, and *ἀγένητον* was used as synonymous with *ἄκτιστον*. In consequence, however, of discussions growing out of the Nicene controversy, and the doctrine of the eternal generation of The Son, they made a distinction between *γενητός* and *γεννητός*, and *ἀγένητος* and *ἀγέννητος*, which is far from being so evident in classical Greek as in the Patristic writings. Christ, they said, was *γεννητός*, but not *γενητός*; or, in other words, he was *ἀγένητος* and *ἄκτιστος*, but not *ἀγεννητός*. So, also, the first progenitor of any organized species was *ἀγέννητος*, although nothing was *ἀγένητος* which was beneath the Divine hypostases. Vide *Cyril. Alexand.*, *De Sancta Trinit.*, 8, page 37.

The Greek philosophers have been, almost all of them, charged with teaching the eternity of matter, and of having been universally agreed in the tenet, that nothing could be created or generated out of nothing, or, as it is expressed by Lucretius,

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.

No doubt this was the doctrine of many, if not most of them, even in the modern acceptation of the terms; that is, they believed in no creation or generation except from pre-existent matter with all the properties of matter as it now exists; or, in other words, the visible material universe was eternal, whatever changes or modifications it might in the lapse of ages have undergone. It was thus held by the Ionic school in all its branches, by some of the Italian, and by all who were atheistically inclined. It was also maintained, however inconsistently, by some who were undoubted theists, as by Plutarch, and a few others who have been styled Platonists.

We cannot, however, charge any of them with these consequences simply from the language of the maxim, as it may be taken in different senses; in some of which it is not only consistent with the purest theism, but absolutely essential to its proper explanation and defence. It is by no means clear that the eternity of matter was ever held by Plato; and, although some things in the Timæus may look that way when only partially considered, yet are they all capable of a consistent interpretation on a different hypothesis. His doctrine of the inherent evil of matter does not at all, by any necessity, involve its eternity. It was not connected with any necessary *existence* of matter, but with certain necessary properties which it *must* possess if created—without which it could not be matter, and without which God could not cause it to exist. Vide remarks on the Platonic doctrine of *ἀνάγκη*, pages 217, 218. In The Laws, as we have seen, his evil principle is spiritual, and has, therefore, nothing to do with the dogma against which we are defending him. Even if he had held it, it would not have been a heresy fatal to his claim to be regarded as a pure theist, although an inconsistent one; and the circumstances in which he was placed would have presented the same palliation as we have offered for his doctrine of

evil. But, indeed, we know of no system of philosophy to which the tenet in question, in this gross form, would have been more foreign. To have allowed any *necessary self-existence* to matter would have been directly in the face of some of his most favourite notions, and especially opposed to that grand division in the Timæus, in which, under the general name *τὸ ὁρατόν*, it is expressly excluded from the class of the *τῶν ὄντως ὄντων*, and assigned to that of the *γιγνομένων καὶ οὐδέποτε ὄντως ὄντων*. Vide page 172, and the remarks on the distinction between the verbs *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*. Nothing can be more express than the declaration that matter—not as organized, but in the most extreme or lowest state in which it can be matter, or, as he defines it in the most general terms, the tangible, the visible, the extended—belongs to the class of generated, in distinction from eternal existences: *ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τε καὶ σῶμα ἔχων γιγνόμενος καὶ γενητὸς ἐφάνη*. *Tim.*, 28. And when we connect this with another proposition in the same passage—*πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι*—"that everything which is *γιγνόμενον* must have been produced by some cause"—it seems impossible any longer to maintain that Plato regarded matter in any state as belonging to the world of *necessary entities;* and if not *necessary*, then not eternal in its nature; for he ever uses the two terms as mutually implying one another. It would also be in opposition to that high and even hyper-spirituality which runs through all his writings, and which would warrant us in giving to them collectively, as their compendious title, "*The SOUL, its eternal nature; its infinite value; its superior antiquity to matter; the immense pre-eminence of incorporeal when compared with corporeal substances, and the utter worthlessness of the whole material universe in itself, or when not viewed as subservient to the higher wants of the spirit.*"

It is true that, in conformity with this ancient maxim,

De nihilo nihil—*ὡς οὐ δύναται οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι*—which, as it stands in the Greek, unmarred by any attempt to transfer it to a more imperfect language, is one of the clearest axioms of reason—he held to an elementary principle, or *ἀρχή*, more ancient than matter, even in its lowest organized state, and which he and others styled *hyle* (*ὕλη*). Although he sometimes seems to use this term in the sense of material or source, yet he could not have meant by it matter itself as something solid, extended, or resisting, since he expressly denies to it any of these properties, or, indeed, any connexion in itself with the sensible world; regarding it, in fact, as belonging to the *νοητά*, rather than, in any sense, to the *αἰσθητά*. No sublimation or refinement of the conception of resisting substance, even when carried to its most æthereal limits—not even the nebular star dust* or rudimentary fluid of the universe, which some modern writers find so convenient an aid in the construction of planetary systems—made the least approach to it; for it was not a mere difference of degree, but a metaphysical entity altogether distinct. It is very difficult to understand precisely what idea Plato and other Greek philosophers attached to this elementary *hyle*, without form, exten-

* This is a favourite term with those scientific men who are ever talking about the progression of the universe from the lower to the higher, from the imperfect to the more perfect, from the unorganized to the organized, and, as they ought to say if they would consistently follow out their theory, from matter to mind, and, finally, to a God. But, on another hypothesis of occasional retrogradations (which no one who considers the vast extent of the universe can deny to be possible, probable, and in perfect consistency with some unfathomable designs of its Eternal Author), the peculiar celestial appearances indicated by this phrase may be, in fact, the floating remains of worlds going out, and in the last stages of their approach to inanity. We are too much in the condition of the fly on the Pyramids, to determine with any satisfaction, unless we resort to reasons drawn from revelation, which theory is correct, or whether we are *physically* nearer our descending or ascending node.

sion, parts, or divisibility. Some ἀρχή or principle seems to have been in his mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity, and existing with him before the formation of the outward material universe.* We are confident, for the reasons assigned, that he did not hold to its necessary eternity, but it is not easy to determine whether he regarded it as an emanation, a generation, or a creation, in the more modern sense of the word. Whether it was merely space regarded as an ἀρχή, or first principle, like the ἄπειρον, or *infinite* of Anaximander; or something similar to the unextended points in the modern theory of Boscovitch; whether it was the manifestation of the Divine power in space, so that visible outward matter would be only those impressions upon soul, of resistance, figure, &c., which are the result of the action of the Divine immaterial principle—a theory which, although ridiculed as Berkleian and absurd, gives us all the results or properties of matter, which is matter enough for all substantial purposes, while yet it leaves spirit, in reality, the only οὐσία, or essence in the universe—or whatever else we may suppose, it is certain that Plato did not teach the necessary self-existence of matter according to the common idea, that is, as a substance composed of solid, extended parts or particles, whether regarded as existing in an organized or a chaotic state.

The axiom *De nihilo nihil*, or others similar to it, may be found in his writings and those of Aristotle. They both regarded it as a self-evident truth; and the latter, in the first book of his Physics, c. 4, asserts that it was the common

* In the passage of the Timæus which we have cited page 123, he uses language which seems to describe it as the matter or material from which matter was formed, yet still without any of its sensible properties. He also styles it there the *mother* of the sensible world, as though it were the passive or negative principle, while God was the father, or positive power, which produced its manifestations in time and space.

opinion of all the ancient naturalists, *that nothing could come into being from that which was not*—*κοινὴ δόξα τῶν φυσικῶν, ὡς οὐ* ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΥ *οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ* ΟΝΤΟΣ. This is capable, it is true, of being taken in the atheistic or materializing sense by those who lay no emphasis on the contrast between the two substantive verbs, or who regard the latter, in this expression, as significant of the material, or of the *terminus a quo*. If, however, we keep in mind the radical distinction between *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*, as explained page 171, and which is generally maintained by Plato in all important propositions, we shall find this sentence divested at once of all objectionable features, and presented, as it really is, as one of the clearest dictates of reason. This language may be, and has been, used by the atheist; but it is capable of being employed with far more power against him. Aristotle gives us the key to this higher sense in another place, where he says, with his usual conciseness, *ὥστε ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι*—that essential or necessary being must be before generation; or, in other words, that there must be a *being* before a *becoming*. Vide *Arist.*, *Phys. Ausc.*, i., 9. The position, thus understood, is that which forms the very soul of Plato's philosophy, namely, the superior rank and antiquity of incorporeal substance in respect to all derived or generated things. It is the very position which he so strongly maintains in this tenth book of The Laws, to wit, "that soul (in its largest sense, and including the Divine Soul, as the source from whence all other spirits proceed, and in which they may be said to pre-exist) must, of necessity, have existed eternally, or that mind is necessarily older than matter." Instead of being favourable to atheism, it is, when thus held, the grand conservative principle which ever stands in direct opposition to it. The English fails properly to express the axiom, in this sense, from the want of two words exactly corresponding to *εἰμί* and *γίγνομαι*; and when care-

lessly rendered it seems to favour the eternal existence of matter. The Latin has the same defect; and hence the atheistic perversion by Lucretius to a purpose so different from that intended by Plato and the Grecian theists. This arises from referring the term *ὄντος*, as well as *γιγνομένου*, to generated and phenomenal being, to which, when used in this higher sense, and especially when placed in such direct antithesis, it has no application; and we are thus led into the mistake that *all* the ancient philosophers taught that matter could only proceed from pre-existent matter.

The idea conveyed by the proposition, *οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι*, or, if the positive form is preferred, *πάντα ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γενέσθαι*, may be shown to be very similar to that of the Apostle, Hebrews, xi., 3: *By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the Word of God, so that the things that are seen were not made* (*γεγονέναι*) *from things which do appear*, *ἐκ φαινομένων*. There is another reading given by Griesbach, namely, *ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων*; on what authority, however, we know not. This would change the sentence to the positive form, and bring it nearer to the Greek maxim when taken in the higher sense to which we have alluded, but would not essentially vary its meaning. It would then be rendered, *By faith we understand that the worlds were formed, so that the things which are seen were made from things which are not seen;* or, in other words, that *the visible or phenomenal was made from the invisible.* A slight attention will show a resemblance to the Greek maxim which does not at first sight appear, and that the language of the Apostle is in several respects similar to the Platonic. Besides the distinctions so frequently conveyed by *ὄντα* and *γιγνόμενα*, the same ideas are variously expressed in Plato by the terms *ὁρατά* or *φαινόμενα* (the *visible*, or *phenomenal*), used in place of *γιγνόμενα*; and *ἀόρατα*, *ἀειδῆ*, or *μὴ φαινόμενα*, used as synonymous with *τὰ ὄντα*. By these and kindred terms he ever opposes the visible to the

invisible, the phenomenal to the essential, the ever-changing objects of sense (*τὰ αἰσθητά*) to the *νοητά*, or those necessary, eternal things which are the objects of the intellect alone. It is not supposed that Paul had any direct reference to Plato or to Platonic language; but we cannot doubt that he uses these words in a similar philosophical sense, especially when we compare the many coincidences of expression, and remember that, although originally derived from Plato, these terms, in the Apostle's time, had become a part of the current scholastic phraseology, with which he must have been familiar. So, also, the words *τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα* (*the unseen things*), which we find Hebrews, xi., 1, and which are equivalent to *μὴ φαινόμενα* in the third verse, are elsewhere used by the Apostle to express the same class of substances which are so frequently styled by Plato, *τὰ ὄντα, τὰ ὁρατά, τὰ ἀειδή, τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα.* Compare 2d *Corinthians*, iv., 18: *μὴ σκοπούντων ἡμῶν τὰ βλεπόμενα ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα· τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα αἰώνια—while we aim not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are unseen; for the things which are seen are temporal* (*belong to time*)*; the things which are unseen are eternal.* The striking resemblance which this bears to some passages in the Phædon cannot be mistaken: *Θῶμεν οὖν δὴ δύο εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές· και τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά*—"Let us lay down two classes of being, *the seen* and *the unseen:* the unseen, *eternal* in their relations; the seen, never the same, but ever changing." *Phædon*, 79, A. The terms are nearly, if not quite, synonymous. *Πρόσκαιρα* is that which exists in time, temporal, or, rather, temporary—liable to change—the opposite of *ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχοντα.* On the other hand, *αἰώνια* is that which is eternal, not simply in duration, but in its very nature, as not belonging to time—fixed, unchangeable, and ne-

cessary—*ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα.* In these passages, neither Paul nor Plato mean by the *unseen things* a mere negation of sense, namely, that which is simply concealed from view as a present fact, or not seen because belonging to a future untried state of existence; but rather *those things that are in their very nature invisible*, that is, which belong not to the sensible world—either the present or any one to come—the *νοητά* as distinguished from the *αἰσθητά*, or the objects of faith and reason as distinguished from the objects of sense. See, also, *Rom.*, i., 20.

We find the doctrine of the *hyle* in the apocryphal book entitled The Wisdom of Solomon, ch. xi., 18: *καὶ κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης*—"having built the earth out of the unformed, or, rather, formless hyle." Compare, also, the Septuagint version of Genesis, i., 2: *ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος.* The word *ἀόρατος* here could only have been used in reference to the Greek doctrine, which represented the hyle not only as invisible, but as incapable of being seen; in fact, as not belonging at all to the sensible world, even if it could not be ranked among the *νοητά.* It may be doubted whether we ever ought, in translating the more strict philosophers, to render *ὕλη* by our term *matter*, unless we can conceive of it as an essence abstracted from qualities, figure, and extension. That God may have created such an essence we have no right to deny, merely because our minds can form no conception of it; and if it may exist as the *originally created* ground of all subsequently generated or created material things when manifested in time and space and clothed with qualities by that Eternal Spirit, which, we are told in Genesis, hovered over the chaotic deep, then may the doctrine of Plato and of the more spiritual writers of the ancient world be in accordance with the philosophy of Paul, Hebrews, xi., 3.

Our only safety here is in clinging to the Bible, and to the fair interpretation of Genesis, i., 1. Human reason left

to itself, finds tremendous difficulties in both views; and when she rejects the aid of revelation, must shrink from taking a decided position on either. The belief that matter in any form, as an independent principle, is eternal, or that anything is such apart from God, carries us to atheism, although it may be maintained by an honest yet inconsistent theist. On the other hand, the doctrine that God once existed *alone*, or that there was a time when *God was all*, seems to draw after it the strange consequences that he never could have ceased *to be all*, or have become *less than all*, and that therefore creation is but an extension of his being; or, in other words, we are in danger of a pantheism seemingly more philosophical, yet less favourable to piety than the inconsistent theism which we have condemned. Reason reels and staggers here like a drunken man, and if she will walk alone, finds a dark abyss on each side of her narrow path, into which she is perpetually in danger of stumbling. There may possibly be a way between these two conclusions, but her eyes are too dim to discover it. The Scriptures most solemnly declare that *God did call into being things that were not*, and yet denies the consequence which reason, if she will trust herself alone, can hardly avoid deducing from it. We must, therefore, on this subject, as on the doctrine of evil, keep close to revelation, ready at a moment's warning, and without a murmur, to give up our most darling philosophy, if it comes at all in collision with any truth which a sound and unforced interpretation would elicit. Neither should we be afraid for our Protestantism, even if we are reluctant to adopt any interpretation which differs from that long received by the Church; by which we ever mean that line of the good, and pious, and learned in the Scriptures, in all ages, which no spiritually-minded reader of ecclesiastical history can ever fail to trace. In such a case as this, too, we should feel that the most pious interpretation is most likely to be true.

even if it should not *seem* to be the most philosophical. If we cannot comprehend a *positive* enunciation of the great truth, we must be content with a *negative* one, better adapted, perhaps, to the present state of our faculties, and *believe by faith that the worlds were not made of things which do appear.*

There is a passage in the Sophista in which Plato speaks plainly of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, from things which before were not. It is very much in the style of the Scriptures, and no better refutation of some of the charges against him could be given than this clear declaration from this undoubted dialogue: *Ζῶα δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτά, ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται—μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον* ΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ *πρότερον οὐκ* ΟΝΤΑ—"In regard to all mortal animals and plants, whatever things grow from roots and seeds, whatever inanimate organizations exist in the earth—can we say that from any other cause than the creating God they *come into being* which before *were not?*" *Sophista*, 265, B.

Page 58, Line 3. *ὅπως ᾗ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία*—"All generation, or every generation, is taking place in such a manner that the essence which pertains to the universal life (or life of the whole) may be blessed." This is the best rendering we can give of this obscure passage. Ast translates it, *ut universæ vitæ felix obtingat status.* It is not clear what Plato means by the expression, *ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχουσα τῷ παντὸς βίῳ*; whether the life of the universe taken collectively as the sum of all which exists—in which case it would seem that *βίος τοῦ παντὸς* would have been sufficient—or whether he intends by *οὐσία* something higher than this, namely, that essence from which the life of the universe proceeds, or, in other words, the Universal Numen or Deity himself. If the last

view be the true one, Plato approaches a higher doctrine than has ever been supposed to be taught in his pages.

LI.

Doctrine that the Parts are made only for the Whole, as set forth by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and Semi-infidels. The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is also for the Parts, examined with reference to the Mutual Harmony of both.

PAGE 58, LINE 4. *οὐκ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου.* The doctrine that the parts are made for the whole is unquestionably true, especially when viewed in reference to physical ends alone. It is, however, only a portion of the truth, and when, as in Pope's Essay on Man, and in the writings of many scientific religionists, it is unqualified by any other views of the system of the universe, it may be very far from any true religious tendency. Indeed, in some minds, it might easily coalesce with atheism; and although its advocates may sometimes seem to talk devoutly, it has much more of the appearance of philosophy than of piety about it. It is a speculative tenet, not much dwelt upon in the Scriptures, and, instead of being directly expressed there, is rather implied in a higher truth, to which, as we have intimated, Plato might have been darkly aiming in the language referred to in the close of the preceding dissertation, namely, the doctrine that the *whole itself, with all its parts severally and collectively*, is made, not for itself, but for a manifestation of the Divine glory and blessedness; a doctrine, the object of most bitter dislike to the frigid rationalist, but which contains an inexpressible moral sublimity to the mind that will have no philosophy which is not in accordance with the teachings of the Sacred Volume.

Irrespective, however, of this higher truth, the proposition here set forth has a converse which is also equally true, namely, that *the whole is made for the parts.* This is not the *opposite* of the other, for in that case they could not both be true, but, as we have styled it, its *converse.* It might be maintained even on physical grounds. "An organized product," says Kant, "is that in which all the parts are mutually *ends* and *means*," that is, not merely in respect to those below them in the scale, but each severally and reciprocally in respect to all the rest. In a much higher sense is this true of that organized product so appropriately styled by the scholastic name *The Universe.* Even on physical grounds, then, may we say, that the whole is as much necessary to make each part what *it is*, and without which it could not have been what *it is*, as the parts are for the completion and harmony of the whole.

It is chiefly, however, in a moral point of view that this converse doctrine assumes a most glorious and thrilling interest. There are some seemingly most inconsiderable portions of the creation for which we are assured that all things are working together for good: *τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν Θεὸν* ΠΑΝΤΑ *συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν. Romans*, viii., 28. So, also, 1 *Corinthians*, iii., 21, 22: ΠΑΝΤΑ *ὑμῶν ἐστιν —ALL things are yours; whether THE WORLD,* or life, or death, or the present, or the future, ALL are yours—πάντα ὑμῶν ἐστιν.* There are again, on the other hand, other parts, of no higher rank, for which all things are working together for evil. "If nothing else," says one of the ablest writers of modern times, "if nothing else, our sins shall give us consequence." Although the other doctrine may be speculatively correct, yet these latter are the views which have the greatest prominence given to them in revelation. The Author of the Bible does not intend that man shall hide himself in an affectation of insignificance, or cover up his

* Here *κόσμος* must certainly be taken in its largest sense.

individualism in what the sentimental humility of his philosophy might style his subserviency to the interests of the universal life. The proposition, against the abuse of which we are contending, might seem, at first view, to be grounded on more enlarged and comprehensive notions of existence. It has so much to say of the great whole, and of a kind of Strauss-ian immortality, which belongs to the race rather than to the individual parts. It is, however, mainly true in a *physical* aspect; and when it occupies the mind alone, or the *moral* importance of the individual is not held up as a corrective, it becomes a cold and speculative fatalism—a *physical fatalism*, in the worst sense of the term, which would bind both matter and spirit, not by the *decrees** of a moral governor, founded on moral reasons, but in the adamantine chain of law viewed as something apart from God—a fatalism which would regard even the Deity himself, should it graciously admit his existence, as *included* in the machinery of the universe. Such a doctrine possesses but little, if any, superiority over the creed of the atheist.

Akin to this is that profession of abstract benevolence which loses sight of individuality in the contemplation of masses or of the great whole, and affects to regard individual happiness only as contributing to the general happiness of the universe. This, although it may be agreeable to the speculative intellect, or to those whose theology is but a philosophy, is nevertheless most chilling to all the moral and religious affections. Its concrete selfishness is only hardened and rendered darker, while, at the same time, it is more and more concealed from the conscience, by the false warmth and glow of an abstract benevolence. Its love to God is only a pantheistic rapture, instead of a feeling of gratitude to a personal Redeemer. Its affection to man is not that love to one's neighbour which the Bible en-

* This unquestionably was the primitive sense of the word *fatum*.

joins, commencing with the domestic and social relations, from whence, as from a centre, it radiates on every side, ever *filling*, but never attempting to overflow the limits of its practical capabilities for good. Those of whom we are speaking—and these declaimers on the greatest good of the greatest number are becoming quite numerous—have really no neighbour, no *vicinus*, *no vicinage*. The word is altogether too narrow in its meaning to suit their expanded views. The individual man who fell among thieves would have been too small and too contiguous an object for such as can only aim at promoting some great scheme for higher developments of the race. Children, family, home, country, friends, all are but fetters to that reforming zeal which leads them to pant so earnestly and so incessantly for the welfare of being in the abstract. Such a philosophical theology may make a selfish mystic or pantheist, luxuriating in some fancied vision of universal good; it may make, under certain circumstances, a raving fanatic, furious in denunciation in proportion to the self-righteousness of his abstract philanthropy; but it never has produced, and never will produce, an humble, devoted, and warm-hearted Christian.

Plato does, indeed, teach this doctrine of the parts for the whole, and we have admitted it to be true when rightly qualified by its converse. Other writings, however, of our philosopher, furnish most abundant evidence that he did hold this converse proposition as equally sound with the one he is now presenting, and which was called forth by the peculiar nature of the objection against which he is here contending. He tells the profane scoffer that this Special Providence will not overlook him, because, though small, he is yet important as a *part* of the great whole. When presenting, however, in other places, the moral aspect of the doctrine, he adopts a very different line of argument. Poverty, sickness, health, life, death, ALL THINGS, he

tells us, are for the righteous man *beloved of Heaven.* His language possesses a striking resemblance to some parts of the Scriptures: Τῷ δὲ ΘΕΟΦΙΛΕΙ *οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν* ΠΑΝΤΑ *γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα*; Οὕτως ἄρα *ὑπολεπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρὸς ἐάν τε ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τε ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν· ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι.* *Republic*, 613, A., B. *Physically*, he would teach us, man is but an atom, subserving the interests of the great whole; *morally*, all things, even a universe of mind and matter, is working together for his individual exaltation or degradation. Instead of dwindling into the insignificance of an infinitesimal, he rises in proportion to the magnitude of that universe of which he is a member, or, in other words, becomes of the greatest individual importance as a rational part of the greatest whole.

These apparently opposite yet strictly consistent views are likewise equally true in science. The whole cannot be fully understood without the parts, and it is an axiom no less important, that some a priori knowledge of a whole as a whole, that is, as a unity, and not merely an arithmetical sum, is necessary to an understanding of the parts. It is by the mutual action, reaction, and introaction of such a mental synthesis and analysis, that any true progress is made in science. When either is neglected, or the balance is destroyed, science becomes, on the one hand, an *ἐμπειρία ἄλογος*,* an *irrational empiricism*, or evaporates, on the other, into empty a priori speculation.

Page 58, Line 5. *Πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς.* The comparison adopted shows that Plato views the doctrine which the present state of his argument requires him to advance, namely, that the parts are made for the whole, rather in its physical than its moral aspect. It

* Gorgias, 464, D.

is not the *κυβερνήτης*, the *στρατηγός*, the commander, the governor, the pilot—comparisons so often employed by him in illustration of moral and political relations—but the physician, the artist, all of whose efforts are directed to the physical perfection of the work in which they are engaged, or that physical harmony which consists in the subserviency of the parts to the whole irrespective of any moral considerations. This is the order of physical production, and of those arts and sciences that copy from it—*μέρος ἕνεκα ὅλου.* It forms the parts for the whole, and not the whole, *in any sense*, for the parts.

Line 6. *πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον βέλτιστον.* Ast and Stephanus would both read *ξυντείνων* in this place, and refer it to the artist. The common reading, however, although the literal version in English is very harsh, seems, on the whole, to be deserving of preference. It more properly has for its subject the work than the workman; as in the example a few lines back—*μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει.* It may here be taken with *βέλτιστον*, and the sentence would be freely translated, *doeth all things for the whole, in respect to that best end which aims at the common good;* that is, in this case, the *physical good*, the good of the machine or structure as a structure, moral reasons, strictly such, not being here brought into view. The argument, then, when carried no farther, would be this: God will not overlook you; his special providence is ever directed towards you, because, however insignificant you may be, physically, in yourself, you are wanted to fill up some place or some vacancy in the great structure, for which nothing else is so well adapted. You may therefore *seem* to be laid aside, but you are not forgotten—his eye is upon you.

Line 8. *ἀγνοῶν ὅπη τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοί.* It is somewhat uncertain whether *ἄριστον* here is to be taken with *τὸ περὶ σὲ*, or with *τῷ παντὶ*, or *ξυμβαίνει.* *Ξυμβαίνει*, however, may be rendered, *to con-*

tribute to the good of anything, or to the accomplishment of any purpose, without any such qualifying word as ἄριστον. It makes but little difference, in the general sense, what view we take of it, and, on the whole, we prefer the following version: *You are vexed, not knowing how that, in relation to yourself, which is best for the whole, contributes also to your own good;* or, if we connect ἄριστον with ξυμβαίνει, it may be read, *not knowing how that which relates to thee best contributes to the good both of the whole and of thee.* At the hazard, then, of a little repetition, we would give the following free paraphrase of the substance of the whole passage; the latter part, however, or converse doctrine, being rather implied than expressed, although it may be clearly found in other parts of the Platonic dialogues: Physically, thou art but an insignificant pebble in the great κτίσμα, or building of the universe (see the comparison of the λίθοι and λιθολόγοι, page 55), yet forming a necessary part in the joinings and compactness of the whole, even absolutely essential to the whole as a whole, and which the builder and keeper cannot neglect without risking the ruin of the whole: morally, the great universe is also all made for thee, and reciprocally for each of its rational parts; it was intended, with all its other parts, to have a bearing upon thy blessedness or misery, according as thou violatest or remainest in concord with its moral harmony; its physical harmony thou shalt ever subserve, whatever may be thy condition or thy course.

LII.

Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe.

PAGE 59, LINE 6. Ἤιπερ ἂν ἔχοι λόγον ῥᾳστώνη θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν—"I think that I am explaining in what way ease in the administration of the

Divine providence may have reason, that is, may be shown to be in accordance with reason." The Epicureans and semi-atheists, in all ages, have been much concerned lest the physical and moral government of the universe should be burdensome to the Deity. Lucretius was unable to see how it could consist with the happiness of the Gods. He therefore most reverently relieves them of all share in so troublesome a business, and, with pious concern for their ease and quiet, commits the world into the hands of Nature :

> Quæ bene cognita si teneas, *Natura* videtur
> Libera continuo, *dominis privata superbis*,
> Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers.
> Nam, pro sancta Deûm tranquillâ pectora pace
> Quæ placidum degunt ævom, multumque serenum!
> Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
> Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
> Quis pariter cœlos omneis convortere, et omneis
> Ignibus ætheriis terras subfire feraceis;
> Omnibus inve locis esse omni tempore præsto,
> Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, cœlique serena
> Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, et ædeis
> Ipse suas disturbet; et in deserta recedens
> Sæviat, exercens telum; quod sæpe nocenteis
> Præterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis?
>
> *Lucretius*, lib. ii., 1089.

Horace entertained the same very elevated notions in regard to natural laws and the abstraction of the Deity from all the concerns of this world, until he was frightened into a little unphilosophical piety by happening to hear it thunder on a clear day. See Ode xxxiv. of the first book, commencing

> Parcus Deorum cultor et infrequens,
> Insanientis dum sapientiæ
> Consultus erro—

He seems to have been brought by his fright into quite a religious fit, and the sentiment with which the ode concludes is not only a devout acknowledgment of a special

providence, but is expressed in language bearing a striking resemblance to some of those many passages in the Bible which speak of depressing the proud and elevating the lowly:

> Valet ima summis
> Mutare et insignem attenuat Deus,
> Obscura promens: hinc apicem rapax
> Fortuna cum stridore acuto
> Sustulit; hic posuisse gaudet.

His use, however, of the word *Fortuna* shows that he could not altogether divest himself of his old atheistic habit, even when he attempts to talk religiously. Some of our modern scientifico-religious works occasionally exhibit a similar mixture of the Jew's language with the dialect of Ashdod.

LIII.

Explanation of a Difficult Passage. Remarks on those Views which resolve Morality into an Obedience to Physical Laws, and regard all Punishment as Consequential instead of Penal.

Page 59, Line 7. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, κ. τ. λ. This obscure passage may be thus paraphrased: "For if any Power, having constantly regard only to the whole, should ever fashion his work by suddenly transforming all things—as, for example, by forming at once frozen water from fire—and should not* proceed by (analyzing) many things out of one, or (compounding) one thing out of many, so that they might thus partake of a first, a second, and even a third generation—in that case, the transformations of each displaced arrangement would be infinite in number; but now (that is, in the actual established course of things)

* Ast, by taking, in this place, ἢ for the common reading, μὴ, has completely changed and perverted the whole meaning of the passage.

there is a wonderful ease in the administration of the Universal Guardian."

We will proceed to give what seems to us the general sense of the passage, and of what follows it for some distance, before going into any particular comment on words and phrases. It seems to be this: the speaker is showing that the Divine administration, even when extended to the most minute particular, is conducted with ease, in consequence of being a *special* superintendence carried on by *general* laws or media, whatever they may be, or by the internal operation of powers which he has implanted in things themselves; so that there is no necessity for supposing any great or general change, or sudden transformation in the state of things (what would be called, in modern phraseology, a miraculous interposition), for the rectification of natural or the punishment of moral evil—a transposition which, if it took place in every case, would call for an infinite number of changes, differing in every instance, and as miraculous as the immediate production of cold water* or ice

* In the text, we have given *ὕδωρ ἐμψύχον*. The common reading is *ἔμψυχον*, and those who maintain it would render *ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον*, *aquam animatam;* to make any sense of which they refer us to the doctrine of Thales and Heraclitus, that water was the first principle of all things, and who also said something about fire, changed into water, being the universal semen. What is told us here about the changes and transformations of matter has, it is true, some little resemblance to the flowing philosophy of Heraclitus. Still, this resemblance is only verbal. The illustration would be too far-fetched and obscure to suit the present place, in which the Athenian is labouring to give his hearers as clear an idea as possible of this difficult position. It would also be giving a sanction to Heraclitus which Plato could never have intended; and besides all this, it is very difficult to perceive how it would present any illustration at all of the subject he has in hand. We therefore altogether prefer the other reading, which only requires the change of an accent, and which has some authority of manuscripts in its favour. *Ἐμψύχον* would be a participle of the verb *ἐμψύχω*, *to cool, to freeze*, and may be taken as

from fire, without any of the intervening generations; thus giving to rational beings no grounds for physical science, or a knowledge of the Divine operations, and making every act of Providence, instead of moving in harmony with, to jar and displace every preceding and temporary arrangement. Instead of this, as we are told in what follows, he has so constituted things, not by any innate necessities of physical laws, but by his own absolute fiat, that good and evil will find in themselves, both in this world and in the pre-arrangements of Hades, their appropriate reward, and will each seek and find its proper place and level; namely, vice will diverge, at first slightly, from the level plane, and thence descending with constantly-accelerated velocity (*εἰς βάθος*), will find its ultimate place in the terrors of Hades; while virtue, mingling with the Divine nature, will ascend to a purer region, and through different degrees of blessedness will at last arrive at a perfectly holy or separate state, *τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον*.

This doctrine of Plato, and the mode in which he states it, is indeed sublime. Still, it needs a qualification similar to the one we applied to a previous view—a qualification for which there may be found abundant support in other portions of his writings where he maintains the strictly penal nature of punishment, as in the close of the Gorgias and the Republic. The doctrine which seems to be here presented is the truth, but not the whole truth. Standing thus alone, and without the corrective influence of any higher views, it is a favourite scheme with many of our modern semi-infidels, who would resolve all morality into an obe-

equivalent to the adjective *frigidus*. We doubt if Plato meant anything more by it than a strong example derived from substances apparently so remote, although capable of passing into each other through a succession of physical media and generations. The other and more common reading probably arose from some ignorant transcriber, who did not understand the passage, and to whom *ἔμψυχον*, *animatam*, appeared more philosophical.

dience to, or a co-operation with, physical laws, and all punishment into natural consequence. We do not wonder at the partiality with which it is entertained by such. They feel that it has no terror for a sinning soul, and that it utterly takes away all the moral power which belongs to the ideas of penalty and retribution. At the same time, they are pleased with it as a wonderful discovery of the nineteenth century, when, in fact, they have merely revived a doctrine of some of the old heathen philosophers, who held that it was the great duty and chief end of man *to live according to nature—Vivere secundum naturam.* Vide *Cicero, De Finibus*, v., 9.

With writers of this stamp it is the whole. When employed by Plato and Bishop Butler, it is only held in subserviency to higher qualifying views of the Divine government, with which it is entirely consistent. Those to whom we allude would confine the maxim, *vivere secundum naturam*, entirely to the nature without us; whereas, in obedience to the law of a higher nature, man is often called to contend with the external world. The perfection of his moral being requires that he should often contemn the law of gravitation, and sometimes even submit that most exquisite handiwork, his body, with all its most wonderful natural laws, to be disfigured, ruined, and utterly broken up in the flames of martyrdom. Still, there is a truth in this morality of nature, and it is only by refusing to associate with it any higher principle that such writers convert it into a most pernicious falsehood.

So, also, may we admit, that the doctrine, that the punishment of sin is the physical consequence of sin itself, is found in the Bible. "*What a man soweth, that shall he also reap.*" "*He that soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption: he that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap everlasting life.*" Revelation declares all this, but it also teaches with much more frequency and with more sol-

emn emphasis, that the punishment of sin is, in the strictest sense, a penalty pronounced by a sovereign judge. "*The wicked shall go away into everlasting fire, PREPARED for the devil and his angels.*" Physical consequences, even when they are strictly such, may be regarded as but pre-appointed executioners, deriving their powers, and their connexion with the sin, from no inward necessities, but from the sovereign pre-arrangements of God; while the law of which they may thus form the penalty is anterior, both in the order of nature and of time, to all the laws of the natural world. The great absurdity of this scheme, when it thus stands alone, consists in this, that it is the penalty which creates the sin. It is wrong to eat too much, because it will be followed by a pain in the stomach; and men are punished with a pain in the stomach, because they have been guilty of a breach of its physical law. Remove the pain, and you remove the sin. Can any one bring himself to feel that anything like this would be true in regard to a breach of the law of charity, or that malevolence would change its moral character, though it could be followed by an eternity of pleasure? If the violation of a physical law proceeds from a disposition to contemn a known arrangement of God, whatever may have been the object of that arrangement, it belongs to another department, and must be transferred to a tribunal higher than the natural.

It is by overlooking the nature of punishment as strictly retributive, notwithstanding the mode of its infliction, that this doctrine of consequential suffering strips the Divine law of all its majesty, and becomes such a favourite with infidels and neologists. There is no terror in it; and when employed, as it sometimes is even in the pulpit, without the qualifications to which we have adverted, its immediate effect is ease and stupefaction of the conscience, rather than any alarm or true conviction of sin. There is, however, no inconsistency in the belief of both views. The punishment

inflicted by human government would be no less the retributive penalty of positive law, although its preordained arrangements were such, that the path of every transgressor was *literally* beset with snares, or that it finally brought him, without arrest or the aid of the executioner, directly to the prison or the gallows.

PAGE 59, LINE 7. *πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀεὶ βλέπων*—"Looking continually to the whole." There is implied here a negative assertion. It is equivalent to saying, "and having nothing else in view." The meaning seems to be, that the process here mentioned might perhaps be adopted, if no regard was had to the parts, as parts, or except in their relation to the whole. In that case, the Divine administration might perhaps proceed by these sudden transformations. But as in each act of Providence a vast number of purposes, direct and collateral, are to be kept in view, and no one to be effected by disturbing or displacing another, there is need of an arrangement that shall be carried on by media, so that one move on the great chess-board (see note 6, p. 59) may accomplish many ends, instead of requiring separate transpositions in every case.

The philosopher evidently perceives a great difficulty attending any explanation that can be given. We can never, perhaps, fully understand the harmonious connexion between a providence carried on by general laws, operating, in the main, with uninterrupted regularity, and a minute attention to those individual cases which may be made the subjects of special prayer and special judgments. It belongs to that same class of mysterious truths, and presents the same apparent contradictions, as the doctrine of the Divine foreknowledge or foreordination, when viewed in connexion with the freedom of the human will, or of the Divine goodness, when attempted to be reconciled with the existence of evil. Why should men be so clamorous for the rights of reason in religion, when, in so many cases, sho

herself declares her own insufficiency as the highest lesson she can teach us, and delivers us over, either to total skepticism, or to that faith by which we receive truths apparently opposed, or whose point of connexion is beyond our radius of mental vision; because, without this, we must give up other truths which our moral nature can only yield at the price of total darkness on all that most concerns us to know.

LIV.

The Word Ἀνώλεθρος *as distinguished from* Αἰώνιος. *Remarkable Passage in the Timæus.*

PAGE 60, LINE 3. *ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον.* There is intended here an important distinction between *αἰώνιον* and *ἀνώλεθρον*. The former means that which is in its very nature eternal, not subject, in any sense, to generation or decay, and, in fact, having no reference to *χρόνος*, or time regarded as proceeding by succession. (*See the definition of time as given in the Timæus*, 37, *E.*, *and remarks upon it, page* 223.) Ἀνώλεθρον, on the other hand, suggests, from its etymology, the idea of something composite, although, when used without precision, it may be applied to that which is possessed of a higher nature. It signifies *indestructible*, not in itself, but because the thing of which it is predicated is upheld and maintained in being by the Supreme Power, and thus rendered capable of enduring through an *endless succession*, although never strictly *αἰώνιον* or eternal in its essence. *Κατὰ νόμον θεοί*, says Ast, has respect to *αἰώνιον* alone, and not to *ἀνώλεθρον*. He would read according to the following order and punctuation: *ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀνώλεθρον γενόμενον, αλλ' οὐ, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί, αἰώνιον—indestructible, yet not eternal as the Gods are.* This contrast between

Gods and men seems plausible, and yet we are satisfied that Ast is wrong. Our opinion is founded upon that passage of the Timæus, in which the Eternal Father thus addresses the inferior deities to whom he had given being: *Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, ἄλυτα, ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν, λυτόν. τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ. δι' ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε,* ΆΘΑΝΑΤΟΙ *μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν. οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας,* ΤΗΣ ΈΜΗΣ ΒΟΥΛΗΣΕΩΣ *μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες, ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε*—" Ye Gods of Gods, of whom I am the Maker and the Father, as of works which, deriving their existence from me, are indissoluble as long as I will it. Everything bound (or composite) is capable of dissolution: nevertheless, to choose to dissolve that which is well harmonized, and works well, is the part of an evil being. For which reasons, and since ye were made (or had a beginning of your existence), ye are not immortal (in yourselves), nor in every respect indissoluble. Still, ye shall not be dissolved, nor shall ye experience the doom of death, partaking, IN MY WILL, of a bond of life stronger and more powerful than those things by which ye were bound (or of which ye were composed) when ye received your being." *Timæus*, 41, A. That is, the permanence of all created things, from the highest to the lowest, rests on the *moral* attributes of the Deity. In his goodness they have a stronger bond than in all the laws or necessities of nature and of things. On this depends the continued existence not only of man, but of Gods, or, in the more sublime language of Scripture, of Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers.

Κατὰ νόμον ὄντες Θεοί: *According to the decree or fate* (*fatum*) *on which their existence depended.* Compare, also, the similar expression, page 61, line 7: *κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρ-*

μένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον. This confirms the view we have taken above in respect to *θεοί*. They were dependent on this law, and not on any innate immortality. *Νόμος* here has about the same meaning with *μοῖρα*, which, according to the more ancient creed of the Greeks, meant simply *the Divine decree*. This, we are prepared to show, is its signification in Homer, and not a *physical fate*, as many contend. The words *ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα* are to be taken collectively for all animated beings thus constituted. The continued existence of soul and body, severally or united, whether in the present state or in any one to come, is dependent on the Eternal Father, who is thus represented as speaking in this sublime passage from the Timæus—who alone is strictly *αἰώνιος* in the highest sense of that epithet, or, as the Apostle declares, 1 *Timothy*, vi., 16, *ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν—who alone hath immortality.*

LV.

The Greek Words for Eternity, Αἰών *and* Αἰώνιος.

Αἰών is compounded of *ἀεὶ ὤν* (see *Aristotle, De Cœlo*, lib. i., c. ix., 10). *Ἀεί, ever*, is from *ἄω, ἀέω*, or *ἄημι*, signifying, primarily, to blow, *to breathe*, secondly, *to live, to pass or spend time.* *Ἄω* seems also related to *ἀΐω, to feel life, to be conscious;* from whence some would derive *αἰών* in the general sense of existence. Homer uses *ἄω* or *ἀέω* in the second of the above meanings, as in the Odyssey, iii., 151, and 490: *Ἔνθα δὲ νύκτ' ἄεσαν*. Because this verb is thus used, in several places in the Odyssey, in connexion with *νύξ*, some lexicographers absurdly render it *to sleep*. It is, however, only thus employed, because by night the flow or succession of time becomes a matter of distinct observation and consciousness more than by day. Hence, as the context shows, it is generally used of wakeful and anxious nights:

Νύκτα μὲν ἀέσαμεν, χαλεπὰ φρεσὶν ὀρμαίνοντες.

Odyssey, iii., 151.

'Αεί, from this derivation, would present the idea of *continuous being, of a going on, or succession;* and as a particle of time, is ever used of that which is boundless or undefined; not so much that which cannot be bounded as that which is not bounded—which is not attempted to be defined, but is always considered as going on, on, on. 'Αεί, therefore, alone, would not express the true idea of *eternity*, but only of endless or unbounded *time*. This *flowing* word must be connected with, and, as it were, anchored upon another of more stability; since stability and fixedness enter into the essential idea of eternity. This other word is the participle of that verb of existence which expresses, in its philosophical sense, the highest mode of *being*. One part of the compound, then, is boundless and unconfined; the other chains it to an eternal present, or, rather, since *ὤν* is of all tenses, altogether excludes the idea of time. It is thus that the Greek term approaches as near the true notion of eternity as it is in the power of language to bring us.

Although the human mind may fail to take in all that idea which *αἰών* aims to express, still an apprehension of it may exist, sufficient, at least, to convince us that it contains nothing unreal, but has a solid foundation in the truth of things. We may approach it by negatives. Αἰών is not *time* long or short, bounded or endless. It is not the opposite of time, but that of which *χρόνος*, or time, in our present state, is the *moving* image. (*See remarks, page* 223, *and the comparison there referred to.*) It may more properly be said to be the opposite of *καιρός*, or *πρόσκαιρος*; being thus used by the Apostle, 2 *Corinthians*, iv., 18, and in such a way as to exclude all cavil as to its extent, at least in that place. It is there the direct antithesis of temporal or temporary.

However difficult it may be for beings who can only

think in a series, to form a conception of that which necessarily excludes succession of thought, we are nevertheless driven, by the clearest decisions of that reason which often goes where the conceptive faculty cannot follow, to affirm that this is the state in which all things must be present to the Divine mind. If to this we apply the term *αἰών*, we have its perfect definition. We may be certain of its reality, although utterly unable to comprehend it. The idea of time is connected with an imperfection necessarily belonging to our present state, namely, an inability to entertain in the mind more than one thought at once. This gives rise to what is called the succession of ideas, constituting the measure of time; and this succession we apply even to those truths which, as reason plainly assures us, have no relation to time or the sequences of cause and effect. Nothing, on these abstruse points, could be more satisfactory than Plato's comparison and definition, to which we have before referred, and which may be found *Timæus*, 37, E.

Almost all our difficulties on the subject of endless being, and especially endless future punishment, arise from considering eternity, or *αἰών*, as *time infinitely prolonged*, as endless *succession* or duration. This addresses itself to the imagination or conceptive power rather than to the reason, and hence this weak faculty of the soul faints and staggers under the attempt to realize what, as a conception of the sense, never can be realized. But the whole subject presents itself under quite a different aspect when we regard the future state not as the beginning of a prolonged period, having its own past and future, but as a transition into eternity—as a condition differing not merely in degree, but in its very nature, from the present world of time. When the revolving mirror of Chronos, which now represents all things in motion, has ceased its revolutions, either in respect to the whole or each man individually, the landscape

of eternity, with all its fearful states, becomes in *experience*, as it ever had been in reality, fixed and motionless—*ἀκίνητα, ἀμετάστατα, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα.* There will be no endless succession of years and periods, which, in every effort of the mind to grasp them, only present, over and over again, the same difficulties of comprehension, and, instead of a true *idea*, give rise only to a painful* and imperfect *conception* of the sense. "For days, and nights, and months, and years, and all other successions of time," says Plato, "were not before the heaven existed. The past, the present, and the future are but temporal forms, which we ignorantly and incorrectly attribute to the eternal *οὐσία*, or *essence*. For we say *was*, and *is*, and *will be*, when IS (*ἔστι*) alone pertains to æonian *being*, while *was* and *will be* belong to that flowing *γένεσις*, or *generation*, which exists in time. For they are motions (*κινήσεις*), but the eternal is, in respect to these, immoveable; never younger, never older, having no past and no future"—*τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως, οὔτε πρεσβύτερον, οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαί ποτε, οὐδὲ γεγονέναι, οὐδ' εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι. Timæus*, 38, A.

Change and succession may be said to form the predominating characteristics of the present flowing phenomenal world. In eternity, all is just the reverse. There, to use language derived from the old Ionic problem, *all things will stand.* The things which are seen are temporal, probationary, preparatory (*πρόσκαιρα*). The things which are unseen are eternal (*αἰώνια*), fixed, immutable, without succession. The word *αἰών* is undoubtedly used in the Greek

* In nothing is this more fully realized than in the efforts sometimes made by preachers and others to convey what they call an *idea* of eternity; as, for example, from an ocean of drops, or the space of the solar system filled with grains of sand, and those multiplied by myriads and millions of centuries. By such immensities of numbers the mind is wearied and exhausted, but never brought a hair's breadth nearer the object at which it aims.

poetry in the indefinite sense of life, existence, or state of being; and there are also some passages in the Scriptures where it is taken figuratively in a lower signification of age or dispensation, although even these are grounded on the higher and radical import; but this we affirm with confidence, that the restorationist can derive no aid from these specimens of Platonic usage, and, in fact, nothing could be more utterly opposed to all his views of change, reformation, or restoration in the eternal state. We conclude with a definition of *αἰών*, derived from the high authority of Aristotle. It contains more reference to succession than that of Plato, but yet is directly in the way of all attempts to limit the meaning of this illimitable word. He is speaking of the super-celestial, or extra-mundane state, and whatever we may think of its reality, there can be no doubt about the force of the Greek terms by which he attempts to set it forth. "Time," he says, "is the number of motion, but above the heaven it has been shown that time cannot exist. There, there is no growing old, neither is there any change, but all is immutable, all is impassible, and having the best and most satisfying life (*ζωὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην*), continues for *all eternity* (*τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα*); *and this its name is divinely declared to us from the ancients* (*θείως ἔφθεγκται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων*). For that end which contains the period of each existence is called its *αἰών* (*ævum, age*, or *being*). According to the same reason or definition—*κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος, καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντων ἄπειρον χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος*, ʼΑΙΩΝ *ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ* ʼΑΕΙ ʼΕΙΝΑΙ *εἰληφὼς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος*—that which constitutes the enclosing limit of the whole heaven or universe, that which embraces *the infinite period, and the infinity of all things*—that is *αἰών*, ETERNITY, taking its name from EVER BEING, immortal and divine." *Arist., De Cœlo*, lib. i., c. ix., 10. Compare, also, *The Laws*, iv.,

715, P., where Plato speaks of the Eternal Justice, which always follows as an avenger of crimes committed against the Divine law (*τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός*), and in commenting on which the scholiast thus defines the word *περιπορευόμενος*, namely, *τὸ αἰωνίως—το Ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά· ἡ γὰρ περιφορὰ τοῦτο ἔχει.*

LVI.

Plato's Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will, viewed in Connexion with the Law of Cause and Effect in Nature.

PAGE 60, LINE 11. *Μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ.*—"He devises this in reference to the whole, namely, what kind of a situation everything which becomes of a certain quality must receive and inhabit." That is, the *ποιότης* or quality which, in the course of generation, anything assumes, must determine the quality of its final habitation. The establishment and enforcement of this law God has reserved to himself as his peculiar prerogative, while, as we are told in the following sentence, he has left to our own wills, *τὰς αἰτίας τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς*—the causes of becoming such or such. (See note 10, page 60.) In other words, he has so ordered the course of nature, by a sort of pre-established harmony, that it constantly enforces this law, while the power of becoming the subjects of its rewards or penalties is left to the freedom of our own wills. The sentiment is about the same with that of Pope:

> And binding nature fast in fate,
> Left free the human will.

We cannot find much fault with this in the heathen Plato, and the doctrine is undoubtedly true of man viewed as unfallen, and in that primitive state when his will was truly free, because it was one with the will of God. The Christian theology, however, does require us to modify the prop-

osition as regards our present condition, and to believe that, in some way, man by the fall *subjected his will to nature;* that, therefore, although it has a wide prison-house within which to rove, and where it may be said to be free in its *choices* of objects before it, still it can never, by any volition, rise above this state of nature, or escape its adamantine chain of cause and effect, until a stronger than nature shall interpose for its deliverance and perfect freedom. The sick man may turn from side to side upon his weary couch, but he cannot rise, take up his bed, and walk. We may exercise all kinds of choices (a term which in the strife of words on this subject so many have confounded with will) within the limits of the sphere into which we have fallen, but we cannot *will* to be holy, to love God with all our souls, and to live to his glory. If the Scriptures were not clear on the subject, it is so plainly a matter of personal experience that we may well wonder how, in the light of an awakened conscience or consciousness, there could be any room for cavil about it.

There is no doubt, however, that Plato was rather Pelagian on this great question; although places could be cited which show that his mind was unsettled, and that there were very great difficulties attending any view he could take of the matter. We may find this same doctrine that is here advanced more fully set forth in the Republic, x., 617, P., where, after a long argument, in which he introduces that wild mythical legend respecting the Destinies, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atrope, he concludes in the following most concise and remarkable manner: *Οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον· αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος*—"Virtue is free from control: the fault is in the chooser: God is blameless," or, rather (since *ἀναίτιος* and *αἰτία* do not in themselves imply blame), God is not concerned in the causation of sin or the production of virtue. Notwithstanding this,

there are several striking passages in which he asserts, without qualification, that virtue is a Divine gift, and that, in the present state of man, its attainment is hopeless without the Divine aid. As, for example, in the Meno, 99, P.: *Ἀρετὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται*—"Wherefore virtue would be neither by nature nor by science or teaching, but by a Divine gift, bestowed upon those by whom it is possessed." So, also, a few sentences below, to the same effect. (Meno, 100, B.) Nothing can be clearer than this declaration, and yet, when we take into view other parts of that same dialogue, it is extremely difficult to determine what he really thought about the cause and source of true virtue. Whether it was by nature, by science, or directly from God, were questions to which his mind often reverts, and which he seems never to have satisfactorily solved. The student may find it discussed at great length in the Protagoras. In the Republic, again (lib. vi.), where he is led to draw as strong as possible a picture of human depravity, he declares most expressly that the acquisition of virtue is *impossible without the Divine assistance.* "Do you think," says Socrates, "that any sophist"—by which he means one of the ancient lecturers on moral philosophy who undertook to teach virtue for pay —"do you think that any sophist, or any instructions of private persons, can control or even withstand such an influence for evil? No one; yea, even to attempt it would only be evidence of folly." And then he concludes in this most solemn and impressive manner: *Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται, οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν. ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου. εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει, Θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς*—"For it neither is the case, nor has been, nor ever can be, that any character (or

state of soul) should undergo a change to virtue in opposition to the corrupt training of these influences. At least nothing human, my friend; the Divine I lay out of the account. For we may be well assured that he speaks most truly who asserts that if anything, under such circumstances, is saved, and becomes such as it ought to be, a Divine dispensation alone hath saved it." *Republic*, vi., 493, A. In another part of this same passage he pronounces the case absolutety desperate—*ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ*—"unless some God should come to the aid of the soul." *Repub.*, vi., 492, A.

Surely, if this be a true picture of human nature,* Plato may be justly charged with inconsistency, yet no greater than many have manifested on this subject who possessed the higher light of revelation. If these representations be correct, how can virtue be said to be without restraint? How can that be free which has so many impediments, to say the least? If there is no accountability when these impediments are supposed utterly to surmount the strength of the will, why is not this same accountability diminished *pro rata* when they exist in a less degree, although falling short of an absolute inability? and how, then, can we avoid the conclusion, that the more vicious the disposition, and,

* There is a most remarkable declaration of Thucydides on the subject of human depravity, which is the more worthy of attention, because it comes from one who, without any philosophical or religious theory, was as cool and keen an observer of human nature as ever lived. "It is the nature of man to sin (says this sagacious historian) both in public and private. No law can restrain him from it. All modes of punishment have been exhausted in the attempt." Lib. iii., 45. And again, in the same section: *ἁπλῶς τε, ἀδύνατον, καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι, ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν, ἢ νόμων ἰσχύϊ, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ*—"To speak plainly, it is impossible; and it is a proof of great simplicity for any one to suppose that, when human nature rushes eagerly to the attainment of any gratification, it can be turned aside either by force of law or any penalty, however fearful."

consequently, the more difficult the practice of virtue, the less the degree of guilt, and the nearer an approach to a state of perfect innocence.

Jacob Zimmerman, in his tract *De Præstantia Religionis Christianæ collata cum Philosophia Socratis*, finds fault with this doctrine *that virtue is a Divine gift*, and thinks that, in the contest of Socrates with the sophist Protagoras, on the question whether virtue could be taught, the latter has greatly the advantage. He also charges the views of Socrates with leading to licentiousness, while he seems to regard his most corrupt antagonists as the friends of the public morals: Et hac ratione Socrates vel invitus effecit, ut illi qui jam vitiis immersi sunt aliquod præsidium inde caperent. Nihil enim libentius ejusmodi homines audiunt, quam ea, quæ summam difficultatem in virtuti colenda probare possunt; ita enim necessario inferri posse putant in suâ potestate situm haud esse virtutem sequi. *Vide Amœnitates Literariæ*, vol. xi., p. 187. That the doctrine of *Divine grace* —for such is substantially the declaration that virtue is the gift of God—should be charged with licentiousness is not surprising, since it has thus been characterized in all ages, even by men themselves as utterly corrupt as those Grecian sophists with whom Socrates contended even unto death; but it certainly is a matter of exceeding wonder, that a professed Christian writer should censure him for that very sentiment in which, of all others, he approaches the nearest to the Bible. See some of these questions most acutely argued in Cicero's treatise De Fato, s. v., vi. It is worthy of an attentive perusal, if for no other reason, to see how very similar, in all ages, have been the discussions which have arisen on these most ancient queries respecting fatalism, causality, co-causes, conditions, moral agency, and the freedom of the will. Jonathan Edwards himself does not distinguish with more keenness than Cicero and the persons whose opinions he has introduced in the tract referred to.

PAGE 61, L. 6. *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν*—"Possessing in themselves the cause of change." That is, without, or to the exclusion of *external* causes, yet still not, as those maintain who contend for the self-determining power of the will, without being under the law of cause and effect existing *within* them; the cause being the internal result of their *present state* at any one time, or the combined sum and product of all the influences, from within and from without, then existing *in* their physical, intellectual, and moral constitution, and the effect being the one single following state which the laws of our minds compel us to affirm must result from it. So Cicero, De Fato, s. xi.: Sic quum sine causa animum moveri dicimus, sine *externa causa* moveri, *non omnino sine causa*, dicimus.

LVII.

Explanation of a Difficult Passage.

PAGE 61, LINE 8. *σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν, κ. τ. λ.* There is a good deal of difficulty about this sentence, and yet we think a very good sense may be made of the common reading, without resorting to those conjectural emendations which some commentators would propose. The versions of Ficinus and Cornarius both proceed upon the idea that the main contrast is between *σμικρότερα μὲν* and *πλείω δὲ*, which view, it must be confessed, seems to have appearances strongly in its favour. Neither translator, however, adheres to the Greek text as it now stands. Viger proposes amendments grounded upon the same view of the passage. He would read *ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ δικαιότερα*, that it might be more directly opposed to *πλείω καὶ ἀδικώτερα*, just below. Ast thinks there is no need of any other change than to expunge *ἐλάττω*, and would render as follows: Quæ minus depravata sunt, ea per terræ planitiem ingrediuntur, quæ vero in majorem depravationem inciderunt in

profundum, &c., detruduntur. It seems to us, however, that almost all difficulty is removed by regarding the main contrast as intended between *σμικρότερα μὲν* and *μείζων δὲ* five or six lines below, and a subordinate contrast between *ἐλάττω* and *πλείω δὲ*. We would place a comma after *ἐλάττω*, and regard a *μὲν* as implied in connexion with it; the omission being nothing strange, seeing that the particle had just been used to mark the main antithesis. In this view of the matter, *μεταβάλλοντα* is to be taken with *ἐλάττω*, and there will also be a contrast of degree between this participle and *μεταπεσόντα*; the former, from its being in the present tense, implying a slight beginning of a change, either for good or evil; the latter, a more sudden and rapid descent. *Εἰς* is to be taken with *μεταπορεύεται* understood as though repeated, and not with *μεταπεσόντα*. In this view, *ἐλάττω*, instead of being required to be expunged, becomes an important word, and the only real defect in the sentence is a mere want of verbal symmetry in having nothing to correspond to *ἀδικώτερα*, together with the harshness which is felt in connecting this word with *μεταπεσόντα*. On the other view, it is not easily explained how *σμικρότερα τῶν ἠθῶν* can be made to mean *those who are less depraved*, as the phrase is regarded by Ficinus, Cornarius, and Ast. Another objection to their version is, that there is nothing with which we can contrast *μείζων ψυχὴ* below, when the whole following context shows that a very strong antithesis was most certainly intended. This, we think, can only be effected by regarding it as in opposition to *σμικρότερα τῶν ἠθῶν*, a phrase equivalent to *σμικρότερα ἤθη*, or *οἱ ἔχοντες σμικρότερα ἤθη*, and which we would consider as synonymous with what Plato elsewhere styles *σμικρὰ φύσις*, *the small nature*, the less marked or inferior character or habit of soul, in distinction from the *μείζων ψυχή*; neither expression in itself implying depravity, but, on the other hand, each including the good as well as the bad.

With these preliminaries, we proceed to state the order of the whole passage, according to the view above taken, enclosing in brackets the implied words which are deemed essential to a full interpretation: *σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν, ἐλάττω [μὲν] μεταβάλλοντα, μεταπορεύεται κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον, πλείω δὲ μεταπεσόντα καὶ ἀδικώτερα, εἰς βάθος [μεταπορεύεται] τά τε κάτω, κ. τ. λ.—μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάβῃ, κ. τ. λ.* Of which there may be given the following free translation: "The smaller natures, to wit, those possessed of none of the greater traits of soul, whether for good or evil, undergoing less change, or as long as they undergo less change, proceed with a slight deviation (change being implied in *μετὰ*) along the apparently level plain of life; but when they decline more rapidly, and with greater degrees of wickedness (the metaphor being carelessly lost sight of in *ἀδικώτερα*), they change their course (*εἰς βάθος*) into a steep descent, and to those regions commonly spoken of as being below, which, under the name of Hades, men fear and dream about, &c.; but as for the greater soul, whenever it partakes of vice or virtue, by the exercise of its own will or by association, &c.—such a soul, we say, whenever, by mingling with the Divine excellence, it becomes in a remarkable degree similar, makes a transition, also, into a surpassingly holy place, being continually carried into another still better region; but when contrariwise, then transferring the seat of its life in a contrary direction and to a contrary abode." From *ὅσα* to *σωμάτων* inclusive, may be regarded as a parenthetical clause, explanatory of *τὰ κάτω τῶν τόπων*. In the second member of the principal antithesis, had there been preserved a perfect correspondence, we should have had *μείζω δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν*; from some idea of which in the mind of a transcriber probably arose the other reading preferred by Ast, namely, *μείζω δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ*, &c. In this way, *ἐλάττω (μὲν)* and *πλείω δὲ* indicate two

different stages in the course of those denoted by *σμικρότερα ἤθη*: the first, a gentle deviation, almost level, and therefore called *ἐπίπεδον*; the second, a rapid descent. There is also a great propriety in the use of the present *μεταβάλλοντα*, which Ast would change into the second aorist—*while, or as long as, they undergo less change.*

In the words *ἐπίπεδον* and *βάθος* there may be one of those geometrical allusions of which Plato was so very fond, and which he so frequently employs. An evil course may be compared to the three dimensions of magnitude. It is first a mere point, then extends itself into a line, then spreads out into superficial space (*ἐπίπεδον*), and, finally, grows into the solid dimensions of iniquity in all their length, breadth, and depth; that is, in the fixed and immutable condition of the sinful nature—a state from which Plato would admit that it was not in the power of the will to return.

There are, in a critical point of view, several defects about both members of this antithesis and the subordinate contrasts. It is, however, far better to admit that Plato sometimes writes carelessly than to hazard so many conjectural emendations. The whole passage strongly suggests a similar thought from the Republic: *ἔχει δὴ λόγον, τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ, κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης—καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς εὐφυεστάτας, κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας, διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι*—"It is reasonable to suppose that the best nature, being in a condition adverse to its proper development, turns out worse than the meaner; and that the most highly-gifted souls, partaking of evil instruction, become surpassingly wicked." *Republic*, vi., 491, D. *Φαύλη ψυχή* here is equivalent to *σμικρότερα ἤθη* in the passage before us. Compare, also, the Republic, vi., 495, B., where the similarity of the expression tends greatly to confirm the view we have here taken: *σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.*

After all, however, it must be confessed that there is no little difficulty about the passage. Had the first member of the principal antithesis been double, like the second, or had it specified two distinct courses in opposite directions, we should have had no doubt about the correctness of the version we have given. Such a view, however, may be implied, and thus *σμικρότερα ἤθη* may be taken of virtue and vice both, as well as *μείζων ψυχὴ* in the second member; the change either way, in respect to the meaner nature, being at first so slight as not to call for the distinction; and, in the second stage, the acceleration of velocity being more naturally associated with the ideas of descent and sin than with that of virtue; so that it is the metaphor which seems to have led the writer astray from the symmetry and consistency of the thought he intended to express. Hence, too, we may perhaps account for the introduction of *ἀδικώτερα*, which seems otherwise to mar the harmony of the passage. Viger proposes as an emendation *ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ δικαιότερα*, as opposed to *πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα*. This would favour the idea contained in our version more than his own. A better course, however, would be to regard the words *κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς*, &c., as implied after *σμικρότερα τῶν ἠθῶν*, in the first member, as they are expressed after *μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ*, in the second. The passage has given great difficulties to all commentators.

LVIII.

The Greek Word Ἅιδης, *and the Hebrew* שְׁאוֹל *and* בֵּית עוֹלָם.

Page 61, Line 11. Ἅιδην ἐπονομάζοντες. This word is most clearly from *ἀειδής*, *invisible*. Thus it is explained by Plato, although he is no great authority in etymological matters: *ἐν ᾅδου—τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων*, *Gorgias*, 493, B. It may therefore mean *the invisible world*, that is, *unseen*, in

the sense of *concealed from present vision*, or it may be connected with the more philosophical import of *ἀειδής*, as used by Plato in the Phædon, namely, *the ideal, the intelligible world*, in distinction from the *visible world of sense and matter*. The first, however, is doubtless the most common acceptation of the word—the *unseen*, the unknown region which the grave hides from our view, and whither we cannot follow the departed. It strongly suggests the old etymologies given for the Hebrew שְׁאוֹל (*sheol*), and to which we cannot help being partial, notwithstanding they are so contemptuously rejected by Gesenius. They make it from שָׁאַל, *to ask, to demand, to inquire;* as though intimating the deep anxiety of men in all ages to penetrate the dark mystery concealed by the veil of death, as in the wailing language of Job: "Man dieth, and wasteth away; he giveth up the ghost, *and where is he?*" *Job*, xiv., 10.

The common poetical expression, *οἶκος Ἅιδου*, corresponds, both in form and sense, to the Hebrew בֵּית עוֹלָם, as used Ecclesiastes, xii., 5: Man goeth to the *house of his eternity*, or to his *eternal house*, instead of our very defective translation, *his long home*, which suggests the grave for the body, rather than that abode of departed spirits which is undoubtedly meant by the Hebrew as well as the Greek phrase. Compare Xenophon's Life of Agesilaus, near the close: "And thus this man spent his life in the service of his country, and, having at length died, was transferred to *his eternal home*"—*εἰς τὴν* ᾽ΑΙΔΙΟΝ ᾽ΟΙΚΗΣΙΝ *κατηγάγετο*. So, also, Diodorus Siculus, in his account of the Egyptians, says, "They call the habitations of the living, *lodging-places* (*καταλύσεις*), or inns, because we dwell in them but for a short time; but the abodes of the departed they style *eternal houses*, because they continue in Hades during the *boundless eternity*"—*ἀϊδίους οἴκους προσαγορεύουσιν, ὡς ἐν Ἅιδου διατελούντων τὸν* ᾽ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ ᾽ΑΙΩΝΑ. *Diod. Sic.*, lib. i., 51.

The Hebrew עוֹלָם corresponds more closely to the Greek Ἅιδης than שְׁאוֹל. It signifies *hidden*, *unknown*, *boundless in time*, and *undefined in space*. The composition of the phrase is the same in both languages: בֵּית עוֹלָם—*οἶκος Ἅιδου—the house of Olam—the house of Hades*—the invisible state, the abode of unseen spirits. These terms suggest conceptions of vastness, of dread sublimity, while the inquiring word *sheol* calls up the unknown world, and presents it to the mind as

> That undiscovered country, from whose bourn
> No traveller returns.

The expression *οἶκος Ἅιδου* must have been common in the most ancient Greek. Its antiquity is proved by the ellipsis, *εἰς Ἅιδου*, which afterward came into such frequent use by the poets. Hence we conclude that it must have been an early Orientalism, derived from this very phrase with which we have compared it. Had it not been so very common in classical Greek, some critics would doubtless have pronounced it a Hebraism.

LIX.

Similar Views of a Future State, and Similar Fears of Hell in all Ages.

Page 61, Line 11. *ὅσα Ἅιδην τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσι ζῶντες διαλυθέντες τε τῶν σωμάτων*—"which, under the name of Hades and similar titles, men greatly fear (*valde horrent*) and dream about, both when living and when separated from the body." This may be compared with a similar passage from the Republic: *Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς. οἵτε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ*

ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, στρέφουσι τὴν ψυχήν. . . . . ὁ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα, ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος, δειμαίνει, καὶ ζῇ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος—"For be well assured, O Socrates, that when any one is near that time in which he thinks he is going to die, there enter into him fear and anxiety. For then the old stories about hell, how that the man who has here been guilty of wrong must there suffer punishment, torture his soul. Wherefore he who, in the retrospect of his life, finds many crimes, like frightened children starting from their sleep, is terrified, and lives in evil forebodings." *Republic*, 330, E. Nothing could give us a surer glimpse into the ancient conscience than such a passage as this. We are very apt to think that the fears of the future world are almost wholly derived from the Bible, and that the ancient mythology respecting Hades was the mere picture of the poet, without possessing any very strong hold upon the common mind. This declaration, however, of the aged Cephalus, is undoubtedly meant by the writer to be characteristic of the class and age to which the speaker belonged. In this most dramatic of all the dialogues of Plato, nothing of the kind would have been put in the mouth of such a character, had it not truly expressed a sentiment deeply grounded in the popular creed and feeling. It testifies more strongly to the ancient universal belief in a retributive hell and a coming judgment, than all the abstract reasonings of our philosopher, and all the mythological allusions of the poets.

The doctrine of a hell for the wicked, as we have elsewhere observed,* is one of the oldest articles in the religious creed of all ages and nations. Such incidental pas-

* See the Biblical Repository, No. xix., Art. 3d, where this and kindred topics are dwelt upon at some length; also a discourse delivered at Burlington, Vermont, 1839, entitled Natural Religion, the Remains of Primitive Revelation.

sages as these refute all the reasonings of Warburton, in his attempt to prove that the doctrine of future punishment exerted but little influence in the ancient systems of legislation and religion. The very efforts of the Epicureans to ridicule the vulgar fears, and to make light of the terrors of the unseen Hades, show how deeply these awful truths, whatever may have been their origin, had penetrated the human soul. Even the style in which Lucretius speaks of them betrays a secret trepidation, and instead of philosophic indifference, manifests that bitter hatred which, as in the case of most modern infidels, proceeds from a mind once deeply troubled, anxious, and yet unable to shake off those fears which its philosophy affects to despise. This exhibition of a soul ill at ease, and of an interested hostility to the very idea of future retribution, is apparent in those lines in which he thus sets forth that monster of horrid aspect, with whose gloomy frown the timid Epicurean was ever haunted:

> Humana ante oculos quom vita jaceret
> In terris, obpressa *gravi sub Religione;*
> Quæ caput a cœli regionibus obtendebat,
> *Horribili super adspectu mortalibus instans.*—*Lib.* i., 63.

The same thing is manifested when (to use Plato's comparison), like a child who has awaked from some dream of terror, he seems to exult in the timid hope of deliverance from the fears of a future hell:

> Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agundus,
> Funditus humanam *qui vitam turbat ab imo,*
> *Omnia subfuscans mortis nigrore;* neque ullam
> Esse voluptatem liquidam, puramque, relinquit.
> *Lib.* iii., 37.

Such strong language most clearly shows, that the doctrine and fears against which it was directed were no light or laughing matter, either to the poet or to those for whom he wrote

We have every reason, therefore, for believing that much

the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of future retribution as now prevail, have ever existed among mankind; coming not from reason or philosophy, but handed down by tradition from some revelation made in the most ancient time. In all ages, too, and in all creeds, the representations of the nature of this future punishment have been of the most terrific kind, as though the imagination, for this purpose, had been taxed to its utmost powers. Fire, and chains, and utter darkness, and similitudes of ever-ungratified desire and of ever-raging passion, have always formed a part of the dread machinery of Hades. The religious poet Pindar describes it as that from which the eye of the soul turns away, as from scenes too full of horror to contemplate for a moment:

τοὶ δ' ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον—*

and, in reference to it, a still more religious poet, even the inspired prophet and leader of Israel, asks with dread solemnity,† "*Who knoweth the power of thine anger?*" Or, as it has been most admirably paraphrased,

> Thy dreadful wrath exceeds our thought,
> And burns beyond our fear.

Leaving out of the account the solemn confirmation of the doctrine which may be derived from the fearful imagery employed by our Saviour, and taking into view only the heathen world, we may well ask the question, *Whence came all this?* The great problem is for them to solve who assert that the doctrine of future punishment is contrary to the Scriptures, the reason, and the feelings. Whence, then, came it, in the face of all these opposing influences? Men are not fond of what is irrational for its own sake, and they certainly do not love their own misery. Whence, then, came this *τριγέρων μῦθος*,‡ these fears of Hades, of

* *Pind., Olymp. Carm.*, ii., Σ., δ. † *Psalm* xc., 11.
‡ *Æschylus, Choeph.*, 312.

Tartarus, of Gehenna, and those other names which, as Plato says in the passage before us, men have applied to this state? Why, if this be all false, and without foundation in any view of the moral government of God, have the human race thus ever tortured themselves for naught? Why have they indulged in these terrific inventions of fancy, handing down, from age to age, and from generation to generation, a useless, yet most tormenting anxiety? And above all, how is it, if sin be such a trifle, that men, by these inventions, have ever persevered in passing a sentence so unjustly severe on their own depravity? Compare the *Gorgias*, 525, C.; *Phædon*, 114, A.; *Republic*, 616, A.

LX.

The Word Ἅγιος. *Exceeding Spirituality of some of Plato's Views. Many of his Thoughts capable of being fairly accommodated to a Spiritual Sense higher than the Author himself had intended to convey. Difference in this respect between his Writings and those of all other Philosophers, Ancient or Modern.*

Page 61, Line 17. *καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον*—"Is transferred, or passes into a place all holy." *Purity*, or *holiness*, is generally given as the primary sense of the Greek *ἅγιος* and of the Hebrew קָדַשׁ or קֹדֶשׁ. This, however, besides being incapable of accounting for the other meanings, some of which are almost directly opposite, does of itself require some ultimate, and, at the same time, more simple conception into which it may be resolved. This more simple and primary idea is that of *separation*,* or of

* This will account for those other senses of the root which seem almost the opposite of *holy*, since it may also refer to that which is *purely wicked*, or *separated from all good*. Hence *ἄγος*, or *ἄγος*, may signify *an abominable crime*. So, also, *ἅγιος* may sometimes denote

being set apart. In proof of this we may compare the use of the word throughout the Pentateuch, in its application to places, sacrifices, and to the whole nation of Israel, as separated from the rest of mankind, to be a *holy*, that is, a *separate* people. In the same manner are Christians characterized, in the New Testament, as ἅγιοι, *separate*, *peculiar;* although in the world, yet not of the world. Thus God is styled ἅγιος, in the highest sense, to distinguish him, on the one hand, from the earthly and impure conceptions of polytheistic idolatry, and, on the other, from the apparently more philosophical, but no less degrading views of the pantheist. He is holy, *separate* from the universe he has called into being, and, although *filling all things*, yet, in his essence, inhabiting the high and *holy place*.

As here used by Plato, ἅγιος τόπος means a place *set apart* from everything that is sinful and vile—the end of a course of purification, during which there has been a continual ἁγιασμός, that is, a continual separation of the pure from the impure, leaving at last nothing that defileth or renders unfit for this exceedingly separate region. Compare the description of this holy place in the Phædon: "When thus the soul is occupied, it goes away to the pure, to the

that which is *accursed, execrable.* On the same principle, the Hebrew קָדֵשׁ may mean *one devoted* to the most *beastly wickedness*, as in Deuteronomy, xxiii., 18. In a similar manner, the kindred Latin word *sacer* may signify *blessed* or *cursed.* The Hebrew בֶּרֶךְ has the same peculiarity, but derives it from a different source. Some would make ἅγιος, or ἁγνός, which occurs in the tragedians (ἅγιος being found mostly in later Greek), from ἅζω, ἅζομαι, to *revere*, to *stand in awe of.* Even here, however, the mind is led to the same original or ultimate sense of separation, as the ground of the feeling expressed by it, whether that feeling be one of admiration and awe of the pure and holy, or of fearful astonishment at enormous crime. The same primary idea undoubtedly exists in the Latin *purus*, from the Greek πῦρ, *fire*, the penetrating and *separating* element which has, in all ages, been regarded as the means and emblem of *purification.* See the Timæus, 56, A.

ever-being, to the immortal, the unchangeable, and, being of a kindred nature with it, always would abide there, and ceases from its restless wandering—*καὶ πέπαυται τοῦ πλάνου*—and is ever engaged in the contemplation of the eternal." *Phædon*, 79, D. Elsewhere he tells us, in almost Scriptural language, that holiness becomes those who would enter this holy place; whether by the term he means a locality in space, or an exceedingly separate state of the soul: *Εἰς δὲ θεῖον γένος μὴ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι*—"To enter into the family of the Divine," or, in other words, to become a partaker of the Divine nature, "can only be for him who departs wholly pure." *Ibid.*, 82, B. Without irreverence may we compare this with Hebrews, xii., 14: *ἁγιασμὸν οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεὶς ὄψεται τὸν Κύριον* — *Holiness, without which no one shall see the Lord.*

We are very far from saying, or even imagining, that Plato attached to these expressions the same high sense in which they are used by Paul, and yet there are many such passages which, without any violation of the spirit of his language, are capable of a comparison, to say the least, with some of the most precious truths of revealed religion. He was evidently directing his vision to a region of reality, far beyond the aim of any of the heathen philosophers who preceded, or were cotemporary with him. May he not have had some faint glimpses of those higher truths which his words, without any violence in their interpretation, frequently suggest to one who reads him by the light of the Christian revelation? Almost everything depends upon the state of mind with which his writings are studied. To the materialist and the skeptic he will often appear visionary and unmeaning. Jefferson, in a manner most characteristic, pronounced him a foggy intellect. Many of the Christian fathers, and a succession of the most learned and pious in the Church throughout its whole history, have ever re-

garded him with enthusiastic fondness, and esteemed his dialogues as ranking next to the Scriptures, although at a distance which forbade any comparison with the latter as an inspired message from Heaven. We would not be so extravagant as to assert that Plato has a spiritual or esoteric sense, as these terms are used by the allegorist or the mystic. No violence need be done to the letter, or to the ordinary laws of interpretation, and yet, by a species of accommodation most easy, and, at the same time, most natural, a higher elevation, and a new and almost divine beauty, may be imparted to many passages, causing them to glow with a radiance that seems derived from the same source with the inspiration of the Sacred Volume. Whatever may be the cause, whether it be that lower truths are ever types of higher, which shine through them when examined by a peculiar light and in a peculiar state of the soul, so that there may be truly a lower and a higher sense equally well conveyed by the same letter (a principle which undoubtedly prevails to some extent in what the soundest expositors regard as the double sense of Scripture); or whether there is a spiritual power in language considered in its essence, if not in its forms, as an emanation from the Universal Reason, so that at times, and when happily employed, it may so manifest its own inherent light as to transcend the mind and intended meaning of the writer himself, while the reader, under more favoured circumstances, is admitted to a higher region of thought, and to a deeper participation of that Spirit which dwelleth in the words—or whatever may be the explanation of the fact, most certain it is, that the language of Plato is often thus easily adapted to a spirituality of meaning, in the Christian sense of the term, beyond that of any uninspired writings, ancient or modern, and to an extent which, we may suppose, would transcend anv conception of the philosopher himself.

Any one may understand what is meant by this, by keep-

ing these thoughts in mind while reading some of the more striking passages to which reference is made. In those parts of the Phædon, for example, where the true philosopher is represented as daily dying to the world and sense (*κινδυνεύουσι ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι*), let the reader think of the Christian instead of the philosopher, and what a close affinity does the style at once assume with some of the expressions of the apostle. What language could more truly set forth that *hidden aim* in the life of the follower of Christ, in which he is so unknown to the great mass around him. *The world knoweth him not.* "The rest of mankind," says Socrates, "understand not that *he lives to die;*" a saying which Cicero, although he but imperfectly comprehended even its Platonic sense, has imitated in the declaration, *Tota philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est. Tusc. Disp.*, i., 74. Again, in the same dialogue, take the description of that wisdom for which everything else must be exchanged, and without which all other apparent virtues are but splendid cheats—*σκιαγραφίαι*—mere shadows of a shade, consisting only in a wretched barter of one passion for another (*ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα καταλλάττεσθαι*), "*the exchanging of pleasure for pleasure, grief for grief, fear for fear*, and greater for less, like the coin of traffic;" let any one, we say, in reading this, and its most instructive context, think of the Scriptural Wisdom in place of the Platonic *φρόνησις*, and how vividly arise to mind our Saviour's parable of the *pearl of great price*, and the sublime personifications of wisdom in the books of Job and Proverbs. Plato may not have exactly meant by *φρόνησις* that *fear of the Lord which is the beginning of all right understanding*, but he was certainly aiming far above any philosopher of his day, or any modern moralist who does

not draw directly from the fountain of inspiration. Examples of a similar kind may be taken from a great variety of passages everywhere meeting us in his most important dialogues. In the first half of the sixth book of the Republic, for philosophy, and the philosopher, keep in mind Christianity and the Christian, and how sublimely does the sense, so sublime before, mount up to a new region of spiritual light; and yet, in all this, no violence is done to the language; every argument, every epithet, every metaphor retains its native force and its relative harmony, while the mind can hardly resist the impression, that this glowing description of the true philosophy and the true philosopher was intended for a higher meaning than, at first, appears upon its face. The incongeniality of this spirit, be it philosophy or be it religion, with the selfish, debasing, and corrupting influences in the midst of which we live—its struggles with sense, the contempt poured upon it by the world, its dependence upon that Divine aid which Plato, in this passage, so expressly acknowledges, its continual aspirations after the fixed and eternal, the rest which it bestows where all else is changing and flowing, the exceeding joy with which, at times, it inspires that small number who, in every age, have tasted and experienced how sweet and blessed is this gift of Heaven, while they contemplate the madness which rules the multitude—*οἱ ὀλίγοι γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν**—the elevation of soul which is produced by a religious contemplation of the *whole of our being*, leading, not to a contempt of our present human life, but to a just estimate of it as an exceeding small portion of our entire existence, and of the boundless field of being which lies around us, as when he says, *ἀδύνατον τῇ διανοίᾳ, ᾗ ὑπάρχει αὕτη ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν*

* Republic, vi., 496, C.

χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον,* all these, as they are presented in this warm and eloquent description of philosophy and the philosophic life, rise at once to a more elevated meaning, while, at the same time, how admirably does every sentence, thought, and word accommodate itself to this higher sense, as though it had formed the main and only design of the writer. When, with that mild pathos which he sometimes uses with so much effect, he tells us what difficulties the *philosophic nature* has to encounter in maintaining its ground against the unfriendly influences of a foreign, uncongenial clime (*ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον*),† we can hardly help thinking that we hear the spiritual and plaintive Leighton declaring, that "the grace of God in the heart of man is like a tender plant sown in a strange, unkindly soil," where its fruit would inevitably wither and degenerate into affinity with some base native weed, unless he that planted it should exercise that constant care, without which it must perish.

In the hands of no other writer, ancient or modern, does philosophy ever assume this heavenly aspect. Should it be supposed that this is all the effect of a partial imagination, let the experiment be tried with others. Let any one, with a similar purpose, read Aristotle, or Bacon, or any of the moderns who treat of the philosophy of the soul, and ascertain if he can, without violence, extract from them any such higher sense, or any such easy accommodation to an elevated Christian spirituality. A faint resemblance of this peculiar Platonic unction may be traced in some of the philosophical tracts of Cicero, especially those that were written during the latter years of his life, and in the subdued spirit of his adverse fortunes; but even with Cicero,

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* Republic, vi., 486, A. † Ibid., 497, B.

they are mere imitations of the style and manner of one whom he professedly takes as his model, and whom he so affectionately styles "his master Plato."

Let these thoughts be carried with us in reading, in the seventh book of the Republic, the description of the dark cave, and of the poor prisoners who are there confined, with their backs to the light, and their intent gaze ever fixed upon those shadowy appearances which so strangely flit across the walls of their chamber of imagery. What thoughtful mind can fail to recur to the higher truths of the Christian revelation, or avoid being struck with the almost perfect parallelism, as, in Plato's most truthful picture, he contemplates the fondness of those miserable bondsmen for their gloomy abode, their first aversion to the dazzling splendour of the world of reality, and the strong grasp with which they cling to their prison house, when some kind hand attempts to draw them forth, through the rough and steep ascent (*τραχείας καὶ ἀνάντους ἀναβάσεως*), into the light of life. How graphic, too, the description of the science and philosophy of that narrow world (*τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας*). How admirably does he depict the interest with which these subterranean *savans* are occupied in the study of what they style nature, in tracing the law of cause and effect, antecedents and consequents, as the dim shadows pass across their contracted scene of observation—the petty pride with which they dignify this pursuit with the *exclusive* name of science, their stinging jealousy of others who are ambitiously aiming at the distinctions and honours of the same most intellectual life, the laborious earnestness with which they are engaged in thus building up from these inductions a *science of shadows*, which might astonish their more vulgar companions, by its seeming vaticinations of the periods and returns of those *φαινόμενα* with which their minds are daily occupied, to the exclusion of any study of themselves or of their true position—while all this time the

real world, in which shines the *real sun*, where may be seen the *real heavens*, and where alone exists the *real science*, are as much and as utterly unknown as are the high hopes of the Christian, and the sublime truths which occupy his soul, to the most grovelling and sensual worldling. *Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθαρῶντι τὰ παριόντα καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσα ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν (τὸν πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοντα) ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους ; Republic*, vii., 516, D. The resemblance between this and the spirit and tenor of the Scriptural representations need not be pointed out. One might almost fancy it an expansion of the striking, yet concise description of the Psalmist : אַךְ־בְּצֶלֶם יִתְהַלֵּךְ־אִישׁ, *Man walketh in a shadow, a land of images*, A VAIN SHOW.

With this philosopher even politics assumes a divine and religious aspect, and, in all his speculations, the political closely connects itself with the theological. How easy and natural would it be, in pursuance of the same method, to adapt what he says of the heavenly paradigm in the close of the ninth book of the Republic, and his *seventh* kingdom in the Politicus, to the Christian Church : *ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ δὲ πολὺ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἄριστον βιωτέον, πλὴν τῆς* ΕΒΔΟΜΗΣ. *πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γε ἐκκριτέον, οἷον θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν. Politicus, or Statesman*, 303, A.

From such an accommodation of Plato's rich and wondrous fancy, how many most valuable thoughts, or rather illustrations, might be suggested, which would not be unworthy even of the pulpit — thoughts which, while they claimed the closest affinity with the Scriptures, might be brought to bear upon the soul and conscience with all the power of illustration drawn from the language of the divin-

est of philosophers. We know of no profane writer who, in this way, might be so useful to the preacher as Plato, and no one whom we would so earnestly recommend to all young men who are aiming at the Christian ministry. Let them not read Plato to understand the Bible — although, even with this in view, they would receive no small assistance—but let them read the Bible in close connexion with our philosopher, and they will understand Plato better than he ever understood himself.

LXI.

Mythical Sense of the Word Θάνατος.

PAGE 62, LINE 4. *ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις.* This evidently refers to the deaths of one individual, and not of many. But why, then, the plural? We think Plato keeps in mind here his doctrine of the transition of the soul, or its *μετεμψυχώσεις*, into various states, either in an ascending or a descending series; the passage from one to the other of which he styles a death and a birth. See the Phædon, 114, B., also 70, C.: *παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις ὁ λόγος, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων*—"It is an ancient tradition that souls go there from hence, and again return hither and arise from the dead." Compare, also, what is said respecting the purgations and metempsychoses of the soul, in the remarkable myth at the end of the Republic. Thus, also, in the Gorgias, 493, A., he speaks of the present life as though, when compared with some preceding state, it might in reality be a death, to which, for reasons arising out of some former relations, we may have been doomed. "As you say," continues Socrates, "life is an awful thing (*δεινὸς ὁ βίος*), and I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when he said,

Τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

Who knows but life is death, and death is life? And perhaps we are now dead, as I have heard of the wise, and that the body is our monument (*σῆμα*) or sepulchre in which the soul is buried."

The context of this strange declaration in the Gorgias affords strong reasons for believing, that it may have been spoken mystically and mythically of that spiritual death which is so prominent a subject of the Scriptures. In this most exquisite analysis of the nature of physical pleasure, and its utter want of all claim to be considered The Good, the sensualist is regarded as "dead while he lives." His soul is said to be rotten and leaky, like a perforated cask (*ὡς πίθος τετρημένος*). His pleasure is described as a continual *inflowing* to supply a constant *outflowing*; a "broken cistern," requiring a constant and laborious filling, in distinction from that spring which Socrates represents as ever full, and which so strongly suggests our Saviour's "well of living water, bubbling up to everlasting life." In this description, physical pleasure is regarded as a protracted dying, because it can only exist as the gratifying of an ever-craving want, the removal of an ever-tormenting pain, the vain attempt to quench an ever-burning thirst, or to fill an ever-empty void. In the language of the sensualist himself: *ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιῤῥεῖν—καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν*—"In this is pleasure, namely, to have the greatest inflowing (as into a vacuum), to drink while ever thirsting, and ever to thirst while drinking." See the whole passage, from 492, D., to 495, A. In the declaration in our text, Plato probably uses *θάνατος* in the first of these interpretations. Ast renders it *quolibet mortis genere.*

LXII.

Omnipresence of the Divine Justice. Remarkable Resemblance of Plato's Language to some Passages from the Bible.

PAGE 63, LINE 1. *οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς.* In this passage *αὐτῆς* refers to *Δίκη*, the Divine Justice or Law, which is so frequently personified by the Grecian poets as ever sitting on the right hand of Jove and sharing his throne. There is a very strong resemblance between these declarations and Psalm cxxxix., 7. "You shall never be neglected by it. You cannot, being small, so descend into the depths of the earth, nor, being raised on high, so fly up into Heaven, but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, whether remaining in this world, or having passed through life into Hades, or having been borne to a region still more wild than these." The expressions of the Psalmist are strikingly similar, although not directly applied to the transgressor. *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven, behold, thou art there. If I make my bed in Hades, behold, thou art there. If I should take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.* More in accordance with the spirit, although with less similarity of expression, is the passage, Job, xxxiv., 21: *His eyes are upon the ways of man, and all his steps he beholdeth. There is no darkness, no land of the shades of the dead* (*no* צַלְמָוֶת,* *or terra umbrarum*), *where the workers of iniquity*

* Is there not some reason to believe that this word, which is generally rendered *shadow of death*, may, more properly, mean the spiritual world itself, the *land of the shades*, as though it had been צְלָמוֹת plural feminine of צֶלֶם, instead of having the punctuation which it has received from the Masorites?

may hide themselves. Compare, also, *Amos*, ix., 2: *If they dig down into Sheol (or Hades), from thence shall my hand take them. If they ascend up into Heaven, from thence will I bring them down. If they be hidden in the top of Carmel, from thence will I discover and take them. If they would conceal themselves from mine eye in the bottom of the sea, from thence will I command the serpent, and it shall bite them.*

How vividly, too, is this doctrine of an ever wakeful, retributive justice presented by Sophocles:

> *ἡγεῖσθε δὲ*
> *βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ βροτῶν,*
> *βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεβεῖς· φυγὴν δέ που*
> *μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίου βροτῶν—*
>
> Bethink you, then;
> Heaven hath its eye upon the pious man,
> Its eye upon the sinner. Flight there's none,
> No hiding-place to which the unholy wretch
> Can e'er escape.—*Œdip. Col.*, 278.

LXIII.

Doctrine of a Final Judgment. Use of the Word Συντέλεια.

Page 64, Line 1. *οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν ὅπη ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμβάλλεται.* Ast translates this, *nesciens eorum collatio quomodo universo conducat*, "not knowing their contribution," &c. He takes *συντέλεια* in what is perhaps the more usual signification in classic Greek, namely, *a contribution by members of a society, a share or assessment*, and which agrees well with *ξυμβάλλεται*. The other sense, however, of *termination, consummation*, &c., suits far better with the context of this most important and solemn passage. It recommends itself, too, to us by its striking resemblance to the use of the word in certain declarations

of the Scriptures. Both the ideas, however, may be united in our word *reckoning, or final settlement of an account which has been long deferred.* We prefer this, because the whole passage has reference to a judgment or final disposition of the wicked, and would, therefore, render it, "not knowing their end or consummation, in what way it contributes to the whole," that is, in what way the present suspension of punishment, and their final doom, sustain the universal government. Probably both senses were present to the mind of the writer, and both seem necessary to complete the harmony of the conception.

Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Præp. Evang., page 635, D., prefers this second sense, which, although the least used, comes the nearest to the radical and etymological meaning of the compound. He translates the passage, *ignorans videlicet qui tandem aut qua parte istorum FINIS et EXITUS cum universi rationibus cohæreret.* The reader may find this deeply interesting subject of the delay of God in the punishment of the wicked treated at great length by Plutarch in his treatise, *Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου βραδέως τιμωρουμένων*; a very excellent edition of which has been lately edited by Professor Hackett of the Newton Theological Seminary. The work is accompanied by notes, chiefly of a theological character, exhibiting much real and useful learning, with no display of that philological pedantry which deforms so many modern editions of ancient writers, and, on the whole, forming one of the most valuable additions to our theological and classical literature.

Συντέλεια, in the sense of *completion, summing, or winding up*, and in a connexion impressively similar to the passage in our text, is found in the explanation of the parable of the tares and the wheat, in which the former are said to be permitted to grow for the sake of the latter, and where, as is here intimated by Plato, all things are referred to some final period of decision and development: *Ὁ δὲ θερισμὸς*

συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνός ἐστιν—The harvest is the end (the day of reckoning) of the world. So shall it be in the end of the world (the winding up, the conclusion, the final account, the catastrophe of the great πρᾶξις, or drama of life); they shall gather out all things that offend and all that do iniquity. Matthew, xiii., 39, 41. The same remarkable word is found, Hebrews, ix., 26: *ἅπαξ ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων—once in the winding up of the ages.*

Συντέλεια signifies not only *an end*, like *τέλος*, but *an ending together, a con-clusion*, an accomplishment of great purposes brought about by a long series of means, which, although, at times, ever so apparently *divergent*, have all, finally, *converged* to one grand result.

On this doctrine of the Divine delay in the punishment of sin, compare Job, xxi., 29: *The wicked is reserved* (Heb. יֻחְשָׂךְ, *held back*) *unto the day of doom: unto the day of wrath shall they be brought forth.* No text in the Old Testament, as is shown by the context, points more clearly to a future judgment of a general and concluding kind. Very similar language is held respecting the fallen angels, Jude, 6: *Reserved in chains to the judgment of the great day.* Compare, also, Prov., xvi., 3: *All things* (*τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον*) *hath the Lord made for himself, yea, the wicked for the day of evil;* which is almost equivalent to the declaration in our text: *συντέλεια αὐτῶν τῷ παντὶ ξυμβάλλεται.* In like manner, the Psalmist, when he ceased to look upon appearances, or, in the language of our author (page 63, line 10), *ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾷν*—when he "entered into the sanctuary," into the study and contemplation of the higher counsels of the Divine government—"*then saw he their end*"—*τὴν συντέλειαν αὐτῶν. As a dream when one awaketh, so, O Lord, when they* awake, or*

* Psalm lxxiii., 20. Thus, we are satisfied, should the Hebrew בָּעִיר be rendered, as applying to the sinner, and not to God; or it may, perhaps, be translated, "*When their image (shade, umbra, manes,*

in the awaking (*that is, in the resurrection morning, at the great day of account*), *wilt thou despise their image* (צַלְמָם), *their ghost or umbra* (LXX., *τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτῶν*).

We would not engage in the superfluous work of endeavouring to prop, by the supports of human reason and human feelings, any truth clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures. There is, however, no one which, if it were necessary, might be more safely trusted to such a defence than this doctrine of a general final judgment. Here the long and steady voice of humanity may be safely appealed to. From the time when the smoking blood of Abel invoked the Divine justice, there has ever been something in the human breast which has declared the necessity of a judgment, of a fixed time, when there shall be a *συντέλεια*, or winding up; when it will be found that the Judge of all the Earth has done right, and must do right; when every wrong which has been seemingly neglected shall be made right; when "all that is crooked shall be made straight," and everything that is dark and mysterious shall be made clear. The alarmed conscience, even while it dreads, demands it. We cannot read a poor work of fiction without experiencing a painful feeling when the termination of the story crosses these instinctive sentiments of the soul, or, in common parlance, does not end well, has no proper *συντέλεια*; when virtue (even the poor, miserable, low virtue which is held in repute by the world) is not rewarded, and vice does not receive its fitting punishment. The reader, in such cases, feels that a wrong has been done to his moral sense—that the universal instinct of justice, which even bad men possess, has been violated. How, then, can the thought be

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or *ghost*) *arises, thou wilt reject it.*" We would also suggest, although with much diffidence, whether there may not be a similar idea in the parallel Hebrew word תְּמוּנָה, as applied to a different character, Psalm xvii., 15: "*When thine image awakes,*" that is, the new spiritual form which thou wilt bestow. See, also, Job, iv., 6.

endured, that there will be no set time when the great πρᾶξις, or drama, of this world shall be brought to a fitting close, and every act receive its just recompense of reward? *The wicked shall not stand in the judgment.* Instead, however, of bringing forward such Old Testament texts in proof of the doctrine as a revealed truth, we would rather see in them a taking for granted of what the universal voice of humanity has ever proclaimed as the voice of God, uttered in the conscience as well as declared in his Word.

LXIV.

Platonic Use of the Word τύπος.

PAGE 64, LINE 4. ἥν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ' ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, κ. τ. λ. "Which, unless one knoweth, he can never know the type (the form) of life." That is, without this doctrine of the *end* of the wicked, and of the manner in which the present suspension and the final infliction of their doom contribute to the universal harmony, life would have no meaning. It would be *Tohu* and *Bohu* (Genesis, i., 2), a moral chaos, on which no intelligible form had been impressed; or, to take a comparison from Job, xxxviii., 14, it would be like a confused mass of clay, which had received the stamp (τύπος) of no significant seal. Τύπος, also, in a secondary or metaphorical sense, means a *summary description*, or, in philosophy, *a general idea, an outline, or model,* requiring a correspondence or general conformity in the filling up of the more minute parts which are not specified. Hence the common phrase, ἐν τύπῳ λέγειν, *to say in general terms.*

This use of the word may be found in the Republic, ii., 379, B., and the following pages, where Plato lays down what he styles τύποι περὶ θεολογίας, *types in theology,* or first principles respecting the Divine Nature, which are

ever to be kept in mind in forming a right estimate of God's character and government. In a similar application, we have *τύπος*, Romans, vi., 17: *χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ὑπηκούσατε ἐκ καρδίας εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς—But, thanks be to God, ye have obeyed, from the heart, that form of doctrine in which ye were instructed.* So, also, the derivative *ὑποτύπωσις*, 2 Timothy, i., 13—*ὑποτύπωσιν ἔχε ὑγιαινόντων λόγων, Hold fast the form of sound words* (*or doctrines*)—doubtless referring to some symbol, creed, or catechism which Timothy had received from Paul, or had heard recited by him, containing an *outline* of the Christian faith, and which he was to use as a preacher and instructer in the Gospel. This Paul enjoins upon him to hold in faith and love (or, as he says in the passage in Romans, *ἐκ καρδίας*), instead of regarding it as a mere speculative scheme, into which, without care, such a *τύπος* or *ὑποτύπωσις* might degenerate.

Without understanding this type of life, we are told in the text, there could be no right judgment formed respecting happiness or blessedness, and their opposites. It is an expansion of the sentiment of Solon. A complete knowledge of what constitutes the blessed man depends, not only upon the end of his individual life, but also upon his relation to the great *end*, or *συντέλεια*, of the world or dispensation of which he forms a part. See Dissertation xxxviii., *on the Greek Words for Happiness and Blessedness.*

LXV.

Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to assert that our Evils, in the Present State, exceed our Good.

Page 68, Line 11. *πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή.* It is not easy to determine the true meaning here, or to decide with abso-

lute certainty, whether the speaker intends to give the preponderance to good or evil in the present state; although there can be no doubt to which party, in this severe conflict, he would assign the final triumph. Ast renders it, *pluribus vero quæ non sint bona, pugna, dicimus, immortalis est*, &c.; to authorize which, he must supply ἀγαθῶν after μή. In the Latin version to Clemens Alexandinus, *Stromat.*, v., 593, it is translated, *pluribus qui non sunt ejusmodi*, which is as ambiguous as the Greek, and leaves it utterly uncertain whether *ejusmodi* is meant to refer to ἀγαθῶν or ἐναντίων. Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, xi., 549, gives an entirely different rendering, by reading τινῶν for τῶν—*quibuscum tamen genus aliud nullum misceatur*—a sense which even his emendation, if it convey any meaning at all, would not yield. It might be, on the contrary (and the supposition has much intrinsic plausibility, if we lay aside all considerations drawn from other passages), that the writer meant, by τῶν μή, things neither good nor bad, or what some would style ἀδιάφορα. Ficinus renders concisely, *et quidem plurium*, meaning thereby the evils; which construction, it may be supposed, he derived from supplying after μή the word ἐναντίων, and regarding πλειόνων as governing τῶν, instead of agreeing with it—as though the whole expression had been equivalent to ἐναντία πλείονα εἶναι τῶν μὴ ἐναντίων. The great objection to this is the exceeding awkwardness of the construction arising from thus piling negatives upon negatives.

Πλειόνων would most naturally be referred to what just precedes it, namely, ἐναντίων. It might, however, be supposed that Plato wrote carelessly, and actually meant to connect it with ἀγαθῶν, farther above. In this case it would correspond to the clumsy English sentence, "*full of good, and full of the contrary, but of more than what is not;*" which, notwithstanding its harshness, would leave little doubt as to the meaning, although it would require us to

regard *πλειόνων* as governing *τῶν* instead of agreeing with it. This view, namely, that *τῶν μή* agrees with *ἀγαθῶν* understood, and is governed by *πλειόνων*, or which would regard the sentence as assigning a preponderance to the good, might likewise be strengthened by an inference very naturally drawn from his having so expressly given the superiority in the moving and control of the heavens to the beneficent soul; as where Clinias is made to say (page 38, line 1), *οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν περιάγειν αὐτά.* Especially might it be deduced from that subtle and beautiful disquisition on the resemblance of the heavenly motions to the motion of *νοῦς*, or intellect, or of the best soul in distinction from that evil one which ever moves, *μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως, in madness and disorder.* But, as we conceive, we are estopped from this interpretation, and compelled to acquiesce in the contrary, by the fact, that Plato, in the Republic, most expressly asserts that our evils exceed our good—*ἀλλ' ὀλίγων (ὁ θεός) αἴτιος, πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν.* We cannot, therefore, help thinking that he suffered a morbid feeling of the immediate evils of the world directly around him, and which were magnified by contiguity, to cause him to forget the legitimate inferences from his own beautiful argument, and to make a declaration which would seem to imply that, on the whole, there is more evil than good. We may also indulge the supposition, that he refers merely to the present time, and believed that the great *battle of the universe*, or the *μάχη ἀθάνατος*, of which he soon speaks, would eventually bring out an opposite preponderance of good, and a final triumph of the beneficent over the evil and disorderly soul.

LXVI.

Μάχη Ἀθάνατος, or Battle of the Universe, between the Powers of Good and Evil. Sin, therefore, no Light Matter, because it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for which God is contending with the Evil Soul.

PAGE 68, LINE 11. ΜΑΧΗ *δή, φαμέν,* ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη.* "Such, would we say, is an immortal conflict, and needing most wonderful care or vigilance." The simile which was commenced in *πόλεμος*, several lines back, is here preserved and brought out in a style which it would be no extravagance to call sublime. All things are most vividly represented as engaged in an everlasting conflict between the powers of Good and Evil. This is the great *ἀγών* which, as he elsewhere says, is *ἀντὶ πάντων ἀγώνων*, in the place of, or before, all other conflicts. In the description of this battle of the universe, the author seems inspired with a more than Homeric grandeur of imagination. The images in the Theomachia of the Iliad may have more tendency to excite and arouse the passions, but they are far inferior in the power of producing that swelling, yet calm feeling of moral sublimity with which the soul is filled in reading this noble passage. Not Gods alone

descending swell the fight,*

but all nature and all worlds rise into deeply interested parties to this universal strife. Order is everywhere struggling with disorder. Light is contending with darkness, truth with error, knowledge with ignorance. The science of medicine is fighting with disease, agriculture with the hostile stubbornness of the earth, art and science of every kind with the rude and savage life. On a higher

* Iliad, xx., 47. *Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μεθ' ὅμιλον Ὀλύμπιοι ἤλυθον ἀνδρῶν.*

scale, the virtues are personified as in conflict with our sins. Righteousness is engaged in a strife which knows no compromise with unrighteousness. Temperance maintains an unintermitting struggle with her most powerful and unyielding antagonist. To crown all, God himself and the celestial powers are represented as everywhere contending with the forces of the Evil Soul, and with the dark, mindless, disorderly Spirit of Matter.

All this, too, seems to be for our sakes, and for our aid, in a strife of which we are so little able to appreciate the immortal issues. The Gods and *δαίμονες* are *our* allies. They fight for us as their *κτήματα*; as shepherds for their flocks. We do not wonder, then, that this passage suggested to some of the Fathers that strikingly similar declaration of the Apostle, *Ephesians*, vi., 12—*Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*—"*Our wrestling is not with flesh and blood only, but with principalities, with powers, with the rulers of darkness of this world, with the spiritual powers of evil in the Heavens.*" Compare *Clemens Alex.*, *Stromat.*, 593, B., and *Eusebius*, *Præp. Evang.*, xi., 26, p. 550. Both of them institute a comparison between this passage and *Ephesians*, vi., 12, and both regard Plato as having derived his doctrine of evil powers in conflict with the good from the Old Testament, especially from such passages as Job, i., 6, 7, and Deut., xxxii., 8.

Invisible beings are contending for us and against us. It is to something like this, and not to a physical strife only (although such a warfare, too, is included), that the philosopher alludes, when he says, *ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων.* Such, too, is the constant style of the New Testament. Life is a *πάλη*, an *ἀγών*, a struggle, a battle, a race, in which we

are earnestly called upon "*to press forward to the mark of the prize of the upward calling*," τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως;* as though God from above was uttering aloud the κέλευσμα,† or cheering battle-cry, to the contending host, and saying to each faithful combatant, ἀνάβηθι ὧδε, "*come up hither*,‡ *and I will give thee the crown of life*;"§ or, as it is admirably paraphrased in that noblest of hymns,

> 'Tis God's all animating voice
> That calls thee from on high;
> 'Tis his own hand presents the prize
> To thine uplifted eye.
> A cloud of witnesses around,
> Hold thee in full survey;
> Forget the steps already trod,
> And upward urge thy way.

Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη—"For noble is the prize, and the hope is great," as Socrates tells us in the Phædon.‖ We may learn even from Plato that our present existence is no vain thing, no

> fleeting show
> For man's illusion given—

according to the mawkish sentimentalism of a modern poet, but a most solemn and dread reality, connected with the whole scheme of the universe, and in which not only man, but angels and devils, powers visible and invisible, are intent and deeply interested actors. "Life, in itself," says Socrates, in the Republic, "may be insignificant, but think you," he continues, "that an immortal thing ought to be concerned, and in earnest for so short a part alone, and not for the whole of its existence"—οἴει οὖν ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ χρόνου οὕτως ὀλίγου μόνον δεῖν ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ. *Lib.* x., 608, E.

PAGE 69, LINE 23. φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη, "Re-

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* Philippians, iii., 14. † Thessalonians, iv., 16.
‡ Revelations, xi., 12. § Ibid., ii., 10. ‖ Phæd., 114, C.

quiring a wonderful watch or vigilance." *Φυλακή* may mean, first, *the act of watching;* or, secondly, *a watch or guard;* or, thirdly, *a state of mind, watchfulness, or vigilance.* Here, perhaps, the first impression would be that it is to be referred to the soul of man. A careful consideration, however, of the whole argument, and especially of what is said, page 72, line 11, compels us to refer the term to the Deity, as intimating the intense interest and watchful care with which God regards the progress of this great battle between Good and Evil.

The precise point of the argument, as a whole, is not obvious without considerable attention; but when that attention is bestowed, it strikes the mind with more force, in consequence of not having been obtruded upon its notice. The substance of it seems to us to be this: those who speak and think of sin as of little moment, and who imagine that God is easily propitiated by their poor offerings, are asked to what class of mere earthly rulers they would liken the Divinities who have charge of us. The absurdity is afterward shown (although somewhat out of its regular place in the argument), of supposing that even these lower guardians could be influenced to do acts injurious to their respective charges, by gifts filched from the very treasury of those to whom they are presented; as though dogs should be seduced to let wolves ravage the flock, by the offering of a small share of the spoils of the robbery, or the governor of a vessel, tempted, by presents of wine and incense from the sailors, to destroy both the ship and them. How much less, then, should it be thought that the Divinities could be induced to be placable to offenders, because they make offerings to them of the very fruit of their own crimes—*ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν.* These considerations being borne in mind, although in part subsequently introduced, and we feel the force of this sublime allusion to the *μάχη ἀθάνατος*—the great strife to

which we are parties, the immense theatre on which we are actors, and the almost infinite relations we bear to the universe of rational and immortal beings. Our actions, therefore, are not unimportant, nor are they, when evil, to be atoned for by any light sacrifice. Moreover, this contest, it should be remembered, is between the powers of Good and Evil. God himself is leading on the one host to the battle, and is personally striving for the victory. There can, therefore, be no neutrality allowed in this warfare, much less any actual taking part with the enemy by those for whose sake, mainly, the contest is waged. On this account, the Deity, by a species of anthropopathy, is represented as exercising the utmost vigilance and circumspection in behalf of a charge so immense, engaged in a conflict and exposed to perils so tremendous. He is compared to the commander of a mighty army, who is ever awake and watching for the slightest irruption of the enemy—

> *Οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα,*
> *ᾧ λαοί τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν.**

In an infinitely higher sense do both the Scriptures and Plato assert the ever-sleepless vigilance of the physical and moral Guardian of the universe: "*He never sleepeth or slumbereth that keepeth Israel.*" "*The eyes of the Lord are in all the earth, beholding the evil and the good.*" It is a struggle of life and death. Resistance is to be made at every point to the advance of the kingdom of darkness. Final triumph is to be secured at every cost. No quarter is to be allowed to the foe, and especially when any of those moral agents, for whom the battle is fought, are guilty of forming an unnatural alliance with the enemy. This constitutes the intrinsic odiousness and wickedness, the exceeding sinfulness of sin. It is treason against the universal Cause of Good. It is direct opposition to the very na-

* Iliad, ii., 24.

ture of God, and a base and treacherous aiding of his malignant foe. When these considerations are kept in mind, we are prepared to feel the force of the concluding declaration, that God will never be propitiated by offerings from unholy men, and to sympathize with Clinias in his passionate burst of indignation at the very thought: Οὐδαμῶς· οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς ὁ λόγος—"By no means; it cannot be; the declaration is never to be tolerated."

LXVII.

Plato's Doctrine of the Δαίμονες, or Genii.

PAGE 69, LINE 2. *Θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες.* There are clearly three distinct grades of superhuman beings presented to us, not only in the theology of Plato, but also in the Grecian mythology as set forth by the poets. These are *Ζεύς*, *Θεοί*, and *Δαίμονες*. *Θεοί*, however, includes both the others, or, rather, we should say, when the first two are mentioned, as in that invocation so common in the poets, Ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοί, the term *θεοί* contains *δαίμονες*; and, again, in such expressions as the above from our text, it includes *Ζεύς*. See the *Timæus*, 41, A.

We have several times alluded to Plato's doctrine of the *Δαίμονες*, or Genii, and would dwell upon it in this place more at length. The passage in which we find the most express and the clearest mention of them is in the Epinomis, or Appendix to The Laws, 984, D.: *μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἑξῆς*, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑΣ, *ἀέριον δὲ γένος ἔχον ἕδραν τρίτην εὐχαῖς τιμᾷν μάλα χρεών, κ. τ. λ.*—"Next to these, and under these, the Genii (as we prefer to render it, because of the bad sense that the New Testament has attached to the word demons), an aërial* race, having the

* According to a division which he makes of all beings below the Supreme Deity, and corresponding to the four states or elements.

third seat, must we honour by prayers." The reader is referred to the entire passage, which is too long for insertion here. They are spoken of as possessing wonderful intelligence, as feeling a deep sympathy in human affairs, as loving the good, hating the bad, and, in consequence of their middle position in the air, acting as interpreters and mediators between God and man. To the same effect Socrates speaks of them in the Symposion, 202, E.: *καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ Δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι Θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ, ἑρμηνεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν. διὰ τούτου ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη· Θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία θεοῖς σὺν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι*—"For the whole demonial race is between God and mortals, acting as interpreters or messengers to both. Through this passes all divination, and the whole prophetical art; for God mingles not directly with the human race, but through these media is ever carried on the intercourse between Heaven and men, both when awake and when asleep." See, also, Apuleius, *De Deo Socratis*, 674: Hos Græci nomine *Δαίμονας* nuncupant, inter terricolas cœlicolasque vectores, hinc precum inde donorum. Compare with the above, Hesiod, Works and Days, 233:

> *ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες*
> *ἀθάνατοι λεύσσουσιν.*
>
> For, close at hand,
> Immortal eyes behold us evermore.

So, also, a few lines below, where he represents the number of these invisible beings as amounting to thirty thousand:

> *Τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ*
> *ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς ΦΥΛΑΚΕΣ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,*
> *ἠέρα ἐσσάμενοι, πάντῃ φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν.*
>
> For thrice ten thousand wait upon our earth;
> Jove's everlasting guards for mortal men,
> Who roam the world in robes of air concealed.

Milton must certainly have had in mind this passage from Hesiod, and perhaps, also, 2 Kings, vi., 17:

> Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,
> Unseen, both when we sleep and when we wake.

In one of Plato's strange myths, which may be found in the fourth book of The Laws, 713, C., the Δαίμονες, or Genii, are represented as having been anciently (in the reign of Saturn) the political governors of mankind, ruling them as man rules the inferior animals. It was intended, probably, to indicate the Divine origin of law and government, in opposition to the absurd paradox that they derive, not only their forms and practical administration, but also their inherent authority, solely from the consent of the governed. It is, however, a paradox which it is difficult to refute by arguments capable of being appreciated by the mass of mankind, and therefore Plato, as is usual with him in such cases, does not surrender the truth, or leave it out of his scheme of legislation, but throws himself back upon an ancient myth. The length of the passage compels us to omit the Greek. On account, however, of its intrinsic value, as exhibiting the origin and ancient mode of presenting certain ideas, a version is given in full: "We have received a tradition of the blessed life of the men of those days, how abundantly and spontaneously it had all things. And this is said to have been the cause of it: Saturn, knowing, as we have related, how that *human nature, in the absolute self-control of human affairs, can never avoid being filled with violence and unrighteousness*, appointed as rulers and magistrates to our cities, not men, but beings of a Divine and nobler race, namely, the Genii. Just as we now conduct towards the flocks and all tame herds, in that we do not constitute oxen as rulers over oxen, nor goats over goats, but we ourselves retain the dominion, the same thing did the Deity, because he was a lover of men. He appointed over us a better race than ourselves, namely, the Δαίμονες; who,

taking the oversight with much ease, both to themselves and us, and giving to us peace, and reverence, and true freedom, and an abundant supply of right and justice, rendered the families of men most blessed, and free from all tumult and sedition. This myth (he proceeds), when accommodated to the truth (*ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος*), or truly interpreted, really means, that in whatever states, not God, but some mere earthly power, has the ultimate sovereignty, there there can be no escape from evils; that we ought, as far as possible, to imitate that mode of life which existed in the time of Saturn; and that, giving earnest heed to whatever *principle of immortality* may yet remain in human institutions, we should, in public and private, administer both our families and our states in accordance with it; naming Law (*νόμον*) the dispensation (*Νοῦ Διανομήν*), or government of Mind or Reason." The specimen of Plato's philology exhibited in this last sentence is poor enough; but the sentiment corresponds precisely to Aristotle's definition of Law, as *Νοῦς ἄνευ ὀρέξεως*, or *Mind without passion.*

We find the same mythical statement in the Politicus, 271, P. 272, A. It may also be connected with the doctrine to which there was an allusion (page 231) as having some support in the Sacred Volume, namely, of guardian or superintending angels having the care of particular nations. As we have already said, this is regarded by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, xi., 26, as maintained in the Septuagint version of Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8—*ὅτε διεμέριζεν Ὁ Ὕψιστος ἔθνη, ὡς διέσπειρεν υἱοὺς Ἀδάμ, ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν* ΑΓΓΕΛΩΝ ΘΕΟΥ—"When the Most High divided the nations, when he dispersed the sons of Adam, he established the boundaries of the nations according to the number of *the angels of God.* But Jacob was the Lord's portion; Israel was the line of his inheritance."

LXVIII.

Beauty and Accuracy of the Ancient and Platonic Division of the Four Cardinal Virtues. Deep Moral Significance of the Four Greek Words, Ἀκολασία, Ἀκρατεία, Ἐγκράτεια, *and* Σωφροσύνη, *as indicating the Four Moral Degrees.*

Page 69, Line 4. σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως: "Righteousness and temperance, or sobriety, with wisdom, save us." There was something very admirable in the ancient classification of the virtues under the four cardinal heads, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and σοφία—*righteousness*, *temperance*, *fortitude* (a term which we use for want of a better), and *wisdom*. A most philosophical analysis of them all may be found in the Republic, lib. iv., commencing 427, P., and continued through several pages. They may be briefly defined thus: Δικαιοσύνη has immediate reference to the duties we owe our fellow beings, although it is used by Plato, in the Republic, in a more extensive sense, for the state of soul from whence all right actions proceed, and in the composition of which all the other virtues do more or less enter. Σωφροσύνη, more properly, relates to duties we owe ourselves, or, according to Plato's favourite allegorical comparison of the soul to a state, δικαιοσύνη would have regard to its foreign relations, σωφροσύνη to its internal police. Ἀνδρεία is that strength of soul or will which gives to all the virtues activity and efficacy. See remarks on ἀνδρεία, Dissertation xliii., p. 257. Σοφία, when ranked among the virtues, is *practical wisdom*, as distinguished from the scientific or speculative moral insight of the mere casuist. It is what Plato elsewhere frequently styles φρόνησις—a wisdom—not grounded on scientific calculations of utility deduced from antecedents and consequents, but rather an innate perception of right, the result of a pure heart clearing the under-

standing; being, in fact, a *sense* or *taste*, rather than *science* In its highest import, it would be an innate discernment of our relations to God and the universe, and the same with the Scripture Σοφία.

Cicero has attempted the same distinctions of the four cardinal virtues, without the names, in his Offices, lib. i., 5. He most clearly imitates Plato. Sed omne, quod est honestum, id *quatuor* partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur; aut in hominum societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum contractarum fide; aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine et robore; aut in omnium quæ fiunt, quæque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quæ quatuor, quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur.

The etymology of this beautiful word σωφροσύνη is put before us in this very passage from our text: σωφροσύνη ΣΩΖΕΙ. It is clearly from σόω, σόος, σώζω, and φρήν, φρόν; and would, accordingly, signify *the saving or healing virtue of the soul, soundness of the spirit or spiritual health*, in distinction from that *dissipation, corruption*, or *internal war* which is the result of the opposite.

The division into what are styled the four cardinal virtues may be regarded as made κατὰ ποιότητα, in respect to quality. There is another arrangement, which, to use a term of Aristotle, is made κατὰ ποσότητα, in respect to quantity. This expresses what may be styled *the moral degrees*, ascending, by way of climax, from the lowest stage, or total privation of all virtue, to the highest condition, or perfect health of the soul. They are represented by four Greek terms, namely, ἀκολασία, ἀκρατεία, ἐγκράτεια, and σωφροσύνη. The etymological analysis alone of these words contains, in itself, volumes of morality of a purer and more practical kind than is to be found in many a frigid treatise of modern casuistry. The first of two them, as

Aristotle tells us, *Ethic. Nicomach.*, vii., 1, belong to the domain of vice, the last two to that of virtue. According to another classification, the two extremes denote respectively the *perfection* of moral excellence and of moral depravity, the complete separation* of all heterogeneous elements from both, or, in other words, the *purely* wicked and the *purely* virtuous; while the two means would represent those mixed states wherein the one or the other moral quality may have a temporary superiority, yet neither can be said to be *triumphant*.

'Ακολασία (*from α, privative*, and *κόλασις*, *restraint*) would denote uncontrolled licentiousness—the *Νοῦς* (to use Plato's anthropological division) in utter darkness, the *θυμὸς* in complete subjection to the *ἐπιθυμία*; or, in other words, the will not simply overpowered, but the consenting slave of appetite and lust. Compare Plato's description of the *δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ*, or the man whose soul is a perfect democracy of ungoverned propensities, *Republic*, lib. viii., 559, 560. Such a character *is free to sin*; or, to adopt a mode of speech directly opposite, yet equally correct, he is *bound* in the iron chain of that *free will*† for which some so strenuously contend as the highest prerogative of man, a will which is its own tyrant, cursed with its own *self*-determining power, and utterly unrestrained by any fear of man, or any grace of God.

'Ακρατεία is want of moral power. The soul is awaking, and has some sense of its bondage. It feels the chain which

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* See Remarks on the two senses of the word *ἅγιος*, p. 322, 323, and note.

† All the seeming paradoxes and contradictions connected with this expression arise from the different points of view from whence the subject is contemplated. See Romans, vi., 20, *ὅτε γὰρ δοῦλοι ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, κ. τ. λ.* "For when ye were the *servants* of sin ye were *free* from righteousness, but now, being *freed* from sin, and having become *subject* to God," &c.

the first character mistakes for freedom. The rational will is overpowered, but unreconciled to its degradation, and struggling feebly against it.

Ἐγκράτεια, *temperance*, or *inward power*, would denote the rational will a conqueror, yet holding the sceptre over a turbulent and rebellious foe ever seeking to regain the supremacy, and requiring constant watchfulness and restraint.

Σωφροσύνη is the spiritual Hygeia, and signifies the will not only superior, but *triumphant*—in perfect harmony with the reason, and presiding, with ever-unresisted sway, over appetites and propensities in cheerful submission to its true and rational authority. In its highest Platonic sense it is the *spirit healed*—in harmony with itself, and only falling short of the Scriptural idea of *harmony with Heaven.*

Such are the thoughts suggested by the very terms, a faint outline of which may be found in Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicomach.*, lib. vii., c. i., 5, 6, c. ix. Almost, if not quite, all the words derived from φρήν (φρον), such as φρόνησις, φρόνιμος, σώφρων, σωφροσύνη, φρονέω, although generally rendered *wise*, *wisdom*, *prudentia*, &c., partake more of a moral than of an intellectual quality, or, rather, may be said to express a combination of both. They refer to what may be styled *practical wisdom*, in distinction from *speculative knowledge* even of the science of morals. This moral wisdom formed a peculiar trait both in the life and philosophy of Socrates. Xenophon has most admirably said of him, Σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, *Memorabilia*, iii., 9

LXIX.

Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases. Comparison of Passages from the New Testament.

PAGE 70, LINE 2. *πείθουσι θωπείαις λόγων*—"*Would* persuade by flatteries." We thus render, because the context, in this place, requires it, and because other examples justify us in thus sometimes taking the indicative mode subjectively, as expressing *desire*, *disposition*, *tendency*, or nature of a thing—what it ought to do, or *would* do, rather than what it actually does; thus seeming to occupy the place of the subjunctive. This is probably the case, to some extent, in all languages, and there is no great difficulty in determining by the context when it is thus employed. The usage occurs a number of times in the New Testament, as, for example, John, 1st Epist., iii., 9: *πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ*—*Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin;* that is, it is not his nature, tendency, or disposition—*he would not sin.* A much clearer example, and one about which there can be no question, although very similar to the preceding, may be found, Romans, ii., 4: *ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοιάν σε ἄγει*—*not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance.* Such is its tendency or nature, that is, what it *would* do, although wicked men often furnish the most striking proof that the actual effect does not always take place. Compare, also, Mark, xiv., 21: *καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ*—*It would have been better for him*, &c.; 2 Peter, ii., 21: *κρεῖττον ἦν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐπεγνωκέναι*—*It would have been better for them not to have known*, &c.

LXX.

Use of the Word Πλεονεξία. *Aristotle's Distinction between Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality.*

PAGE 71, LINE 4. *πλεονεξίαν.* This is a very general term, and, although usually rendered *covetousness* wherever it occurs in the New Testament, may be applied to any case in which one seeks to have more than others, be it in respect to wealth, worldly honours, or sensual enjoyment. Plato, as well as the Scriptures, would place them all in the same low scale, and regard the passion, whatever may be its immediate object, as in all cases alike opposed to the harmony of the universe; that is, to the good of the whole, the good of the parts, the good of the individual who exercises the feeling, besides being intrinsically, or irrespective of consequences, an evil, and a disease in the spirit. It comprehends all that is included under our term *ambition*, and, when directed to personal distinction, is pre-eminently "*a lust of the mind*," in distinction from those bodily propensities which some moralists would regard as the only sources of sin.

Plato here compares it to a *plethora*, or a tendency in one member to absorb into itself more than its share of what belongs to the whole body: *τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον.* We may call it, generally, a violation of the law of equality; not simply of that *arithmetical equality* which would reduce all ranks of being, be it angels, men, or the lower animals, to the same undistinguishing level, but of that *geometrical equality* without which harmony could not exist, or would become only a dead and monotonous unison. A violation of this equality would consist in the desire or tendency of any member to grow out of its natural proportions. Those who have it may call it a lofty ambition; the Scriptures, however, and

true philosophy, represent it as a low and selfish passion, utterly blind to that infinitely nobler sentiment which, while it causes the soul to acquiesce, and even rejoice in ranks and distinctions, as necessary parts of the Divine scheme, yet enables it to lose sight of them all in its aspirations after "that honour which cometh from God only."

For the distinction alluded to between *arithmetical* and *geometrical* equality, or *ἰσότης* (from which, we can hardly help thinking, comes the Latin *jus*, *justus*, *justitia*), see Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicomach.*, lib. v., c. iii. and iv.; also, the sixth book of The Laws, 757, A., at the passage commencing, *δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν.*

LXXI.

Impiety and Folly of Attempting to Bribe Heaven.

Page 71, Line 11. *ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ.* Ἀδικημάτων is an elliptical expression, and may be rendered, *of the fruit of their wrong doings.* There cannot be a baser conception than this, that God could be bribed by a share of the product of iniquity; and yet, in all ages of the world, and under all religions, men have been both weak enough and wicked enough to entertain it; that is, if they can disguise it under some delusive name and appearance, since, in its gross, naked form, it would revolt even the most brutish soul. Instead of making clean hands and a clean breast by giving up the gains of iniquity, we often find men, even in Christian lands, endeavouring to make atonement, and to purchase ease of conscience, by devoting a part of their ill-gotten wealth to religious uses. How indignantly, in the fourth book of The Laws, does Plato repudiate the very thought that God, or even a good man, can receive gifts from the wicked: *παρὰ δὲ μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτ' ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε Θεόν ἐστί ποτε τόγε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι.*

μάτην οὖν περὶ θεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, 717, A. Compare Cicero, De Legibus, lib. ii., 41: Donis impii ne placare audeant Deos: Platonem audiant, qui vetat dubitare qua sit mente futurus Deus, quum nemo bonus ab improbo se donare velit. Also, Plautus, Rudens:

> Atque hoc scelesti in animum inducunt suum,
> Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis;
> Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia
> Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicii.

To refer to all the passages in the Scriptures where the same sentiment is strongly expressed would be to quote no small portion of the Sacred Volume. *I will not receive a bullock from thine house, nor goats from thy fold; for all the beasts of the wood are mine, the cattle upon a thousand hills. Psalm* l., 9. *Bring no more vain oblations; your incense is an abomination unto me. Isaiah*, i., 13. Nothing could be more absurd than to suppose that, by such declarations, the God both of the Old and New Testament meant to undervalue his own most solemnly-appointed institution of sacrifice. It is most clear that he intended, rather, to guard it, by denouncing, in most indignant terms, that gross abuse which would pervert the *ritual avowal of the need of expiation*, and the ritual acknowledgment of the Great Atonement through its type, into the miserable conception of a bribe to the Almighty—an offering of flesh and fat as to a hungry Baal. And yet this is the only view which some, who would be styled theologians, can take of this institution, so ancient and so universal, not only as it regards the heathen nations, but even in respect to those who were expressly taught of God.

The sentiment which we have quoted from Cicero and Plautus is most admirably expressed by Shakspeare. Nothing can be finer than the contrast he presents between Divine Justice and the imperfections of human courts. It is also rendered peculiarly striking by being put into the mouth of the guilty King of Denmark:

Forgive me my foul murder!
That cannot be; since I am still possessed
Of those effects for which I did the murder,
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen.
May one be pardoned, and retain the offence?
In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice;
And oft 'tis seen, the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law. But 'tis not so above.
There is no shuffling; there the action lies
In its true nature; and we ourselves compelled,
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults,
To give in evidence.—*Hamlet, Act III.*

LXXII.

Different Species of Atheists. Morality of Atheists not Founded on Principle. First Species, styled δίκαιος by Plato, and invested by him with too good a Character. Second Species, the Magician or Juggler. The Atheist often in Secret the Victim of Superstition. Hobbes. The Ironical Species of Atheist, a character peculiar to the Ancient World. Elymas the Sorcerer. Simon Magus. Apollonius of Tyanea.

Page 78, Line 4. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ, κ. τ. λ.* This is the first and most harmless kind of atheist, the one who, although honest and just in his private relations, does not hesitate boldly to avow his atheism in speaking against religion with its oaths and rites, while, at the same time, he ridicules those who respect them. Such a one Plato thinks may have a dislike for wrong doing (*τῷ δυσχεραίνειν*, page 77, line 7), that is, a dislike founded on habit, prejudice, or an early bias of the mind, remaining in spite of his atheism; for the *δίκαιον ἦθος* he is there represented as possessing could not be the result of anything like principle, seeing he rejects the *principium* of all morals and all law in denying the existence of a Deity. That such indi-

viduals may be found here and there in the midst of a society holding to a different belief, may, perhaps, be admitted. Their virtue, however, is only the effect of outward pressure. How long anything like morality would remain in a nation of atheists is a question of far more fearful magnitude. Although the experiment has never yet been fully tried, there can be but little doubt as to what would be the horrid result.

We can hardly help thinking that Plato, in what is said page 77, line 5, has given altogether too good a character to this man. Such persons may be found putting on a show of morality, and making their lives a lie for the sake of giving support to the falsehood of their creed, yet still, it is exceedingly difficult for them to disguise their deep hatred of all who are righteous from religious principle. This, however, was probably less apparent in Plato's time. Christianity has brought out many a malignant trait in the human character, which, although deep seated in the heart, never made its appearance in the dusky twilight of the heathen systems of religion. Notwithstanding the laboured chapters of Gibbon, he who reads human nature in the light of the New Testament will have little difficulty in understanding why, Christianity kindled such a flame of persecution on its first entrance into the world, or in realizing the truth of Christ's declaration, that he "came, not to send peace upon the earth, but a sword."

Page 78, Line 8. *ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων μὲν . . . . . εὐφυὴς δὲ, κ. τ. λ.* This is a very different character from the other. He has no ambition to be thought above vulgar prejudices. His grand object is to turn to the best account, in promoting his own interests, the prejudices and the superstitions of other men. Hence he carefully conceals his atheism, while he makes the most abominable abuse of the religious fears of mankind. Having none of that fear of the invisible which would deter ordinary men, he resolves upon playing a bold

game in the assumed character of fanatic, magician, conjurer, fortune-teller, oracle-monger (a character, as we learn from Aristophanes, quite common among the Athenians), Sophist, public lecturer, or whatever may best suit his unholy purposes. It is on this account he is styled εὐφυής, *acriori ingenio præditus, a man of great resources*, having a nature well adapted to any scheme of impiety. Sometimes, however, the character may not be all affected. Gross as is the apparent inconsistency, atheism is often found connected with superstition. The absence of the fear of God may sometimes give rise to most alarming fears of a devil. The religious instinct, to which atheism has done violence, but has not been wholly able to destroy, may yet live in the most painful terrors of a superstitious and darkened imagination. The soul of man must have, in some way, its supernatural world It cannot long endure the desolating void of atheism, and would even find relief in the most horrid imaginings of malevolent superhuman powers. It must believe in something stronger and higher than itself. Hence, if a God is denied, the moral vacuum must be filled with some personification of Fate, Fortune, or Destiny, or peopled with the Gorgons and Chimæras of a diseased and troubled fancy. See page 133, where we have shown that the atheist, even on his own theory, has no security against an unknown world of horrible superhuman beings.

No man ever furnished a stronger proof of the truth of these positions than Hobbes. However seemingly bold he may have been in his writings, we are told on the best authority* that during a large portion of his life he was in

* Vide Bayle's Dictionary, vol. iii., 471, N. Bayle loved sometimes to expose the skeptic as well as to sneer at the believer, and he says, most justly, that "the principles of philosophy (meaning materialism) are not sufficient to rid a man of the fear of apparitions; for, to reason consequentially, there are no philosophers who have less right to reject magic and sorcery than the atheists."

constant terror of ghosts and hobgoblins, and that he could never sleep without a light burning in his chamber; not daring to trust himself to that darkness which presented so true a picture of his own depraved and gloomy mind.

Page 78, Line 15. *τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν.* The first impression would be that this refers to the first character, who is described as ridiculing (*καταγελῶν*, line 6) and making a mock of sacred things. It is clear, however, that a more serious and develish kind of irony is intended. It is the irony of the laughing and juggling fiend, secretly triumphing in the ruin which he is accomplishing in weak and wicked human nature. The second character is undoubtedly meant—*ὁ δόλου καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης*—"the man full of guile and stratagem." Nothing could more perfectly correspond to some parts of Plato's representation, than the description of that magician and false prophet who is mentioned, Acts, xiii., 6, 10, under the name of Elymas the Sorcerer, and whom Paul addresses in a style remarkably similar, in some of its terms, to that which is here used: *Ὦ πλήρης παντὸς δόλου καὶ πάσης ῥᾳδιουργίας, υἱὲ Διαβόλου, ἐχθρὲ πάσης δικαιοσύνης.*

We can hardly appreciate, at the present day, the description of this character, as given by Paul and Plato; but there can be no doubt that heathenism furnished many an example, exhibiting a hideousness of depravity of which it is now difficult to form a conception. It was a character which combined, in their most revolting forms, the boldest and most Heaven-daring atheism with all the *devilism* (if we may use such a term) that existed in some of the most horrid rites of the heathen religions. Most faithfully drawn specimens of these last productions of the expiring reign of Satan may be found in two tracts of Lucian; one entitled The History of Alexander, and the other, The Death of Peregrinus. The first was a follower of the famous Apollonius Tyanæus, who has often been blasphe-

mously compared by infidels to our Saviour, and who himself exhibited, in a most remarkable degree, this abominable combination of transcendental sophistry, mystic pantheism or disguised atheism, and Satanic magic. Whether this last was wholly pretended, or to what extent it may have been real, it is very difficult now to determine.

LXXIII.

The Nightly Conference, or Areopagus, of Plato's State. The Athenian Areopagus.

PAGE 79, LINE 7. *οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου κοινωνοῦντες.* As far as we can recollect, no description of this body, styled The Nightly Conference, is given in any of the preceding books of this dialogue. The reader, however, will find its composition and offices subsequently set forth in the twelfth book of The Laws, 961, A., B. It was to be formed by a careful selection from the body of the magistrates, and of those who had travelled abroad for the purpose of learning the morals and legislation of foreign lands, together with some of the more choice young men who might be thought worthy of so distinguishing an honour. This court, which he styles the anchor of the state, was to assemble very early, either at, or just preceding, daybreak; a season which, besides presenting the most leisure from other necessary employments, was also most favourable to clear thought, and calm, impartial deliberation.

In a subsequent part of the twelfth book (968, B.) it is again spoken of under the same title. It is not expressly mentioned, we think, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to the Laws, and yet the whole of that obscure book seems to be intended to point out a peculiar mode of education for the members of this conference, and a certain higher philosophy, into which, as into sacred mysteries, they were to be

initiated before they could enter upon this most responsible trust. Perhaps in this Plato hoped to realize one of the dreams of the Republic, namely, that union of the characters of the statesman and the philosopher, in the combination of which he found the perfection of the political structure.

This body was intended to unite civil with religious and spiritual functions. It was to be the high ecclesiastical court of equity and conscience. The members were not only to perform the duties of judicial magistrates, but also of public censors. They had, besides, the still more sacred and spiritual office of counsellors and instructers to those who were undergoing the discipline of the *Sophronisterion*, but had not yet been sent to the prison of the incurable; thus acting, in short, not only as judges, but also as chaplains and ghostly advisers of the wretched criminals, especially of such despisers of God and blasphemers of Providence as the characters treated of in this book. In addition to all this, they were intrusted with the censorship of the laws themselves.

In this court or conference, Plato seems to have had in his mind the Athenian Areopagus, which, in like manner, was the guardian of the laws and public morals. It was also of a religious nature, and was regarded with so much religious awe that, as Æschines informs us, it was not allowed for any one to laugh within its precincts.

LXXIV.

Common Law against all Private Religions. Examination of Plato's Doctrine in respect to Changes in the Public Worship and Religion of the State.

PAGE 81, LINE 5. *κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον, κ. τ. λ.* The law here set forth was intended not only for the three kinds of offenders which have been mentioned,

but for all the people of the state. It was to be a law of *prevention*, intended to reach the origin of the evil, namely, that private superstition which led weak men and women (*γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας πάντας*) to have private chapels and rites of their own, while they neglected the administrations of the public temples and altars. This seems, in Plato's time, to have been carried to a great extent, and to have produced, and been produced by, the very class of atheists against whom he has been legislating; especially those of the third division, who held that God was easily propitiated by peculiar rites and offerings. These men were also interpreters of dreams, expounders of omens, and, in short, the priesthood of a private superstition, which became more extensive and more iniquitous in proportion as it shunned the notice of the legal guardians of the public religion. To prevent this evil, with its irreligious and demoralizing consequences, this law was to be established for the common weal—*ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω.*

The same law is given by Cicero in his treatise De Legibus, lib. ii., 8, as cited from the twelve tables: Separatim nemo habessit Deos; neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto. Clemens Alexandrinus refers with approbation to this law of Plato,* although there can be no doubt that the similar statute in Rome was the proximate, if not the remote, exciting cause of the cruel persecution Christianity had to undergo as, at first, a foreign, and, in a great measure, a private religion. There was, however, one most beautiful species of family religion, which Plato not only allowed in his scheme of legislation, but even encouraged by the warmest commendation. We allude to the sacred domestic altar, which he would have dedicated to the paternal and filial affections, and to the worship of the aged living parent or grandparent, as the

* Stromata, lib. v., 584, D.

best representation of the invisible God. See remarks on the passages referred to, Dissertation I., pages 88, 89.

PAGE 81, LINE 15. *ἱερὰ καὶ θεοὺς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾷν τὸ τοιοῦτον*—"It is no easy thing, or it is no small matter, to establish (or consecrate) chapels and Divinities. Such a work requires no ordinary intelligence." The phrase *ἱδρύεσθαι ἱερὰ καὶ θεοὺς* may be taken generally for the introduction of new religious rites and the adoration of new Divinities. The primary reference is to private innovation, but it has respect, likewise, to all changes attempted in the public worship, either by private individuals or by magistrates. We may compare with this a passage from the fifth book of The Laws, 738, D.: *περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν ἅττα τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοις ἱδρύσθαι δεῖ, οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρήσει κινεῖν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅσα ἐκ Δελφῶν, ἢ Δωδώνης, ἢ παρ' Ἄμμωνος, ἤ τινες ἔπεισαν παλαιοὶ λόγοι, φασμάτων γενομένων, ἢ ἐπιπνοίας λεχθείσης θεῶν*—"In respect to the Gods and sacred things and places, &c., no one who has reason should attempt to change or unsettle anything which has come from Delphos, or Dodona, or Ammon, or which ancient traditions have recommended to us on the authority of supernatural appearances, or of a Divine afflatus or inspiration." In another place (Laws, vi., 772, D.) he condemns all innovation in religion, or in any of the fundamental laws of the state, unless there shall be the threefold consent, first, of all the magistrates; secondly, of all the people (by which he means, at least, a large majority); and, thirdly, of all the oracles of the Gods: *πάσας μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ ξυμβούλους, πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον, καὶ πάσας θεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας· ἐὰν συμφωνῶσι πάντες, οὕτω κινεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μηδέποτε μηδαμῶς.*

When we regard Plato as without any special revelation from Heaven, or any Divine commission to change the religion of his country, we cannot severely condemn his

solicitude in this matter. He may have wished to preserve all the forms of religion, and yet have been influenced by a sincere and earnest desire to introduce a thorough reformation into its spirit. He had not the experience of a thousand years, such as is now spread before us in the history of the Christian Church, to convince him that this thing was impossible. We, however, with such a special revelation in our hands, cannot approve the doctrine or the law here laid down, however much we may respect the motive which gave rise to it in his peculiar circumstances.* The Oxford theologians would hail Plato as inculcating here their favourite dogma of authority and tradition. Professor Sewal, of that University, has made every effort to turn his language to such a use, sometimes with a tolerable degree of fairness, and sometimes by giving to Plato a sense of which he never dreamed ; although we do not think that the professor has ever referred to the passage before us. Every attempt, however, to bring to their aid the divine philosopher of Greece must fail them, when it is remembered that to him tradition was *all* the revelation he possessed, and that when this tradition became corrupted, he had no higher standard (such as we possess) by which he might correct it. How much he would have prized such a special *written* revelation, and how joyfully he would have put away from him any inferior guide, may be learned from his famous declaration in the second Alcibiades : "That we must wait patiently until some one, either a God, or some inspired man, teach us our moral and religious duties, and, as Pallas, in Homer, did to Diomed, remove the darkness from our eyes"—*ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελεῖν. Alcibiades*, ii., 150, D. A like inference may be drawn from that most remarkable passage in the Republic, where he indulges the

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* See a more extended discussion of this subject, *Diss.* v., p. 102, x., 116, and Note 13, page 6.

hope that the true heavenly philosophy (*ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινὴ φιλοσοφία*), and a people in possession of it as a gift from above, either had existed in the immense past time, or might *now exist in some obscure part of the Barbarian or Oriental land*—(*ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ πόῤῥω που ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως*), or might at some future period be revealed to the rest of the human race. Lib. vi., 499, B. Can we suppose that he would have preferred his myths and his traditions, had he known assuredly that just such a people, with just such a Heaven-inspired philosophy, then existed in the mountains of the barbarian Judea, and that it had been most solemnly declared, even then, that "*A Law should go forth from Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem.*"*

Without fearing at all for our Protestantism, we may indeed admit, as Plato says, that it is a most important matter to establish new religious rites, or to attempt a change in religious doctrines or modes of worship which have long prevailed, and which, even when most erroneous, can seldom be suddenly and violently taken away without danger, to say the least, of tearing up something which may be vital to the soul. The sentiment of Plato may have some truth, even in reference to times and countries possessing a permanent revelation from God, and to which resort may be had in bringing men back from those deviations from it which are the natural results of human depravity. Admitting that there are such seasons when doctrine and worship must be reformed, and when private men under the general, if not special, revelation may be regarded as lawfully called to engage in this most responsible work, still may we say, with Plato, that it does, indeed, require no ordinary intelligence. Such occasions call for souls of the highest order—*τῆς μεγίστης διανοίας*—and no vulgar instrument,

* Isaiah, ii., 3.

no brawling, fanatical reformer should be regarded as Heaven's agent in so solemn an undertaking. When such men as Luther and Calvin arise, it is not easy to mistake the evidences of their peculiar mission, or their fitness for the great work to which they are called.

LXXV.

Belief in Apparitions, Ghosts, Spectres, Dreams, &c., the same in all Ages.

PAGE 82, LINE 2. *ἔν τε φάσμασιν ἐγρηγορότας διὰ φόβους καὶ ἐν ὀνείροις*—"Startled, when awake, by apparitions, and in sleep by dreams." Nothing would present a more interesting subject of investigation than the nature and extent of the ancient belief in ghosts and apparitions. That it prevailed extensively, that it was most deeply rooted, and that it had existed from the most remote antiquity, is beyond all doubt. If ever there was a doctrine of which it could be said that it was held *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, this is one. There can be no greater mistake than to suppose that this is a consequence of Christianity, and that its revelations of the spiritual world have quickened the imagination to impressions and terrors unknown to the ancient times. The belief in ghosts and supernatural appearances is as old as the belief in a hell, or in any existence after death, and all of them may be traced back to a period where profane history wholly fails us. It was the creed alike of Jew and Gentile, of the East and the West, of Greek, Chaldean, and Idumean. The account of Saul and the Witch of Endor incidentally discloses the extent and depth of the common Jewish belief in the ghostly world, and that, too, much more strongly than would have been done by any express declarations. Whatever may be thought of the silence of the Old Testament in other parts, the fact of a nu-

merous and well-known class of persons, whose profession it was to maintain intercourse with the dead, whether such intercourse was deceptive or not, does prove, beyond all cavil, that the ancient Israelites were no Sadducees, and that, if they did not get their belief in a spiritual world from Moses, they must have derived it from some still more ancient source common to all mankind.

That it existed as a part of the patriarchal religion, we have direct evidence from the vision of Eliphaz, Job, iv., 13: *A spirit* (a *φάσμα*) *stood before my face.* The manner in which the appearance of this ghost is described, bears a striking resemblance to all representations of the kind in ancient or in modern times. The *φάσμα*, or shadowy appearance under which the mind is always led to contemplate the departed yet restless soul—the changing and flitting motion, so admirably expressed by the Hebrew יַחֲלֹף, the formless form, the silence, and the voice, present the same marked features that are to be found in almost all ghostly narrations. It is not spoken of as a phenomenon until then unknown, but as something in the possibility of which all his hearers are supposed to believe. It is no answer to say it was a dream. How came the nightly world of the imagination to be peopled with representations from an unseen state, if a belief did not universally prevail which brought such representations before the soul? As an example far less sublime than this, but with many of the same points of resemblance, we may cite the apparition of the shade of Patroclus to Achilles, as described in the twenty-third book of the Iliad, v. 100:

> *ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἠΰτε καπνός,*
> *ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα. ταφὼν δ' ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς,*
> *χερσί τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος δ' ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν·*
> *Ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν*
> *ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον· ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν.*

We may sometimes find ancient accounts of this kind

that may compare with any of the narratives of the Middle Ages. Take, for example, Plato's myth at the end of the tenth book of the Republic. His wild and fiery beings (*ἄγριοι καὶ διάπυροι*), that torment the wicked, one might almost suppose had been copied from some saint's legend. When Socrates tells us, in the Phædon, of the ghosts that haunt the tombs and monuments — *σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα οἷα παρέχονται τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι—the shades of the impure departed*—we might almost fancy it the language of some German ballad. The story of the apparition which so solemnly summoned Brutus to his last meeting at Philippi presents another striking instance of the same kind. A still more remarkable case is recorded by the younger Pliny (*Epistolæ*, lib. vii., 27), of a frightful spectre which appeared in a certain house at Athens. The details are given with such an air of truth and sobriety, that we cannot help thinking that the writer, materialist as he was, did really believe it, or, at least, was seriously affected by the account. It is, however, mainly interesting, by reason of its presenting features so very much resembling some of those that are to be found in the ghost stories of modern times. The old, spacious, deserted, and suspected house; the clanking of chains, first faintly heard at a distance, and becoming louder and louder as the spectre approaches at the dread hour of midnight; the silent and fixed position; the waving of the hand; the pointing with the finger; the motion to follow; the solemn tread with which the apparition leads the spectator through the lonely passages of the building until it finally disappears in the courtyard, and the result, which the reader of modern legends can almost anticipate, namely, the finding the bones of a murdered man, as they are dug up in the very spot where it had vanished—all these are of such a nature as to make us feel for a moment as though, instead of reading Pliny and a story of the ancient Athens, we had actu-

ally been occupied with some of the wild creations of Shakspeare's fancy in Hamlet or King Richard the Third. Whatever may be thought of its truth, it is of value as showing that the imagination, in all ages of the world, has been filled with the same images, and that there must be some deep ground of reality to which all such incidents, however deceptive in outward appearances, are to be referred.

How much even the Epicurean age of Horace was affected by these preternatural terrors, may be learned from the great variety of frightful names he presents in two lines of one of his Epistles, in which he would describe a mind raised above the superstitious imaginings of the multitude; although, from some evidences he has left us, it was not a state to which he himself could lay claim:

> Caret mortis formidine et ira?
> Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
> Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala, rides?
> *Hor., Epist.*, lib. ii., 2, 206.

Φάσμα is nearly, if not quite, synonymous with *φάντασμα*. The latter term is the one employed in the New Testament, Matthew, xiv., 26; Mark, vi., 49. In another passage, to express the same idea, the word *πνεῦμα* is used; as where Christ says, *A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have.* Although he asserts that he himself appears in his risen body, yet, at the same time, he seems clearly to sanction the belief in the existence of ghosts or spirits, and to treat it as a well-known fact. We cannot bear, in this passage, the doctrine of accommodation. Let any one think for a moment of those solemn circumstances which so strongly demanded the utmost sincerity and truth on this very point. Would Christ have used such language to his anxiously-inquiring disciples, after having himself just returned from the world of spirits, if their belief had been a mere popular delusion? Would he thus have trifled with

them, while their minds were intent upon the solemn realities of the spiritual state, and occupied with those thoughts which were suggested by his own death and resurrection? If, under these circumstances, he spoke the language of accommodation to a false belief, we know not when and where we may expect the literal truth.

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